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German Naval Staff 
Operations Division 




JUL 25 1950 

y nurofeer / ' / 




jUff 1972, .SUBJS 

_ . jKDS 

OCTOBER, 1943 id 


German Naval Staff 

ODerations Division 



Part A 

Vol. 50 






(Operations Division) 

October 19^3 

Chief, Naval Staff: Grand Admiral Doenitz 

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff Vice Admiral Melsel 

Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff Rear Admiral Wagner 

A Volume: 50 

Begun: 1 Oct. 194;? 
Closed: 51 Oct. 1943 


Washington, D. C. 


1. The Office of Naval Intelligence has undertaken to 
translate important parts of the War Diary of the German 
Naval Staff. The present volume, entitled War Diary of 
th e German Naval Staffm Operations Divis i on, Part A, 
Volume 50 is the twenty-sixth one of 'the series to appear. 
Other volumes will follow shortly. 

2. The War Diaries, Part A, are important because they 
contain a day by day summary of the information available 
to the German Naval Staff and the decisions reached on the 
basis thereof. Together with the Fuehrer Conferences on 
M atters Dealing with the German Navy, 1939-1945 , which have 
been published by this office, the War Diaries should provide 
valuable material for the study of naval problems arising 
from total war. The War Diary, Part A, is also a useful 
index to the German Naval Archives of World War II; 
references may be found in the microfilm library of Naval . 
Records and History. 

3. Due to the cost of publication, only a limited number of 
copies could be made; it is therefore desirable that the 
copies which may have been distributed are available to 
other offices which may be interested. 

Washington, D. C. 


1 Oct.. 19*0 CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Politics 1 Importance ■ ■■'< 

According to British and Airier i'cair^press' reports ,-•• the. U. .3.;..., ."' 
Senate has postponed the debate on the Fulbright resolution 
suggestion U. S. participation in maintaining peace after 
the "war. It is- apparent that- a crisis will arise regarding 
the conference. The U. S. Government has expressed the 
•wish, to meet in London instead of going to Moscow as arrang- 
ed/ apparently to make it possible for 72 year- old Secretary 
of State Hull to attend- Evidently. the Russians have not yet' 
agreed. As regards the agenda of the conference, British and 
American opinions -are divergent. ."The Times" writes appre- 
hensively that an alliance between the Americans and British 
alone Is one Ideology and that the world security can only 
be built up on a foundation of British, American' and Russian' 
unity. It is evident that U. S. policy does not follow the 
Russian trendto the extent still regarded necessary in London 
at present. The differences which are usual and natural in 
such a war coalition are anyway quite evident at the moment' 
and require most careful observation. These differences will, 
however, still not be great enough to warrant any hope .of .a. ... 
spontaneous relaxation of enemy pressure on us - either' 
politically or strategically. It remains to be seen to. what;"- 
extent any clear picture of the actual diplomatic and polit- 
ical game can be- gained from press reports and other sources 
of information, diplomatic included, even with a greater -in- 
sight into these than Naval Staff has. The degree to which 
the Foreign office and Priced Forces High Command are success- 
ful in this is not known, since the supreme, commands are' 
given no information or orientation. It' is therefore only ' 
possible with difficulty to obta in satisfactory recognition 
of the special experiences ga ined from the individual sectors, 
for example the naval officer's specific outlook, which is de- 
tached from matters Continental* By reason of its nature this 
cannot be restricted to purely military matters. What lends 
special interest for the near future to the factors above • 
.indicated within enemy coalition, is the reciprocal effect 
of politics and "warfare. The question of the so-called 
Second Front in Europe has a political aspect.' which is... : '....'■ 
just as important as its military one. The same applies to 
the enemy's strategic plan in the Mediterranean, particularly 
with regard to the Balkans and the Near East In view of 
this reciprocal effect In. the. political and military game 
.it is understandable If Nava.l. Staff is anxious to concern - 
'itself with the problems of warfare as a whole and that 
the limited opportunity in this respect is felt to a certain 
extent as shortcoming. 

According to Reuter, the-Badoglio Government has been re- 
formed. General Ambrosio has been' appointed Chief of General 
Staff, •'Roatte/ Chief.. of the Army Staff, Admiral De Courten, 
Secretary of Navy, Genera l,Sandelli Secretary for Air. 
According to "Exchange", Italy will' soon be regarded 'as- a- 
"co-belligerent state". 

.'■.•'.•.", :",v, r l r ^ CONFIDENTIAL- 


Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff 

I. Army Situation : 

In the southern part of the eastern front a full 
defensive success was scored in the Melitopol sector against 
a heavy enemy attack. The battles for the Dnieper bridgeheads 
continue vith fluctuating success. Positions on the contemplat' 
ed "East Wall" line have now been taken up from the s:uth as 
far as Gomel. In the Smolensk sector heavy ebemy pressure 
inflicted considerable losses on our forces. The Russians are 
throwing in their men regardless of the cost. In Italjy and 
the Balkans the situation is more or less unchanged. 

II. Chief, Naval Staff announces that the Fuehrer- 
wishes monitors to be improvised for the defense of the Iron 

Chief, Operations Division reports that the defense assign- 
ment is already being carried out by parts of the Danube 
Flotilla. Group South will be requested to investigate the 
possible strengthening of defense b;v bringing up naval 
landing craft. Chief, Naval Staff orders that Admiral, 
Fuehrer Headquarters be advised accordingly for today's 
situation report. 

III. Chief, Naval Staff enquires regarding the state 
of anti-aircraft defenses at Gdynia and the possibilities of 
imm.ediate measures to increase them. The present .re infer cement 
by 12.8 cm guns will still take many weeks owing to the 
constuction of emplacements. Quartermaster General does not 
consider the transfer of 8.8 cm. mobile anti-aircraft 
batteries from Brest worthwhile, as their caliber is not 
effective. This matter will be investigated further. 

IV. Chie f, Organizations and Mobilization Branch," 

Quartermaster Division reports that Commanding Admiral, Group 
South has again drawn attention to the considerable difficult- 
ies in administration resulting from the withdrawal of 

Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic from the sphere of 
Admiral, Adriatic. Armed Forces High Command has now withdrawn 
its objections to the difference in the area boundaries, as 
far as naval control makes it necessary. With the exception of 
dockyards, Naval. Staff considers that every advantage lies in 
the assignment of the North Adriatic to the area of Admiral, 
Adriatic . 

Chief, Naval Staff signifies his approval but stresses the 
fact that Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic must still' 
%ee two sides" and is on no account to neglect the interests 
of German Naval Command, Italy. 

V. T he Naval Attache's Section reports that the 
crew of submarine U "blY" will be transferred to Cartagena. 
On arrival Lieutenant (s.g.) Brandi will "escape". 



Chief, Naval Staff orders that blowing-up of the submarine 
must be ensured under all circumstances (on account of the 
pis.tols in the bov tubes ). This would best be carried out 
under the unobstrctive supervision of one of her officers. 

The Naval Attache's Section further reports that Italian 
ships -will sail from Las Palmas, i.e. are being handed over 
to the enemy. • . 

VI • Repo rt by Chief, Naval Intelligence Division 

Discussions took place between Eisenhower and Badoglio 
aboard the NELSON in La Valetta, probably on the use of 
Italian forces . 

A report of the German Ambassador in Dublin describes 
Britain's inner power' of resistance as far lower than is 
apparent from the majority of other reports. One must 
take the writer's Irish environment into account. 

According to a Portuguese report, the British and Americans 
intend to take up the fight against Russia after the defeat 
of. Germany; whether before or after the Japanese conflict is 
settled is not jta.ted. 

A report of the Greek Ambassador in Ankara confirms the ■ 
current rumor that the Russian Ambassador has requested 
from the Turkish Government active participation in the 
war on the side of the Allies . Turkey has refused. It is 
assumed that Russia's step was instigated by exhaustion 
and fear of the Turkish armed fcrce being intact at the 
end of the war. 

VII. Chief, Operat i ons Division reports on the agree- 
ment between Germany "ancT England regarding the exchange of 
seriously wounded prisoners, which is to start on 8 Oct. 
according to the British proposal and on 12 Oct. . according 
to the German proposal, in Gothenburg, Oran/Marseilles and 
Smyrna. For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIi: 


Special item s ■-...:./..'•'.■ 

I. In order to co-ordinate defense of the Scheldt, 
Group West and Naval Command, North have, agreed that as from 
20 Oct. the whole artillery group "Zeebrugge" be transferred 
to Admiral, Netherlands without any change in the previous 
area boundaries . 

II. According to the previous arrangement, overlapping 
in the Memel sea area between Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic 



and Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic is unavoidable. 
Naval Command, Baltic proposes therefore that the boundary 
be moved to the line Polangen-TJtlaengan. The entire Memel sea 
area will thus come completely in the'area of Commanding Admiral, 
Defenses, Baltic so that uniform command is guaranteed. 

III. Commander in Chief, Navy has put into force for the 
Nav^ the directive for the Shipbuilding Commission, issued 
with his approval by the Minister of Armament and Ammunition. 
The following order is given: "Up to now cooperation between 
warship construction and weapons development has been lacking. 
In future all efforts must be concentrated to the full on 
completion of 1943 Fleet Construction Program." 

To attain this objective "Coordination of Ship, Weapons and 
Equipment" I order the following: 

"All naval research departments will without delay submit to 
the Shipbuilding Commission a written survey of the devel- 
opments at present in preparation or already in progress. If 
the Shipbuilding Commission then wishes to have certain projects 
canceled, in order to concentrate forces, and if an agreement 
cannot be reached I am to be called on to make a decision. 
In future the Shipbuilding Commission is first to be advised 
of developments contemplated and its approval obtained before 
any orders are given for these'.' 

For copy of directive as per l/skl 29919/43 geh. see War 
Diary Part B, Vol. V. 

Situation 1 Oct. 

T~. War in Foreign Waters 

Nothing to report. 

11. S ituation West Area . 

Enemy Situation: 

Only four enemy planes were reported over the Bay 
of Biscay; this is the lowest number ever reported unless 
(and this is unlikely) interception of radio traffic is no- 
longer an indication of the actual number of enemy planes 
on operation. One British vessel was located in BF 2?o0 at 
2319 and another in BF 5120 at 2330. On 30 Sept. fishing 
vessels equipped with radar were detected in BF 8356 and 92? 1. 


1 Oct'. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

If postive results are obtained by our air reconnaissance 
operating on the afternoon of 1 Oct. it is planned to send out 
our destroyer sub-division on 2 Oct. to seize the suspicious 
vessels . 

Own Situation : 

Atlantic Coas t; 

Four submarines were escorted out and two in off Lorient, 
Brest and La Pa 11 ice. One mine was swept off the Gironde and 
another off La Pallice. 

In order to seize the fishing vessels, destroyers should, if 
necessary, put out on the night of .1 Oct. so as to be in pos- 
ition 70 miles southwest of the mouth of. the Gironde at 
dawn. . Commander, 8th Destroyer Flotilla with destroyers Z 
"24" and Z "32" will be transferred to Royan roads in read- 
iness . 

Submarine Division requests a decision on the proposal of 
Commander., Submarines, West for bringing out the • FLIEDER . 
Escort, as. in the case of our submarines, is proposed. If 
it Is desirable for reasons of prestige, escort by torpedo 
boats may be considered, In agreement with the Commander 
of the FLIEDER, Submarine Division recommends a normal 
escort, as torpedo boats offer no protection but only 
endanger the submarine. Naval Staff decides in accordance 
with the proposal. " "_ 

Channel Coast: ■; 

At 1730. an enemy vessel, apparently attempting mine- 
sweeping in our barrage, was fired on five miles north of 
Calais. At 2320 the target was located hy radar six miles 
northwest of Boulogne. From 23^5 onwards, enemy vessels were 
detected off Boulogne by radar and searchlights and attacked 
by our batteries . One landing boat caught fire and capsized; 
the remaining : boats turned away. The capsized boat (200 GRT) 
was towed in to Boulogne and beached. The enemy's intentions 
are not yet known but minesweeping is possible. 

During the night of 1 Oct. the transfer of the LIVADIA with 
torpedo boat T "19" from Le Havre to Dieppe will continue. In 
addition the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla will be transferred from 
Cherbourg to Brest. The projected mine laying operation by 
the 2nd, 4th., ;• 6th, and ,6th PT Boat Flotillas on theconvoy 
route between. Harwich and Great Yarmouth was broken off as 
visibility deteriorated.* 

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters 
1. North Sea : 


1 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL • ■ 

"•'... .< 

During the night of 1 Oct. the 7'th Minesweeper 
Flotilla and the 9th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla are" to carry 
out mine laying operation "Fafnia" west of Terschelling. 
Otherwise nothing special to report. 

2. Norway/ Northern Waters: 

Enemy Situation: 

Over the North' Sea 18 planes were' detected on 
.operation. Photographic reconnaissance .of 28 Sept. revealed: 

At Murmans k: 1 destroyer in dry dock, 1 torpedo boat on 
slipway, 13 vessels, apparently minesweepers, some being 
fitted out and on slipway, 1 repair ship, 1 special service 
vessel, 1 torpedo boat of the "S 11 class, .2 vessels, 
apparently PT boats,'! submarine (Presumably of the "E" class) 
in floating dock, 1. submarine on slipway and 17 freighters 
with a tonnage of 62,000 G.R.T. The total number of, ships ■> ■.?.-.::•.'»■? 
in harbor is almost unchanged since August.- .;.;{■.-. 

Polyarnoye: 4 submarines, 1 vessel, presumably a submarine 
supply- ship, 1 tanker (about 3,000 G.R.T. ), one vessel,. . 
apparently a motor minesweeper. The number of submarines 
detected in this port has decreased. ^.: — 

Our aerial reconnaissance sighted on 1 Oct. at 0925 in.^AM . . 
2151 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, 3 escort vessels and 2 large 
merchantmen on course 300 degrees; also south of the Faroes 
1 merchantmen and 1 destroyer on course 270 degrees-.' • -•---- - 

Reconnaissance with single planes was detected in the Bana.k; 
and Petsamo-Vardoe area on 29 and 5*0 Sept. At 0651 the mine- 
layer PARIS was unsuccessfully attacked with an aerial torpedo 
by a Boston in the .harbor of Honningsvaag. ■ ■ 

Own Situation: 

At I855 on 30 Sept.. the Norwegian steamer ST. . SVITHUN 
(1,376 G.R.T. ) was attacked off Stadtlandet by five enemy 
planes with bombs and machine-guns and set on fire. She 
was beached off Buholmen. Rescue work. Is hampered by a 
southwesterly sto-rim. .'.' :,'':* 

In the' area of Haval Command, Norway.' 22 ships' were . escorted, 
north 'aiid 22 south. In the Arctic. Coast- area 14 ships were 
left lying in harbor owing' to la ck /of escorts . The Task ■ 
Force reports that one of 'the enemy midget submarines was 
salvaged and beached. Investigation will commence on 2 Oct. 

Submarine Group "Wilking" , ..operating along the West Siberian 
route reports sinking altogether 15,000 G.R.T. of merchant 
shipping. The Group is now homeward bound.- On© boat is to 
bring along the rest of the crew -of the Russian steamer from 
Hope Island. • 


1 Oct, 19^3 " CONFIDENTIAL 

IV... Skagerra k , Baltic Sea En tr ances , Baltic Sea 

1. Enem y S 1 1 ua t i on :.' ' 

In Kronstadt Bay and airing the. Islands in the 
Gulf, of Finland the situation is unchanged. 

Admiral, Baltic States reports the appearance of partisans 
in the Libau and Windau area. North of Libau a truck carrying 
twelve Latvian auciliary police was ambushed and eight men 
■were killed; the bandits escaped. 

^ • Own Situation; 

The five Danish gunboats engaged in patrolling the 
Sound were laid up, since the crews had to be returned to 
the large minesweeper MRS "11". 

The steamer RADBOD (4,354 G.R.T.) ran aground south of Kjelsnor 
Salvaging is under way. 

Effective 1 Oct. the previous offices of Coast- 1 Defense 
Commanders, Western Baltic, Pomeranian Coast and Eastern 
Baltic are abolished and Coastal Defense Commanders-, Central 
and Western Baltic now established. 

The LUETZOW and PRINZ EUGEN put in to Gdynia. 

On the afternoon of JO Sept. two mine detonations were observ- 
ed east of Tyters. West of Lyserort the steamer NOGAT' was attac- 
ked by a twin-engined torpedo bomber. 

Two patrol boats are standing by off the Latvian coast as anti- 
aircraft defense for steamers expected at d^wn. 

V. S ubmarine Warfare ' 
1. Enemy Situation: 

According to/a'n Intelligence, report from Portugal 
a convoy will sail from Portland (Maine) during the first ' 
days of October with approximately: 15,000 U. S. and Canadian 
troops as well as war materiel on board ^nd will probably 
join up with a .convoy to Boston. Destination - England. 

2. Own -Situation: ■ ■-< ■ 

Evaluations of radio intelligence show that the 
two convoys expected in the North Atlantic actually are in 
a position further to ' ■■ 



"Rossbach" has, therefore, been ordered to take up new 
disposition AD 8511 to AK jBjk on 2 Oct. at 0800. It is 
evident that the enemy is reacting to the serious defeat 
of the last convoy battle by resorting to very rapid. and 
decided deviations. It is very doubtful whether, in view 
of the small number of submarines and the large area to be 
covered, the convoy will be intercepted. Without our own 
air reconnaissance this is more or less a matter of chance. 

Naval Staff informs the Naval Attache in Tokyo that our 
submarines have arrived in the operational areas off Mombasa, 
in the Gulf of Aden, off the southern point of India and off 
Bombay. Another submarine is expected in three days off the 
Gulf of Oman. The submarines will remain about four weeks in 
their operational areas. 

Submarine successes are reported from Northern Waters and the 
Mediterranean. =-. 

VI. Aerial Warfare 

1. British IslesQgjj Vicinity: 

The 3rd Air Force had 25 planes out on operation 
over England, 27 over the Atlantic and 10 over the Mediterranean. 

The attack by 18 planes on the convoy intercepted west of 
Cape Finisterre was unsuccessful. It is intended to repeat 
this operation with stronger forces. 

During the day the enemy attacked airfields and traffic 
installations in Belguim and France. 

At noon 25 Fortresses from the south flew into the upper 
Lake Constance area. Fifteen bombs were -dropped on Feldkirch; 
115 of our fighters shot down five Fortresses. 

A large formation, also coming from the south, flew in to 
Austria and dropped 60 bombs on Wiener-Neustadt . According 
to reports so far, 54 of our fighters shot down 10 out of 
50 - 60 Liberators, 7 of our planes being lost. The damage 
caused at the Messerschmidt plant was less serious than in 
the first attack. 

During the night of 1 Oct. 300 bombers made a heavy 1 raid 
on the Rhine - We stphalian industrial area, concentrating on 
Hagen, where considerable damage is reported. Anti-aircraft 
batteries shot down one bomber; although 19 of our fighters 
went up they scored no successes. 

-8- ' 



2.. Mediterranean Theater : 

The 2nd Air Force reports only slight transport 
activity from Corsica because troops are engaged in loading 
ships. As soon as this is completed, however, increased air 
transports are to be expected. Our planes were out on 
reconnaissance flights. 

Air Force Command, Southeast made' another attack on shipping 
in Leros . One destroyer and one freighter were damaged. 

Further attacks were made on Kos to prepare for our landing 

Air reconnaissance of Beirut was not possible. The enemy 
air activity over the combat area was normal. The airfield at 
Frosinone and the city of Bologna were raided, but damage only 

Six enemy reconnaissance planes were detected over the Aegean 
Sea . 

3- Eastern Front: 

Nothing is reported from the Army front. The 5th 
Air Force reports 24 planes out on reconnaissance flights. 

VII. Warefare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea 

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean: 

Two transports escorted- by five destroyers left 
Gibraltar presumably for the Atlantic. At noon eight loaded 
U. S. tankers, carrying planes as deck cargo- passed Tangier 
on easterly course. Two of these, entered Gibraltar, followed 
by a cruiser of the DIDO class also from the Atlantic. At 
1400 the following were lying in Gibraltar: 3 ILLUSTRIOUS 
class, 5 destroyers, 7 corvettes, 3 transports, 56 freighters, 
8 tankers, etc. 

No reconnaissance reports have been received from the western 
and eastern Mediterranea . 

Reconnaissance of 'the Italian area brought little result owing 
to the small number of planes on operation. Ten ships were 
sighted north west of Palermo and 10 also 60 miles north- 
northeast of Bizerta. The course and speed of these two 
units were not ascertained. In the afternoon 1 light cruiser 
and 1 destroyer were, off the west coast of Sardinia- on 
westerly course.. In the Gulf of Salerno 70 ships were counted. 
Thirty miles south of Salerno there were 7 ships proceeding 
south and 90 miles south of Salerno 12 ships proceeding south 
and 90 miles south of Salerno 12 ships proceeding West. New. 




enemy landings -were observed at Caste 11a ma re near '.Naples . 
Naples "was occupied by the enemy after our forces had finally 
withdrawn. The increased numer of hospital ships between Italy, 
Sicily and Tunisia indicates considerable enemj losses. 

Submarine activity has increased between Bastia and the' 
mainland.. Our convoys were attacked on 29 and 30 Sept. and 
on 1 Oct. On 30 Sept.' the leading ship of the lobster boat 
flotilla was sunk. 

On the afternoon of 30 Sept. a small convoy was sighted 30 
miles south of crotone on course .'ribrtheast. The number of 
merchantmen in Bar i has increased slightly.- ., • 

Naval Staff, Operations Division has drawn' up a preliminary; 
survey of the whereabouts of the Italian Fleet. For copy as 
per 1/Skl 1 m 29.806/42 gen, see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV. 

This statement shows that out of the original 8 battleships 
5 are in enemy hands and 2 in ours. The eight battleship was 
sunk. The 2 heavy cruisers are in our hands. 

Out of the 15 light cruisers , 7 are in enemy hands', 5 in ours 
and 1 Is interned in Spain. The thereabouts of the remaining . .• 

2 cruisers is not known. 

Out of 28 destroyer s 11 are in enemy ha ids, 5 in our hands and 
3 are interned in SDain. One was sunk; the hereabouts of 8 
destroyers is not kn-'Wh. v-: 

Of 66 submarines 13 are in enemy .hands, 7 in our hands and 3 
were destroyed; 43 submarines have not been located. 

2. Own Situation Mediterranean: 

The PT boat operation during the nights of 29 an; n 
30 Sept. had to be broken off on account of the weather. 
Minelaying operation "Pomme'rn" was also postponed' until ...': •■. 
1 Oct. because of the weather. Ferry traffic from Corsica 
to Leghorn was carried, out as planned despite air : and submarine 
attacks. This will probably be. 'Completed already on 3 Oct;: 
T*wo of the seven enemy fighters which attacked three naval- 
landing craft off Bastia on 29 Sept. were shot down* On the .-.■ 
s.ame day four of our transport planes were shot down by enemy 
f ighters which flew out from Sardinia . 

Naval Staff asks German Naval Command, Italy whether ground 
mines were laid in the harbor of Naples. If not, the 2 nd Air 
Force should be urged to lay aerial mines. 

Submarine U "410" , firing five single torpedoes on a westbound 




sank a steamer of 8,000 GRT in CJ 7718. Since four addition- 
al detonations were heard, it is probable that further 
steamers were sunk and damaged. 

3. Area Naval Group South : /■■.-"-. '•.'■• ■ 

a . Adriatic Sea : 

One small steamer, 7 auxiliary sailing vessels 
and 7 auxiliary fishing vessels were captured' at Zara . Che 
company of the 1st Motorized Naval Communications Division left 
Belgrade for the ' Dalmation coast under.' its. own power. 

b. . Aegean Sea : 

On 50 Sept. and 1 Oct. MIlos and Candia were 
attacked by single enemy planes. . 

The disarmament of Italian troops on -Andres has been carried 
out. The next action is being prepared against. Paros and 
Antiparos. Minesweeping on the "Trikkeri" barrage is. being 
continued. North of Skiathos passage another enemy barrage 
was detected, from which 18 mines Mark XIV were swept. Three 
boats of Minesweeping Group Attica are engaged in clearing a 
barrage gap in the entrance to the harbor of Argostoll. •" 

For instructions from Group South to Admiral, Aegean regarding 
the crew of the Italian Hospital ship GRADISCA see teletype 

c . Black Sea : . .. • 

At 2035 an enemy submarine was located .70 miles 
west of Sevastopol. 

Operations by our PT boats and patrol units off the south and 
north coasts of the Tainan Peninsula and east of .Genichesk were 
withoot result. Three boats of the 1st PT boat Flotilla were 
sent out during the night of 1 Oct. against enemy naval forces 
and supplies in the Anapa - Cape Utrish area. 

Otherwise nothing to report. : 

VIII. Situation East Asia . ■ '"■ 

ii.— ■ m i , n — — ■ — — 11 — ■ .|| 1 f 1 ,,„ — 1-^ ■— ■!■ 

Nothing to Report. - ........ 


2 Oct. 19.53: ... ; CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Political .Importance . . . 
Nothing to report. : ... . 

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff 

I. Army Situation: 

On 1 Oct. no large-scale actions took place on the eastern 
front. The inactivity in the southern sector is obviously 
caused by the heavy losses suffered by the enemy, especially 
in the Zaporozhe area . The battles for the Dnieper bridge- • 
heads continue with varying success. Enemy attacks In the : 
sector of Army Group Center no longer- shoved the same impetus 
as hitherto. The areas of Gomel and Smolensk are the main 
points of attack. 

In Italy it appears that the forces ve had available were 
insufficient to hold the Foggia area. There is increasing 
partisan activity, somes times under British leadership, in 
Northern Italy. _ : 

British and French troops appeared for the first time, on 
Corsica. There are still approximately 6 ,000 of . our own 
troops' and 1,500 motor vehicles as veil as numerous anti- 
aircraft guns on the island. All tanks and assault guns 
have been taken off. 

The Apennine line In the Florence area is being strenghtene'd. 

II. a. Quartermaster General reports that an order has 
been received from the Reichsmarschall for concentration in 
the production of anti-aircraft guns on heavy ones , chiefly 
12.8 cm. caliber. Super -heavy anti-aircraft guns ("15 and 24 cm. 
which are being developed) have been dropped. Anti-aircraft 
rockets are the only ones In the calibers above. 12.8 cm,, which 
are still to be manufactured and their output is expected to 
benefit from the above restrictions. This will, however, not 
effect the Navy. 

b. Group West reports that out of 100 Italian officer 
and 1,000 enlisted men, 10 officers and 70 men have declared 
their adherence to the cause; 70 officers and 450 men have- 
volunteered for labor service. Twenty officers and ] -l^ r ' ren 
refused any further cooperation. 

III. Chief, Naval_Qrdnance Division reports on a meeting 
with the General War Office and Commander, Replacement Arm?, 
regarding preparation of the Fuehrer's directive through which 
the Ministry of Armament and Ammunition is to be granted the 
right to inspect and dispose of all stocks of the Armed Forces. 
On 4 Oct. a final discussion on this matter will take place 
under the auspices of Chief, Armed Forces High Command. The 


2 Oct. 19^3 ■— CONFIDENTIAL 

point of view of the Navy, as. approved by Commander 
in Chief, Navy, is that the Ministry must naturally be 
furnished a survey' on all stocks but that. these can only 
be surrendered with the consent of the branches of the 
Arned Forces concerned. It is pointed out in this connect- 
ion that the Navy nowhere has excessive stocks of materials 
which are in short supply. 

With regard to the armament conference at Gdynia and the 
Gauleiter convention at Posen, Commander in Chief, Navy 
orders that new weapons and new submarine tactics are not 
to be discussed. 

IV. C hief, Naval Intelligence Division: The first reports 
from abroad on the convoy battle in the North Atlantic are now 
to hand. According to Reuter, more than 6 freighters and j - 4 
escort vessels were lost, including the Canadian destroyer ST. 
CROIX, from which the crew of 14? was lost except for one 
survivor. The submarines are said to have attacked two convoys 
and it is assumed that new and deadly torpedoes were used. 

Reports from the United States mention torpedoes with acoustic 

Chief, Naval Intelligence Division also submitted a final 
report on enemy merchant shipping losses for the month of 
September. (For copy as per l/Skl 30012,A3 geh. see War Diary 
Part D, Vol "Enemy Shipping Losses 19*13"). The number of ships 
sunk was 59, totalling 202,584,GRT, out of which our sub- 
marines accounted for 16 vessels totalling ?6,392 GRT. 

V. In a Highly Restricted Circle : 

Following a report by Quartermaster General :>n 
strengthening the anti-aircraft defense of Gdynia, Chief, 
Naval Staff decides that completion of the final emplacements 
for 12.8 cm. twin anti-aircraft guns is to be awaited. 

Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch, Air Defense Section 
reports on the anti-aircraft defense of Pillau, Memel and 
Libau and states that personnel is lacking for the material 
which is available for strengthening defense. Chief, Naval 
Staff orders that Chief, General Naval Administration Bureau 
should assess personnel requirements by the niddle of October. 
With regard to smoke-screen defense, Air Defense Section 
proposes that no change be made in present arrangements. 
Chief, Operations Division urges that the re -formation of 
smoke-screen battalions with Italians be investigated and 
Naval Command, Baltic be. ordered to investigate the possibilit^ 
ies of dispersing berths in Gdynia.' 



2 Oct. 19^3 . CONFIDENTIAL 

VI. Chief, Na,val Staff again discusses the failure 
of technical developments, which lest summer -led to the 
break-down in submarine -warfare. It is the second time 
that technical deficiency has robbed the submarines of 
great successes. Even now heavy pressure has been nec- 
essary to urge technicians to speed up research work. The 
"Zaunkoenig" torpedo was not to be ready for operational 
use before 1944. 

Special Items 

I. Operations Division had expected the eleven boats of 
the zero series- of the multi-purpose .boat to be put into '..'.'. 
construction Independent of completion of the first boat. 
It agrees, however, because of the difficulties reported by 
the Shipbuilding' Commission, that construction of the 
eleven boats shall not commence until after the first boat; 
has been tested, ' if this emergency meesure is offset by 
arranging quotas of minesweepers and nor or minesweepers so 
that output is possible at least of the number requested. 

II. The Swedish Naval Attache In Berlin has reported 1 that, 
according to Swedish experiences, the duretionof minefields 
in waters where there are currents is relatively short, since 
the mines go adrift a fter 8-9 months ; lie has asked for a 
report on German experiences in this matter. ''. . ' 

This is. obviously a ruse in order -to obtain data on the 
durability of German mines, e.g. those used in J the "West 
Wall". Probably Sweden was astonished at the protracted 
efficacy of our Ska gen barrage (loss of the ULVEN)'. 

The Naval Attache's Section is given the following guide 
for an evasive, reply: ....* " . ' 

"The Swedish .Navy's unfortunate experiences on the limited 
duration of minefields can only be confirmed to a certain ... 
extent. Numerous drifting mines with broken goring -rope :"■ 
are continually discovered. These mines are of German, as ., 
well as of British origin; they are mostly obsolete. A proof 
of the good durability of the German mooring ropes is the 
large barrage east of Ska gen which is- still effective though 
laid over three years ago. This is shown by the loss of the'. 
Swedish submarine ULVEN." •• 


a Oct. 1943 ''• CONFIDENTIAL 

Situation 2 Oct. 

I. War in Foreign Water s 

All units operating in foreign waters are advisee. 
regarding the enemy situation by Radiogram 0902. 

Otherwise nothing to report. 

H- Situation West Area ■'. 

1. E nemy Situation: .-'.-',; '.'. \ 

Over the Bay of Biscay 20 planes were detected on 
operation. The following were located: one British vessel at 
1905 in BP-4548 and one at 20^3 in BF 4518; 1 U. S. vessel at 
2100 in CG 4720. 

Our aerial reconnaissance reported: 

at 1320 1 light cruiser on course 270 degrees in BE 6772; : 
at 1340 32 merchantmen, 8 guardboats and 1 cruiser on course' 

360 degrees in BE 5986; 
at 1840 a convoy consisting og 17-19 merchantmen with 5 

guardboats 2-3 destroyers and 1 vessel, presumably a 
cruiser, on course 360 degrees in ..BE 9719* 

As regards the vessels successfully attacked during the night 
of 1 Oct. off Boulogne, of which one landing boat was brought 
in, Group West no longer adheres to its previous assumption of 
a minesqeeping operation. It seems most likely that- the enemy's 
aim was to land sabotage detachments between the. harbor and 
batteru at Mont de Couple or between this battery and Cape 
D'Alprech or, if more vessels were taking part, to seize 
radar sets located there,- The enemy plan was successfully 
frustrated by prompt detection and accurate hits on the 
leading boat. 

2. Own Situation: ' 
Atlantic Coast: 

One ELM/A mine was swept off Brest and one off lie 
de Re. Altogehter 7 submarines were escorted in to Brest, St. 
Na zaire, La Pa 11 ice and the Gironde. 



2 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIA 

Torpedo boats T "22". "23". "24" and "25" ^ero transferred 
from .to Brest. The operation by a destroyer sub- 
division against steam trailers was postponed for 24 hours,.-....'. 

C hannel Coast : 

Three ELM/A mines were swept off Nieuport. The : LIVADIA 
■was escorted from Le Havre to Dieppe by 13 escort vessels. 
Further passage to Boulogne is postponed for 24 hours. 

Four boats of the 6th Minesweeper Flotilla and torpedo boat 
T "19", vhile being transferred, became involved in an 
engagement "With seven vessels of the 2nd Motor Minesweeper 
Flotilla towards 0300 off Cayeux between Boulogne and Dieppe.- 
Both Flotillas fired at each other with all calibers for 
approximately ten minutes. The command, boa ts of the Flotillas 
were quite unable to stop the engagement although they were 
aware of the true situation. The incident, which entailed 
casualties amounting to 4 dead and 14 seriously wounded as I 
well as some damage to the boats, was ceused by the blowing-up : 
of star shells which were intended for the detection of an 
unknown target located by radar, but which misfired. 

Considering the facts available, this must be regarded as one 
of those unfortunate incidents which in wartime can never be 
entirely avoided. .>'; '■'.•'■ 

For detailed report by Group West see teletype 1437. 

A minelaying operation on the convoy. route Harwich - Great 
Yarmouth by the 2nd, 4th, 6th and 8th PT Boat Flotilla and 
a torpedo operation by the 5th PT Boat Flotilla against a 
convoy off the southeast coast are scheduled for the night 
of 2 Oct. 

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters 
1. North Sea: 

North of Terschelling and Ameland altogether 8 
ELM mines were swept. Emden was heavily raided from 1450 - 
1710 by a U. S. bomber formation with fighter escort. 
For details see "Aerial Warfare". 

Commanding Admiral, Defenses., North, reports . that a deep- 
water route for special purposes has been prepared by a 
double sweep and requests permission to search and sweep 
the remainder of barrage "3". For sailing directions see 
teletype 1845. 

Naval Staff has approved as requested. 

. : ... •■..■ ■■'■' CONFIDENTIAL 

-16- ' 


2. Norway; Northern Waters : 

' i' * i i 

Enemy Situation: 

Eighteen planes were detected on operation; over 
the North Sea. Slight gunfire was observed in the Petsamo 
area and slight aerial reconnaissance in the Yard ow area. 

Our air reconnaissance of Longyearbyen on 1 Oct. estab- 
lished that the coal dumps there /were still smouldering 

Own Situation : 

In the area of Naval Command, Norway Ik vessels and 
1 submarine were escorted north and 11 vessels south. In 
the Arctic coast area 15 ships qere delayed owing to lack of 

Chief, Naval Staff has decided that twelve submarines are to 
remain in the northern area. Order to this effect from 
Naval Staff has been sent to Group North/Fleet, Admiral, 
Northern Waters, Commander,. Submarines, Norway and Submarine 

Submarine Division has arranged withdrawal of the. submarines 
so as to leave Commander, Submarines, .Norway s:ix boats 
which are at present at sea, also five which will be ready 
for operations in October and a twelfth, the date of .operation- 
al readiness of which is not yet certain. "Nine submarines 
will be withdrawn for operations in the Atlantic. 

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea : '■■'■ 

1 . ' Enemy Situation: 

Only slight gunfire is reported from Kronstadt 
Bay. The steamer NORDSTRUM was unsuccessfully attacked by 
a torpedo bomber which was again observed southwest of Windau 
and off Sworbe. 

2 . Own Situation: •, 

A mine was swept off schulzgrund by mine- 
exploding vessel "13", which was slightly damaged. 

Naval Command, Baltic transmitted a report from Admiral, 
Denmark according to which the police raid on Jews carried 
out in Denmark during the night of 1 Oct. was a failure, 
since most of the Jews, warned by rumors, had hidden. A 
mass flight of Jews -to Sweden has- also started. Admiral, 



Denmark further reports that according to telephonic 
advice from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, 
demobilization of the Danish Armed Forces -will probably 
commence next -week. Admiral, Denmark interprets this to 
mean that obviously there will be no. recruiting of SS 
volunteers .. 

Convoy and transport traffic in the entire Baltic Sea 
area vas carried out according to plan. Nothing special 
is reported from the area of Commander, Minesweepers, 
Baltic and Admiral, Baltic States. 

Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation Office 
of the Armed Forces Overseas advises that, in view of the 
enemy aerial torpedo attacks on hospital ships and. leave 
ships as well as on merchantmen proceeding to and from the 
Baltic States, this traffic must cease as long as escort 
and air Cover are not provided. (See teletype 2224). 

Naval Command, Baltic advises Operations Division for 
information of instructions issued to offices concerned 
dealing with the situation and plans for escort of .vessels 
to and from the Baltic States. For copy as per l/Skl 2?644/43 
Gkdos. See War Diary, Part C, Vol. III. 

It is of primary importance to equip all ships proceeding to 
and from the Baltic States with 2 cm. anti-aircraft guns, 
to establish an anti-aircraft relay escort from Kolkas to 
Backofen by four heavy gun carriers of the 24th Landing 
Flotilla, to have the 3rd Patrol Boat Flotilla, which 
will be withdrawn from the Gulf of Finland, carry out anti- 
aircraft escort of specially valuable ships and tankers and, 
finally, to establish air patrol by the 102nd Bomber Wing. 
Moreover, merchantmen have been advised to keep a sharp 
lookout and to avoid the run from Demesnes to Libau at dawn. 
Attempts should be made, until all .merchantmen are equipped 
with anti-aircraft guns, to have unarmed ships proceed to- 
gether with one that is armed. As -regards armament of merchant 
men in the Baltic, Operations Division has issued revelant 
instructions to Quartermaster Division and requested re- 
armament of all merchantmen passing north of the line Memel - 
southern point of Oeland. If possible Finnish merchantmen too 
s ho old be armed. The first request; in this connection was 
already made on 2.5 Sept.. to Quartermaster Division. 

V. Submarine Warfare 

On the basis of .evaluations of radio intelligence, 
the patrol 1 ne of Group "Rossbach" was once again mov: 
50 miles further north into the line AD 8133 - AK 392; 

Otherwise nothing special to report from the Atlantic. 



VI. Aerial Warfare. 

1 . British Isles and Vicinity: 

The 3rd Air Force reports the number of planes out 
on operation as 60 over England, 15 over the Atlantic and 3 
over the Mediterranean. A mine laying operation was carried out 
over the Humber area by 56 planes, of -which 4 did not return. 

Einden was raided between 1640 and l r ,<40 by/200 - 250 enemy 
planes .mostly 4-engined ones, which came in over the Heligoland 
Bight. Our fighters, numbering 244, went up in defense and 
brought down 3 enemy planes but themselves lost- 10. Consider- 
able damage was caused at Emden. Amongst other things, a slip- 
way and a submarine were badly damaged at the Nordseewerke. 
The Schulte & Bruns Dockyard was hit by 30 high explosive 
bombs, causing a. 95$ deficit in production; a floating deck 
with crane sank. At Cassens dockyard all machines in the 
workshop and forge were destroyed. A floating dock with a 
patrol boat sank and a patrol boat was heavily damaged. 
Production deficit is 75^. At the State Dockyard the pro- 
duction deficit is 60fb. One steamer, two tugs and two barges 
sank and further vessels were damaged. Traffic on the Ems- 
Jade Canal will be interrupted for 8 to 10 days owing to 
hits on the locks. Furthermore, naval barracks and labor 
camps were badly damaged. 

The enemy obviously still regards Emden as a center of 
submarine production, possibly remembering the first "World 
War. Actually submarine construction at Emden is extremely 

During the night of 2 Oct. about 70-80 planes carried out 
mine laying (probably heavy) in the Heligoland Bight and 
the western part of the Baltic Sea. 

Approximately 300 planes flew into southern Germany via 
Belgium and carried out a heavy raid on Munich where exten- 
sive damage was caused to residential districts as well as 
to industrial installations .- 

Twenty further planes carried out nuisance raids over 
Duisburg, Dortmund and Remscheld, causing only slight damage. 

With reference to the attack of 1 Oct. on Wiener-Neustadt, 
it is now reported that this was carried out by 8l enemy 
planes of which 6 were brought down by anti-aircraft guns and 
19 by our fighters, of which 47 were sent out. Of the 25 
Fortresses which raided Feldkirch, presumably as an alter- 
native target to Augsburg, 2 were shot down by fighters 
over northern Italy and 6 over home territory. In addition 
it is reported that 8 Fortresses made forced landings in 



According to Swiss press reports, Swiss anti-aircraft 
guns opened fire on several of the U.S. planes flying 

over and actually shot -down at least one. '. 

2. Mediterranean Theater ; 

The 2nd Air Force reports reconnaissance activity 
over the area of Corsica - Salerno - Palermo. Following the 
loss of four Arado 196' s on transport operations from Corsica, 
these planes will be withdrawn. Air Force Command, Southeast 
reports a successful attack on Leros end the airfield of Kos . 
Over Crete our fighters brought down two enemy planes. 

In Italy the enemy carried out continuous fighter-bomber 
and machine-gun attacks over the Army Front'. Two planes were 
over Rome. 

Over the Aegean Sea 14 reconnaissance planes were observed. 
An unsuccessful attack by 6-- 8 enemy planes was carried out 
on Rhodes . • . 

3. Eastern Front: - 

On 1 Oct. the 4th Air Force carried out photographic 
reconnaissance of Black Sea ports. For evaluations see Enemy 
Situation, Black Sea. ; A:- 

Ten planes of the 5th Air Force carried out reconnaissance. 
West of Ireland 4 merchantmen with 3 destroyers and 2 escort 
vessels were sighted on course 210 degrees. 

VII . Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea 

lv Enemy Situation Mediterranean; 

At 0815 (obviously 1815, Tr.N.) a. cruiser of 
the DIDO class which put in to Gibraltar in the morning 
put out for the Atlantic. A convoy' of 22 loaded freighters 
left Gibraltar in the evening for the' Mediterranean. 

report from Cape Spartel, a convoy of 5^ 
•tankers and 10 destroyers passed the line 
Cape Trafalgar between 1700 and 1800 on 
and passed through the Straits of Gibraltar 

No reports on air reconnaissance have been received from the 
western and eastern Mediterranean. 

According to a 

freighters , 10 • 

Cape Spartel - 

easterly course 

at 2000. 




In the Tyrrhenian" Sea. rough interpretation of photographic 
reconnaissance over the Salerno beachhead shows en increase 
in the numbers of cruisers and large landing boats. No 
convoys were sighted between Salerno and Sicily. 

At 0930 there was a cruiser with two destroyers on south- 
easterly course 60 miles Least of Cagliari. No further land- 
ings at Caste llama re were observed. 

2. Own Situation Mediterranean: ■- 

During the night of 1 -Oct. the minelayer POMMERN 
broke off her operation after laying three barrage sections, 
but will resume it during the night of 2 Oct. Ferry traffic 
from Corsica by large vessels and barges continues according 
to plan. 

Submarine chaser "2210" was unsuccessfully attacked by an ■;■■ 
enemy submarine off Porto Ferraio. 

On 30 Sept. the auxiliary minelayer LAURANA was commissioned 
in Venice end on 2 Oct. the minelayer CROTONE was commissioned 
in Spezia . 

At 0102 30 miles northeast of C^pe Tones submarine U-"223" 
heard two hits on a steamer of 10,000 GRT and observed a 
hit each on a destroyer and a steamer 8,000 GRT. Commander., 
Submarines, Mediterranean assumes that all three vessels - 
were sunk. According to a report from submarine U "81", 
there was an enemy destroyer group in the Strait of 
Otranto during the night. Submarine U "380" is heading 
for Salerno Bay. 

German Naval Command, Italy has requested immediate shipment. 
of 450 EMC mines to Toulon for mine laying operations north 
of Corsica and off the Ligurian coast by the minelayers 
POMMERN and AQUI . Naval Staff has arranged for shipment of 
the 431 EMC mines available. The mines, however, only be .... 
released after presentation of an exact mine laying plan, 
since the shortage, of mines makes it imperative to 'restrict 
barrages to areas which can be defended by us. :' .:..-..: . 

German Naval Command ? Italy had requested on 4 Sept.. closing" 
of the approaches to the central Adriatic in a Tine from 
Cape Gargano to the island of Korcula with 520 SMF or 1260 ." 
EMC mines, and asked for allocation., of two to four mine- 
layers from the area, of Group South. Developments • in the ', 
situation in Italy at tiv o t time made it appear 'most urgent 
to defend the Aegean Sea and the Dalmatian c oa s t ; further-, 
more, enither sufficient mines nor minelayers were avail--, 
able. Accordingly Naval Staff on 10 Sept. re jected the 
minelaying project and promised available mines and mine- 
layers to Group South for defense of the Aegean Sea and 
east coast of the Adriatic. On 26 Sept. German 


2 Oct. 19^3 CO NFIDENTIAL 

Command, Italy repeated the request, and proposed that the 
Adriatic minefield be laid immediately by Group South . In 
addition it requested 72 UMB and 200 EMC mines for oper- 
ations by PT boats and naval landing craft off the southern 
ports of the east coast of Italy and reported the imminent 
commissioning of small Italian minelayers equipped with 
Italian mines and of one naval landing craft for German mines. 

Operations Division has approved the latter request. Naval 
Ordnance Division, .Underwater Obstacles Branch has been order- 
ed to supply the mines to the Mining and Barrage Command, 
Venice. As regards the Adriatic barrage, Naval Staff deems it 
expedient, because of the situation in the southern part 
of the Adriatic which is by no means under control and in 
view of the short supply of mines, to continue to con- 
centrate mine defense on the coastal areas. Group South is 
of the same opinion and also reports that the Adriatic barrage 
cannot at present be laid by minelayers of Admiral, Aegean 
as this might jeopardize the entire mine laying plan in the 
Aegean area. On 29 Sept. Operations Division advised Group 
South and German Naval Command, Italy as well as Admiral,. 
Adriatic for information, of its views and entrusted 
Group South with responsibility for the defense of the - 
Adriatic Sea area including the southern approaches, with • 
orders to investigate the possibilities of a barrage approx- 
imately off Ancona. Furthermore, Group South . is. to submit 
as soon as possible plans and requirements for mine, defense 
of the east coas t of the Adriatic. ■:. 

German Naval Command, Italy is also to report the mines and 
minelayers available in Trieste to Group South and Admiral, 
Adriatic, while Group- South is to .investigate, the possibility 
of diverting minelayers from the Aegean for. the tasks in the- 
Adriatic Sea area and on the east coast of this. . area .- 

On 1 Oct. German Naval Command, Lfcalj submitted the v^ew 
that an EMF barrage in the Adriatic off Gargano> combined 
with anti-submarine barrages • laid in the direction of the 
enemy, even without possibility of patrol, can decidedly • 
hinder or check an enemy operation in the Adriatic, par- 
ticularly a thrust into the partisan area with landing 
craft. German Naval Command, Italy, therefore, asks for 
increased shipments (of mines,: Tr.N) to Venice. The Italian 
east coast ports will be mined with Italian mines. Oper- 
ations Division has ordered Group South to investigate 
the suggestion made by German Naval Command, Italy, . 
considering, facilities available, and has advised German. 
Naval Command, Italy that further shipements of mines are at 
present impossible, except 100- cutting floats, and that it . 
should resort to Italian mines-. 


2 0ct : .;i9% -C ONFIDENTIAL 

3. Area Navel Group South : . -; . •; , . • . 

8 • Adriatic Sea ; •' 

Of the steamers proceeding south from, the 
northern Adriatic, the motorship POZARICA en route from 
Trieste to Cattaro put into Zara, as the route South of . 
Sibenik .is not navigable owing to shelling from land. 
The steamer. DEA MARCELLA -was probably sunk there, on the 
same route. The steamer MERANO has turned back. 

b. Aegean Sea : ..■■..'• ■._..-. 

. ' On the afternoon of 1 Oct. a strong enemy 
formation which flew into the arep of Suda Bay was scatter- 
ed by our fighters, which Drought down three enemy plants. 

On 1 Oct. the landing operation on Kos , code word "Eisbaer", 

commenced. Army troops boarded steamers and na.val vessels 

which sail from Piraeus, Suda and Cahdia in three groups and 

meet west of Naxos . :. r.,« ..'.■ 

Operational control rests with Admiral, Aegean and tactical 
control at sea with Commander, 21st Submarine Chaser Flotilla 
The landing on Kos is set for 3 Oct. at 0^00. So far the 
operation is proceeding according to plan. 

c. Black Sea : 
Enemy Situation: 

According to photographic reconnaissance of 1 
Oct. the following were lying: 

In Poti: 

1 battleship, 1 heavy cruiser, 2 destroyers, 1 of 
them in dock, 6 submarines, 3 of them in dock, 7 motor 
minesweepers, the submarine accomodation ship NEWA, 15 
freighters ,etc. 

In the Schopi estuary: 

The hulls of 1 cruiser and 1 destroyer were made out and 
2 submarines, 3 PT boats, 1 tanker, 8 freighters and other 
vessels were detected. 

In Oshemshiri: 

There were 3 submarines, 6 motor minesweepers, k of 
them on slipway and also 2 submarine escort boats. 




Own Situation: 

The enemy carried out air attacks on Feodosiya, 
■where two motor minesweepers were heavily damaged and 
casualties sustained, on Senna^a and on a convoy from 
Kerch to Feodosiya. Our fighters reported that one enemy 
plane was shot down... 

During the night of 1 Oct. our motor minesweepers were in 
position off the southern outlet to the Strait of Kerch 
without sighting the enemy. When putting in to Feodosiya 
they were bombed by enemy planes without success. 

Repeated enemy air attacks were also made by day on the 
naval landing craft and naval artillery lighters in patrol 
lines north and south of the Taman Coast. 

Two naval landing craft returning from the south Taman coast 
struck mines and became total losses. 

Submarine U "9" -put out from Constanta into the operational 
area . 

Otherwise nothing to report. 

VIII. Situation East Asia. 

Nothing to report. 

* * * ■* * * ■* * * ■* * * * ■* -X- * * 



5 Oct. 19^3 ■:.;., .., CONFI DENTIAL 

Items of Political Importance . 

According to British press reports , Spain, Switzerland,' 
Sweden and Portugal have decided for the time being not to 
recognize the new; Facist-Republican Government ■ of Italy. 
However, the Badoglio Government also is'not yet recognized; 
by these countries. According to Swedish reports from London, 
Russo-Polish tension has increased to such an extent that an 
inter-Allied crisis is feared. Churchill's diplomacy will be 
put to its hardest test yet in order to prevent a conflict.. 

According to a Reuter report from Washington, emanating from 
apparently the best informed source, the opening of the 
second European front will be advanced bj more than a month 
compared to the Quebec plan, because of the speedy development 
in the situation in Russia and in Italy. General Marshall is 
said to be making preparations to leave Europe. The British, 
U. S. and Russian Supreme Commands regard Europe now as the 
only theater of war. All preparations are said to be uncer- 
way. Practical execution will be the main topic at the Allied 
Staff discussions soon to commence. 

According to the "International News Service", the U/'S. 
State Department has dr.^wn up a : pl°n for post-war cooperation 
with Russia, in preparation for the Three Power Conference 
in London or Moscow, which plan is s^id toprovidea system. 
for maintenance of lasting peace. The United States have, 
according to Reuter, dropped the plan to hold the conference 
in London instead of in Moscow, in view of Russian objections. 

British newspapers are again discussing the possibility of a 
Portuguese declaration of w^r on Japan. 

The strikes for wage increases continue in the British Arma- 
ment industry. 

Confe rence on the Situation wi t h Chief, Naw 1 Staff 

I. Army Situat ion; ■ '•• 

The situation on the whole is satisfactory- on the eastern 
front. There were no large-scale actions on 2 Oct.'.. 

I taly; 

The withdrawal from Corsica should be completed by 3 
Oct. The Fuehrer has ordered that the line Gaeta - Ortona 
is definitely to be held. Two divisions will be moved up 
from Northern Italy. If this is successful, the surrender 
of Rome will thus be avoided. 



3 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTI AL 

Mopping -up operations in the Goerz area are completed and 

will be followed 03 similar operations in the Pola, Trieste 
and Flume areas. .■ . 

II. According to advice from -Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters, 
the Fuehrer has expressed concern regarding a possible 
enemy landing In the Crimea and considers the concentration 
of all naval forces for defense to be imperative. 

Chief, Operations Divisi on reports in this connection that 
the following are available for defense of the Crimea: 

6 submarines, 3 of them in operational .readiness : 10 PT 
boats, k of them in operational readiness; 17 motor mine- 
sweepers, 12 of them in operational readiness; 7 naval 
artillery lighters, 6 of them in operational readiness 
(4 in sea of Azov, the remained in the southern Crimea); 
5 Italian CB boats (midget submarines, Tr.N.) all of 
them in operational readiness; 9& naval landing crafty 
70 of them in operational readiness (35 of these are re- 
quired for increasing escort duties in the western part' 
of the Black Sea ), 

Rumanian naval forces cannot be used for defense of the 
Crimea. No additional German forces from home "waters can be: 
allocated in view of the exceedingly, tense situation In 
all areas. No reserves are '. available. ... • 

Chief, Naval Staff orders that Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters 
be informed' at once and his attention drawn to the Fleet v.: 
Construction Program for 19^3, which should ensure the 
most urgent naval requirements. , ■•>■•.. • ■■' = 

For teletype l/Skl 2772O/ 2 Gkdos. see War Diary., Part C, 
Vol. XIV a. 

III. On the evening of 2 Oct. Operations Division received 
telephonic advice from Armed Forces High Command, Operations 
Staff through competent authorities that, as regards demob- 
ilization of members of the Danish Armed Forces, plans,- have . 
been revised. It is intended to carry out demobilization '-'. 
also of regular soilders within the. next few days. 

Instructions to this effect from Armed Forces High Command, 
Operations Staff were received on the evening of 3 Oct. For 
copy as per l/skl 27736/43 Gkdos .. see War .Diary, Part C, 
Vol. III. According to these- instructions , recruitment for 
the Schalburg Corps and River Ra ilway Police is to commence 
after non-commissioned 'officers and enlisted men are demob- 
ilized. ; : 

It remains to be seen whether recruiting will still be very 
promising after what has happened meanwhile. Further, Chief 




Operations Division reports on difficulties "which have 
arisen as regards the exchange of seriously wounded between 
Germany and Britain because the Foreign Minister refuses to 
report to the Fuehrer the result of negotiations so for, so 
that adherence to the date fixed (12 Oct.) is questionable. 
It will be impossible to adhere to the date if the Fuehrer's 
final instructions are not issued today. For details see 
War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII. 

Chief, Naval Staff orders that Chief of Staff, Army Group B 
be advised of the negative decision regarding the appointment 
of the negative decision regarding the appointment of Vice 
Admiral Ruge, with special reference to the fact that the 
latter is not an expert on coastal defense. • 

S pecial Items 

I. • The Shipbuilding Commission - Sub-Commission /Lane ing 
Craft - reported on 28 Sept. that the immediate setting-up 
of a construction site for nav^l landing cr°ft and n^val- 
artillery lighters in Salonika, as requested by Naval Staff , 
cannot be carried out. ..'. ■>.■ , : -...i"- 

Naval Staff must nevertheless insist most emphatically, on 
its demand; naval landing craft cannot be dispensed' with in 
the Aegean Sea for the extensive tasks of minelaying, escort 
submarine chase, etc. and -also as freight-carriers. 

Siebel ferries can only -be used to a certain extent in these 
operations. Quartermaster Division therefore requests the ■■'*'■ 
Shipbuilding Commission to take the necessary steps without 
further delay so as to make up for lost time. 

II. Operations Division, Special Weapons Division (Vice 
Admiral Weichold) has ascertained from Prince Borghese the 
present situation regarding material and personnel of the 
Italian special weapons available, with a view to quick 
establishment of fighting power and operational readiness.. 

Naval Staff contemplates setting up the 10th Italian PT. 
Boat Flotilla as a volunteer corps with Italian personnel 
under the command of Prince Borghese, since there are no^ 
forces available for the establishment of a German unit 
and new training would take too long. The- Borghese unit 
would be put under Admiral Legnani. German Naval Command, 
Italy would submit operations requirements to Legnani, 
would supervise, through the liaison officer to the 10th 
Italian PT Boat Flotilla, Its training, activity and 


3 Oct. 19^3 ■ CONFIDENTIA L 

conduct and would expedite, through the Cocrr-anding .Generals- 
Armed Forces, establishment of /war readiness., as well- as . 
current material requirements, by means of Italian dockyard ' 
and industrial facilities. ';; 

Naval Staff advises German Naval Command, Italy of these 
plans and of' the fact that Prince Borghese will leave foK. . 
Rome on 3 Oct., in order to contact Admiral Le.gnani, The' 
position of the former German Liaison Officer of Armed 
Forces High Command, Intelligence Division to the 10th 
Italian. PT Boat Flotilla remains unchanged for the time. 

III. With regard to the considerations put forward by k: 
Operations Division on the enemy mine offensive against 
our submarine bases in the Biscay area (see War Diary 

5 Aug.), the views of Group West and Commanding Admiral, 
Defenses, West, as requested, have in the meantime been 
received. Both Commands fully agree with the basic state- 
ments of Operations Division and their reports, especially 
the one of Commanding Admiral, Defenses , West, contain 
various requests and recommendations which have been follow 
ed up in detail or are still under consideration by Naval. ' 
Staff. •• •< 

The following are dealt with: All anti-mine measures and 
defense against mines, including navigational aids of a . '?:' 
technical as well as of a tactical nature. For further ■: :■■•'■ 
details see order l/Skl IE 26140/43 Gkdos. and l/Skl, 
IE 27542/43 Gkdos. in files IE 15, Vol.: 3- ';•::/ - 

IV. In brief Report No. 4/43 regarding the situation: 

on the eastern front, Naval •Intelligence Division 'reports ■ 
on the following, among.- other- things : . .;■ 

Re-occupation of Novorossiisk by the Russians on 10 Sept.; 
armored boat flotilla in the Sea of Azov; ships sunk In the. 
Arctic by submarines and awards conferred. For copy as for 
l/Skl 30186/43 geh. see War Dipry,- P^rt D, "Data on the ■•■ 
Enemy Situation 1943". . ..-..• ...'.'■ 

Situation 3 Oct. . j : \ 
I. War in Foreign Wa ters 
Nothing to report, ;■ 



II. Situation West Area' 

1. Enemy Situation: 

Over the Bay of Biscay 42 planes were detected on 
operation. Between 1918 and 2140 one British vessel each 
was located in BE 9890, AL 68lQ s BE 9440 and AM 44?0. 

Our air reconnaissance reported at 0951 ^ freighters 
tanker and 6 destroyers on course 250 degrees in BE J>1q2 

5 — 

From 2115* vessels were located in the Channel west of 
Boulogne, northwest of Calais and in Les Sept lies area. 

2 . Own Situation : 

Atlantic Coast: 

Seven submarines were escorted out of Brest, St. 
Na zaire and La Pall ice. The tanker NORDVAARD left Brest at 
I65O with escort Lezardrieux. Air Commander, Atlantic Coast 
plans to guide the destroyer sub-division to steam trawlers 
with radar on 4 Oct. So far this operation had post- 
poned owing to fog. 

Channel Coast: 

Torpedo boat T "19" put in to Flushing in the 
morning,. Torpedo boats T "22", "23". "25" and "27" left 
Brest at 1900 for transfer to St. Malo; The convoy of the 
steamer LIVADIA from Dieppe to Boulogne was carried, out 
with 14 escort vessels and is- scheduled to continue- t: Ostend 
at 2400. At 2331 British long-r*nge batteries fired on one 
of our westbound ©envoys between Blanc-Nez ' and Gris Nez with- 
out effect; our batteries returned fire. 

Two ELM/ J mines were swept west of Zeebruegge and 14 ELM/A 
mines between Nieup-ort and Ostend. 

The PT boat mine laying operation during the night of 2 
Oct. was canceled on account of bad visibility. The Torpedo 
operation by the 5th PT boat Flotilla was not carrier; ; o'ut 
owing to negative air reconnaissance. • 

Group West transmits a report of Commander, 2nd Coast patrol 
Force on the brief reports of the 6th minesweeper Flotilla and 
the 2nd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla on the. exchange of gun- 
fire during the night of 1 Oct. 

For copy see teletype 1610. 




111 • North ■■' Sea / Norws y , Northern Wa ters 

1. North Sen: 

Patrol operations were to some extent hampered by 
unfavorable weather. . Three ground mines were swept west of 
Scheveningen. In the Dutch coastal area s, few bombs were .s 
dropped by enemy planes. No casualties or damage sustained . 
Patrol boat "2009" was set on fire off Vere by eight enemy 
planes and capsized, casualties being sustained. Minesweeper 
M "438" was' damaged in an air attack of Wemeldingen. • 

For report of Naval Command, North on the heavy enemy attack 
on 2 Oct. on Emden see teletype 0801.- ■ The damage caused was 
already reported on 2 Oct. Under "Aerial Warfare". 

2 . Norway, Northern Waters : 

Enemy Situation: 

Over the North Sea 23 planes were detected on 
operation. On 1 Oct. and 2 Oct. single reconnaissance planes 
were reported in the areas of Banak and Nordkyn. 

Own Sit uation: 

On 2 Oct. the steamer ROTENFELS (8,000 GRT) carry- 
ing a cargo of ore went aground while lying anchored off 
Roervik. The ship was damaged and towed off. 

Seventeen vessels were escorted, north and .18 south. The 
Task Force reports that during the night prior to the 
midget-submarine attack and on the morning itself the 
barrage gap to the TIRPITZ net enclosure was open owing - 
to continuous boat traffic with teletype station "Dosskopf". 
During darkness the gap was patrolled by a sailing smack 
manned by TIRPITZ personnel. Furthermore, the hydrophone 
station aboard the TIRPITZ was manned until broad daylight 
at 0700. .••..;•-. ' ; 

This report gives decisive, .information on the submarine's 
penetration into the net enclosure. 

Meteorological operation "Kreuzritter". began from Hammer f est 
on the evening of 2 Oct. and operation "Schatzgrae'ber 11 was 
commenced on 3 Oct. 0310. • • .■ 

Group North/Fleet has transmitted to the 5th Air Force 


3 Oct. 19^3 ■ CONFIDENTIAL 

agreement of Chief, Naval Meteorological Service to the 
installation of a meteorological station on Hope Island 
for the Air Forces; a naval station will not be set up-. 
Admiral, Northern Waters has orders to communicate direct 
with the 5th Air Force regarding prepart ions for this 
project as well as transport and instant ion of the station. 

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entranc e s, Baltic S ea 

1 . Ene my S i t ua t ion : ■ 

Minor gunfire and slight patrol bo^t traffic 
were observed in Kronstadt Bay. Eighty planes flew in over- 
Denmark, the Baltic Sea entrances, Fehmarn Belt, Luebeck 
Bay and the central part of ' the Baltic, apparently on 
mining operations. A returning Liberator was shot down by 
naval anti-aircraft guns in the outer Kiel estuary. 

2. Own Situation: 

Three ELM/A mines were swept in the Fehmarn area 
and five in the central part of the Baltic. 

Group North/Fleet' submits a brief report of the ? LUETZOW on 
her transfer from 23 Sept. to 30 Sept. For copy see teletype 
1232. In the whole Baltic Sea area convoy and transport 
traffic was carried out as ■ planned and. without^ incident. 

The Finns swept four Russian ground mines in the P or ka 11a - : 
Helsinki channel on 2 Oct. • 

The heavy gun carriers of the 24th Landing" Flotilla 'on 
barrage patrol in the "Seeigol" area were relieved by the 
2^th Minesweeper Flotilla and will transfer to the Irbcn 
Straits as anti-aircraft defense for merchant shipping. 

V. Submarine Warfare 

From the patrol line of Group "Rossbach": "'two submarines 
report an attack by enemy planes which, however, caused no 
damage. Three submarines of the patrol' line were probably 
sighted by planes, according' to" radio' intelligence. These •'■ > 
planes are possibly the advance reconnaissance- of the await- 
ed convoy. It is possible that the convoy has already passed 


3 Oct. 19^3 confidential 

the patrol line, and, If so, it -will no longer be possible 
to intercept it. 

No further important reports have been received from the 

VI . Ae rial W arfare 

1. British Isle s pnd Vicinity : 

The 3rd Air "Force had 15 heavy fighters out :n 
free lance opera t ions over the Atlantic. Two enemy planes 
are reported shot down. Nine bombers attacked airfields ■ 
in the Bedford area and 16 heavy fighters attacked airfields 
in the Cambridge area . 

During the day the enemy attacked airfields and patrol 
vessels in Holland. Four airfields and several boats were 
damaged. Two enemy planes were brought down.. In Belgium 
the airfield at Beauvais Tille was badly damaged. In 
Western France, Le Havre and Fecamp were raided as well 
as the electric power plants at Mur de Bretagne, Le 
Treport and Orleans. Three enemy planes were shot down. 

Over Germany there was lively reconnaissance activity by 
single planes in the northwest and in the Baltic Sea area. 

During the night Cassel was heavily raided by about '• 3Q0 '....; 
enemy planes. Our fighters, numbering 26l, went up in defense 
and shot down 15 planes, theselves losing 8. The damage to 
industrial and traffic installations in Cassel is serious. 
For particulars see "Daily Situation". 

2. Mediterranean Theater: 

The 2nd Air Force reports an attack by five 
fighter-bombers on LST r s off Termoli. One LST was damaged. 
Air reconnaissance was also- carried out. The enemy carried.' 
out reconnaissance in the Bologna - Padua area and raided 
Civitavecchia. In addition, continuous attacks are reported 
from the front. 

3. Eastern Front: 

Fifty two enemy planes were shot down over the:' ■:, 
Army front on 2 Oct. We- lost one plane. Nothing special is 
reported by the 4th and 5th Air Forces . 




VI I . Warfare in the Med 1 ter ra ne an a nd Bis ck Sea 
~L • Enemy Situation : 

On the evening of 2 Oct. 3 tankers, 1 freighter, 

2 escort vessels end 16 vessels, presumably minesweepers , 

put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic. On 3 Oct. 7 destroyers, 
and, at 1415,. the VALIANT put in from the Mediterranean. 
One DIDO class put out on the evening destination unknown. 

The large eastbound convoy -which entered the Mediterranean 
on the evening of 2 Oct. was not detected again. 

Our own air reconnaissance in the Corsica - Sardinia area 
was incJr.plete because- of unfavorable weather. Only a few 
reports Were received ^Iso from the Tyrrhenian Sea. At 
O85O.4 torpedo boats and 3 landing boats on course west 
northwest were sighted 10 miles east of Cagliari. 

The hunt carried out for the submarine which attacked 
submarine chaser "2210" seems to have been successful; 
according to a report from German Naya.l Command, Italy, 

Submarine chaser "2208" reports having out-maneuvered a 

spread of three torpedoes southeast of Rapallo, Submarine 

chase was taken up by her and later on continued by a- ■ 
motor minesweeper. • .••: 

Motor minesweeper R "212" was unsuccessfully attacked by 
an enemy submarine off Bastia. 

According to photographic reconnaissance the following were 
lying in Taranto at 1025: ': 

3 light cruisers, including an Italian one, 3 destroyers:, 
2 torpedo boats,. 6 vessels, apparently torpedo boats, 6- 
submarines, 3 of them in dock, 53 small vessels (naval), 

10 LST's. 1 large passenger steamer. 3 tankers, 19 freighters. 
Only a few light naval forces were detected in Brindisi but' 
the number of freighters ■■ had increased. In the harbor of 
Termoli 4 ships were observed, apparently for the first time 
enemy vessels. : v 

^ • Own Situa tion: 

On 2 Oct. 2300 PT boats unexpectedly sighted a 
receding convoy 40 miles northeast of Ustica. Fuller reports 
have not yet been received. This confirms that conveys are 
out at sea at night. 

Commander, Supply and Transport, Corsica reports at 2300 


■j. Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 


the completion of evacuation. From 1? 15 Bastia was under 
enemy fire. PT boats were disposed erst of Corsica as flanking 
defense for ferry traffic. 

The minelayer POMMERN has completed her operation according 
to plan. The escort boats LIDO and SCARP ANTO. were commissioned 
in Venice. In the area of Naval Shore Command, West Adriatic 
an escprt group of five vessels and a H°rbor Defense Group a 
Venice are being formed. Preparations are being made for the 
formation of a submarine Chaser group, The manning of three 
coastal batteries in the Venice area has started. 

Submarine U "6l6" left Toulon for Salerno Ba\. Submarine U 
"410" has now reported on arrival, in connection with her 
successes of 1 Oct., that the sinking of the steamer of 
8,000 GRT was observed and sinking of the other four 
steamers totaling 31,000 GRT is to be assumed on the basis 
of dept setting (torpedo pistol Pi 2 - 7 meters) 

3 • Area Naval Group South: 

a . Adriat ic Sea: 

Radio communication has been established 
between the naval liaison officer to Army Group F and Durazzo, 
Cattaro, Ragusa and Zara, according to a report from Group 
South. According to' a decision by Air Force Command, 
Southeast; convoy escort in the Adriatic will at present 
be provided by Air Commander, Albania, since Air Commander, 
Croatia has not sufficient forces available. 

The loss of the steamer DEA MARC ELLA south of Sibenik 
was due to stranding and fire caused by coastal battery 
gunfire. Her German crew was rescued. 

Group South has again stressed its request for allocation 
of vessels for the Adriatic, reporting the following as 
minimum requirements : 

a. for offensive operations: 

2 PT boat flotillas, 1 midget submarine flotilla • 

b. for minesweeping end escort operations: 

3 motor minesweeper flotillas and as many torpedo boats 
as possible. 

c. for local patrol and minesweeping: 
3 coast patrol flotillas 

d. for submarine chase: 

3 submarine chaser groups 




e . for mining opera 1 1 ons : 

1 minelayer unit and 1 net barrage unit 

f. for anti-aircraft defense of ports 
Siebel anti-aircraft ferries 

g. for supply traffic: 

naval landing craft , as man^ ?s possible, pIso barges, 
lighters and tugs 

h. for local defense: 

naval artillery lighters. 

Group South also reports that an increase in the number of 
vessels in the Aegean is imperative and that submarine chasers. 
motor minesweepers, PT boats and submarines are primarily 
needed. For- copy of report see teletype 13^5- 

b. Aegean Sea : 

■11 ^"^ . r 

On 2 Oct. the airfield of Gadura on Rhodes 
was attacked by six to eight enemy planes without any 
particular damage. Over the central and southern parts of 
the Aegean several enemy reconnaissance planes were detected 
throughout the day of 2 Oct. . ■ 

Naval Staff has advised Armed Forces High Command, Oper- 
ations Staff, Navy and the.. Naval. Lia is on Officers to 
High Command Army, Army Gernal Staff and Commander In 
Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff regarding naval par- 
ticipation in the landing operation on Kos, based on the 
report by Group South. (See War Diary 2 Oct.) For copy 
of teletype as per l/Ski I op 2?6?V i O Gkdos see War Diary, 
Part C, Vol. XIV. 

Group South reports that the landing on Kos beg^n at 0-400 
as planned. Commander, 21st Submarine Chaser Flotilla, re- 
ported at 0922 that the landing was almost completed and 
that it had been successful. Casualties are slight in 
spite of strong resistance. Our radio intelligence inter 
cepted at 0653 an enemy order for air attacks on our 
invasion forces. Our landing vessels, with the exception 
of two naval landing craft, are on return passage. 

After completion of the mopping-up of Andros the bulk of 
the Army Group was transported back to Syra . 

Sweeping of mines from the barrage north of Skiathos and 
in the harbor of Argo-stoli was continued. 




c . Black Sea : 

Enemy S 1 1 up 1 1 on : ■.■;:'" 

At 1600 Feodosiya was attacked by eleven planes . 
Twenty-five high-explosive bombs fell in the harbor . basin 
and on the mole, causing only slight damage. 

Own Situation: 

Nothing to report from any of the patrol lines 
during the night of 2 Oct. The patrol line, north . of the ., 
Taman coast was repeatedly attacked from the air; .two, enemy 
planes were shot down. 

The last transports out of Senna ya arrived at Kerch. . : 

Installations in Taman and Sennsy* were blown up. Ferry : 
traffic over the Strait of Kerch, between Kossa Shushka. 
and Yenikale as well as convoys between Kerch and Sevastopol 
were carried out as. planned and without incident. 

VIII. Situation East Asia 

Nothing to report. 


- 36 . . • ■ ,. 


4 Oct. 19^3 ';■■ CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Politica l Import ance 

"DNB" transrits a Spanish, press rep ;rt 'from London, 
according to which Allied discussions are taking place 
at Brindisi regarding Italy's admission to the Allied 
Nations . ,•-.■■■'. 

Conference on the S it uation with C hief,: N- r val S taff 

I . Army Situation: 

Evacuation of the Tainan penisula is' being continued a $ 
planned. On the eastern front the areas of Me 1 it op o l/Zap or ozhe 
and of Smolensk are the two enemy points of concentration. 
The Dnieper line is firmly in our hands. On the Volchov front 
the enemy has again taken up the offensive. Army General Staff, 
calculates that approximately 50 divisions pre being assembled 
for the Russian winter offensive (80 according to Japanese 
Statements ) . 

Italy : 

The ferry operation between Corsica and the mainland. is 
completed. The enemy is pursuing hotly in the Foggia area.;' 
in the Naples area he is only following up our movements 
with hesitation. 

Ba lkans : 

Partisan activity has Increased in the Agram area , The 
partisan leader Tito is trying to recapture, the coastal' 
area of Split. The. operation against Kos is proceeding 
according to plan. 

II. The steamer LIVAPIA was sunk in the Channel by enemy 
long-range batteries during' the night of . 3 Oct. Thus the first 
attempt to withdraw large vessels from' the- west area to the. 
east has failed, but the operation will be continued when 
conditions ^re more favorable. > ' 

III. For report by Operations Division, Fleet Operations 
Section on revised instruction of Armed Forces High Command, 
Operations Staff regarding Denmark, see statements in War- 
Diary under 2 Oct. and j5 Oct. 

IV. Chief, Naval Communications Division, Rear Admiral 
Stummel, will be" unable to attend to his duties for 
several weeks because of injuries sustained while picking 



4 Oct. 19^5 

V. Chief, Naval Intelli gence Divisi on reports that out of 
175 senior officers at the Italian officers' prison, camp in 
posen only four have declared allegiance to Mussolini. 

It seems that the Spanish Government is making preparations ■- 
for the -withdrawal of the "Blue" Division from the fighting 
line on the eastern front. 

Reuter reports press statements by the U. S. Secretary of 
the N-vy, Knox, at Algiers, after visiting Eisenhower, Alex- 
ander and Cunningham. According to these statements the 
Allied attack on Europe has not yet begun and the most 
difficult part of the war is yet to come. The battle has so 
far only been for outposts. At present the submarine menace is 
not so serious, through there was a time '■when everything hung 
in balance. Knox warned against underestimating with German 
submarine. The Germans would reappear on the scene with newly 
equipped submarines,, Their submarines had again appeared in 
the Atlantic in full strength. Submarine warefare is a serious 
threat as long as the war lasts. 

Special Items 

I. According to telephonic advice from Armed Forces High 
Command, Operations Staff, Navy, the -Fuehrer will address 
a letter to the Duce regarding the const tut ion' of the future 
Italian Armed Forces. Branches of the Armed Forces are to 
submit suggestions for this at once, According. to a report 
of Cdr. Meier, the Army will suggest the formation of four 
Italian Divisions, to be trained in France and the Air Force 
the formation of several groups. 

Chief/ Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster 
Division is of opinion that it will be impossible ti) lay c own 
such specific requirements as to number and type regarding 
the Italian Navy. After having obtained the approval of 
Commander in Chief, Navy by telephone, Chief, Organization 
and Mobilization Branch submitted the following suggestions 
to the Fuehrer Headquarters by telephone on the afteroon of 
3 Oct. As regards Commander In Chief's approval is to be 
noted that he personally included "submarine warfare" in 
Section 3 ss he had in view possibly using the "Gross i" 
Unit again for submarine operations when conditions in 
Italy became more settled. 

1. Formation of commends and offices for Coastal 
tasks of .the German Navy in the Italian area, such as commands 
for coastal defense as well as offices for harbor traffic. 
The type, .number, strength and operational areas of these 


4 Oct. 1943 ■. ■,■'.'• CONFI DENTIA L 

commands and offices, which : - are under German oper- 
ational control, are to be determined in direct discussions 
between the two High Comma nds ... . 

2. Formation of further, end/or retention of' already 

existing smoke- laying units, construction parties, and 
similar units to be used also outside the Italian area for 
tasks of the German Navy. Here too the number and strength 
should be decided in separate discussions. ■■-. 

3. In special exceptions to be determined by Naval 
Staff, formation of Italian units for patrol of coastal 
waters, commando operations and submarine warfare under 
German opera ti ona 1 c ontr ol . 

II. Instructions of Chief, Naval Staff, regarding advice . 
to Admiral Inspector of the Navy on the war situation are..- 
contained in order l/Skl 50094/43 geh. "For copy, see War 
Diary, Part B, Vol. V. 

III. Submarine Division advises Operations Division for 
inf orma t i on of ins tr uc t i ons 1 C omma nder s , S ubina r ine s , 
West and Mediterranean regarding the transfer of five 
submarines to the Mediterranean during the next new moon 
period. For teletype in question as per l/Skl 3000/43 Gkdos 
Chefs, see War Diary, Part C, Vol IV. 

IV. According to advice from Quartermaster Division, 
Fleet Branch, the PRINZ EUGEN will h^ve to undergo a six to 
eight weeks' engine overhaul, and subsequently tw.o months' . 
training before she will be ready for operations. Complete 
operational readiness is, therefore, not to be expected 
before the beginning of February .1944 at the earliest , 

Situation 4 Oct. 

I. War in Foreign Waters ■;. . 

All vessels in foregin waters were advised of enemy 
shipping movements by Radiogram 2103 . 

Otherwise nothing to report. 



II . Situation West Area 

'"'■*■• Enemy Situation: 

Forty -four planes "were observed on operation over 
the Biscay area. One British vessel was located at QjOo in 
BE 2990, one at 0^40 in BE 6110 and one at 1155 in AM 4l40. 

Radar locations in the areas of Boulogne and Calais -continued 
until 0224. Further locations were made from 0102 to 0156 
in the area of Les Sept lies. 

2 . Own Situation : 

Atlantic Coast: 

One ELM/ J mine was swept by a plane off Lorient. 
The LONDOR put in to La Pallice a% 1600. The FALKE and 
torpedo boat T "14" were transferred from Bordeaux to 
Royan Roads . 

Off Brest, Lorient, St. Naeaire and La Pallice four sub- 
marines were escorted out and four in. 

Channel Coast: 

Torpedo boats T "22"./ "25", "25" and "27" had an 
engagement with enemy destroyers at 0202 four miles- west' 
of Les Sept lies. Commander, 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla 
first reported two and later four modern destroyers , one 
possibly being a small cruiser. Both sides brought their 
guns and torpedoes into full action; a torpedo hit on a 
destroyer and a large number of gun hits were observed. 
Actual sinking of enemy vessels was not ascertained. 
Torpedo boat T "27" received a hit from from 15 cm. shell 
in her boiler room and sustained casualties - two seriously ( 
wounded and two slightly wounded. For brief action report 
of Commander. 4th torpedo boat Flotilla see teletype 1415. 
Repairs to torpedo boat T "27" will require one to two 
days. The Flotilla put in to St. Malo in the morning. When 
entering port torpedo boat T "22" had a minor collision 
with patrol boat "7 07" and sustained, slight damage; repairs 
will require two to three weeks. 

The convoy of the tanker NORVAARD left- Lezardrieux at lbOO 
for Cherbourg. Three boats of the 4th torpedo Boat Flotilla 
provided close escort from St. Malo and then put in to 
harbor again. Seven boats of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla in 
two groups were in defensive patrol line from 2200 north- 
west of Peterport. Mine -exploding vessel "180" sustained 
slight damage from splinters when one of our westbound 
convoys was shelled by long-range batteries during the 


-40- : 

] 4 Oct. 19^3 ■ CONFIDENTIAL 

night of 3 Oct. -All vessels put in to Boulogne. 

The convoy of steamer LIVADIA started on passage from 
Boulogne to Ostend at midnight and -was shelled from 0115 
to 0157 by long-range batteries from Dover. At 0150 the 
steamer sprang a leak forward folio-wing s close hit, but 
■was unable to continue. Foliwing a second hit close to . ■;. 
her side damage was caused to the engine. An attempt to • 
tow the ship in to Calais was unsuccessful and she sank 
at 0226. Her entire crew was rescued. The escort vessels .: 
sustained no damage or casualties. For brief action report 
see teletype 0630. 

The naval supply depot near Rouen was damaged during an- 
enemy air attack by 12 planes with fighter escort on 3 
Oct. at 19^5. Traffic was also interrupted through one ferry 
being put out of action. 

III. North Sea, No rway, Northern Waters : 

1. North Sea : • ' ■ 

Torpedo boat T "19" was transferred from Flushing 
to Rotterdam. Petrol positions were not taken up ow xng to 
the weather. An enemy air attack on convoy traffic between 
Zijpe and Wemeldingen on the afternoon of 3 Oct. caused 
damage to one heavy gun carrier and two' naval landing craft. , ; 
On the morning of 4 Oct. the ferrv at Zi^pe was again 
attacked. One enemy plane was shot down and one set on. fire • 
by boats of the Maas Flotilla. A tug of a convoy off Wemeld- 
ingen was beached. A further plane was shot down. From 09^2 
an enemy formation flew into the Heligoland Bight in three 
waves but was forced by a large number of our fighters to 
turn away to the west. Three planes are reported shot down 
by gighters . .... 

2 . Norway, Norther n Waters: 

Enemy Situation: 

Over the North Sea 8 planes were observed- in the 
morning and 27 in the afternoon on operations in the direction 
of the Norwegian coast, the northern .area and Iceland. In 
the morning Ik planes were detected on air-sea rescue operat- 
ions northeast of Cromer and In the southern' part of the •■■ 
North Sea. In the area of Vardoe slight air reconnaissance 
was reported on 3 Oct. 




On 4 Oct., . between 0755 and 0835 about 44 British and U. S. 
carrierborne planes of the Martlet, Skua, Martin and 
Thunderbolt types carried out surprise attacks in the 
Bodoe area on two of our convoys, one northbound and 
the other southbound, as veil as on ships in Bodoe harbor. 
At 16^5 Admiral, North Norwegian Coast reported an air for- 
mation in AF 6429 on course south. 

At 1300 a Ju 88 sighted in AF 26?1 17- warships, including 
a carrier, on course 90 degrees. This, report did not reach the 
naval operations office until a second plane had landed, . 
as the shadowing plane did not return and the radio message 
sent was only picked up at sea. 

Consequently the first reports as to the extent and the nature 
of the operation were at first only transmitted through Air 
Force stations. Naval Staff was also unable to gain a clear 
picuture of events from individual radio messages inter- 
cepted from escort vessels regarding, air attacks and hits on 
ships in the convoy which messages came in late in the 'morning, 
quite apart from the fact that the above mentioned reports 
were not submitted unfoil the afternoon, entailing a regrett- 
able delay. 

Own Situation: 

The enemy raid, which was apparently carried out 
by strong British and American fleet units and which came 
as a complete surprise owing to absence of bur own re- 
connaissance, has caused us appreciable losses. Altogether 
6 steamers totaling approximately 22,300 'GRT were lost and 
4 further steamers totaling 18,000 GRT more or less badly 
damaged. The latter include the . tanker SCHLESWIG (10/762 
GRT) with a cargo of fuel oil and the troop transport 
SKRAMSTAD (4,300 : GRT) with several hundred troops aboard. 
Difficult communications hampered, exact determination of 
the losses sustained, which are now known to be as follows: 

The Norwegian steamer TOPEKA (4,991 GRT) burned' out; 6 of 
the ship's anti-aircraft crew dead, 4 seriously wounded. 

The Norwegian steamer VAGAN (687 GRT) sank following a bomb 

Naval landing craft MFP "231" was beached after a bomb 
hit forward; 2 of her crew were wounded. 

The tanker SCHLESWIG (10,762 GRT) received 3 bomb hits. 
The vessel Is out of control and has anchored. 1 

The steamer KERKPLEIN: 2 bomb hits , steering out of order, 


4 Oct. 19*13 CONFIDENTIAL 

stern on fire; 13 dead and 17 seriously wounded. The 
steamer was towed to Bodoe roads. 

The steamer La Plata (8,056 GRT) was beached after a bpirb 

The troop transport SKRAMSTAD (4,3.00 GRT) was hit by a 
bomb; probably cannot be kept afloat. About 40 men' seriously 

The steamer IBIS (1,367 GRT) sustained slight damage from 
ma chine -gunfire. „., 

The steamer MALAGA (2, 7 11 GRT) sustained minor damage from 
an unexpeploded bomb. 

During the attack on Bodoe harbor and roads the steamer 
RABAT (2,719 GRT) sank following a bomb hit. The steamer 
KAGUIR (1,536 GRT) was beached in the inner harbor following 
a bomb hit. 

Only 2 of the attacking planes were shot down, according'' ' 
to reports received so far. 

Two U. S. Pilots were taken prisoner. 

Our own countermeasures : At 1940 Admiral, North Norwegian 
Coast ordered coast alarm third degree and at 1139 second 
degree . 

From 1045 - 1119 Air Commander, Lofoten sent out two Ju 
88 ' s and one He 115 on reconnaissance for the assumed 

Admiral, Northern Waters has ordered the Task Force to 

maintain three hours' readiness from 1900. For 5 Oct, one 

submarine is disposed in AF 37^0 and two' submarines in AF 

Admiral, Northern Waters reported at 1942 that the enemy's 
final plans could not be recognized and that further air 
attacks were to be expected. At 1900 Group/North Fleet gave 
its views on the situation as follows: The carrier sent out 
against our shipping, which was escorted by forces presumably 
superior to our Task Force, will turn away again after the 
attack. An air formation in AF 6429 is combing the coast for 
further convoys. Reappearance on 5th Oct. is unlikely. 
Group North/Fleet is obviously correct in its opinion that 
the enemy has no aims other than air attack on our own 
shipping. The 5th Air Forceplans further reconnaissance at 
dawn on 5 Oct. ' " ; 

Naval Staff is of opinion that ' following our operation on 
Spitsbergen some kind of enemy activity in Northern Waters 
was to be expected. 


4 Oct. 1945. ;;>■•:, CONFIDENTIAL 

Our convoy traffic has become obvious target of attack 
since the cessation of Swedish transit traffic. By its 
operation "Zitronella" (attack on British base at Spits- 
bergen, Tr. N) the Task Force has 'drawn great attention 
to itself. This enemy operation, as well as the midget 
submarine attack in Alta must, therefore, be regarded as 
the beginning of systematic provocation of our heavy 
vessels, aiming at elimination of our battleships in 
order to obviate the undesirable tying down of heavy 
enemy vessels in favor of concentration against the 
Japanese Fleet. 

Further, it is reported: 

At 0507 submarine chaser "1214" sank, probably through .. ; .r 
striking a mine, in the outlet of the Bussesund while 
escorting a westbound convoy. .■■•'■■;■. 

Fifteen ships were escorted north and 24 south.- 

In connection with the proposal of Group North/Fleet (see 
War Diar 30 Sept) to assign additional armed fishing 
vessels to Naval Command, Norway in order to strengthen 
defense in Alta Fjord, Operations Division decides as 
follows : 

"1. Out of the first 300 armed fishing vessels, 66 were 
assigned to Naval Command, Norway (more than to any other-; 
theater of war). Naval Command, Norway will also in future 
receive preference in assignments. 

2. If armed fishing vessels are. considered suitable for 
strengthening defense Of the : Alta' Fjord anchorages , Naval 
Command, Norway must provide some for this purpose from- its 
own numbers . ■■' .-.- 

With regard to the plan to transfer the HUASCARAN tp Alta 
for repairs to TIRPITZ, Commander, Submarines, Norway- 
requests that he and Commanding Admiral , Submarines be 
consulted in this matter and points out that this repair 
ship is indispensable for- submarine repairs at Trondheim. 
and Bergen. For copy of report see teletype 1425. 

The following details are reported regarding the successes of 
submarine Group "Wilking" in the North Siberian area from 
30 Sept. to 2 Oct.' against a southwest convoy. 

Submarine U r, 601" sank .1 steamer '-■($, 100 GRT), U "703" 1 

steamer (4,200 GRT), U "96O" 2 steamers (8,900 GRT) and 1 

escort vessel. An ice-breaker, and. 2 escort vessels have 

escaped. --• ; • " '---" 

•• •'.•• ' - ♦■-■ •» —..'■ - ' . ■•" : 

U "387" and ^,"255" nave put out from Narvik into the 
operational. areas Off the . Lofoten Islands (AF 3750 and AF 
3730). ..';.: ;'.-. ' . 




Weather ship KOBURG has reported that staying in her 
present position for the winter is considered possible. 
Group North/Fleet reports in this connection that rapid 
deterioration In ice conditions renders release of the 
ship by icebreakers Impossible and that there is no 
possibility of seaplanes or land based planes making a 
landing, according to pir reconnaissance. Ice conditions 
also prevent the use of submarines. It is therefore intended 
to leave the ship in the Ice and to have the transmission 
of -weather reports commence from the end of October, since 
the enemy Air Force will no longer be able to re^ch the ship 
owing to darkness. As soon as the days begin to lengthen 
the weather reports by r^dio will be discontinued and the 
ship's crew will be fetched later on. Naval Staff agrees with 
this solution. 

I V . Skagerrak, Balt ic S ea Entr ances, Ba ltic Se a 
1. Enemy Situation: 

At 0150 a large fire was observed on Seiskar 
and at 10^5 dense smoke. 

2. Own Situation: 

Nothing to -report from the area of Commanding 
Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. 

Convoy and transport operations In the Baltic Sea were 
carried out as planned and without incident. 

Two boats of the 3rd Patrol Boat Flotilla are in position 
in the Irben Strait for relay escort. Heavy, gun carriers 
are still under way. 

Battery "Prlnz Heinrich" shelled the Sudomech Dockyard 
from 0930 - 0955 and Kanoerski Dockyard and Petropalovsk 
from 1028 - 1200. Hits causing heavy fires were observed. 
Counter-fire was feeble and targets were heavily smoke 

The Reich- Commissioner of Maritime Shipping does not 
regard the air patrol off the Baltic coast provided by the 
Air Force as sufficient and has requested Commander in Chief, 
Air Force to transfer two fighter flights to Libau. The 
Commissioner requests Naval Staff to investigate whether, and 
to what extent, escort forces can be used to protect ship - 
mg in this «rea , and, further, to see to it that vessels on 
the run to the Baltic States are equipped with anti aircraft 
guns as quickly as possible. 



Operations Division replies as follows.: 

"Escorts for merchant shipping in the northern part of 
the Baltic for defense against air attack cannot he provid- 
ed at present owing to shortage of suitable navel vessels. 
Moreover, such escort operations, .which would also have 
to extend to the Aaland Sea area considering the present sir 
situation, would necessarily involve considerable delays for 
shipping. Local anti-aircraft relay escorts are, however, 
already provided. A basic order for equipment with anti- 
aircraft guns of all merchantmen passing north of the line 
Memel - southern point of . Oe land has already been issued 
and will be carried out according to thearms available. ■ 

The Air Force has promised fighter defense at local points 
of concentration, as far as forces are available." 

V. Submarine Warfare 

I. Enemy Situation: 

The following is an extract from brief Report. 
No. lg/43 of Naval Intelligence Division. 

According to an official statement in Washington, three 
German submarines were sunk and a fourth damaged recently 
in the Atlantic by a Grumman-Avenger bomber which took off 
from an escort aircraft carrier. Sixty-five survivors were 
picked up by a destroyer. .■;..- 

Chief, Ant i- Submarine Division on the Staff of the U. S. 
Fleet Admiral stated on 28 Sept. that more than 4,000 
Allied vessels had been convoyed across the Atlantic from 
May to the end of August this year, without a single: ship 
having been lost by submarine attack. 

Naval Intelligence Division remarks in this connection: 

According to data available, the figure mentioned of oyer 
4,000 ships convoyed across the Atlantic without loss from 
May to the end of August may be correct. 

Naval Intelligence Division, Enemy Situation Branch estim- 
ates trans-atlantic traffic as follows: 








Augus t 



1,200 ships 

1,190 ships 

1,0§2 ships 

■ 1 ,107 ships 

Total about ~T, 579 ships 

Chief, Ant i- Submarine Division on the' Staff 1 of the TJ. 8. 
Fleet Admiral also announced the formation of the 10th Fleet, 
Incorporating all naval vessels for operations against Axis 
submarines . 

Further statements regarding anti-submarine measures of 
the U. S. Navy deal with new types of escort vessels, 
destroyer construction and improvements in location gear. 

2 . • Own Situatio n : 

Reports of two submarines of Group "Rossbach" show 
that the expected convoy evidently passed our patrol line 
on 3 Oct. at 2100. At this time destroyers, apparently 
of the remote escort, were sighted and from dawn on 4 Oct. 
enemy planes also. 

Unfortunately the sighting of these destroyers was not 
reported promptly enough for an order to be given to pursue 
and search. The operation was therefore unsuccessful, although 
radio intelligence provided some data. 

Submarine Division in this connection points out the 
difficulties of intercepting the enemy without air reconnaiss- 
ance and complete radio intelligence. Reconnaissance reports 
from planes, for which the operational area was within 
range from Norway, could have influenced the present oper- 
ation decidedly. 

Group "Rossbach" will proceed from 5 Oct. at 0800 on course 
195 degrees in order to intercept an eastbound convoy m 
AK 80 and AK 90 on 7 Oct. Data' on this is, however, based sole 
ly on an estimate of convoy schedules. U "455" reported bj 
short signal from the supply rendezvous as attack by carrier 
borne planes necessitating transfer to BD 8l. 

VI. Aerial Warfare 

1 . British Ilsles and Vicinity: 

The 3rd Air Force reports 25 planes out on operation 


4 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL 

over England end 13 over Biscay area. One Liberator was shot 

In the morning the enemy raided Frankfurt on Main with 300 
Fortresses in six waves. On the run-in a heavy escort off 
fighters accompanied them as far as Holland and met them 
again on the return flight. Our fighters numbering 302, 
went up In defense. For flight of a further formation of 
about 100 Liberators into "the Heligoland Bight see !, 3i.t 
uation North See". Altogether 18 enemy planes were shot 

During the night of 4 Oct. Frankfurt on Main was again 
heavily raided by about ^00 bombers, of which 10 were 
shot down by our fighters. For particulars of the appreciable 
damage caused In the Frankfurt area see "Daily Situation". 

Further attacks were; carried out during the night on 
Mannheim, Ludwigshafen and Worms, also causing serious 
damage to industrial installations. 

In Belgium and France airfields were attacked by smaller 
formations. Fifteen planes were on a mine laying operation 
over the mouth of the Gironde. 

^ • Mediterra nean Thea ter : 

Formations of the 3rd Air Force carried outt re 
connaissance flights as far as the Western Mediterranean* At 
1800 a large convoy of 80 vessels was detected off Cape 
Tenes and this is to be attacked by 80 bombers on 5 Oct. 

Air Force Command, Southeast had 21 <Ju 88' s and J>6 Stukas 
out on operation against Leros with good results. 

The enemy attacked the 'station and town of Bolzano, w.ith 
44 Fortresses and the station and town of Pisa with 28 
Fortresses. Here two of our ammunition tram's were destroyed 
and a goods train damaged. 

In an enemy air attack on the airfields of Athens - Tetoi 
and Argos altogether 16 of our planes were destroyed on the 
field. Over the Aegean nine reconnaissance planes were 
detected during the day and eight during the night. 

5 . Eastern Front: 

Nothing special is reported from the Army front-i The 
5th Air Force reports 17 planes on reconnaissance flights. 
For details of evaluations see "Situation Norway, Northern 
Waters" . 


4 Oct. 19^5 

VI I . Warfare in the Medi t erranean and B lack Sep 

1 . Enemy S ituat ion Mediterranean : 

Two transports, carrying troops "which had apparent- 
ly had been relieved, 12 freighters, 2 destroyers and 2 gun 
boats left Gibraltar; 6 freighters and 2 corvettes put out 
direct from the Mediterranean into the Atlantic. The. cruiser 
UGANDA,. 15 freighters and 4 corvettes arrived at Gibraltar 
from the Mediterranean. At 1400 the VALIANT, 3 ILLUSTRIOUS 
class, 15 destroyers, 2 transports, 30 freighters, 13 tankers 
etc. "were lying in port. 

The large convoy which put into the Mediterranean on 2 Oct. 
■was detected on 3 Oct. at l83Q north of Alboran consisting 
of 69 ships and on 4 Oct. at 6845 north of Oran consisting 
of 40 ships and 8 escort vessels.. . .-• . 

Our air reconnaissance also sighted: at 0824 1 transport on 
course west 60 miles north of Trapani; at 1930 3 small -warships 
30 miles southeast of Cagliari; at 2140 a merchantmen south of 
Punta Stilo on course northeast. 

PT boats and landing boats -were sighted off Olbia for the 
first time. Continuous freight traffic -was observed off the 
beachhead at Termoli 

No evaluations of air reconnaissance have been received from 
the eastern Mediterranean. 

2 . Own Situation Mediterranean : 

Our PT boat operation during the night of > Oct, 
led to an unsuccessful attack on a convoy escorted by destroy- 
ers 70 miles north northeast of Palermo. 

PT boats S "30" and S "33" were placed at the disposal of 
Naval Shore Commander, - North Adriatic by German Naval Command, 
Italy. The minelayer POMMERN left Toulon a.t 2000 on a new 
mine laying operation off the west coast of Italy. 

It is probable that the enemy submarine attacked southeast 
of Rapallo was destroyed. 

Chief, Supply and Transport, Leghorn reported at 0704 that 
the withdrawal from Corsica w^s carried out according to 
plans . 

The Fuehrer has addressed the following message to Commanding 
General, Armed Forces, South with copy to Commander in Chief, 
Air Force, Operations Staff and High Command Navy,- Naval Staff 



4 Oct 1943 -.; ■::; • :■..;-:- ■■ CONFIDENTIAL 

"The withdrawal of troops, Including their heavy - 
arms and equipment, from Sardinia and Corsica to the main- 
land was an exceptional feat. It was- hardly to be hoped 
that this evacuation from one Island to the other and thence 
by sea to the mainland would be completed so successfully. 

The German forces, pushing though the treacherous Badoglio 
troops, shelled from the sea and attacked from the air by 
by strong enemy formations, made their way to Bastia, 
recaptured it and there held out against the attack of 
regular de Gaulle troops until evacuation to the main- 
land was completed in spite of numerous enemy submarines. 

I express my fullest appreciation. to the Commander on . ; 
Corsica, General Von Senger und Etterlin, to the troops 
under his command as well as to the Naval and Air Force 
escort and transport units and to their Commanders." 

Commanding General, Armed Forces, South advises Naval 
Staff for information hf his request to Armed Forces High 
Command, Operations Staff for allocation of two further 
21 cm. guns for defense of the Piombino Strait (See '.., 
teletype 1925) . •. 

3 • Aree Naval Group So uth; 

a . Adriatic Sea : 

The steamers BOCCACIA and LEOPARDI and the 
tanker JOHN KNUDSEN arrived at Cattaro from Trieste on 
3 Oct. "• ■ ■ : . -. '. 

Naval Shore Commander reports that the coastal battery at 
Cattaro is, as an emergency measure, manned by Army troops. 

Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic reports plans to send 
1,500 coastal gunners during the night of k Oct. aboard five 
steamers to Dubrovnik and Durazzo end requests air escort and 
reconnaissance from. Air Commander, Dalmatia since naval 
escort cannot be provided. 

Army Group F advises in this connection that air escort can 
only be provided from Korcula southward. 

It is of importance for Adriatic shipping to note that an 
1700 an enemy submarine was sighted for the first time again; 
she was on course 6:0 degrees , kO miles north-northeast 
of Ancoria. Radiogram 1855 on this was transmitted from the 
submarine base at Pola to Commander Submarines, Italy and' 
German Naval Command, Italy. 



In accordance with Instructions from Operations Division 
dated 29 Sept. (see War Diary 2' Oct .) .regarding mine 
defense of the Adriatic Group South reports thaty.iri its 
view a barrage off Ancona is impracticable because data on 
navigation is lacking; it also, reports pl^ns. to effect 
transfers for mine defense of the e^st co^st of the Adriatic., 
beginning from Valona to the north, i.e. V. n lon~, Durczzo, 
Drin Gulf. 

This report by Group South obviously crossed with the last 
instructions from Operations Division of 7 Oct. (see War 
Diary 2 Oct.) regarding a barrage in s line from 
to Korcula . A reply to this enquiry is, therefore, to be 

b ' Aeg ean Sea ; 

Enemy air attacks in the C^ndir rver on the evening, 
of 3 Oct. and during th?t night caused only slight damage. 
For particulars of the attacks on the airfields of Tatol and 
Argos see "Aerial Warfare". 

The operation on Kos proceeded recording to pl- n n against 
slight enemy resistance. On the evening of 3 Oct. our 
forces were outside the city of Kos and the island airfields 
from which no enemy planes came out on operation. Operations 
from Cyprus rnd North Africa were ineffectual, whereas our 
Air Force in considerable strength ver^ effectively covered 
the advance of our troops. On 3 Oct. at 1400 1 cruiser and 
2 destroyers were reported appoaching northwest of Cyprus. 
Twelve Ju 88 ' s were sent out a gins t this unit. Other planes 
carried out fighter escort of our escort of our convoys, 
reconnaissance, air~ser rescue operations nnd dropping of 
a para troop company. On 4 Oct. at 0?00 the Commander of 
the landing troops reported that the airfield and harbor were 
in our hands and that 800 men, including 200 British, had 
been taken prisoner. 

A brief report by Commander, 21st Submarine Chaser Flotilla' 
(Lt. Car. Brand) liad been received on the prrt played by 
Naval Forces in this operation. For copy see teletype 1725. 

According to this report, several landing groups were ass- 
embled in the Naxos area on 2 Oct. On 3 Oct. between 
0400 and 0430 the first wave was landed by surprise at 
three points of the Island of Kos with naval 'landing craft. 
Two landings were made on the south coast by 0700. -These 
were attacked by enemy planes, of which two were shot down. 
The four steamers of the northern : group were unloaded to 
some extent under mortar fire rn£ shelling. This group also 
was attacked by planes, of which three were shot down. The 


4 Oct. 1943 CONFI DENT IAL 

passage of the small vessels and naval landing craft was 
also subjected to continuous mortar fire and, at times, to 
shelling. Our losses were insignigicant . Unloading was 
assisted by two armed fishing vessels, several motor boats 
and cutters. Four submarine chasers and two unloaded steam- 
ers received orders to depart at 1500. This convoy was 
shelled while passing the island of Callno. On receipt of the 
report that enemy naval forces had been sighted north- 
west of Cyprus, which by dead reckoning could reach the west- 
ern point of Kos at 2100, Commander, 21st Submarine Chaser 
Flotilla decided to discontinue operations immediately 
and to start back in several groups, avoiding direct courses 
and leaving behind the last four naval landing craft which 
were still loaded. All vessels participating have meanwhile 
reached harbor. The steamer CIT.TA DI SAVONA and submarine 
chaser "2102" were bombed and machine-gunned by seven low- 
flying enemy planes; only minor casualties were caused and 
one enemy plane was shot down. 

The prudent decisions taken by Commander, 21st Submarine 
Chaser Flotilla fully met the situation and were instrumental 
in reducing to the minimum the danger to our vessels from 
enemy naval forces, which was considerable when the situation 
as a whole is taken into account. 

c . Black Sea: 

Ene my Si t ua t i on : 

According to air reconnaissance three destroyers were 
lying in Tuapse. 

• Own SI tuation: . 

Nothing is reported from the patrol lines during the 
night of 3 Oct. The naval landing craft on the north coast 
of the Tainan Peninsula were repeatedly attacked by enemy 
planes during the day; two planes were shot down. Naval 
landing craft F "125, while returning from the inner 
part of Tainan. Bay, struck a mine at 0555 seven miles east- 
southeast of Kerch and was later shelled from the coast. 
The boat received three direct hits. Five men including the 
Commander of the group are" missing. 

Feodosiya was attacked 1?" times during the night of 3 Oct. .--;- 
and again four times during the -day. One lighter and one tug 
were damaged. The anti-aircraft defense of Feodosiya has been 
strengthened by two heavy batteries and one, light battery. 

Barrage "X" was laid in the Strait of Kerch as planned. 


4 Oct. 1943 ... CONFIDENTIAL 

Three boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla served as escorts for 
convoys from Feodosiya to Sevastopol during the night of 4 

In carrying out evacuation of the Gotenkopf bridgehead the 
following "were transferred from 28 Sept. to 3 Oct. inclusive: 

21,314 tons of -war supplies 
45,620 men 
1,857 "wounded 
5»2§? motor vehicles 
6,003 horse -dra-wn vehicles 
4,092 guns 
23 tanks 
15*845 horses and 
800 civilians 

of which 16,824 tons of war supplies 

1,923 men 

812 wounded 

89 motor vehicles and 

11 guns 

fell to the share of the Navy. 

VIII. Situation East Asia 

Nothing to report. 

* Mr * *■*■* -*■*■* -X- -X- *- -X- -X- * •* * ■* -X- -X- # #•** -X- *-#-*-* -X- -X- -X- -X--X- # 



Items o f Political Impor tance 

The United States have appointed a new Ambassador for Moscow. 
At the same time the new Russian Ambassador in Washington has 
presented his credentials. These facts pre worthwhile mention- 
ing since a 'certain political significance had withdrawn from 
previous conditions. 

Moscow has now definitely been fixed as the location for 
the Allied Foreign Ministers' Conference. The forthcoming 
Conference will be the most critical diplomatic undertaking 
of the war, according to a statement by Hoare Belisha. Only 
if it leads to a closer relationship between the Three Big 
Powers can speedy victory and a world order ensuring lasting 
peace be hoped for. 

Admiral Cunningham has been appointed successor to the F~rst 
Sea Lord, Dudley Pound, who is retiring for reasons of health. 

Confe rence on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff 

*■■ Army Situation: , • ' 

No large scale actions took place on the eastern front. 

According to a new directive from the Fuehrer on future 
operations in Italy, Commanding General, Armed Forces., South 
is to continue delaying defense only as far as the l^ne Gaeta- 
Ortona . This line is to be held and two divisions from 
northern Italy brought up for this purpose. If the enemy 
does not press on more strongly to the north but plans to 1 
invade the Balkans from southern Italy, Commanding General, 
Armed Forces, South is to work out plans for an attack on 
Apulia . 

Elba is to be kept occupied by one fortress regiment. The 
duties of Army Group B pre: to pacify its territory and 
suppress the uprising in Slovenia and Iatria with strong 
forces; to protect rear communications and the coastal flank 
of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, concentratingo 
on the Ligurian Sea; to organize defense in northern Italy; 
to build up a defense position on the Apennines and the 
adjoining coasts, concentrating on the Ligurian coast. 
Since major enemy operations agpinst the coastal sectors of 
Army Group B are not expected within the near future, coastal 
defenses shou]d be reduced, with concentration on the most 
important sectors and ports, m favor of operations by strong 
forces in Istria and Slovenia. 


5 Oct. 19^3 — - . • • CQNFIDEM^k. 

II. Admiral, Ge r ma n ' Na v a l C oggna nd , . 1 1 p 1 5 ' reported to Chief, 
Naval Staff on^f Oct. that the transfer from Cor sice to the 
mainland of all German troops. Including vehicles and most 
important sipplies, have been completed and added in his 
report that this was achieved thanks to the untiring effort 
and devotion of all naval offices and units concerned. Chief, 
Naval Staff replied as follows: 

"The task of withdrawing German troops from Sardinia and 
Corsica has been carried out remarkably well and I commend 
German Naval Command, Italy and all naval units and offices 
concerned. " 

III. Chief, Operations Division reports on the inefficiency 
in transmitting reports during the air attack on our convoy 
traffic in Norway on 4 Oct. Naval Staff should in any event 
have received a report from Naval Command, Norway at latest 
during the morning. Chief, Naval Staff orders that the follow- 
ing personal teletype be dispatched to Naval Command/ 
Norway with cpp.3 to Group North Fleet; "The successful air 
attack by British and American carreer borne planes on 

our convo\ traffic m skerries off Bodoe on the morning 

of 4 Oct. "was not reported to Navel Staff by Naval Command, 

Norway until the evening* I must insist that Naval Staff be 

advised at all times without delay of all special events". 

IV. Chief, Naval Ordnance Division reports on the meeting on 
^ Oct. with Chief, Armed Forces High Command.. 

Within the armament organization of the Ministry of Armament 
and Ammunition all interests of the Armed Forces are taken 
care of in Office "Kehrl". Armed Forces High Command will be 
represented by a General in this Office. No extension of this 
representation to branches of the Armed Forces is intended. 
As regards the right to seize Armed Forces reserve stocks, 
Chief, Armed Forces High Command will in specific cases cons- 
ult branches of the Armed Forces. The final decision, how- 
ever, will rest soley with Armed Forces High Commando 

V. Chief, Operations Division reports that transports of 
prisoners of war through the Dardanelles are at present out 

of question and that the Foreign Office is of the same opinion, 

In a Highly Restricted Circle: 

VI. The Fuehrer's directive regarding future operations in 
Italy outlines the Navy;s tasks as follows: 

"The Navy will assist the Army in every way possible, 
especially in: coastal defense against enemy landings at the 


5 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL 

rear of our front; maintenance of coastal traffic, "which 

may be of vital importance in case the enemy succeeds in 
effectively disrupting railroad traffic along the east apt 
vest coasts of Italy; offensive naval operations against 
enemy shipping." The -main task of the Air Force will still 
be attacks on enemy shipping; in addition, support of the 
Army and defense for large-scale, troop' movements and vital 
lines of communication. 

German Naval Command, Italy and Group South, for information, 
have been sent an extract of the above by Operations Division, 
For teletype l/Skl I op 3001/43 Gkdos . Chefs, see War Diary, 
Part C, Vol. XIV. 

VII « Chief of St aff, N aval Staff states: 

It is necessary to adjust our plans to the fact that, in 
spite of all previous assurances, the raw materials required 
for the 1943 Fleet Construction Program -will in fact not be 
available. Naval Staff must point out that the 1943 Program 
already represents minimum requirements so that any cuts will 
unquestionably mean that tasks of naval warfare can no longer 
be fulfilled. There are now already gaps caused by mountain 
losses and increasing damage through natural wear and tear, 
which can hardly be filled even if the 1943 Program 
is carried out- in full. Moreover, the Program is drawn up, 
as regards the various types of vessels, on the basis that 
one type is absolutely dependent on the other. This means that, 
if cuts should actually become unavoidable, these can 
only be made, in the entire- Program according to the various 
Recording to the various types required and not solely in this 
or that category. In ahj case, operational considerations only, 
and not practical wishes for reasons of construction, 
may be the basis for effecting cuts. In view of recent 
experiences, a curtailment of the definite minesweepers 
and motor minesweeper Construction Program will cert- 
ainly not be justified. Events have already proved that 
the 1943 Program also is very moderate ^nd represents a 
minimum which was perhaps 1 adjusted all too much to meet- 
emergency conditions and leaves no margin for cuts. 
Investigations should be made as. to whether the Italian 
dockyards really did not give us raw materials which render 
a certain alleviation of the raw material situation possible. 

Chief, Naval Staff agrees and points out that, if necessary, 
a reduction in submarine construction in favor of mines- 
weepers and motor minesweepers might have to be accepted. 



Special Items 

I. The transfer of Naval Shore Command, North Adriatic 
to Group South, as approved by Commander in Chief, Navy 
on 1 Oct. was ordered by Quartermaster Division, Organi- 
zation And Mobilization Branch - n s follows: 

1. Effective immediately Naval Shore Commander, 

North Adriatic under Admiral, Adriatic. The boundary 
between Admiral, Adriatic and German Naval Command, Italy 
■will be the Isonzo River. Further details will be worked 
out between Admiral, Adriatic and German Navai Command, 

2. The Dockyard Control Staff of German Naval Com- 
mand, Italy will provide Working Group "Trieste" as long 

as control of dockyards from the Italian area is necessary. 
Ensure cooperation with Admiral, Adriatic and N-°val Shore 
Commander, North Adriatic. 

3- Cooperation between Naval Shore Commander , North 

Adriatic and local operational headquarters of Army Group B 
regarding Fuehrer Directive No. 40 • 

4. If alteration of the boundary between Naval Shore 
Commander, North Adriatic and Naval Shore 'Commander, Dalmatia 
Is intended, submit proposal. 

II. Operations Division has settled the request of Group 
South for allocation of forces in the Adriatic" area (see 
War Diary '3 Oct.) as follows: 

A. Since Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic is now under 
Admiral, Adriatic, Naval Staff plans the following distribution 
of forces in the Adriatic: 

German Naval Command, Italy (Naval Shore Commander, West 
Adriatic will receive: 10 Siebel ferries, one third of the 
naval landing craft becoming available, in the Adriatic up 
to a maximum of 10, as well as the necessary Harbor Defense 

Group South will receive all other warships and auxiliary 
warships of every description, naval landing craft and 
Siebel ferries becoming available in the Adriatic. 

B. The following remarks are made on the particular 
requests submitted by Group South: 

1 and 2 are acknowledged. 

.. >■* ; : 57 CONFIDENTIAL 


3. Anti-aircraft defense rests -with the Air Force. 

4. Submarines will not be assigned. Operations 
by submarines also midget submarines, in the 
Adriatic -will be ordered when the occasion 
arises . 

5. Will be decided on separately. 

6. Request is acknowledged in principle and will be 
complied with as far as possible (with the 
exception of a midget submarine flotilla, see 
under 4. ) . 

The composition of naval forces of Admiral, Adriatic 
will probably differ substantially from that request- 
ed by Group South. Naval Artillery lighters will not 
beaava liable at present for the Adriatic. Instruct- 
ions with regard to organization of naval forces in 
the Adriatic will be issued separately. 

7. All forces becoming available in the Adriatic 
will be assigned to Group South. It is left 
to the discretion of Group South to transfer 
part of these forces to the Aegean Sea, 
according to the situation. 

III. Naval Intelligence Division issued Enemy Situation 
report No. 19. 43 on 2 Oct. For copy as per l/skl 27972 A 43 
Gkdos . see War Diary, File "Enemy Situation Reports of 
Naval Intelligence Division". 

With reference to the general situation this report states: 

"inadequate air reconnaissance in the Mediterranean makes 
an insight into the present disposition of enemy landing 
craft and merchant shipping difficult. It is assumed that 
approximately 30% of special landing craft available and 
approximately 20^ of merchant shipping in the Mediterranean 
is still engaged in traffic between North /frica/Sicily 
and the Italian operational areas. 

It is expected that the focal point -of future operations 
in the Central Mediterranean outside the Italian mainland 
will be the east Adriatic area ( Albania /Da lma tia ) , while 
in the Eastern Mediterranean a further operation against 
the Aegean islands is likely." 

With regard to enemy merchant ' tonnage, Naval. Staff has 
reached the following conclusion: 

"The to. total tonnage of vessels over 1,000 GRT each avail- 
able to the enemy at the beginning of October 1943 is 
estimated to be approximately 35,000,000 G.R.T. without 
taking the lately acquired Italian tonnage into account. 




The surplus ' in. .new constructions reached a maximum level 

of approximately 1,000,000 - GRT during the month of September. 

Freighters which -'can he' used for supplying home countries 
and troops overseas-, for operational purposes and other tasks 
must be estimated as exceeding 20,000,000 GRT. 

At present a rise in enemy -tankers is to be expected, since 
in the USA alone approximately 20 tankers are to be commiss- 
ioned every month. The tanker construction program of the 
United States may be connected with enemy operational, con- 
siderations . 

It is intended to build 200 tankers during 194^ in the 
United States, while for 1944 only 89 tankers sfe planned. 
This leads to the assumption that the tanker fleet avail 
able is considered sufficient as from 1944 for the demands 
to be made on it . 

Accurate figures of serviceable Italian merchant shipping 
which fell into enemy's hands cannot yet be ascertained. 
About 500,000 GRT of Italian end former French merchant 
shipping are in enemy territory; a substantial part, 
however, may have been sunk or damaged. 

■In addition there are approximately 100,000 GRT of Italian 
merchant shipping at present in Spanish ports." 

Situation 5 Oct. 
-*-• War in Foreign Waters 
Nothing to report. 

II. Situation West Area 

1. Enemy Situation: . 

Twenty- seven planes were detected on operation over 
the Bay of Biscay. One British vessel was located at I538 
in BE 5350 and one around midnight on 5 Oct. in BE 6220. 

An Intelligence report states that there . is a marked decline 
in the assembly of invasion troops for northern France in 
England. ...-■"-'•. 

:, 59'. . -.■■ CONFIDENTIAL 


and traffic restrictions as "well as closed areas have 
been abolished Shipping concentrations in southern ports 
no longer indicate an imminent operation against northern 
France. Troop movements from these ports during September 
were destined solely for the Mediterranean and India. 
For particulars see teletype 1830. 

2. Own Situati on: 

Atlantic Coast: 

One ELM/J mine -was swept by a plane off St. Jean 
de Luz . 

Three submarines were escorted out of Brest and La -Pal lice. 
The FLIEDER (Japanese submarine, Tr. N. ) left Brest at 1600. 
The FALKE and torpedo boat T "14" anchored in Royan roads 
on the evening of 4 Oct. T "23" ~nd T "27" left St. Ma 1-6 
for Brest at 1845. 

With reference to the inquiry by the 3rd Air Force as 
to the use of BV 222' s in the Atlantic, Naval Staff is 
of the following opinion: 

"in order to augment reconnaissance, it seems advisable to 
leave the BV 222' s there even ^fter allocation of JU 290 's. 

The view that the BV 222 is inadequately armed has up to 
now net been borne out by any air combat. It is not 
considered importa*nb to retain the BV 138' s in the Atlantic 
area . 

Since, at the order of Commander in Chief, Air Force, 
Operations Staff, the further production of large flying 
boats has been discontinued, a maximum of seven flying 
boats only be reckoned with, of which never more th^n three 
to four boats can be in operation simultaneously. Expansion 
of the ground organization at Biscarosse need, therefore, 
provide only three to four berths with provisional camouf- 
lage, of which two are already completed according to inform- 
ation available." 

Naval Staff, therefore, requests Commander in Chief, Air 
Force, Operations Staff to keep the operational BV 222' s 
still in use, even after introduction of the 5th long- 
range Reconnaissance Group. 

Channel Coast: 


Five ELM/j mines were swept northnorthwest of 
Dunkirk. The convoy of the NORDVAARD put in to Cherbourg 
at at 0330 and at 2000 continued its passage to Le Havre; 
however, on account of ships located and presumed to be 
in a lurking position, it was first insturcted to proceed 
close to shore and, later, to turn back to Cherbourg. 


5 Oct. 1943 CO NFIDENTIAL 

Torpedo boats T "23" and T "27" left St. Ma 16 for Brest 
at 1845- 

The first batch of 1,000 surface mines (types OMA I, II and 
IV) developed in. accordance with the earlier request of 
Group West' has been delivered to this Group in exchange for 
the remaining UMA/K mines. Instructions have been given 
to make a study, in close cooperation with the Mlnelaying 
Experimental Command and by participating in the trials 
being conducted In the Channel, of the efficiency of 
the OMA mines and to try out the first OMA/l. mines delivered 
in operation. The extent of further production of OMA I, II 
and IV mines will depend on the practical results.. 

III. North Sea , Norway, Nor the rn Waters : 

1. Nort h Sea : 
Nothing to report. 

2. Norway, Northern' Waters : 

Enemy Situation: 

Twenty-one planes were detected on operation over 
the North Sea. Single reconnaissance flights were observed 
in the Petsam® - V^rdoe - Alta areas. On 4 Oct. five planes 
were reported south of Stadtlandet and one. plane each off 
Ytteroe and Bergen. 

Our air reconnaissance sighted at 0945 in AE 9630 1 aircraft 
carrier, 1 battleship, 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers on course 
200 degrees and at 0925 in AF ?4l0 1 aircraft carrier, 1 
cruiser and 5 destroyers on course 14.0 degrees.. Admiral, 
Northern Waters and Group North/Fleet assume that the war- 
ship unit detected on 4 Oct consisting of 1?' ships is on 
return passage In two groups. 

Own S it uation : 

In view of the enemy situation the' three hours' 
readiness of the Task Force is canceled* The submarines will 
be withdrawn to West Fjord. Skj omen Fjord, rema ins the sub- 
marine base for the present. Admiral, Northern Waters 
expects a repetition of similar surprise attacks at any 
time until the days become very short, since there is no 
reconnaissance of coastal waters. He considers that submar- 
ine bases and vessels carrying ' supplies, ore and men on 
leave are still in danger considering the small number 
of our escort, forces rnd inadequate anti-aircraft defense. 
Eight steamers damaged and one naval landing cr^ft sunk 
justify a further request for permanent transfer. 


5 Oct. 19^3 '• C ONFIDENTIAL 

of fighter planes to the northern pre?, -where they are 
just as badly needed as in southern Norway (See teletype 

Naval Command, Norway reports casualties sustained yesterday 
evening as follows: 

200 believed, to be dead and 15 seriously "wounded on the 
troop transport SKRAMSTAD, which had 8^4 soldiers aboard. 
On the steamer KERKPLEIN, which hcd 1,551 prisoners on board, 
14 are reported dead, 9 missing and 29 seriously wounded. 
For further particulars see teletype 1320. 

From investigation of the salvaged British midget submarine 
the Task Force deduces that these submarines avoid any known 
nets and also anti-submarine bottom nets, so that our net 
defense is still of utmost importance. (See teletype 09^0). 

In the area of Naval Command, Norway 11 ships were escorted 
north and 28 south. In the Arctic co^st- ares 9 ships were 
held up owing to shortage of escorts. 

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances , Baltic Sea 

1. E nemy Situation: 

In Kronstadt Bay there was heavy gunfire- from the 
Oranienbaum pocket on our positions from. 1000. At 0200 about 
25 Russians landed near Strelna Mole and west thereof; they 
blew up two Army assault boats and fired on a pillbox. As 
soon as our Armj defense went into action they withdrew 
to Leningrad Mole, leaving a rubber dinghy behind. • 

In the afternoon the presumed positions of Army Battery 688 
and Army Coastal Battery 509 vere bombed without result bv two 
enemy planes after Army Battery 688 had shelled Lavansaari. 
There was only minor air activity -over Tyters . Mine laying is 
suspected in the Irben Strait. 

2. Own Situation: 

Four ground mines were' swept in the Baltic Sea 
entrances and' one off Gdynia. The Danish steamer HANNE 
struck a mine and .was damaged near Drogden lighthouse. 
Convoy and transport, operations in the whole Baltic Sea 
area were carried out according to plan. 


5 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIA L 

Operations Division points out to Naval Command, Baltic, 
as regards control of merchant shipping, that some ships 
come from the North Sea and, from Hiltenau, pass through into 
the northern part of the Baltic Sea without calling at- 
an intermediate port. It is therefore the distribution 
of military instructions. This should rather be done direct 
by Naval Command, Baltic in order to avoid misunderstand- 
ings . ' . , 

Special It ems 

Naval Command, Baltic submitted on 29 Sept. plans for 
Naval Warfare and coastal defense in the Gulf of Finland 
and Eastern part of the Baltic Sea during the coming year 
after commencement of Operation "Blau" (withdrawal to 
"East Wall" position). 

Naval Command, Baltic specifies the Navy's tasks in this 
operation as follows: 

"a. To' continue blockade of the Russian Fleet in the 
Gulf of Finland so as to exclude a threat to the 
Baltic Sea. This is to be done in spite of the 
deterioration in our positions in the Gulf of 
Finland and the activitiy to be expected from 
the Russian Fleet. 

b. To protect the coasts of the Gulf of Finland and of 
the Baltic States in such a way that- a- threat to the 
left wing of the eastern front from the sea is' 
impossible . 

c. To ensure sea communications from the Baltic States 
to Germany and vice versa, as well as to and from 
Finland, in spite of increased threat." 

Commanding Admiral, Naval Command, Baltic is of the opinion 
that this can be done if a certain concentration - in men' . 
and material - is effected and if the Navy is given adequate 
support by the Air Force. The requirements set forth in the ■ 
following plans have been weighed up in view of the threat 
to the Baltic Sea and also have in mind, retaining Finland's 
faith and trust in our strength and thus keeping her still as 
our Ally. 

The plans provide for: 

1. Strengthening of the "Nashorn" barrages. 

2. A new defended barrage system to be known as "Krebs" 



for the defense of Tallinn and Helsinki and for control 
of the sea area between "Seelgel" and "Nashorn" oarrages. 

3. Coastal defense barrages and flanking barrages and expan- 
sion of "Seeigel" barrages. 

For defense by naval forces, Naval Command, B-ltic is of 
opinion that the Dutch gunboats, artillery motor minesweepers 
and coastal minelayers would be suitable as torpedo carriers. 
In view of the requirements of other theaters of war certain 
requests are not being made at present. 

A total of 16,400 mines and 13,000 anti sweeping devices 
will be required. ,. 

The 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla, the 24th Landing Flotilla, 
the 31st Minesweeper Flotilla and at least two minelayers will 
be required to carry mines. It is considered necessary to 
assign twelve further armed fishing vessels to the ,31st- 
Minesweeper Flotilla for anti-submarine patrol. 

Two additional minesweeper flotillas would h?ve to be 
assigned to Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic for defense 
of the routes in the eastern pert of the Baltic Sea which 
are outside the area of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic. 
Furthermore, as a precaution, a request is made for two 
submarine chaser flotillas for the Baltic Sea aaea. The 
old vessels of the .-.Coastal Defense Flotilla, Baltic States 
would have to be replaced by armed fishing vessels. 

The tasks of coastal defense will be: 

a. defense of the Estonian coast so as to prevent 
landings aimed at occupation of the oil shale area; 

b. on connection with this, patrol of the defensive 
barrages laid for the same purpose; 

c. defense of the "Nashorn" and "Krebs" barrages. 

The disposition of batteries has been planned In accordance 
with these tasks.. In addition it, is 'intended to expand 
the radar network,. Preparations for withdrawal of batteries 
from the Leningrad sector are being made at the instigation 
of the 18th Army. Command. The batteries concerned are: 
Battery "Prlnz Heinrich"; two 13 cm and two 10. 5 cm batteries; 
Battery "Bluecher" and one 8.8 cm anti-aircraft battery. 



Preparations are being made for demolition of the ports 
of Peipia and Rutschi. The defense of Tyters is being 
Strengthened. With regard to mine laying operations , 
Operations Division issued the following order to Naval 
Command, Baltic on 2 Oct. 

"1. "Na s horn ": 

a. The proposed reinforcement is approved in 
principle. Economical use of mines will, however, 
suffice since only a slight deterioration is to 

be assumed in deep barrages lying outside the enemy's 
sphere of minesweeping activities. 

b. The use of EMP mines is advisable on account of 
their all-round effect against submerged submarines. 
UMA mines should also be provided in deep rows. 

2. "Krebs": 

a. This barrage system is onlv to be provided in case 
Tyters and/or Hogland are evacuated, so that "Seeigel" 
position cannot be held. .. 

b. The barrage should (according to the "Juminda" 
system) be laid over as wide an area as possible and 
lie shallow (against surface faces only). An average 
distance between mines of 15-20 m. is sufficient. The 
number of anti sweeping devices (average distance apart 
5 m. ) applied for is far too large, since these are 
less efective against narrow shipping targets than 
against minesweeping gear of 100 150 m. cutting width 
and frequently remain effective still for the next 
minesweeping run. 

c. Report whether sufficient Finnish mines are available 
for the barrage section north of Kalbada. 

d. The shallow mines of the old Juminda barrage have, 
after three winters, certainly been rendered in- 
effective by ice, but the deep mines are probably 
still effective. They would, however, become useless 
if a searching sweep of the whole area were carried 
out. It therefore appears possible to lay mines next , 
spring by. motor mieesweepers and naval landing craft 
without a previous searching sweep by minelayers with 
advance motor minesweeper gear. 




3. "Seeigel": 

a. Attempts are to be made to retain, and reingorce 
the northern part of this barrage system up to Neu- 
grund and to extend it from Neugrund in approx 
imately a ■ southerly direction as far as the coast. 

b. Here too the mines should be laid over as wide an 
area as possible and lie shallow. The average 
distance apart of mines in the new sector should be 
about 15 meters. 

c. Plans to extend this barrage in the direction of 
Hungerburg are inadvisable. This extension could not 
be defended, since it would be within range of Russian 
batteries assumed to be on Kurgala Peninsula . 

do If it is impossible to hold the islands, extensive 
mine laying should only be carried out in the area 
between the islands and in the eastern part of Narva 
Bay; for this purpose extension of "Krebs". 

4. Make preparations for coastal defense barrages, if 
necessary also system "Krebs", as alarm barrages, ±r± 
accordance with developments in the situation. 

5. If operation "Blau" does not arise, repeat in general 
the mine laying operations carried out this spring. 

6. Mines: 

Present stocks and probably supplies permit allocation 
of at most 50$ of the numbers requested; EMF and DMA 
mines will also have to be used. 

7. Mine carriers: 

At least two minelayers as well as motor minesweepers, 
naval landing craft and coastal minelayers in the numbers 
available this year can be relied on. 

8. In view of the above points, revise plans and submit again 
in compliance with the necessary material restrictions." 

Further plans as regards coastal batteries will be drawn up 
by Quartermaster Division and when completed will be decided 
on finally by Naval Staff,-. 



Naval Ordnance Division, Underwater Obstacles Branch 
received the folio-wing order on 5 Oct.: 

"In order to create mine reserves for the large 
numbers needed in spring 1944 in the Gulf of Finland , from 
November on the following numbers monthly are to be set 
aside, with designation "Otto 29"°. 

400 EMC 
400 UMB 
200 EMF and 
200 UMA 

Lengths of mooring rope 100 m. 

Irrespective of this provision, the special production 
program of the Minister of Armament and Ammunition should 
be speeded up in every way possible and current Production 
brought to its highest level. The total requirements applied 
for by Naval Command, Baltic for the Gulf of FinLiM next 
spring are 1.6,400 mines and 13,000 anti-sweeping devices . It 
is therefore imperative to increase monthly output of anti- 
sweeping devices to at least 500 in spite of ample supplies. 

V. Submarine Warfare 

Four submarines of Group "Rossbach" are returning owing 
to damage and casualties. A supply group of four submarines 
was attacked by several enemy carrier-borne planes on .4 Oct 
in BD 9750. One submarine was damaged and also had to start 
on return passage. 

No successes have been reported from the Atlantic or the 
Indian Ocean. ■ • 

VI. Aerial Warfare ■ . . 

1. British Isles and Vicinity: 

During the : day minor enemy forces attacked traffic ' 
installations and planes on the ground in Belgium and France.' 
Three planes are reported shot down and two crashed. No enemy 
planes flew in during the night of 5 Oct. During the night 
of 4 Oct. 16 planes were shot down and on 5 Oct. 18 were 
definitely shot down and 15 probably "' shot down. ■ 


5 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIA L 

2. Mediterranean Theater : 

The 3rd Air Force sent out 57 planes against a convoy 
off Cape Tenes . Of these, 46 reached the target and sank 
or damaged 15 ships totaling 150,000 GRT. Four of our planes 
•were lost through strong fighter escort and very severe light 
anti-aircraft gunfire. 

The 2nd Air Force sank two landing boats and damaged a third 
one during an attack by 24 fighter-bombers on the port of 
Termoli. Air Force Command, Southeast had 67 planes out on 
operation against Leros, concentrating their attack on 
Port: Lagc, and reports accurate hits on land and on small 
vessels . 

3. Eastern Front; 

The 5th Air Force reports 23 planes out on re- 
connaissance . 

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea; 

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean; 

Three u\ S. tankers, 1 U. S. Coastguard cruiser 
and two U. S. gunboats left Gibraltar in the afternoon 
for the 'Atlantic and 13 auxiliary minesweepers left for the 
Mediterranean. The VALIANT, FORMIDABLE, INDOMITABLE and one 
ILLUSTRIOUS class left port in the evening, probably 

A damaged Norwegian tanker sank during an attempt to tow 
her into port. 

At 1800 on 4 Oct. the large eastbound convoy was detected 
again 20 miles west of Tenes, consisting of 80 ships and 
7 escort vessels; on 5 Oct. it was successfully attacked 
by forces of the 3rd Air Force. 

At 0350 there were 5 ships on northerly course 55 miles south 
of Salerno, at 1355 7 ships on southwesterly course 12 miles 
south of Salerno, at 0335 5 ships on northerly course east- ' 
northeast of Crotona and at 0650 4 ships on northeasterly 
course 15 miles east -northeast of Punta Stilo. There were 
no ships in Termili harbor. The coast 13 miles northwest 
of Termoli was subjected to heavy gunfire, probably from 

No reconnaissance reports have been received from the 
eastern Mediterranean. 


5 Oct. 1943 - C ONFIDENTIAL 

The Naval Attache In Madrid transmits a report from 
the Italian Embassy, according to which Italian warships 
and merchantmen v ill leave the Balearic Islands, presum- 
ably for the British area (Gibraltar). (See teletype 1750). 

According to a 'later report, the Spanish Foreign Minister 
assured the German Ambassador today that Italian warships 
in the Balearic Islands are definitely interned. For details 
see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII. 

2. Own Situation Mediterranean: 

At 08^5 the minelayer POMMERN sank, presumably 
as a result of striking a mine, lj miles south of San Remo 
while on her way to a new mine laying operation. Naval landing 
craft rescued the Commander and 189 of the cratf . These 
survivors are to man the minelayer AGNI and a mine ferry. 

A nsval landing craft was sent out on a minelaying operat- 
ion in the Nettunia area . 

Submarine U "380" probably sank a tanker of 8,000 GRT 60 
miles south of Salerno, U "593" after return from the 
operational area in Salerno Bay reported: 

"No location from the air, no night activity, strong naval 
patrol. Heavy traffic on courses north and south over CJ 6797 
and 6798. Good result with "Aphrodite" (submarine decoy, Tr.N)." 

Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reports on the 
completion of the withdrawal from Corsica as follows: 

"it. was possible to conclude withdrawal of troops, 
all assault guns and special motor vehicles to the mainland 
as planned, in spite of a marked Increase in the enemy's 
pressure during the last stages of withdrawal from the 

During embarkation of the last bridgehead garrison in Bastia 
the new harbor was continuously under heavy gunfire from 
1715 until nightfall, so that some of the vessels hod to 
be loaded under considerable diff i-culties outside the harbor 
on the open coast. Embarkation of the troops was completed 
towards 2300. Demolition companies destroyed the harbor and 
sank the steamer SASSARI as a block ship/ Only after the 
last rear guards and demolition parties had embarked die 
the Commander of the German Armed Forces on. Corsica, General 
Von Senger und Etterlin, leave the island with his staff. Two 



motor minesweepers stood by.. off Bastla. until around 0^00 
to pick up any stagglers. There was no enemy interference 
on the return passage and all the vessels taking part ■ 
have put- in." 

German Naval Command, Italy reports that 2,282 men,, 222 
prisoners, 328 motor vehicles, 51 guns and 77 tons of material 
were transferred on 3 Oct, the last day. 

Transports and escort units will at once be transferred 
to coastal traffic, especially for intensified evacuation 
of return cargo from the front-line area on west and east 
coasts. From the Gaeta ,-*■ Ostia area alone 25,000 tons 
are to be transported. 

The interruption of traffic across the Brenner by enemy air 
attacks proves the vulnerability of land traffic .routes and 
the importance of coastal traffic from southern France to 
the west coast of Italy. 

5 • A rea Nav al Group South; 

a . A driatic S ea : 

Na^val Shore . Commander, North. Adriatic reports 
plans to send the 62j5rd Naval Artillery Battalion aboard the 
steamers ARGENTINA And ITALIA from Trieste outside the Islands 
to Durazzo on the evening of 5 Oct. and to send two detach- 
ments -of the 6 12th Naval Artillery Battalion aboard the steam- 
er FIS3ER from Pola to Zata and from there aboard' the steam- 
er CAGLIARI to Durzzzo on the morning of 6 Oct. Air escort 
especially of tje ARGENTINA and ITALIA, is necessary. (See 
teletype 1758). 

Group South, as instructed, commented on 4 Oct. on the 
suggestion of German Naval Command, Italy with regard to a 
barrage defense of the entracne to the Adriatic Sea ' In a 
line Lagosta - Pelagosa - Tremiti and urged that enemy- 
occupied ports on the east coast of Italy be mined by. 
planes . 

Operations Division then issued the following instructions 
to Group South, with copy to German. Naval Command, Ital 



1. a. Mine barrages for defense of the entrance. to 
the Adriatic Sea in a line Lagosta - Pelagosa - Tremiti 
are too late. .Since enemy forces have already been estab- 
lished in Termoli and withdrawal of our land front as' far 
as Ortona has been ordered, the laying of mines in the 
western part, as planned, is questionable; barrages in 
the eastern part only would be a half measure, especially 
as enemy supplies will stay close to the Italian coast 
occupied by him. 



b. It is left to your discretion to l ay mines ., 
vest of Pelagosa and in our coastal waters between Lagosta 
and Lissa merely in order to harass enemy thrusts to the 
north; due regard must, however, be given to passage 
facilities for the submarines of Commander, Submarines, 
Mediterranean. ■ ■- 

2. Offensive operations against enemy supplies off the 
ports on the east coast of Italy are desirable. Close con-, 
tact should be maintained with Commander, Submarines, 
Mediterranean owing to operations by our submarines in this 
area (submarine mining operation off Brindis.i). 

J> . The suggestion made regarding mining of enemy-.' ... 
occupied ports by planes will be passed on to Air Force 
Operations Staff. 

4. On the Adriatic coast the mine defense of Cattaro .. 
appears to be urgent. .' 

5. The following mines will be allocated under 
designation "Ad 2": 

a. for mine laying as per 1 b: 

300 EMF's and 200 m. mooring rope, 
100 EMR's and 200 m. mooring rope. 

b. for offensive operations as per 2: 

36 EMF's and 200 m. mooring rope, 
lkk EMF's and 100 m. mooring rope, 
100 LMB's. , ; \ 

*■ •■ ''■ i 

In addition, 100 UMB's and 150 m. mooring rope, since the ■..••. 
laying of EMF mines by PT boats is dependent on calm weather.-. 

Details and place of delivery are to be arranged direct 
with .the Mining and Barrage Inspectorate. 

Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean has been advised at 
the same time as follows: 

Group South has received, instructions, When laying mines 

in the Adriatic - .... 

a. between Lagosta and Lissa 

b. between Pelagosa and Tremiti 

c. off enemy- occupied ports on the east coast of 
Italy, _ •. '■. 

to take into consideration passage and operational facilities 
for our submarines and, therefore, to keep in close touch 
with Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean. 




b. Aegean Sea : 

On 4 Oct. at O805 our air reconnaissance sighted 
a surfaced enemy submarine on southeasterly course 24 miles 
east of Naxos . 

All naval forces and steamers which participated in the 
operation against Kos, except for two neval landing craft, 
have returned to Piraeus. Our losses amount to 15 dead and 70 
wounded. The number of prisoners taken on Kos has increased 
to 600 British and 2,5.00 Italians. Among other things 1 
ferry barge, 1 fishing smack, 1 luxury yacht and 11 planes, 
as well as ho guns, are also reported to have been captured. 

The operation to disarm Naxos, Paros and Antiparos by Army 
groups, which are to be transported from Syra on boats of 
Coast Patrol Flotilla "Attica" and one naval landing craft, 
was scheduled for 5 Oct. No reports have yet been received. 

According to radio intelligence, enemy air activity over the 
Agean was less than usual on 5 Oct. 

c. Black Sea: 

Enemy Situation: 

During the evening two submarine locations were 
reported southwest and northwest of Sevastopol. The destroy- 
ers reported In Tuapse have apparently put out. Our air 
reconnaissance sighted shortly, after midnight on 5 Oct. two 
destroyers proceeding at high speed on westerly course 
58 miles southeast of Feodosiya. One destroyer shelled Yalta 
without particular effect. Coastal batteries returned fire % 
without the result being observed. 

O wn Situation: 

Naval artillery lighters and naval landing 
craft had an encounter from 0200 to 0230 at the northern 
outlet of the Strait of Kerch with several enemy gunboats 
which were proceeding towards the Taman coast. The enemy 
attack was repulsed. There were no casualties or damage. 
During the day the patrol line off the north Taman coast 
was bombed and machine-gunned by 50 enemy planes without 
substantial damage. No enemy planes were brought down. 
On 4 Oct. three enemy planes were shot down at this point, 
and not too as previously reported. 


5 Oct. 19"43 .. • CONFIDENTIAL 

During the enemy sir attack on Geniche-sk on 3 Oct. a tank.. 
containing 13 corn, of gasoline -was destroyed.- The battery 
position on Biryushi partly collasped. Enemy planes attacked 
Feodosiya three times during the day of 3 Oct. Two lighters 
were damaged. . 

Crimean convoys were carried out according to plan. 

Three boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla, as expected, sighted 
an enemy destroyer while escorting the Kerch-Feodosiya 
convoy during the night of 5 Oct. The destroyer, however, 
outmaneuvered attack. 

Two Italian midget submarines are proceeding from Sevastopol 
to Constanta via Odessa for repairs. PT boats S "51" and 
"52" left Constanta for Ivanbabe and S "49" left Ivanbaba 
for Constanta. 

VIII. Situation East Asia 

Nothing to report. 



Items of Politics! Importance 

According to"DNB" the U. S. press reports, in view of 
Franco's latest speech,; that Spain has changed her foreign 
policy from' a non-belligerent status to one of watchful 
neutrality. ■ ." 

According to Reuter, disappointment is becoming increasingly 
evident in Moscow over£the failure to open a second front, 
now, during the height of the Russian offensive, since 
progress is necessarily becoming slower. The Allied advance 
in Italy is regarded by Russia as too slow and unimportant. 
Very little Is expected of the Balkan operation. It is held 
that the Balkan problem would be automatically solved by a 
German defeat on the western front. 

Finland's attitude seems to have become more settled lately. 
The new Parliamentary elections for summer 19^ snd this 
year's municipal elections have wisely been postponed. A 
capitulation is unanimously rejected. 

The "Daily Mail" writes as follows in connection with the 
appointment of Cunningham: 

"Now that the Atlantic is under British control and 
the Mediterranean as good as cleared, the Pacific 
looms on the horizon. In the days to come the biggest 
naval war in world history will be fought in the 
East. Preparation for this war will be Cunningham's 

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff 

I. A rmy Situation: 

On 5 Oct. no major operations took place on the 
eastern front. The enemy's anticipated large-scale offen- 
sive in the Melitopol - Zaporozhe area has not yet commenced. 
Minor penetrations into the "East Wall" position prove the 
weakness of this line, where our own divisions, most of them 
exhausted, have to defend sectors of 20 - 25 km. each. 

Fighting in the Leningrad area shows an increase. 

Our forces were sent in against the enemy landing near 
Termoli behind our Italian front but they were not able to 
break through. 



II. The departure of the three aircraft carriers from the 
Mediterranean may indicate, that no operation against the 
Balkans in the near future is contemplated. Aircraft carriers 
are no longer needed in the Italian area since the occupation 
of the Tyrrhenian islands. 

Chief, Naval Staff expresses his great appreciation of the 
able command of naval forces during the operation on Kbs 
by Commander, 21st Submarine Chaser Flotilla. 

No other special conferences or decisions. 

Commander in Chief, Navy attended the Gauleiter Convention 
at Posen, in the course of -which he spoke on questions of 
naval warfare. The Fuehrer also attended this Convention, 

Special Items 

I. On 6 and 7 Oct. there will be discussions at Naval 
Staff headquarters between the Chiefs of Staff of the Groups, 
Naval Commands and the other high Command headquarters. 

For itinerary and list of reports and conferences as per 
1 Ski I op 29 2 H5A3 gen. see War Diary, Part B, Vol. V. 

This meeting has been called with the intention of acquain- 
ting all those concerned, in personal discussions, with the 
general situation and requirements in the various theaters 
of war. 

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff will take the opportunity to 
impress on all the Chiefs of Staff the necessity of quicker 
and more effective advice to Naval Staff regarding special 
events . 

II. The Shipbuilding Commission has requested Naval Staff 
to decide as to whether a number, which is lower by at 
least 50$, of larg e mine -exploding vessels (3,000 tons, 
14-16 knots) should be constructed or whether the number, 
as provided in the 19^3 Construction Program, should be 
constructed of wartime mine -exploding vessels of the present 

Operations Division gives the following views on this to 
Quartermaster Division: 



If it is possible to build the wartime mine -exploding' 
vessel with the additional fittings and reinforcements, 
without thereby lowering the speed to less than 12 
knots, Operations Division 'agrees to construction of the 
wartime mine -exploding vessel of the present design and 
abandonment for the time being of the 3,000 ton type. 
It is, however, requested that the plan of the letter 
type nevertheless be taken in hand and completed, so that 
construction can be' started without delay if the situation 
should demand it. •" 

Situation 6 Oct, 

I. War in Foreign Waters 

■'■ h i !■■ n ii i ip n !■ i ■■ i ■■■■■■■■ i m i . ■ i. 

1. Enemy Situation : 

Nothing to report. 

2.. Own Situation: 

The naval Attache in Tokyo reports that the 0S0RN0 
has orders to leave Jokjokarta on 26 Oct. In his report he 
also gives details as' regards route, equipment and intended 

According to a further report of the Naval Attache, the 
Japanese Navy will probably agree to the request to hand 
over all three AQUILA submarines. 

All vessels in foreign waters were advised of the enemy 
situationjsee Radiogram 1651. 

II. Situation West Area 

1. Enemy Situation: 

Only five planes were detedced on operation over 
the Biscay area. One British vessel was located in BF 1810 at 
2013 Channel: Up to 0245 enemy targets, probably larger 
than PT boats', were located in Seine Bay, also at 014^ 
9 miles west of Boulogne and 0242 North" of Point D'Ailly. 

2. Own Situation 

Atlantic Coast; 



6 Oct. 1943 , CONFIDENTIAL 

One ELM/J mine was swept on 4 Oct. off St. Jean de 
Luz and one on 5 Oct. off Lorient and La Pallice. 

Three submarines were escorted out of the submarine bases 
and one was escorted in. 

Destroyer Z "37" was transferred in the morning from 
Bordeaux and the KONDOR in the evening from La Pallice 
to Royan Roads . 

Torpedo boat T "27" ran on to the net barrage while 
entering Brest, but sustained no damage. 

Tactical exercises in the Bay of Biscay by the 8th Destroyer 
Flotilla and the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla rre planned for 
7 and 8 Oct. 

Channel Coast: 

A ground mine was swept north of Gr-^ve lilies on 3 Oct. 

Patrol positions in the Channel were not taken up on 
account of weather conditions. 

The convoy of the NORDVAARD put in to Le H^vre again at 

III. North Sea, Norway,- Northern Waters 
1. North Sea : 

Patrol positions were not taken up and minesweeping 
operations had to be canceled owing to weather conditions. 

The Hook - Elbe and FUE.SILIER convoys were postponed for 
24 hours . 

Patrol duty in the inner part of the Heligoland Bight 
was carried' out according to plan. 

2 . Norway, Northern Waters: 

Enemy S i t ua 1 3. on : 

Twenty- one planes were detected on operation over the 
North Sea, A reconnaissance plane was reported in the Alta area 



Own Situation: 

At 04.00 the steamer ANTJE FRIT ZEN was damaged at the 
waterline by an adhesive (sabotage) mine in Aelesund 
harbor, but remained afloat. 

Seventeen ships were escorted north and 17 south. 

In the Arctic coast area 13 ships were delayed owing to 
lack of escorts . 

Naval Command, Norway reports that it, as well as Admiral, 
North Norwegian Coast, and the Naval Shore Commanders were 
quite inadequately informed on events regarding the con- 
voys and the actual situation during the enemy air attack 
in the Bodoe area, owing to inefficiency in the trans- 
mission of messages by our escorts - the cause of which 
has not yet been ascertained. It took some time to obtain 
accurate information on the situation. The message of 
l^OO reporting the sighting of the enemy carrier unit was 
not received by the 5"th Air Force until 1739. Messages 
received up to then by the 5th Air Force were such that 
even its Commanding Gereral was not sure until 1730 that 
the planes concerned were carrier-borne. (See teletype 

Naval Command, Norway further submits a survey dated 4 
Oct. of casualties and damage so far ascertained. 
(For copy see teletype 23 15.) 

Submarine U "733" will relieve U "277" off Ice Fjord. . 
U H 36" will take up position AB 3568. 

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea. Entrances, Baltic Sea 

• 1. Enemy Situation : 

Gunfire in Kronstadt Bay vas very lively. In 
our lines 450 impacts were counted, Including 85" heavy ones 
near Battery "Prinz Heinrich", but no damage caused. Battery 
"Prinz Heinrich" shelled the large floating dock and Kan- 
onerski Dockyard from 100 to 1200. One hit was observed 
in the dock and three in the dockyard area, causing a fire. 

Tho enemy planes which droppped numerous bombs were 
reported in the coastal area. At 1105 there were 26 
motor minesweepers northeast of Labansaari on westerly 
course. This unit put in to Lavansaari at 1315. 


6 Oct. 19^3 


A submarine was located between the net barrage and the 
line Hogland-Tyters . ._ :,.-l.; 

The Finns have captured a Russian with radio set and 
provisions, who had been landed oh Hamen-Holmarne from. 
a submarine. On the southern part of Hogland a radio set 
and a store of provisions were found. A further search has so 
far been fruitless. ... 

2. Own Situation: 

Two ELM/J mines were swept east of Halsbarre. . ■- i. 

Mine exploding vessel "18" is transferring from Gdynia %6.:;.r 
Copenhagen for operations in the Danish p.tbp . 

Convoy and transport traffic in the entire Baltic. Sea area 
was carried out according to plan and without incident. 

Nd other reports of special note have been received from 
the areas of Commander, Minesweeper, Baltic and Admiral, 
Baltic States. 

V. Subma r ine Wa r f a r e 

1 . ■ Enemy : S i tua t i on : ... 

Nothing to report. 

2. Own Situation: 

U "539" shot down one enemy plane on 4 Oct. in AD 
8190 (south of Newfoundland) and warded off a further one. 
The s ubma r ine s us ta ine d minor da ma ge . 

Group "Rossbach", consisting of 16 submarines, is to be 
in reconnaissance patrol line from AK 3970 to AK 9290 
at midnight on 7 Oct. and will proceed at 5 knots on course 
2 20 degrees. 

On 8 Oct. an eastbound HX- convoy is expected. There is, 
however, no Information on its position. 

Four submarines are proceeding to BD 37 for refuelling. 


6 Oct. 19^43 CONFIDENTIAL 

VI. Aerial Warfare 

1. British Isle.s and .Vicinity : 

The 3rd Air Force reports kk planes out on 
operation over England, 16 .over the Atlantic and 3 over 
the Mediterranean. 

Nine planes carried out nuisance raids on London, dropping 
1-4.2 tons of high explosives. 

Five FW 200 's have been sent out on armed reconnaissance -west 
of Portugal. 

During the day and the night enemy air activity over the 
vest area and Germany was only slight. 

'2. Mediterranean Theater: 

Planes of the 2nd Air Force were on : reconnaissance 
operations over the Italian area. 

Air Force Command, Southeast reports that 20 Ju 88 ' s , 4 
He Ill's and 25 Stukas carried out operations against 
land targets on Leros with good effect. 

All available planes of Air Force Command, Southeast 
were sent out against the enemy force of two cruisers and 
two destroyers which attacked our conVoy west of. Leros. 

3 . Eastern Front : 

The 4th Air Force had 67 Stukas out on operations 
against three destroyers south of Yalta. For- particulars of 
this successful operation see "Black Sea:". Reconnaissance 
of Poti was also carried out. . . 

On 5 Oct. W49 enemy planes were shot down over the Army 
•front. Our losses amounted to two planes. 

VII. Warfare in the' Mediterranean and Black Sea 

lo Enemy Situation "Mediterranean: . ' ■ 

Four freighters and 2 destroyers put in to Gibraltar 



from the Atlantic and 2 battleships of the KING GEORGE V 
class -with 5 destroyers and 1 cruiser of the CARDIFF class 
put in from the Mediterranean. 

Tres Forcas reported at O83O 13 escort vessels on course 
east, presumably the auxiliary minesweepers which left 
Gibraltar on the evening of 5 Oct. 

Two floating docks in tow and k escort vessels proceeding 
towards the Mediterranean were also reported. 

The large eastbound convo^y, which was off Cape Tenes on 

4 Oct. 5 was not detected again owing to lack of reconnaissance 

German Naval Command, Italy is of opinion that the convoy 
probably- entered Algiers or Bone. Photographic reconnaissance 
of Bizerta and Bone was broken off owing to unfavorable 
weather. ""... 

The number of ships, in Sardinian and Corsiean ports was 
found to be unchanged. In the Salerno-Sicilian area- 
single ships were sighted. 

Merchantmen, tankers and landing boats were lying in 
Naples on the afternoon of 5 Oct. according to photo- 
graphic reconnaissance. 

Considerable shipping movements, consisting of small 
convoys or single vessels, were observed near Crotone, 
off Brindisi and Manfredonia by our reconnaissance planes. 

No reports have been received from the eastern Mediterranean. 

2 . Own Situation Mediterranean: 

Submarine U "380" fired a T5 torpedo on a destroyer 
off Salerno Bay without, however, observing the result. 

In CO 5721 (60 miles west of Derna ) U "596" fired a spread 
of four torpedoes on four steamers; three hits were heard. 
The submarine was heavily dept charged and is not returning 
to Pola. . 

Mine laying oprations during the night of 5 Oct. were 
carried out by PT boats, minelayer F "8" and one 'naval- 
landing craft according to plen, Two motor minesweepers ■ ',. 
searched the area off San Remo without result. 

Out PT. boats were sent out on operation in the Salern 
Ustica area during the night of 6 Oct. 



6 Oct; 1943 

The torpedo- boat ARTURE "was commissioned in Genoa on 5 Oct. 

The torpedo boat MISSOURI, manned by an Italian crew, 

is. at present supporting Army operations in the Flume area. 

German Naval Command, Italy reports in teletype 1920 complete 
figures on ferry operations from Sardinia to Corsica and 
from Corsica to the mainland. Our vessels lost in these 
operations -were: 1 infantry landing boat, 7 naval landing 
craft, 2 submarine chasers, 1 tug, 3 Siebel ferries, 1 
barge and 3 steamers each of 16,943 G..R.T. In 40- enemy 
air attacks 15 planes were shot down and in 8' submarine 
attacks 1 submarine was destroyed. Our total casualties 
amount to 31 dead and 101 wounded. 

Commanding General, Armed Forces, South in his report to 
Armed Forces High Command, makes mention of the operational 
achievements of German Naval Command and Chief, Supply and 
Transport, Italy. He expresses highest praise for the crews 
of the naval landing craft, Siebel ferries, combined 
operations boats and the transport planes on their excellent 
achievement during the last few weeks, their daring having 
been decisive for the success of the whole operation. 

3. Area Naval Group South 

a . Adriatic Sea : 

It is intended to use the Cruiser CATTARO as 
a floating anti-aircraft battery for Trieste. 

After the occupation of Split by German troops it was 
found that the mole. was only slightly damaged and for the 
most part can be used, whereas the dockyard and the large 
dock are out of action. It will be possible to repair the 
small, floating dock-.'' Three ships were sunk in the harbor, 
but they can be made serviceable again in six to eight 
weeks . ■"'■".. 

In the Adriatic the steamer SIBENICO avoided a submarine 
torpedo on 4 Oct. 38 miles southeast of Pola . 

The steamer SIGLlANO reports on the same day a mine deton- 
ation ten miles south of Pola . A subsequent report states 
that the tanker KNUDSEN' was damaged by a torpedo or mine 
hit two miles off Dubrovnik' on 29 Sept. She was, however, 
able to reach Cattaro. 

The steamer E. H FISSER left Trieste' for Sibenik on 5 
Oct. according to plan. 


u kj^ u . j-y~r j 

In connection with the intended mine offensive and 
operations by naval forces along the southeast coast 
of Italy, Group South assumes that Commander, Submarines, 
Mediterranean will coordinate plans with Group South or 
keep the Group promptly and continually informed in order 
to avoid complications. 

Gri'Up South further proposes that the Naval Liaison Staff'/. 
Croatia be put under Admiral, Adriatic, as it is in this 
area of command and many points for discussion arise in 
connection with the training :f and operations by 'Croat- 
ians. Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization 
Branch will go into this matter further. 

b. Aegean Sea : 

At 0050 20 low-flying enemy planes machine-gunned 
the airfield at Araxos , One plane was destroyed by fire. 

Two naval landing craft arrived at Piraeus from Kos with 
500 Italian prisoners. The operation against Pares' and 
Antiparos has been postponed since all naval landing craft 
are reserved for a special operation. Details of ..-tnls are 
not yet known to Naval Staff. 

The steamer OLYMPOS and six naval landing craft are trans- 
ferring one battalion from Piraeus to Kos. 

c . Black Sea : 

During the night . of 5 Oct. two enemy destroyers 
attacked. the Crimean coast off Feodosiya -Ivanbaba ,. while 
the destroyer CHARKOW with two further destroyers attacked 
Yalta and Alusta. The destroyer group off Feodosiya was 
attacked and driven off by the 1st PT boat Flotilla, 
acting as flank escort for the Kerch-Feodosiya convoy, 
in cooperation with our night reconnaissance planes. In 
this way the enemy operation planned against the coast . 
and our convoy was frustrated in cooperation with ' the 
Air Force. At 0^00 enemy planes attacked Ivanbaba, using 
numerous flares to illuminate the target for shelling 
from the sea „ 

At ^0350. the CHARKOW group shelled the roads ,. harbor 
and town of Yalta .at -long, range. No 'militarv damage 
is reported. Our coastal battery immediately returned 
fire. -t 

The enemy withdrew to -the east under heavy smoke and 
shelled Alusta. At 0503 submarine U "9" unsuccess- 
fully attacked the enemy destroyer formations which 
had joined up at a position about 30 miles south- 



Towards 0?00 the returning enemy unit Was attacked by 
one of our- Stuka .formations. One enemy vessel, possibly 
a minelayer, was sunk and a destroyer was put out of control 
and had to be' taken in tow by the CEARKOW. In a second 
air attack at 0950 another destroyer received two direct 
hits. At 1253 the sinking of one, and at 1326 of two destroy- 
ers 'W£3 observed. The remaining j5 destroyers withdrew at high 
speed. . • ■; 

At 1625 U ,l 9" observed the explosion of a destroyer when 
closing in for an attack. 

The destruction of three destroyer can, therefore, be 
considered certain. 

Four boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla left Ivanbaba at 
1800 for a further operation against enemy destroyers and 
at 1950 had an engagement with three Russian gunboats'. 
In addition to U "9"* U "20" also was ordered to operate 
against enemy naval forces end to bring in prisoners if 
possible. •'.•"•"• - ■••;• 

During the night of 5 Oct. Naval landing craft in patrol 
line off the north Taman coast had an engagement with 
enemy naval forces. Hits on one enemy vessel were observed. 
During the day the naval landing craft were repeatedly 
bombed and machine-gunned. One naval landing craft was 
slightly damaged. Kossa Tussla was occupied by the enemy 
during the night of 5 Oct. : '."■.".-':•. ..':'".'..': 

At 0750. before entering Feodosiya one of our convoys 
was unsuccessfully attacked by twelve enemy planes which 
dived on it. r. ■ • -.!.. : "•' ■' 

Nothing else to report. v 

VI 1 1 . Situation East Asi a . ■• 

The Naval Attache- in Tokyo reports : 

1. The Japanese Naval Representative in Batavia, 
Captain Maeda, was in Tokyo for two weeks, in order to 
draw attention of headquarters to the inadequate defense 
of Sumatra and Java . ■Should the enemy Attack" Burma, it 
will, in the opinion of naval offices In the southern area, 
only be a deceptive operation. The enemy's main thrust 
must naturally be- expected on southern Java or Sumatra, 
aiming at Palembang and later at Balikpapan. Should these 



oil supply centers be -wrested from Japan, her situation 
would become very serious. The present defense of the 
islands is far too weak and above all cound not -withstand 
any surprise attack from the Indian Ocean, which must 
soon be expected. 

2. Admiral Nomura has, since his return, given more 
than 50 lectures on Germany, several of them .before highest 
Government and Armed Forces offices. He is said to have 
expressed himself on Germany in a very definite manner, with- 
out glamorizing, and in view of this General Banzai was 
very "soon no longer taken seriously. Admiral Nomura has 
played an important part in recent Government measures 
for total mobilization. 

*•* * #*■*■* -* •** ■* **■ •* •*■* * * * * * 



Items- of Political Importance , .... 

Reuter transmits from Washington- the report of the Senate's 
Sub-Comittee for Mobilization, according to which the Allies 
now have sufficient shipping available to carry out a 
devisive blow against Europe this year. It Is planned 
to transport a U. S. Army of 5 million men overseas,. of 
which 2| .million will be shipped by this Christmas. It 
was. possible to advance the original d^tes planned by 
six months as, through .the lull in submarine warfare,^ 
the increase in tonnage has exceeded its quota by 3 million 
tons' .'.'•' 

The British Home Secretary stated in one of his speeches 
that Great Britain's objective in this war was the annih- . 
ilation of Japan just as much as that of Germany. 

The military state of emergency"' in Denmark was canceled on 
6 Oct. 

According to an intelligence report of 16 Sept. the 
expected declaration by Salazar and the Portuguese National 
Assembly has been postponed until completion of large- 
scale maneuvers now commencing. Portugal Is to be 
declared a non-belligerent with close leanings to Great 

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff 

I. Army Situation: 

No large-scale actions took place on the eastern front. 
In Italy our attack on Termoli was broken off. The enemy 
landed new forces and assisted the fighting on land with 
gunfire from cruisers and destroyers. Strong enemy forces 
broke through 10 km. southwest of Termoli. Enemy supplies 
are continuously moving in via Brindisi, Taranto and 
Termoli. The marked increase in freighters at Salerno 
indicates preparations for a new landing operation. Enemy 
advance battalions have reached the Volturno southeast of 
Capua . 

II. Operations Division, Fleet Operations Section submits 

a report fr-om Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, 
Naval Liaison that the convoy of the steamer OLYMPOS con- 
sisting of six naval landing craft led by submarine chaser 
"2111" was attacked by an enemy submarine at 0400 and later 
by surface forces in the Amorgos-Levitha area, while en route 
from Piraeus to Kos in connection with the operation against 
Leros . All our vessels, with exception of one naval landing 


T Oct, 19^3 , ' CONFIDENTIAL 

cra£t- s; -w ere ;sunk-i 'according ; to. air reconnaissance. Naval 
Staff , mere ly;. knows ' tha t tfe is . c envoy : wa s intended- . for the 
transfer of one battalion of German troops ' from Piraeus 
to Kos . It is to be assumed that the destroyers detected 
by our air reconnaissance southeast of Rhodes on the 
afternoon, of 6 Oct. carried out this attack. So far 
Naval Staff has not been advised of any operations planned 
following that against Kos. It is only known that the 
operation against Paros and Antiparos was postponed in 
favor of s special operation and it seems that this was 
the operation against Leros. Chief of Staff/ Group South, 
who was present at the Chiefs of Staff Conference was 
questioned, and states that he too was not informed. 
Chief of Staff, Naval Staff has therefore ordered. the 
following teletype to be sent to Group South: - 

''Commander in Chief, Navy and Naval Staff were not 
advised regarding plans for and commencement of the oper- 
ation against Leros, otherwise approval to carry it out 
would not have been given. 

After the successful attack on Kos, Naval Staff expect- 
ed enemy measures to prevent a similar German success 
against Leros . The Fuehrer has ordered an investigation 
as to why the Operations Divisions concerned were not 
advised beforehand of this plan, of the preparations 
and of the actual commencement of the ' operation against 
Leros. Commander in Chief, Navy and Naval Staff have, 
.even up to the time of dispatch of this teletype, only 
had information from messages transmitted from the Air 
Force Operations Staff; nothing has so far come in 
from Group South. • , . .• 

I have to request a brief report by KR (most immediate) 
telttype without delay, enabling me to inform the Fuehrer 
at this evening's conference on the situation. A detailed 
report on the preparations for and course of the operation 
is subsequently to be submitted to me. 

A basic order to 'this effect is being sent separately to 
all Groups and Naval Commands." . 

III. Prompted by the action off Bodoe, Operations Div- 
ision has written to Commander in. Chief, Air Force, 
Operations Staff as follows: - :'• 

On k Oct. 19^3 an enemy naval force, which presum- 
ably included two aircraft carriers, succeeded in approach- 
ing the north coast of Norway unobserved. Carrier-borne 
planes carried out the surprise and successful attack 
on our convoy south of Bodoe and on ships in Bodoe harbor 
on the morning of h Oct. The losses sustained are very heavy, 



Naval Staff is of opinion that a repetition of such attacks 
is certainly to be reckoned -with and that our traffic in the 
Norwegian skerries may be seriously affected by this. 

Since, following the notice given to terminate transit of 
Armed Forces transports through Sweden, supplies by sea 
for our forces in northern Finland and Norway now assume still 
greater importance than hitherto:, every .precaution should be 
taken to pre cent the enemy -a gain achieving such successes 
in similar attacks to those on 4 Oct. 

Naval Sta.ff will do everything possible to increase convoy 
escort and to reinforce anti-aircraft guns on bo-°rd and ships 
being convoyed. These, measures a. lone will, however, not 
suffice to protect our convoys adequately. 

In this respect it is of primary importance to have/an 
adequate air reconnaissance off the entire Norwegian coast, 
which establishes the approach of enemy aircraft carriers 
early enough to enable our forces to operate against the 
enemy unit. In addition, it will be necessary to transfer 
sufficient fighter planes also to northern Norway so :as 
at least to provide the convoys with .fighter cover in case 
the approach of an aircraft carrier is not prevented. 

It is therefore requested that investigation be made as 
to how the forces necessary to fulfill these duties and 
the necessary fuel can be allotted to the 5th Air Force- 
Quartermaster Division will make further arrangements 
regarding reinforcement of anti-aircraft guns aboard ships. 

Chief, Naval Staff agrees, -... . ■■■■ . 

For copy of order l/skl I op 28009/43 GKdo3 . see War Diary, 
Part C. Vol. Ha . 

Special Items 

I. Quartermaster Division has issued the following order 

1. In the area of Admiral, Adriatic a new escort 
flotilla will be formed consisting of the escort vessels 
GIORGIO, SALVORE and F "149" at Venice and the torpedo 
boats MISSOURI at Trieste, AUDACE at Venice and INSIDIOSO 
at Pola. Crews for the torpedo boats are to be drawn from 



reserves for the CALATAFIMI and from reserves on PT boat 
depot ships . 

2. The following new constructions, -which will be completed 
by the end of 19^3 , are to be given priority: 

At Ansaldo Dockyard: 

In Genoa -Sestri: 

3 torpedo boats, 1 corvette, 2 vedette boats. 

In Geno-Voltri 

1 war transport 

In Genoa -Sampler d 1 Arena: 
3 naval landing craft. 

At Cantieri Baglietto, Varazze: 

2 minesweepers, 1 sea -rescue boat and 1 motorboat. 

At Cantieri del Tirreno, Riva Trigoso: 

10 naval landing craft and 1 war transport. 

At Odero Terni Orlando in Muggiano: 

3 transport submarines (top priority) 
(two of these not until 1944). 

At Odero Terni Orlando in Leghorn: 
1 destroyer and 2 corvettes. 

3. At Cantieri Navale Riuniti del Adriatico in Monfalcone: 

2 coastal submarines and 3 transport submarines 
(not until 1944). 

At San Marco and Rocco (Trieste): 

2 corvettes, 1 PT boat (vedette boat), 
2 torpedo boats and 5 tugs. 

At Cantieri Navale del Quarnaro: 

In Fiume: 

2 torpedo boats. 

In Breda : 
1 corvette. 

4. A decision as to the new constructions which will 
be completed in 1944 will be made later. 

II. Re: River Mine -ex ploding Vessels 

' ' " - ' ■ ' . I w. M 1. 1 . . . 

In view of the favorable experiences of Naval Ordnance 


7 Oct. 19k 


Division, Underwater Obstacles Branch, and owing to the 
urgent need to supply as many small mine-exploding vessels 
as possible to the front in the shortest possible time, 
Operations Division request Quartermaster Division immed- 
iately to convert a series of naval landing craft into 
river mine -exploding vessels or to fit up new naval land- 
ing craft for this purpose. 

The following are to be provided: 

for the 
for the 
for the 
for the 

West Area 
Baltic Se; 
North Sea 
Da nube 

as reserve 

6 river mine-exploding vessels 

£ it it ~ a 

g ii it . ii 

•2 II II It 


24 river mine-exploding vesseTs 

This new use of necessity requires the construction of 24 
more naval landing craft. The introduction of the river 
mine -exploding vessel will entail an appreciable relief 

it can free them of duties 
and river mouths* This will 

for the seagoing ones, since 

in the shallow coastal areas 

sdon' enable n general improvement in the present very 

strained situation as regards these vessels. 

III. German Naval Command, Italy proposes the introduct- 
ion of a special award for crews of sm-°ll ships, in view 
of the outstanding achievements by crews of naval landing 
craft, Siebel ferries, barges, etc. 

IV. Personnel requirements, which are becoming more 
urgent every day in connection with the increase in 
small naval vessels and escorts, are also being felt 
in Royal Navy. Naval Intelligence Division reports 

that the Admiralty is taking measures to appoint officers 
of the Royal Marines as Commanders of landing craft and to 
man certain types of boat with Royal Marines exclusively. 
For details' see copy as per 1/Skl 30641/43 geh. in War Diary, 
Vol "Evaluation of Intelligence on Foreign Navies." 

V. For summary of intelligence on the enemy obtained by 
radio decoding and radio intelligence from 27 Sept. to 

3 Oct. see Radio Monitoring Report No. 40/43. 

Situation ,7 Oct . 
I. War In Foreign Waters 
1 . E nemy Situation': , i 
•Nothing to- report 

rix\ ?rV 



7 Oct. 19^3 ■ .,, CONFIDENTIAL 

2 . Own Situation: 

The Navel Attache in Tokyo reports an order for the 
RIO GRANDE to leave Jokhokarta on 29 Oct., with statements 
as regards route, equipment, camouflage, etc. 

Naval Staff 'advises the Naval Attache in Tokyo that the 
FLIKDER left Brest on 5 Oct. at l600. 

II. Situation West Area; 

1 . Enemy Situation: 

Forty-five enemy planes were observed on operation 
over the Bay of Biscay; there -was much r^dio traffic of an 
urgent nature between them. 

One British vessel was located in BE 989O at 2029 ^nd one 
in BF i860 at 20^4. 

Nine British freighters arrived at Lisbon from the southwest 
according to an intelligence report. An escort, consisting 
of one destroyer and h corvettes, is waiting off the Tagus 
for 8 outgoing steamers. 

2. Own Situation: 

Atlantic Coast: 

Three submarines were escorted out and che in. The 
steamer MUENSTERLAND is being transferred from Royan to 
Brest. The exercises of the 8th Destroyer Flotilla have 
been postponed. 

Channel Coast: 

Patrol positions were not taken up during the 
day because of stormy weather. 

The steamer NORDVAARD moved from Cherbourg to Le H^vre 
during the night of 6 Oct. 

The 2nd, 4th, 6th .and 8th PT Boat Flotillas were out 
laulng mines on the Harwich - Great Yarmouth convoy 
route during the night of 7 Oct. Targets located by 
radar in the Channel, off Boulogne, Dieppe and in 
the western part of Seine Bay were in no case confirmed 
by searchlights and star shells. 


7 Oct.. 1943 :. CONFIDENTIAL . . 

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters 

■:, North Sea :- .■•■■;■... :•,>.. ••.- ..-. 

Three ground mines- were swept north of Terschelling. 
Three PT boats were transferred from Wilheirns haven to the 
Hook. Hook - Elbe. convoy "1179" started out at 1900; torpedo 
boat T "19" joined this convoy. It is intended to transfer 
the steamer FUESILIER from Helder to Ijmuiden during the 
night of 7 Oct. 

Emden was attacked by twelve enemy planes at £000. No 
damage is reported from the harbor and dockyards. Towards 
mignight planes were detected on mine laying operations 
in the Borkum - Elbe mouth area . In the morning two 
unescorted Dutch freight barges were sunk by eight Typhoons 
in the East Scheldt. 

In connection with air attack on Emden on 2 Oct., it is. 
now reported that despite good smoke screens and an over- 
cast sky numerous bombs hit the town and its northern, 

Norway, Northern Waters: , . 

1. Enemy Situation: 

Twenty-seven planes were detected on operation 
over the North Sea. Minor reconnaissance activity was 
reported over the Vardoe/Nordkyn area and near Stavanger 
on 6 Oct. A merchantmen lying, at Toross landing pier, . 
at the outlet of Kola Bay, was attacked and damaged 
by our planes on 6 Oct. The ship has apparently run 

2. Own Situation: 

Fifteen ships were escorted north and lk south. 
Nine ships were left lying in harbor in the Arctic coast 
area owing to shortage .of escorts. 

Naval Command, Norway submits a report of Admiral, North 
Norwegian Coast. from Bodoe stating that exact figures of 
the casualties sustained on k Oct. cannot yet be .given, 
since the local hospitals were temporarily cleared during 
the full alarm and the seriously wounded were evacuated, 
some to Germany and some to Fauske. 

Group North/Fleet reports that the submarine operation 
against the radio and signal station and the coal mines 
at^Syea (Spitsbergen) will be canceled because of the 
slight chances of success and view of the number of 
submarines and, their state of readiness. 



IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea 

1 . Enemy Situation: 

Over the mouth of the Luga and Lippovo slight 
air activity was reported during the day. On 5,6 Q-nd 7 
Oct. our vessels -were unsuccessfully attacked by a tor- 
pedo bomber off Duenamuende, off Demesnes, -west of Back- 
of en and off Porkalla,. 

2. Own Situation.: 

Two mine detonations "were reported off the Shulz- 
grund. In the exercise area of the Torpedo Experimental 
Station off Gdynia altogether five ground mines were swept. 

Three heavy gun carriers on the 24th Landing Flotilla 
anchored north of Moon on the evening of 6 Oct. because 
of weather conditions. 

The activity of vessels of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic 
was also hampered very much by weather conditions. 

Naval Command, Baltic reports: 

"1. For operation in the Skagerrak, Commanding 

Admiral, Defenses, Baltic has at his disposal: 
The 16 th Batrol Boat Flotilla with 6 boats, 
The 17th Patrol Boat Flotilla with 9 boats 
and 4 detached minesweepers of Commanding 
Admiral, Defenses, North - in all 19 vessels. 

2. On continuous operations: for Oslo convoys 8 
boats, for convoys to Kristiansand South 2 boats 
for boiler cleaning and relief purposes 5 boats 
in all 15 boats . 

3. This leaves only 4 boats available for the 
patrol line Arendal-Hirtshals for inter-' 
ception of blockade runners. As these boats 
have to relieve each other, the patrol line 
can only be taken up by 2 or at the most 3 
patrol boats . 

4. The number of boats in the patrol line is 
too small and they are too slow. A break- 
through by blockade runners can, therefore 
not be prevented effectively. 

5. It is deemed necessary to allocate to 
Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic another 6 
fast boats from another area, since only then 
will there be a chance of intercepting 



of intercepting the blockade runners. No such boats 
can be released from the area of Naval Command, 
Baltic. . tXyi /;.;-; . . . ' 

6. From 15 Oct. the 5th Air Force intends to carry 
out regular evening reconnaissance in the inner 
part of the Sk.agerrak and morning reconnaissance 
in the outer part of the Ska-gerrak to detect 
blockade runners. This promise was only given with . 
reservation. Reconnaissance will only- be carried out 
when formations' are available and if they are not 
needed for more urgent operations. 

7. Nothing was said about plans to provide bombers 
and torpedo bombers to operate against the block- 
ade runners" . .'.-.- 

With regard to the anti-aircraft defense of Peenemuende, 
Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, ifc'vy reports: 

"An assignment of heavy batteries does not promise 
any appreciable improvement in anti-aircraft defense, since 
the location of the objective on a peninsula offers few 
good facilities for emplacements and during day attacks 
does not permit fire to be opened before bombs are released. 

An investigation is requested as to whether High Command, 
Navy can provide an anti-aircraft cruiser for improvement 
of defense. " 

Quartermaster Division will make this investigation. 

Naval Command, Baltic informs. Naval Staff of instructions 
to Baltic Sea Offices that the 102nd Bomber Ving cannot 
provide continuous fighter and convoy escort' for merchant 
shipping and that, therefore, reports Of departure, as 
ordered up to now, are superfluous. The 102nd Bomber Wing 
is still willing,- by means of single planes, occasionally 
to harass activity by Russian torpedo bombers. 

V. Submarine Warfare : 

1, gnemy Situatio n: 

According to an Intelligence report, 10 tankers, 
including 3 of the latest type, left Baltimore on 2. Oct. 
at 0200. During September, 62 ...freighters carrying war material 
left Baltimore for Ireland, Gibraltar and Siberian ports. 
On 29 Sept. a convoy of 11 freighters left Philadelphia, .- 
destination unknown. 


7 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL . . ■ ;; 

2, ■ O wn Situation : 

From the Gulf of Oman U "188" reports the 
sinking of a U. S. Steamer type "C 3" (8,000 GRT) in MZ 
8916 on 21 Sept. end: of the tanker BRITANNIA (9-970 GRT) 
in MF 2640 on 5 Oct. From MF 8630 to 8860 and subsequently 
30 miles away from the 200 m line the submarine observed 
convoy traffic with light escort on course 35 degrees and 
215 degrees; also in the inner part of the Gulf occasional 
single vessels. During the day planes made straight for 
the submarine, apparently by location* Wo night air- activity 
was observed. Probably due to diminished acid content 
in electric torpedoes, the submarine had 10 misses (end of 
run detonators ). which cannot be accounted for otherwise, 
and thus lost the chance of any great success. 

Investigations are being made as to whether tropical 
influences on the electric torpedoes could be the cause. 

The loss of transport submarine UT "460" and of U "422" 
is to be assumed. Anit-a ircraf t submarine U "27l n bss 
been sent to BD 30 as defense for UT "488", 

In the North Atlantic single submarines in the later 
afternoon contacted in AK 6l and 62 what was obviously the 
destroyer escort Qf an eastbound SC convoy. Group "Rossbach" 
was sent in. During the night of 6 Oct. altogether 8 sub- 
marines reported destroyers, some .'of which were proceed- 
ing in sub-divisions. One destroyer was sunk. Our BV 222 ' s 
are carrying out reconnaissance of the convoy area. 

VI. Aerial Warfare 

British lies and Vicinity: 

The 3rd Air Force reports 36 of our planes out on 
operation against London and 39 against Norwich. Four bom- 
bers and two fighters are overdue. Ten JU 88' s were on 
free-lance operations over the Atlantic without success. 

The enmy- f lew reconnaissance with altogether seven planes 
during the day over Germany and carried out machine-gun 
attacks in Holland, Belgium and France on railway install- 
ations and on airfield, as well as on vessels off the coast. 
On the east coast of Walcheren the motor ship KAMPERLAND 
and a fishing smack were sunk. 


7 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL 

During the night of 7 Oct. the Baltic Sea entrances and 
the Heligoland Bight -were mined by strong enemy formations. 
A large-scale attack -was carried out on Stuttgart. Further 
bombs -were dropped on Munich, Boeblingen, Friedrichshafen 
and Strassburg. Substantial damage was done in Stutggart. 
For particulars see " Daily Situation". Our fighter defense 
in northern' Germany, consisting of 56 planes, shot down 4 
enemy planes; in southern Germany our fighters could not 
go up owing to fog. 

. Mediterranean Theater: 

the 2nd Air Force carried out reconnaissance 
flights . . 

Strong formations of Air Force Command, Southeast carried 
out continuous attacks on an enemy warship unit off Scarp- 
anto, which was defended by 18-20 fighters and accurate anti- 
aircraft fire. Hits were scored on two cruisers. 

Our planes rescued 219 of the survivors of the OLYMPOS 
convoy. Reconnaissance reported at 1550 near Castelli Rosso 
two destroyers on course 280 degrees. The enemy's air activity 
over the Italian front was only slight. In the Aegean the 
airfields -of Castelli on Crete and Maritza on Rhodes were 
attacked. In addition two Ju 88 ! s were damaged during an 
attack on the airfield .of Candia . 

Eastern Front.: ? .. ,, 

The 5th Air Force reports 32 planes out on 
operation without special event. 

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and B lac k Sea 
1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean: 

Cape Spartel reported at 1000 sighting 
convoy of about A3 ships with 6' escort vessels making 
for the Mediterranean. Seven of these ships put in to 
Gibraltar in the afternoon. Four destroyers put in to 
Gibraltar from the Mediterranean, and the FORMIDABLE, 
and the INDOMITABLE and 4 destroyers left Gibraltar 
for the Mediterranean and one- CARDIFF class left for 
the Atlantic . 

No reconnaissance reports have been received from the 
western and eastern Mediterranean. 



At Naples many lighters were observed, so that It can 
be assumed that the blasting of the berths was effective 
Strong enemy fighter defense makes reconnaissance over 
Naples and Salerno impossible. 

According to Italian reports , a British cruiser sank on 
9 Sept. as a result of a mine detonation, when entering 
Taranto. This was probably due to the mines laid by our 
PT boats and naval landing craft. Off Rapallo one of our 
motor minesweepers was unsuccessfully attacked by an 
enemy s ubma r ine . 

2. Own Situation Mediterranean: 

The PT boat operation during the night of 6 Oct. 
was discontinued owing to unfavorable weather conditions. 

As regards the loss of the POMMERN, it is reported that this 
minelayer was chased by two submarines into the Bay of San 
Remo. Whether she was sunk by a submarine or a mine is 
still being investigated, Our own minesweeping operations 
off San Remo were hampered by weather conditons. 

On 8 Oct. four naval landing craft are to leave Marseilles 
for Genoa; they will be joined from Toulon by three further 
naval landing craft. 

Submarine U "8l" reports from ON 3256 six misses on a 
freighter of 1,800 GRT; U "3&0" reports from CJ 6794 a 
miss with a T 5 torpedo on landing boats and from CJ 9128 
a miss by a spread of four torpedoes on two overlapping 
freighters, firing data being certain. The Commander pre- 
sumes pistol failures. 

Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic reports that dockyards 
have received orders from the Italian Secretary of the Navy 
which do not conform with the instructions issued by Naval 

Quartermaster Division has ordered that dockyard interests 
of the Navy in the north Adriatic area be looked after by 
the Dockyard Control Staff of German Naval Command, Italy 
as long as matters relating to dockyards in this area are 
controlled by Organization Speer from the Italian area. 
Naval interests at the yards are to be looked after by- 
Working Group Trieste from the Dockyard Control Staff of 
Serman Naval Command, Italy, with cooperation between 
German Naval Command, Italy and Admiral, Adriatic. 

Regarding the Army Situation, Commanding General, Armed 
Forces, South reports regrouping for continuation of the 
Attack near Termoli; however, he considers it doubtful 
whether a decisive success can still be gained. 



3s. Area Naval Group Sout h: ' 
a. Adriatic Sea: 

The steamer ERIDANIA en route from Pola to 
Flume was sunk by an enemy submarine at 0740 off Cape Pro- 
montore. The stea-mer SANSEGO en route from Zara to Pola -was 
unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy submarine at" 1445 at the 
same point as the ERIDANIA. The steamer UGLIANO was fired on 
by enemy submarine between Zara and Pola . She returned the 
fire and observed several machine-gun hits on the bridge of 
the s ubma r ine . 

•In the Valona area Italian coastal batteries were taken 
over, namely six 15 cm guns at Saseno, three 15 cm guns 
at Cape Linguette, one 15 cm and 7-5 cm battery, .at Cape 
Treporti. In Venice PT boats S "30" and S "32&" - n re lying 
in restricted operational readiness and S "34" and 3 "61" 
out of operational readiness. .. •■ 

Report on departure of the st.ea.ner ROSSELLI from Dura z 20 
to Patras has not yet been received. 

b. Agean Sea : 

Our air reconnaissance sighted: at 1240 on 6 
Oct. four miles south of Leros one destroyer or torpedo 
boat on south-easterly course; at 1500 east of Leros a 
small naval vessel on easterly course; at 1540, as already 
reported by the Air Force, six miles south of Castell Rosso 
2 destroyers on' westerly course. These reports were contain- 
ed in the morning situation report of Group South, which 
did not reach Berlin until 153'8. At 0400 on 7 Oct. an enemy 
force of 2 cruisers, and 4 destroyers with a few escort 
vessels was reported. off Leros; this attacked our convoy 
OLYMFOS. The same force consisting of 2 cruisers, 2 
destroyers and 2 corvettes was sighted at 1000 between 
Rhodes and Scarpanto on southeasterly course end was 
successfully attacked by our Air Force. 

As already reported only one "naval landing craft remains 
out of the convoy of the steamer QLYMPOS. . So far 490 men 
have been rescued in operat. ions started at once by naval 
and air forces. These operations are continuing. 

Naval Staff advises Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters, with 
copy to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy 
as f ollpws : 

"Submarine chaser "2111", the steamer OLYMPOS and 7 naval 
landing craft left Piraeus for Kos with one battalion of 
German troops aboard at 0715 on 6 Oct. At 1.150 on 6 Oct. the 


7 Oct. 1945 CONFIDENTIA L 

convoy was first detected by the enemy Air Force southwest 
of Kos. At 1640 the convoy •was' west of Serif os according 
to plan. At 0400 on 7 Oct. the convoy leader reported 
sighting a submarine and subsequently sent a distress 
report on a submarine attack east of Amorgos, to the north- 
west of Stampalia. At 0-426 submarine chaser "2111" reported 
heavy gunfire from the direction of Levitha and requested 
Air Force assistance. At 0458 the steamer OLYMPOS and one 
naval landing craft were lost. At 0515 distress report was 
sent by torpedo boats. At 0510 our air reconnaissance detect- 
ed 2 cruisers and 2 destroyers on course 250 degrees immediat- 
ly south of Levitha. At 0525 our air reconnaissance reported 
enemy naval forces and submarines attacking our convoy. Our 
air reconnaissance also sighted at 0550 2 cruisers approach- 
ing west of Patrnos and at 0605 east of Stampalia 2 destroy- 
ers on course east. Between 0500 and 0550 the convoy was 
scattered by enemy surgace forces about halfway between 
Levitha and Stampalia. At 0624 3 of our motor minesweepers 
were about 1J> miles west of the scene of the engagement; 
they requested air cover and at 0720 reported having rescued 
survivors. According to air reconnaissance, the entire 
convoy was sunk, except for one naval landing craft which 
proceeded ti Stampalia. Other convoys en route to Kos 
were diverted. Two naval landing craft are on their way 
to Kos for rescue operations. 

An enemy force consisting of 6 vessels which were with- 
drawing to the southeast was attacked at 1000 by our Air 
Force between Scarpanto and Rhodes . 

Naval Staff was not advised by Group South or Admiral, 
Aegean either about further operational plans following the 
operation against Kos or about the departure of the convoys 
on 6 Oct. Subject to further investigations, Naval Staff is 
of opinion that convoys should have been recalled following 
the report of two destroyers on westerly course by our 
air reconnaissance at 1540 on 6 Oct. 80 miles southeast 
of Rhodes. Necessary steps for further investigations have 
been taken. " 

Group South has replied to the teletype from Chief of Staff, 
Naval Staff as follows: 

"1. Group South assumes that Naval Staff was informed 
through the Fuehrer directive and the situation reports 
of the Group regarding the plan to push the British out 
of Dodecanese, especially as the first part of the oper- 
ations had already been carried out with the occupation of 
Kos. The date for the attack on Leros had to be adjusted 
according to the outcome of the operation against Kos 
(in view of cooperation of the Air Forces) and' according 
to the enemy situation. 


7 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL 

2. Reaction by the British to the operation 
against Kos 'was expected by all Commands in the Aegean, 
namely reinforcement of defense on the islands and pre- 
vention of further offensive operations by us. Our 
limited resources for operations at sea and on land 
■would not have permitted any later operations, since we 
•would not have had sufficient forces after the enemy 
had strengthened his positions. British intervention 

at sea could not be expected at any time and for long 
periods, so that plans for this operation could not 
be made dependent on a •waiting policy. Only the following 
counte.rmeasures on our part -were possible: 

a. immediate continuation of the operation and 

b. very strong cooperation by the Air Force through 
suitably heavy and extensive reconnaissance and 
systematic attacks on the enemy. 

3. The transfer of one battalion to Kos as relief 
and as the island garrison, reported in the evening sit- 
uation report of 6 Oct., meant practically the start of 
operation- "Leros". Group South has, however, not yet 
received any detailed- orders end instructions for this 
because of delay of the air courier. The causes are 
under investigation. 

4. Advice to Naval Staff about Leros operation 
•was held. back until the date and codeword were stated 
by Army Group E. and until receipt of data at least for 
the naval operation. 

5. Sinking of the convoy of the steamer OLYMPOS 
was reported by Group South in the morning situation report 
of 7 Oct. and in most immediate teletype 5920 Gkdos, of 7 
Oct. No reply to further inquiries of Group South to 
Admiral, Aegean regarding the operational control of this 
convoy has been received here yet." 

Group South has also submitted the context of the following 
order issued by Army Group E regarding the occupation of 
Leros : 

"1. In the unanimous opinion of Army Group E, Naval 
Group South and Air Force Command, Southeast, the immediate 
occupation of the island of Leros is decisive for main- 
taining the Aegean stronghold.' 

2.- I therefore order that:: 

a. The island of Leros is to be attacked and 
occupied at latest on 9 Oct., if possible 
on 8 Oct., by forces under the command of 
Lt. General Mueller in accordance with basic 
operational plan discussed and agreed on 5 Oct. 
It is necessary to act with extreme daring and 



to accept all risk before the British transfer further 
reinforcements to the island. 

b. It is the task of Admiral, Aegean to carry out the 
naval part of this operation at once, setting aside 
all- objections and avoiding all runs not essential 
for the success of the operation. Plans for carrying 
it out are to be reported to me at once. The date for 
attack - 9 -Oct. definite unless developments., in . . 
the situation make a change necessary, in -which case 
I will personally make the decision. 

5. The 10th Air Corps "will continue support -of .the 
operation -with combined forces. 

4. Lt. General Mueller has been advised by radiogram 
accordingly, " . 

Naval Staff then asked Group South and Admiral, Aegean to "Whom 
this order -of Army Group E "was addressed, "when it was received 
by Admiral, Aegean and "when by Group South. Information has ' = 
also been requested as to who gave the order for departure of 
the convoys on 6 Oct. and when the reconnaissance report of 
1540 on 6 Oct. was received by Admiral, Aegean and how this 
report was evaluated. 

Mopping-up operations on Kos are continuing. The number of 
prisoners taken has increased to 886 British and 3,000 
Italians. A reinforced platoon of Assault Division Rhodes 
landed on Symi, where Italians ' offered resistance before 
the town. According to unconfirmed reports-, the islands of 
Calino, Stampalia and Nicaria are occupied by British forces. 

c. Black Sea : •'. 

Enemy Situation; 

According to radio intelligence there was a submarine 
90 miles south-southwest of Feodosiya ,. one 35 miles west- 
northwest of Sevastopol and one 40 miles east of Constanta. A 
destroyer of the FRUNSE class was seen coming from the south- 
east at 1145 in the area of the central Caucasian coast. The 
three destroyers sunk on 6 Oct. were the CHARKOW and the des- 
troyers "D" and "E", according to radio intelligence. 

Own Situation: 

Three of our boats sustained slight damage in the 
engagement between the 1st PT Boat Flotilla and several 
enemy gunboats south of the Strait of Kerch. Definite hits 
were observed on two enemy boats. Our boats carried on their 
operation after the enemy had withdrawn 

-101- confidentia: 

7 Oct. 1943 • • CONFIDENTIAL ' 

and rothing was sighted at the point where the destroyer 
went down except a large oil patch. 

The operation was then broken off since the weather- , 

Submarine U "24" unsuccessfully attacked a coastal ., 
vessel with two torpedoes 18 miles southeast of Tuapse. 

Further continuous air attacks were carried out on naval 
landing craft in patrol line off the north Taman coast, 
but no appreciable damage was caused. At 10^0 the convoy . 
PR0D0M0S en route from Sevastopol to Constanta was unsuccess- 
fully attacked by five enemy planes with three aerial 
torpedoes and two aerial mines east of Capt St. George. 
At 0850 four enemy planes attacked Yalta, where a small 
fire was started aboard the tug BAIKAL. 


VIII. Situation East Asia 

According to Reuter, a strong U. S. Force bombed and. 
shelled the Japanese garrison on Wake Island on 5 Oct. 
An aircraft carrier took, part in this operation. According 
to an "Exchange" report from McArthur ' s Headquarters, 
the Allies have gained complete control of the Gulf of 
Huron through capture of Finschh^fen. They now surround 
all Japanese bases still left on the Solomons, New 
Guinea and New Britain, and are attacking these : constantly 
from the air. 

**■* **■**■*■***■#•■* -a-***.* 



I tems of Political Importance 

According to Swedish press reports, Hull's trip to 
Moscow is significant in that he wishes to prevent 
territorial concessions by Eden which have come to Wash- 
ington's knowledge. Hull will submit for debate, a peace 
plan consisting of three points. He is also said to have 
been charged by Roosevelt with making endeavors for a 
separate peace for Finland. The .Anglo-American divergen- 
cies are quite obvious in regard to territorial concess- 
ions. Whereas it is sa^d to be Churchill's intention to 
re-establish the Baltic States between Russia find Central 
Europe, Hull is of opinion that Russia does not need the 
protection of such buffer states, in other words that her 
territorial expansion to the west is not necessary. As to 
the program of the forthcoming conference, every question 
is put forward which might in any way come Into consider- 
ation either for the continuation of the war or for the 
organization of the post war period. To some extent they 
serve to show the difficulties which lie in the Anglo- 
American differences of opinion alone. 

The success or failure of the conference will undoubtedly 
have far-reaching effects for Germany. Its failure could 
entail the most favorable conditions for political measures 
Our prospects will be. decidedly prejudiced if the three 
Allies should reach complete unanimity. As there is 
obviously no possibility for us to hamper the course 
of the negotiations in any way except by unexpected major 
strategic successes, for instance in submarine warfare, 
the course of events must be watched and the outcome 

Discussions with Chief, Naval Staff 

A. ■ Report of the Shipbuilding Commission on Submarine 
Construction Matters: 

The Main Committee of the Shipbuiidijng Commission has 
requested that construction of the two submarines type 
XVIII at the Germania Dockyard in Kiel be canceled, in order 
that this dockyard may be commissioned with the construction 
of types XIV, XX and XXI, without a delay in the date 
fixed for type XX (transport) submarines. The changes 
planned could be carried out with a delay of five weeks 
only, if the two submarines type XVIII were dropped, ■ 
whereas otherwise a delay of eight months would have to 
be expected. The Shipbuilding Commission is of opinion 
that most of the trials planned for the two submarines 
type XVIII can be carried out by the first submarines of 



types XXI or XVII, -which will be completed earlier. 
The question as to "whether the two submarines must be 
regarded as type boats for subsequent series is decisive. 
As this is unlikely in view of the increased torpedo tube 
equipment planned for serial boats, the Shipbuilding 
Commission recommends that the two trial boats be dropped 
as requested by the Main Commitee, on condition that any 
changes for type XVII arising from research while still 
under construction be taken into consideration. 

Submarine Division is opposed to abandoning type XVIII. 
In the entirely new field which will be embarked on with 
the new submarines no stages in development should be 
omitted. The experiences gained with type XVII are quite 
inadequate. This type too will certainly only represent 
an experimental stage and will not lead yet to operational 
vesselr. . 

Operations Division emphasizes the operational importance 
of transport submarines. Every effort should be made to 
speed up their construction. It points our that the delay 
might be avoided if other ways and means are found regard- 
ing the contemplated changes in construction work. 

Representatives of the Naval (Ship) Construction Division 
confirm that the plan of the Main Committee to shift 
construction will be responsible for delays. The Naval 
(Ship) Construction Division is at present investigating 
the whole question of dockyard capacity. Furthermore, 
It will shortly be able to submit a plan which will allow 
us to forego construction of type XIV. 

Chief, Naval Staff decides that the proposals of- the ... 
Naval (Ship) Construction -Division should be awaited and 
he intends then to discuss the whole matter with Director 
Merker personally. 

B. Situation; 

I. Army Situation : 

On the eastern front the enemy has succeeded, apparent- 
ly without any special reinforcements, in breaking through 
our lines in the area of Veliki Luki on a broad front and 
in penetrating beyond Nevel, None of our forces are at 
present available in this area to prevent further serious 
consequences, but they will be brought up. This situation 
is extremely tense, especially in view of the effects 
of the break-through on the rest of the northern front. 



Heavy fighting is reported from the western sector of 
the front in Italy. The situation in the area of Terrnoli is 
still obscure. Obviously new enemy reinforcements have 
been landed. Mopping-up operations Istria are progressing 
according to. plan. 

Enemy air attacks are being directed systematically 
against traffic junctions in northern Italy, so that 
bringing, up of our reinforcements to the south is 

II. Leros Operation: 


There is now a clear picture of the operation as such 
since meanwhile reports have been received from Group South 
and Admiral, Aegean. 

According to the report of Group South, this Group received 
on the afternoon of 6 Oct. orders from Army Group E. to 
continue the operations in the Dodecanese. This was the 
first information regarding operation "Leros".' The follow- 1 
ing targets were given: first, the occupation of Leros 
and subsequently that of Samos after Nicaria h n d been 
eliminated. The assault group of Lt. General Mueller was 
to carry out these fasks with the cooperation of all 
available air and naval forces. Lt. General Mueller was 
to arrange details direct with Admiral, Aegean ^nd. the 
10th Air Corps. The morning of 9 Oct. was fixed as the 
.latest date for landing on Leros. 

The code word for the operation against Leros was "Leopard" 
and , for that against Samos "Poseidon". 

Assault Divison "Rhodes" had orders at the same time to 
clear the islands of Symi and Nisiro of agents and to 
destroy British radio stations. Before informing Naval 
Staff, Group South wished to await the operational order 
of Admiral, Aegean stating the times, which was on its 
way by air courier and had been reported by telephone. 
The report on the departure of the OLYMPOS convoy for Kos 
was not taken as an executive signal since the operational 
order had not been seen. The operational order of Admiral, 
Aegean was received by Group South at 20^0 'on 7 Oct. 
and gave only operational instructions, without laying 
down any details as to execution. The following was planned: 
During 6 Oct.: departure of various groups to Kos according 
to instructions of the local Naval Commander.. For 7 Oct.: 
occupation of Kalymhos as jump ing- off point for landing 
forces. Landing on Leros at 01/50 on 9 Oct. Air escort for 
naval forces while on passage from Piraeus to Kos. 
Oh' 7 and. -8 Oct. continuous fighter patrol in the operat- 
ional area . 


8 Oct. 19-43 •-• CONFIDENTIA L 

operational area . In his- report to Group South, Admiral, 
Aegean states that he decided to let the OLYMPOS convoy 
proceed because of the definite order from Commanding' 
General, Army Group E, -which -was described as his final 
concession. This order fixed the night of 8 Oct.. as the 
latest date for carrying out the operation against Leros . 
Admiral, Aegean had rejected the demand that the operation 
be carried out during the night of 7 Oct. as impossible. 
As pointed out "with special emphasis by Commanding General, 
Air Force Command, Southeast, a further delay vould have 
meant our air forces becoming -weaker by daily losses 
suffered through systematic enemy attacks on our air- 
fields . 

Definite recall of the convoy -would have entailed a delay, 
-with further enemy reinforcement on Leros and -weakening 
of our Air Force. Furthermore, only one small patrol vessel 
■was sighted in the operational area. The two destroyers 
between Cyprus and Rhodes -were only detected once at 1530 « 
There -were no enemy locations during the night of 5 Oct., in 
contrast to the preceding night. Moreover, intervention 
of enemy naval forces -was always to be expected. The 
arrival of the convo^ was decisive for the operational 
date, as the battalion for the occupation of Kos -was 
carried in this convoy. This battalion was to relieve assault 
forces for the attack against Leros, Naval Landing craft 
were provided for the occupation of Ka lymnos , which had 
to be carried out prior to the Leros operation. The fact 
that convoys could go through despite the enemy's attention 
having been aroused through the "Kos operational is proved 
by the simultaneous successful transfer to Kos of two naval 
landing craft, one Italian PT boat, and the 12th Motor 
Minesweeper Flotilla, Furthermore, the Air Force had 
promised to provide strong escort for the convoy from 
dawn, which promise was kept. 

Admiral, Aegean has fowwarded direct to Naval Staff the 
same report as to Group South in reply to the inquiry 
of 7 Oct. In this connection he. reports that the . order 
of the Commanding General, Army Group E, referred to ' 
above, was received at 1620 on 7 Oct., and the reconnaiss- 
ance report on the destroyers near Rhodes at 1815 on 6 
Oct. and that the order for departure of the convoys 
was given by Admiral Aegean on 6 Oct. 

Group South does not regard the reasons given. by Admiral," 
Aegean for allowing the convoy to proceed as sound. The 
group is of opinion that the enemy situation should have 
been taken into account by spreading out the formation, 
even if this would have delayed the operation by 24- 
hours. Furthermore, our incomplete reconnaissance did not 
justify the conclusion that the destroyers proceeding 
towards Rhodes vould not penetrate into the Aegean. 
Group South also states that it was not advised until 
the morning of 7 Oct. about sighting of the destroyers 
and attacks on the convoy OLYMPOS. 



Group South comments on the order of Commanding General, 
Army Group~-E as follows: ; v . -. •■■:'' 

"1. Group. South is also of the opinion 'that the oper- 
ation, as repeatedly -emphasized, should be carried 
■ : .out as soon as- possible 1 and with ..a 11. available 
resources. The /Navy will try. to assure this with 
all. available mean's. s - .' r ' 

2. However, it must be stated that the responsibility 
for the operations at sea must rest solely with 
the Navy, consideration being paid to. the assist- 
ance to be expected from the' Air Force as a compen- 
sation for the absolutely Inadequate f.ighting 
strength of our naval forces." 

Chief, Naval Staff ,. as well as Naval Staff, has now gained 
the impression that, in view of the clear order Issued by '■ 
General Loehr, Admiral, Aegean cannot be blamed for his' 
decision. The risk was to be approved if the operation was 
worthwhile. •■■•. 

It is still to be regretted that Naval Staff was not 
sufficiently informed by Group South about, the- plans 
against Leros' beforehand. The statement by the Group'' re- 
garding this Is unsatisfactory and does not obviate the 
objections raised. Chief, Naval Staff, .if £ully Informed, , 
would have been in a position at once to give the Fuehrer ; . 
his views on this matter. "••'• 

Commanding Admiral, Group South in a telephone conversation' 
with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, stated that he could not 
regard the reproaches made in the teletype on 7- Oc-t. as 
entirely justified and objec ed. especially to the right 
claimed by Naval Staff to intervene in. the execution of ; 
the operation. .-•'•-■••• '.'.,. ...■'> \ . 

Chief, Naval Staff stated that there no doubt on 
this point. . :.-''•";•■■■ '".....' 

In order to- clear this matter up completely, the following 
teletype was dispatched to Commanding Admirals', Group North, 
West, South, Naval Commands, Norway^ North, Baltic, and 
Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy:. . ' 

"I am forced to draw attention to the. basic instruct- 
ions regarding the system of reports in the Navy. 
it is essential that Naval Staff . be advised in the 
most direct way possible and kept informed Of' oper- 
ational plans, current events, soecial occurrences 
measures carried out and future plans. Only in this 
way will I be in a position to -intervene if necessary 
Mu^ch ^or e 1 VG ?uppeme CoKm ^ 'the required information. 



importance must be attached than, hitherto to the immediat< 
transmission of important reports to Naval Staff. "When- 
ever circumstances permit, preliminary reports should 
be made by telephone. Under no circumstances should it 
occur that important reports on naval warfare reach 
Naval Staff first through one of- the other services 
here' or via the Fuehrer Headquarters. I request that 
the attention of subordinate offices be drawn repeat- 
edly and emphatically to observance • of the above 
principles. Everything must be done to see that now at 
last the system of reports in the Navy takes all require- 
ments Into account in accordance with the conditions in 
the new Volume I.b. of the Manual of Naval Warfare." 

Admiral, Aegean meanwhile received on the evening of 7 Oct. 
a definite order from Army Group E to carry out operation 
"Leopard" on 9.. Oct. Admiral, Aegean is to ensure execution 
of the naval part of the operation, setting aside all 
objections and avoiding all runs not essential for the 
success of the operation. The order states that it is 
nescessary to act with the greatest daring and to accept 
all risks before the British transfer further reinforcements 
to the island, Admiral, Aegean has reported that he is now 
carrying out this order. 

Chief, Naval Staff order that the following be reported to 
the Fuehrer at once, by a telephone message to the Naval 

1. Context of the order of Army Group E. 

- 2. On the basis of this order Admiral, Aegean has 
started the operation despite his objections. 
. A report regarding the expediency of its tactical 
execution will follow after further investigation. 

5. Commander in Chief, Navy reports that owing to the 
lack of any naval supremacy, safe transfer of troops 
and material in this area cannot be guaranteed. If 
the occupation of the island of Leros is regarded 
as a strategic necessity, the risk involved must 
be taken. Naval Staff is of opinion that the 
occupation" of the island of. Leros is necessary, 
since it is now certain that Crete and Rhodes 
are to be- held for the time being, 

4. The operation started again today. Four convoys 
put out this morning; the fifth convoy will leave 
, . today at noon. • ' 

Chief, Nav^l Staff also, orders clear instructions to Group 

South and , ..■•■;. 


8 Oct. 1945 C ONFIDENT IAL 

South and Admiral, Aegean by the folio-wing teletype: 

"1. ' Commander in Chief, Navy this morning made a 
•preliminary report to the Fuehrer about the 
'OLYMPOS convoy, as follows': 

Owing to the lack of any naval supremacy, safe 
transfer of. troops and material to the Aegean 
islands cannot- be guaranteed. The risk must be 
accepted if the occupation of Leros and other 
islands is nevertheless necessary* for strategic 
reasons. Naval Staff is of opinion that occu- 
pation of Leros is necessary since it is now 
certain that the islands in our possession are 
not to be given up. 

2. This report of Commander in Chief, Navy to the 
Fuehrer is to be regarded as a preliminary 
assessment of the measures of Admiral, Aegean 
in the case of the OLYMPOS convoy and as a guide 
for future plans . A detailed evaluation of the 
operation is reserved." 

A further, full report to the Fuehrer was made by Chief, 
Naval Staff with teletype l/Skl la 3042/43 Gkdos . Chefs. 
For copy see War Diary, Part C, Vol.- XIV. After fully 
describing the previous events this report concludes as 
follows : 

"I am of opinion that the tactical and strategic 
deliberations of- Admiral, Aegean should not be 
contested in view of the strategic situation 
and the orders issued by the Commanding General, 
Armed Forces. I have also, ■therefore, raised 
no objections to the start of the operation 
against Leros on 8 Oct. by departure' from 
Andros, Syros and Piraeus of the troop convoys, 
if the situation is similar to that on 6 and 7 

• Oct. 

The departure of the OLYMPOS convoy, which was 
not directly destined for Leros, but was to carry 
troops to Kos for relief was not reported by 
Group South to Naval Staff as the start of a new 
operation. Furthermore, Naval Staff was not 
sufficiently informed of discussions held with 
Army Group E on the whole plan. It was therefore 
impossible to inform Armed Forces High Command, 
as was our duty. In additon, the distress signal 
of the convoy leader, which was the only message 
intercepted before the sinking of our ships, was 
not acted upon by Admiral, Aegean to my satisfaction. 
I have taken the necessary steps here." 

III. Quartermaster General, Naval Staff : 


8 Oct. 19^3 , ... , .... . C ONFIDENTIAL 

" All formation for the Mediterranean have now been 
recalled. '-'Transport of the Naval Artillery 
Battalion destined for the South Adriatic is 
'. delayed by the loss of the steamer as reported 

. • on 7 Oct. 1 ' •■ ' '. ''; 

b.' Formation of the 11th Coast Patrol Flotilla 
has been ordered. 

c. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff 
has appointed a Deputy General For Albania. 
For the Navy the office of the Naval Shore 
Commander suffices. 

d. All PT boats in the "west area have now been 
equipped -with cupolas .' Equipment of t£e 1st 

-PT Boat Flotilla in the Black Sea is in progress. 

e. The Todt Organization has plans for PT boat pens 
in Feodosiya and Ivanbaba. In view of the sit- 
uation and the extremely large material require- 
ments, investigations will be made as to -whether 

■ these are still to be constructed. 

f. The 40.6 cm. Battery "Engeloe" in the West Fjord 
is reported in provisional readiness. 

g. Reich Minister Speer has. asked Commander in Chief, 
Navy for assistance in the evacuation of captured 

r ■:-.. Italian material. A Naval Liaison Officer has been 

'■ • appointed- to Staff Leyers, as requested. 

In a Highly Restricted Circle ; 

TV. " Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division: 

a. According to a report from Naval Attache in Tokoyo 
the AQUILA submarines will not be ready to put out 
from Japan for about another two months. 

b. Transfer of the blockade runners from Japanese 
ports to- the southern area has commenced. 

c. A Japanese construction engineer -who has been 
able to triple the underwater speed of submarines 

.• -will proceed to Germany aboard the TANNE- As 
.; desired, this matter is to be kept strictly 

secret from the Japanese representatives In Berlin. 


8 Oct. 19.43 ' ".'.■■;"' CONFIDENTIAL 

Special Items 

I. Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilizations 
Branch has been informed by Armed Forces High Command, 
Operations Staff, Navy that Marshal Graziani will arrive 

at Fuehrer Headquarters on 9 Oct. The Fuehrer has ordered a 
survey to be submitted on 8 Oct. shewing Italy's armed 
strength and the requirements of the branches of our' 
Armed Forces in connection with the new Italian Armed 
Forces to be set up.. 

The detailed requirements of the Navy have been compiled 
accordingly by the Organization and Mobilization Branch 
and after approval by Commander in Chief, Navy forwarded 
to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy. For 
order on this as per l/Skl 28254/43 Gkdos . see War. Diary, 
Part C, Vol. XIV. 

II, The following general assessment is taken from the 
enemy situation report of Army General Staff, Foreign Armies 
West No* 15/43 of 5 Oct.,: 

"New developments in the Mediterranean are determined by 
the following events: 

1. The enemy has succeeded in practically- 
e 1 imina t ing I to ly as a p ow er . ' 

2. The first defense zone of Europe has been 
deeply penetrated. 

3. The enemy has gained important jumping-off 
bases for new operations which endanger 
practically the entire Mediterranean defense. 

■4-. The elimination of the Italian Battle Fleet 
releases strong enemy naval forces. Their use 
in the Pacific and Indian area may cause a 
decisive change, in the ratio of forces there. 

As a result of these events the enemy has achieved, apart 
from wider operational, facilities, a considerable gain in '■ 
self-reliance which may lead to bolder action than up to 
now. The gain in general prestige and the actual gain as 
regards Russia appear to be at least of equal importance. 
The latter is based. first of all on the' fact that the 
enemy has achieved his considerable successes with a 
relatively small loss of forces, and has thus reached a 
more favorable ratio of forces, with Russia in view of her 


8 Oct. 1943 ' CONFIDENTIAL 

tremendous "war losses. At the same time Russian dependence 
on material supplies from the British and Americans may have 

Moreover, the heavy increase .in naval forces for the 
Pacific lessens the importance of Russia in the Anglo- 
American battle against Japan.' On the -whole it can therefore 
be assumed that the Anglo-American Supreme Command has 
become much more independent of its Russian ally in 
reaching decisions than up to now. This fact must have 
repercussions on the problem of the second front and will 
presumably make Anglo-American plans with regard to the 
Balkans more independent of Russian opposition. 

Tho military developments on the eastern front are obvious- 
ly increasing anxiety in Britain and America about an 
.early decision in Russia's favor. This concern demands the 
establishment of European barriers against the Russian ■ 
advance as quickly as possible. In this connection the 
Balkans primarily will play a part. 

This concern and the obviously imminent decision on the 
whole eastern front were probably the reasons for the 
decision at Quebec, to leave the Anglo-American center of 
operations still in Europe and to try and prevent the 
bulk of the Continent from being lost to Russia. 

Nevertheless, the present Anglo-American increase in 
strength in all sectors of the Armed Forces, combined 
with the release of strong naval forces in the Mediterran- 
ean, will permit the Anglo-American Supreme Command to 
divert considerable forces to the .Pacific area and thus 
to intensify the war against Japan as demanded by the 
American public." , , . . 

Th es above considerations make it evident that the enemy's 
general aims in Europe will be to force an early decision 
in 1944,. .using 'strong forces on all fronts, thus gaining 
positions against Russia which are as far east as possible. 

Immediate enemy' plans will be to create the necessary 
conditions for this by extension of the operational base 
in Italy, by establishing a bridgehead in the Balkans and 
perhaps also in the Atlantic area (Channel Coast, Noway?) 
and by intensification of aerial warfare against Germany 
and southeast Europe.". 

.Army General Staff has arrived at the following views 
regarding the individual theaters of war: 

In Norwa y the establishment of a bridgehead, which is 
possible with forces available, is regarded as rather 
unlikely in view of the advanced season and the develop- 
ment in Europe on the whole. 




8 Oct. 19^3 C ONFIDENTIAL 

Considering the situation in s outhern England the Anglo - 
American. readiness for an advance in the Atlantic pre? 
is regarded' as- more progressed. This permits the early 
start of a large-scale landing at any time. If the 
situation remains the same, howeveri, - only minor: 
operations' for the purpose of sebotage, testing. German 
defensive readiness or establishment of local bridgeheads 
are to be expected at present. ■• ... 

A general change in the situation can, however, make the 

enemy decide at short notice on a large-scale action. 

Such a- change in the situation might be brought about, 

for instance, by the •withdrawal of Major German forces 

from the Atlantic front or by the dreaded use in the 

Channel area of a German secret weapon which proves 

to be highly effective and impervious to operations 

by the Air Force. In both cases a large-scale enemy operation 

is possible either to take advantage of or to clear up 

the situation on the French and Belgian coasts. 

-O ' 

The present main target in the Western Mediterranean is to 
be seen in the occupation of the Italian mainland as a bnse 
for "further operations, presumably against the- Balkans, 
and as an air base against southeast Germany and southeast- 
Europe, The individual targets in Italy aimed at by the 
enemy are not yet obvious; it is considered, possible that 
they lie already in the line Spezia -Rimini. Operations 
so far indicate that the enemy will aim for- his target 
through the use of frontal pressure and • outflanking landings 
by limited' forces . It is, however, emphasized; that the lack 
of German '.air reconnaissance offers the enemy a chance to 
assemble large transport and naval forces in the African and 
Sicilian areas unobserved and to put them into operation by 
syrprise in the Tyrrhenian or Adriatic Seas. 

In the Balkan area obvious targets are: our most important 
raw material sources, elimination of our allies and block- 
ing of Russian advance. 

Any operations in the Balkans will undoubtedly meet stiff 
Russian opposition. It is , however, believed that the 
Anglo -American supreme Command' now feels itself to be 
strong enough to pass over this. This is indicated bv a. 
remark from Churchill at a public meeting that advantage 
will be taken of the situation in the Balkans.. The British 
influence on. the insurgent groups in the Balkans, which 
is increasingly leaps and bounds, is to be similarly 
evaluated. It includes the dispatch of numerous officers, 
including recently a General, and the rapid increase in 
supplies to the Balkans by sea and air. The fact that 
Yugoslavian King has gone to Egypt is 


8 Oct. 19^3 CON FIDENTIA L 

also a proclamation from the King's entourage in 
■which his early, return to Yugoslavia together with 
the Allies, is announced. 

The British control of the Serbo - Croat insurgent 
movement is obviously aimed at occupation of the Adriatic 
ports and their approaches. It must certainly be assumed 
that, at the same time, poslltical alliances according to 
the Italian method are being pursued with our allies in 
the Balkans . • 

In short, various signs indicate enemy plans against 
the Balkans. For strategic reasons the coastal sector 
Scutari-Split is considered to be particularly endangered. 
Concentrations of forces and other indications of an 
imminent Anglo-American operation on a large scale are 
not yet apparent but it is possible that this is not 
planned until 19^4.. Attempts to occupy ports and to 
establish bridgeheads must, however, always be expected 
and may start soon. 

In the Aegean area the enemy will for the time being 
presumably try to defend and enlarge his naval and air 
bases, in order gradually to attain naval supremacy. 
The quick operations by light forces on the Aegean 
islands following the Italian betrayal and the strong 
British reaction to our operation against Kos emphasize 
the greate interest in the Aegean taken by the British 
High Command. The early appearance, of enemy naval and air 
forces and commandos in order to cut off communication 
with the mainland from Crete and Rhodes must be expected. 

Finally the" attitude of T urkey will need 'increased observ- 
ation and her gradual falling into line with the British 
and Americans must be taken into account strategically. 

The assessment of the situation by Foreign Armies West 
corresponds in general with the opinion of Naval Staff. 
(The last sentence added by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, 
Tr. N.) 

III. Since 0200 on 8 Oct. Portuguese weather stations have 
discontinued the transmission of weather reports... ." 

Situation 8 Oct. 

I. War in Foreign Waters 

Nothing to report. 


8 Oct. 1943 ••■ - . . CONFIDENTIAL 

II. Situation West Area 

1. Ene my Situation : 

Over the Bay of Biscay 49 planes -were detected on 
operation. One British vessel was located at 1850 in AM 
1780 and one shortly after midnight in AL f>4 - 55.' ■.-.: . 

Our air reconnaissance sighted at 1413 in BF 1936 
(100 miles northwest of Brest) two destroyers on 
southerly course, presumably in connection with a 
rescue operation. Air Commander, Atlantic Coast 
reports further: 

At 1339 a BV 222 sighted in AL 4138 (600 miles west-north 
west of Ireland) a convoy of 2-6 ships on/easterly course, 
proceeding 7 knots. (For .further particulars of this long- 
range reconnaissance report see Submarine Warfare.) 

At 1650 3 FW 200' s detected in CF 9211 a northbound convoy 
of 57 ships with 1 cruiser and 6 escort vessels. 

In the Channel a tanker (6,000 GRT) was sighted at. .1750 
southwest of Plymouth on Westerly course. 

2. Own Situation': 

Atlantic Coast: 

One ELM/J mine was swept off St.- Nazaire on- ■■ 

7 Oct. Three submarines were escorted out. The outer Gironde 
is temporarily closed owing to suspicion of ground mines. 
Exercises by the 8th Destroyer Flotilla are planned for 

8 and 10 Oct. 

Channel Coast: ,-, 

Mino laying operations were carried out by the 2nd 
4th, 6th and 8th PT Boat Flotillas off the southeast coast 
as planned during the night of 7 Oct..,: wind, was north- 
northeast 4-5 and seaway 3-4. For brief report see teletype 
1825. • 

From 0252 to 0301 an- Army Coastal battery shelled targets 
located off Pt. d'Ailly with 17 cm. Salvoes. 

The harbor defense' barrages at Dieppe and Le Havre were 
damaged by our patrol vessels and have been temporarily 
taken up. Patrol positions were not taken up because of 
weather conditons. Escort operations were carried out as' 



8 Oct. 1943 CONFIDEN TIAL 

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters 

North Sea : ''■■' \ - • 

North of Terschelling and in the Heligoland Bight 
altogether 17 ground mines were swept. Hook-Elbe convoy 
"1179" was carried .out as planned and without incident. 

At 1415 a strong enemy formation approached in three waves 
via Holland and the Heligoland Bight for an attack on 
Bremen from a high altitude. For details see Aerial War- 

Norway, Northern Water s: ■ 

1. E nemy Situation: 

■..'. ;•.•■•'.•; Over the North Sea 14 planes were detected on 
operation. On 7 Oct. minor reconna is s-ance- activity was 
reported in the area of Petsamo and V^rdoe. Between 0145 
and 0255 on 8 Oct. the Air Force radar station on Flekke - 
oey located to the southwest what were -apparently various 
shipping targets. 

2. Own Situation: .-.-.. . ■'; . 

The 56th Minesweeper Flotilla discovered a 
mine depot northwest of Froeya . The island of Vaa'ges 
was occupied. Several Norwegians were arrested. At 
1905 on 7 Oct. the troop transport OSTLAND' ran' aground 
north of Trondheim and is leaking. All leave personnel 
were rescued. The destroyer IHN. put in to Narvik on 8 
Oct. for repairs. ■■:•;-;. : ■'-■ : 

Twenty-six ships were escorted north and 28 south. In all 
19 ships were left lying in harbor owing to shortage of 
escorts , 

Group North/Fleet advises Naval Staff of. its request to 
the 5"th Air Force to investigate again the question- of sea 
reconnaissance- and intensified fighter escort, especially 
In the Bodoe area, in view of the events of 4 Oct. Such 
surprise attacks and their graVe consequences can only 
be prevented if air reconnaissance of the sea area 
Spitsbergen/lceland/Faroes is carried out daily, if possible 
in the morning and in the evening, so that the approach of 
the . enemy is detected early and defense measures can be 
taken in time. As the period of darkness becomes longer 
the only possible way to obtain information on enemy, aims ■' 
will , be by daily photographic reconnaissance of the enemy' 
bases. Naval Staff is asked to express its support of this 
request to Air Force Operations Staff. (Se'e teletype 


8 Oct. 19^3 


IV. Ska gerraX*. Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea : 

1. Enemy .•Situation:. • ■. .. 

Manual reported at 0350 three- ships, including 
one large one, -proceeding at high speed on course west; 
a mine laying- operation is possible. :'■'•: .... 

In Kronstadt Bay minor air activity and single tugs 
and a guardboats are reported. 

2. Own Situation ; .-•', • ••■: 

.- Mine laying operation "Lithium" was carried out 
during, the night of 8 Oct. as planned, despite .two ground 
mine detonations on. the course shortly before mine laying 
started in.; AN 3923- Four ELM/J mines were also swept off 
Anno It and Ska gen. A considerable number of troop transports 
and leave ships was escorted according to plan and without 
incident. ■ , 

In the area- of. Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic three 
heavy gun carriers are standing by. in. the Irben Strait 
for relay escort. At 03^7 minesweeper M "19" reported a 
brief engagement with two small vessels west of Tyters . 
Both vessels turned away when, f ired' on.. 

Na va 1 C omma nd , Ba .1 tic ha s a ppr o ve.d the pr op os a I of 
. Commander > Minesweepers > Baltic to ■ take., up the net 
' "Walross " ; bo fore • the ■ ice period begins . For. details 
see teletype 1730. . . • :,;,. ,'•,•; 

V. Merchant- Shipping: 


The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping has 
provided for the following shipping requirements in Oct.: 

For Armed ; Forces supplies and supplies to 

in Norway. .• .;;. -..-.- :'.; ' - . ; 

for . supplies to Finland 

for supplies- to the Baltic 

for German coastal traffic 

for coastal coal traffic 

Expected in October from Lulea 

and from Oxeloesund •' 

, except 



a ppr ox. 



11 • 



: 11 . * 


















2-. ■ Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant 
Marine Bra nch gives information in Report No. 8/43 on 
"Foreign Merchant Shipping" regarding the development in 
speed of new enemy merchantmen from 1939 to 1944. According to 
to this report out ojt 3.8,9.00,000 GRT of new constructions 
17,100,000 GRT. are fast ships with a speed of 14 knots and 
more. About 16,000,000 GRT of these have a speed of 14-1? 
knots and 1,100,000 GRT a speed of 18 knots and more. 

VI. Submarine Warfare 

In,. the North Atlantic there- was a west : wind in the 
operational area up to l800 with good visibility^ which 
then deteriorated considerably. The detection of the 
eastbound convoy of 26 ships, reported by a BV 222 in AL 
4138, did not lead to any success, by ' our submarines . 
The direction-finder signals of theplane we're' not heard 
and the convoy was not sighted. The reconnaissance report 
was presumably inaccurate- naviga tionaily. .A .'/total of 
seven enemy planes was detected by radio intelligence in 
the convoy area. ... - ..■',. 

Possibly the enemy set our submarine patrol line in motion 
through a scattered destroyer group and planes, while the 
convoy passed by further to the south-. It is . otherwise in- 
explicable that none of the 20 submarines engaged/ was able 
to gain any data on the convoy itself -during . the operation, 
which lasted. two days. This operation will be broken off 
on the morning of 9 Oct. 

Only one destroyer was reported' sunk. , ., ..,-. ,-.-,m ; z 

From the Indian Ocean Submarine U "183" reports no traffic 
for ten days. Off Mombasa only one destroyeivwnd: two' small 
patrol vessels were sighted. This ..submarine is operating at 
present in LJ 93 against traffic from Aden to Cape. 

The Naval Attache, in Tokoyo is' 'advised that one of the MONSUN 
submarines is due to call at Penang; in about' two weeks for 
overhaul' of torpedoes and for supplies. Transmission of 
passage route and approach course is requested. ; 

S pecial Items : 

According to a report from Submarine Division, 4 12 
submarines were in commission on 1 Oct. 1943, including 
175 operational submarines. 



Of these 155 "were in the Atlantic 
15 In the Mediterranean 
21 in northern waters and 
6 in the Black Sea . ;■ 

In the. Atlantic .curing the September there were 9»5« ••'■ 
submarines , on a daily avere'ge, in the operational area 
ancl 50.5 on outward and return passage at sea. During 
September 50 submarines left for the Atlantic. The follow- 
ing were lost: in the Atlantic 6, in the Mediterranean 
and Northern Waters 1 each,- in home waters 2 submarines. 

VII Aerial Warfare 

British Isles and Vicinity: 

The 5^d Air Force had 54 planes out on operation 
against England, 52 over the Atlantic and 5 over the 
Redi terra nea n. uulsr«a nee raids against London and Dover were 
carried out by minor formations. Our fighters shot. down 
7 enemy planes . 

Air Commander, Atlantic Coast reports several engagements 
with the enemy on 7 Oct. during free-lance fighter oper- 
ations over the Bay of Biscay; one Liberator was shot 
down and four of our planes were lost. 

During the day 400 four-engined planes with fighter escort 
attacked Bremen from an altitude of 7,000 - 8,000 m. ; 
497 of our fighters went up and reported 56 enemy planes 
shot down, 24 of ours being lost. Another 8 planes were 
shot down by a nti -aircraft guns. During the night Bremen was 
again attacked, this time by 150 planes; 200 planes attacked 
Hanover. Single planes flew in as far as Berlin. Our 
fighters probably shot down 25 planes, themselves losing 
10. The damage sustained in Bremen during the two raids 
is considerable. Damage in Hanover is extremely heavy. For 
details see Daily Situation. 

In western France the airfield at Brest-South was attacked 
in the afternoon. Out of 21 enemy planes 4 were shot down. 

Mediterranean Theater: 

Only reconnaissance reports have been received 
trom trie 2nd Air Force and Air Force Command, Southeast. 
According to photographic reconnaissance three PT boats 
were lying in Castell Rosso at 1600 




in from the -west. The enemy attacked the airfield of 
Eleusis near Athens and the airfield of Caste Hi on 
Crete. Two of our planes were destroyed. Both airfields 
are closed. Twelve enemy planes were shot down while two 
of ours were lost. 

The enemy carried out continuous fighter -bomber attacks 
over the Army front in Italy. 

Eastern Front: 

The 5th Air Force reports 33 planes out on operation 
without special event. 

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea 
•*• • Enemy Situation Mediterranean : 

Out of the convoy of over 40 ships coming from 
the Atlantic on the afternoon of 7 Oct. 17 merchantmen 
put into Gibraltar. The part-convoy which went on to the 
east was joined by 3 tankers and 4 freighters from Gibral- 
tar. The convoy consisting of J>k merchantmen and 7 escort 
vessels, passed north of Alboran at 0900. 

The following were lying in Gibraltar at 1^00: 2 KING 
cruiser UGANDA in dock, 13 destroyers, 7 corvettes, 2 
transports, 53 freighters, 11 tankers and numerous small 
vessels . 

At 1705 a submarine was sighted 85 miles southeast of 
Majorca . 

During the night of 7 Oct. 20 ships were detected in the 
Salerno -Sicilian area about 50 miles southeast of Sa lerno 
on soutwesterly course. Otherwise only single ships were 
sighted. • ; •■*•... 

The number of freighters in Maddalena has increased. The 
presence of a submarine at Cagliari is noteworthy. 

German Naval Command, Italy is of ■' opinion that demolition' 
of the harbor of Bastia by blowing up the moles and sinking 
ships will be effective for some time. In additon there are 
ground mines in the harbor basin and entrance to the harbor 
The sinking of a block ship was not entirely successful. 


8 Oct. 19^3 ~ CONFIDENTIAL 

In the .area of Tunis -Sicily-Malta concentration of 
transport planes. has been detected.. According to the 
situation' report of. Commanding General, Armed Forces, 
.South, the NELSON -was lying at Malta on 30 Sept, and the. 
RODNEY is also presumed to be there. Radio Intelligence 
intercepted urgent radio traffic, partly of a tactical 
nature, between Alexandria and Tobruk and a British radio 
station in the Aegean, srea . . .; ■■ -.• 

2. . Own Situation Mediterranean: 

Submarines U. "371",; U "223" and U "%31" hs;ve 
been assigned new operational areas. Submarine U "73" is 
carrying out a special operation for the Intelligence 
Service (landing of agents on the African coast). 

No PT boats were out on operation owing to weather 
conditions. Coastal traffic was carried out as planned.. 

On 5 Oct. in an enemy commando raid near Rimini the 
motor cycle column of the Diplomatic Corp3, consisting 
of ten vehicles, was destroyed. 

The closed area south of Bastia has been extended to the 
east as far as 9 degrees 50' E. 

German Naval Command, Italy has advised Naval Shore 
Commander, North Adriatic that orders regarding dock- 
yards may only be given through German offices. Require- 
ments of Italian authorities are to be fulfilled as 
allowed by dockyard capacity, but our. orders have absolute 
priority. • 

5 • A rea Naval Group South : 

a. Adriatic Sea : 

The 11th Coast. Patrol Flotilla was formed at 
Trieste. The six steamers which are to be transferred from 
the Adriatic to the Aegean are to be sent off from Dura^zzo 
at the. rate' of one every night. 

b, ,, Aegean Sea ; ; ■ 

With regard to the OLYMPOS convoy, Group South 
reports that submarine chaser "2111" and the steamer 
OLYMPOS were definitely sunk, the latter by a submarine,- 
before the attack by the surface forces and that five 
naval landing craft were probably sunk. 


8 Oct, "1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

Rescue operations are being carried out by planes, one 
Italian PT boat and three motor minesweepers. So far about 
656 survivors have been picked up, Admiral', Aegean trans- 
mits a report of the Commander of s ubma r ine ' cha s er "2111V 
The report states that the convoy was first attacked by 
two submarines, and later by two cruisers and two destroyers. 
All vessels of the convoy had been sunk by 0600. Most of 
the crew were in the water, either swimming or in rubber 
dinghies, and were fired on with tracer ammunition by 
cruisers and destroyrrs which passed them repeatedly 
a very short distance away. As the enemy force withdrew, 
it fired its guns on the soldiers floundering in the water. 
The matter will be pursued. For details see War Diary, Part 
C, Vol. VIII. 

Admiral, Aegean states, in addition to previous reports: 

1. If the convoy, already delayed for three hours, had 
been held back until receipt of the morning reconnaissance 
report which does not come in until later, it would have 
had to pass through the Strait of Kos in darkness and with- 
out air escort and naval landing craft, which were already 
scheduled to go into operation during 7 Oct. against Kal- 
ymnos, would not have been available in time. As a matter of 
fact three enemy PT boats appeared In the evening of 7 Oct. 
in the Strait of Kos. 

2. Up to 7 Oct. the enemy had operated only occasionally 
in the eastern Aegean, obviously for fear of our Air Force. 

3. The loss of the OLYMPOS, aboard which the greater 
part of the battalion was embarked, was due to a submarine 
hit. Such a loss could have happened to any other convoy. 

4. Our Air Force, apart from achieving no success against 
the enemy, attacked our own motor minesweepers during 

the rescue operation, despite the fact that it had been 
Informed of the presence of three German motor minesweepers. 

5. The slow speed of the convoy was decisive. In i s case 

the two demands for transfer of troops "ps early and as safely 
as possible" could not be fulfilled at the same time if our 
own Air Force did not make up for the weakness against super- 
ior enemy. 

Admiral, Aegean still regards his considerations and measures 
regarding the OLYMPOS convoy as justified," even on sub- 
sequent review. 

According to a report from Group South, the landing operation 
against Leros will start at 01^0 on 9 Oct. Five convoys are 
en route 





for this purpose, namely: 

a. Three motor minesweepers from Milos . 

b. The DRACHE and the BULGARI from Piraeus. 

c. Submarine chaser "2101", naval landing craft- : 
F "131" 'and armed fishing vessel "2" from Syra . 
Coast pa-trol boats GA 'W', "44" and "45" from 
Castron and 

e. as substitute for the OLYMPOS convoy, one comprising 
tfre steamer INGEBORG, 2 naval landing craft and 1 
armed fishing vessel, led by submarine chaser "2102". 
This convoy left Pireeus at 1100. 

The BULGARIA -was sunk by. an enemy submarine at 1523 five 
miles south of Amorgos, after two unsuccessful submarine 
attacks had already been made on this convoy in the morning 
Aboard this vessel were 285 men of the 10th Battalion of 
the 999th Regiment, besides the crew of 8l. Rescue operat- 
ions are in progress . 

At midnight three enemy PT boats machine-gunned a coastal 
post on Kos without inflicting any damage. Two enemy 
minefields were discovered five miles west of Kos. 

The Italian garrison on the island of C^lino has surrended 
and was transferred to Kos. The island of Symi was again 
evacuated after heavy fighting with superior enemy forces. 
The town of Symi was defended by 300 British in dug-out 
positions . 

The hospital ship GRADISCA was damaged in Patras by two 
explosions in the stern on the evening of 7 Oct. The 
cause is still unknown. The ship was destined for the 
exchange of seriously wounded between Germany and England. 

c. Black Sea : 

Enemy Situation: 

According to photographic reconnaissance the 
following were lying on 7 Oct. at Tuapse: 1 destroyer, 
1 torpedo boat, 8 PT boats, 2 minesweepers, 4 gunboats 
and 8 coastal vessels. 

During the night of 7 Oct. a few bombs were dropped on 
Genichesk. No military damage was sustained. At 0625 
naval landing craft in the patrol line were unsuccess- 
fully bombed and machine-gunned in a dive attack. There 
were also three unsuccessful air attacks on a. convoy 
from Feodosiya to Sevastopol by altogether 15 planes 
south of Cape Sarich. 


8 Oct. 194>, ■ CONFIDENTIAL 

Own Situation; 

The last day -of the evacuation of the Kuban 
bridgehead proceeded as planned. Kossa Tuszla as the 
last position, will be probably evacuated at dawn on 

9 Oct. The vessels engaged in the evacuation will be 
transferred to Sevastopol in three convoys of about 
60 vessels each and should pass Cape Takil between 
0^00 and 0600 on 9 Oct. Barrages ! 'K 13 n and "K 14" 
have been laid according to plan. On 7 Oct. an FZ mine 
was swept too miles west of Sevastopol. 

IX. Situation East Asia 

■ ■ Ml I ■ II. — ■ ll ■ ■ ..■■■■ ^ ■ . I I — ^»— — 

Nothing to report. 





Items of- Political Importance 

Salazar made a statement at a secret session of the 
Portuguese Parliament on 8 Oct. It is also announced 
that Salazar had a long interview /with the Japanese 
envoy. According to "Exchange Telegraph", dramatic 
developments are expected. ;-":"/. 

According to information from the Japanese Liaison- 
Officer to Naval Staff, the Japanese Naval Attache 
in Lisbon has reported that cable communications 
between Lisbon and Azores are interrupted. Rumors 
in Lisbon have it that the Azores have been occupied 
by Americans . •' .< • 

No confirmation could be furnished by the Foreign Office. 

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff 
I. Army Situation: 

■ 1 1 1 1 — ^— n ■■!■■■ - — i M—yi ■ i a ■ 

■The situation on the eastern front must be regarded 
on the whole as extremely tense. The strain to which 
our exhausted formations are put makes itself felt 
in diminishing- powers of attack while the enemy pays 
no regard to losses, and shows surprising mobility. 
The penetration at Nevel, which on the first day 
thrust 40 km. into our lines, is a serious sign. 
Attacks against enemy Bridgeheads on the western 
Dnieper are also not. very successful. 

The evacuation of the Kuban bridgehead, now completed, 
was more successful on the whole than expected. 

It is estimated that the enemy still has 9,000 - 
10,000 armored vehicles of all kinds. 

Our losses on the eastern front in August and September 
amount to 3^,000 and 20,000 killed, 134,000 and 86,000 
wounded and 13,000 and 20,000 missing respectively. 
Compared, to these figures our losses in the south 
are extremely small, 

Armed' Forces High Command, Operations Staff transmitted 
a Fuehrer Directive to' Commanding General-, ' Armed Forces, 
Southeast on 6 Oct. wiht copy to Group South, regarding 
future plans for the entire southeastern' area . This came 
to the knowledge of Naval Staff on 9 Oct. 


9 Oct. 1943 ./• . .",.• CONFIDENTIAL 

This Fuehrer Directive reads as fallows:,, 

"The order for defense of the entire southeastern prea 
( including the. Peieponnesos ) remains unchanged, • but 
disposition of forces must take the present situation 
into account. Major forces should be concentrated 
•where the main enemy assault is .to be expected.. 

The most important islands of the southern Sporades 
must remain occupied or be re-occupied, ps they are 
essential as a protection of the block Crete-Rhodes." 

The Directive then gives the disposition of forces on 
the Peleponesos end in the rest of Greece and gives 
the following further instruction among other things: 

"The following must remain occupied or be occupied, 
apart from Crete and Rhodes: at least the Ionian islands 
of Corfu, Cepha Ionia, Zante and the Aegean islands of 
Scarpanto, Milos, Kos, Leros, Samoa, Chios, Mytilene 
and Lemnos . 

In case a large-scale enemy landing should be successful 
at any point on the extensive coasts', effective demol- 
itions must be prepared so as to restrict enemy oper- 
ational facilities and gain the necessary time for our 
countermen sures . 

Preparations for such demolitions are to be made in the . 
entire area south of the line Corfu - Metsovon Pass - 
Olympos and north thereof on the Adriatic coast at a 
depth which will be laid down by Commanding General, Armed 
Forces, Southeast and will differ according to geological 

Preparations for demolition must include all important 
economic installations (Power stations, port installations/ 
industrial plants, the waterworks at Athens ) and a lso the 
traffic network (railroads, highways, constructions - 
such as dams, bridges, viaducts, Tr. N. - communications). 
It is essential that highways and railroads be rendered 
useless to the enemy for months. When demolishing military 
installations, the airfields especially pre to be comp- 
letely destroyed. Airfields on the Peieponnesos and on the 
Aegean islands , which are not needed> are now already. to . 
be rendered unserviceable in agreement with the Air Force." 

II. Report by Quartermaster General: 

a. Group West is making experiments on two trial mine- 
fields for use against low-flying planes. 


9 Oct. 1945 ' . " ' CONFIDENTIAL. 

b Armed Forces High Command has issued instructions 
regarding the military oath for members of the 
Italian Armed Forces. 

c. The following instructions have been received 

from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff: 

"1. It' must be expected that the. enemy, just as he did 
at Termoli, will continue attempts to surround the 
front of Commanding General, Armed Forces South, 
by landings in the deep flanks and to bring about 
its collapse. Such attempts can only be frustrated 
with. the limited forces available if the enemy is 
destroyer by our coastal defense already before 
or during landing. 

2. The. Fuehrer has ordered that Commanding General, 

Armed Forces ," South expand coastal defense along the 
Tyrrhenian and Adriatic coasts, concentrating at a 
\)' depth 'of about 100 km. behind line ''B" and pacing 

special attention to artillery defense. 

In this connection Commanding General, Armed Forces, 
South will report what captured guns suitable for 
use against naval targets are available (stating 
caliber, range, rate of salvoes and armor-piercing 
ammunition) - and what personnel is required for 
manning the captured batteries, apart from the 
400 coastal gunners already requested, stating 

5. Commander in Chief, Air Force is requested to 
transfer to Commanding General, Armed Forces, 
South at once ten to twelve batteries comprising- 
8.8 cm., If possible 10. .5 cm. anti-aircraft 
guns for coastal defense. A decrease in anti- 
aircraft defense of industry in northern Italy 5 
will be accepted .to* this extent. 

4, Commander in Chief, Air Force is requested to 

report what facilities or forces he can provide for 
this important task", 

Naval Staff is investigating all available possibilities. 
In order to ensure speedy manning of the batteries 
captured In the Italian area, a 20% withdrawal of personnel 
from the west area would have to be resorted to. This 
was formerly rejected with' the Fuehrer's permission. 

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff remarks., that coastal 

defense in this case' should definitely be the responsibility 

of the Army, especially as ' the Navy does . not have mobile 


9 Oct. 1943" < CONFIDENTIAL 

forces a vs liable for this unless weaknesses at other 
equally important points are to be accepted. 

Chief, Naval Staff stresses that it depends where the 
greater danger lies and order that Armed Forces High 
Command be informed that naval forces are not avail- 
able for the required task, unless permission is given 
for withdrawal of the 1st Naval Artillery Battalion 
from France. Chief, Naval Staff is of opinion that 
withdrawal is justifiable at present. 

III. Chief, Operations Division reports on Spanish notes 
regarding the submarines BLUM and BRANDI according to copy 
in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII. It is to be hoped thpt 
the release of Lt. (s.g.) Brandi through the Nav^l Attache 
or the Intelligence Service will not be effected. 

In a Highly Restricted Circle: 

IV. R eport by Quartermaster General: 

The UNDINE might be used as the floating anti-aircraft 
battery for Peenemuende requested by Commander in Chief, 
Air Force; she has been fitted up as an anti-aircraft 
cruiser and is actually scheduled for operation in the 
Putziger Wik. 

Chief, Naval Staff agrees. 

V. Chief, Naval Staff brought up for discussion further 
defense measures for the TIRPITZ. Her immobility will 
tempt the enemy to further attacks. Considerations by 
Naval Staff to have the ship moved by tugs will encounter 
great difficulties. Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch 
Is of opinion that the TIRPITZ should remain in Alta 
until she is at least ready to proceed again with two 
screws. The present condition of the ship still entails 
many unknown factors. Defense in Alta /-'gainst attack 

by heavy units is still inadequate. No heavy batteries 
are available. The question of transferring torpedo 
batteries, perhap with FAT torpedoes, to Alta is under 
investigation. The ship's own adequate defensive readiness 
must, of course, be maintained constantly both materially 
and as regards personnel. 

VI . Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division : 

a. According to a report by Group South, Admiral, Aegean 
already replied on 8 Oct. in accordance with the statements 
meanwhile submitted to Naval Staff, to the direct inquiry 
from Army Group E of 7 Oct. regarding the Fuehrer's questions 


9 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENT IAL 

on the loss of the OLYMPOS convoy. .Admiral, : Agean adds that it 
appears advisable for further reports to the Supreme 
Command to be made only through Group South, if possible, 
in order to avoid reports being submitted to a Supreme 
Ccmmand by offices -which are not in a position to judge 
questions of naval strategy -with sufficient knowledge. 

Group South agreed -with this opinion. 

For teletype as per l/Skl JOkj/Uj. Gkdos . Chefs, see Files 
1 Ski I op II, 15. 

Group South further reports that operation "Leopard" 

has been postponed until 0130 on 10 Oct. by order of 

Lt. General Mueller. The delay -will be utilized to 

increase the number of naval landing craft from five 

to seven, to bring up the remainder of the 10th Battalion 

of the 999th Regiment, to restore the airfield on Kos, 

to check the approach routes, since British mineiaying 

has been ascertained, and to bring up reserves of ammunition. 

Group South has promised final views on the execution of 
operation "Leopard" so far. 

Naval Staff agrees in every respect with the view express- 
ed by Commanding Admiral, Group South that responsibility 
for a combined operation, if it is sea-borne, lies with 
the Commander of Naval Forces, This,, however, does^not 
exclude the possibility that the strategic situation or 
considerations on the operations as a whole may make it 
necessary to set aside objections as regards navigation 
and naval tactics, and to accept risks. 

In the meantime the- basic order of Armed Forces High 
Command to Commanding General,- Armed, Forces, Southeast 
and to Group South of 6 Oct.. has also been received, hav- 
ing, taken three days to arrive. This is the same Fuehrer 
Directive which has already been dealt with under "Army 
Situation". ..Concerning the Navy it states: ■ 

"Stocks for and supplies to the numerous islands to be 
occupied must be assured by sea in the same way at least 
as supplies to the divisions operating in the northern 
part of the Dalmatian coast. ■. 

Agreement is to be reached with Commanding General, Armed 
Forces, Southeast on the erection and taking over of 
further coastal batteries on the newly occupied, coastal 

Laying of mine barrages off the newly acquired ports is 
especially important." : 



Naval Staff considers it necessary to report to Armed 
Forces High Command that carrying out of the tasks demanded 
of the Navy cannot be guaranteed should the enemy become 

Chief, Naval Staff agreed. 

The delay in learning of the Fuehrer Directive has made 
.a survey of the situation regarding operation "Leopard" 
much more difficult for Naval Staff. 

Naval Staff does not support the opinion expressed by 
Admiral, Aegean and sponsored by Group South regarding 
reports to the Supreme Command. There is no objection to 
reports to and from Armed Forces High Command via ^Commanding 
Generals, Armed Forces. However, it is necessary tn*t 
Naval Staff be informed at the same time. 

Here, too, Chief, Naval Staff agreed. Group South and 
Admiral, Aegean have been given the following instructions; 

1. Commander in Chief, Navy has reported to the Fuehrer 
about the OLYMPOS convoy as follows: 

"in my opinion the tactical and operational deliberations 
of Admiral, Aegean should not be contested in view of the 
strategic situation and the orders issued by the Commanding 
General, Armed Forces. 

2. Presentation of the promised final views of Group South 
on the execution of this operation is left to it. 

3. Naval Staff confirms that responsibility for carrying 
out such a combined operation, if it is sea-borne, lies with 
the Commander of Naval Forces. This does not exclude the 
possibility that the strategic situation or donsiderations 
on the operation as a whole may make it necessary to set 
aside objections as regards navigation and naval tactics 
and to accept risks. This was the case here. 

4. No objections can be raised to the fact that the 
Commanding General, Armed Forces, within his responsibility 
for the entire execution of a combined operation, also 
reports to the Supreme Command on matters of naval tactics 
it is the duty of the Commanding Admirals to ensure that- 
Naval Staff is advised early enough for the views of the 
Navy to be duly received with those of other commands." 

b. According to information from Commander in Chief, Air 
Force, Operations Staff, Naval Liaison, the Fuehrer has 
prohibited long-range night fighter missions.. Our air 
activity over England is to concentrate on attacking 
cities. This will seriously affect 6ur rir activity 
over England is to concentrate on attacking cities. 




This will seriously effect our current mine laying 
offensive. .. ; 

c. The new Italian Naval Liaison Officer in Berlin will 
best be attached to the Naval Attaches Section for the 

Chief, Naval Staff agreed. 

VII. C ommander, Submarines, Medit er ranean has requested 
that previous subordination to. German Naval Command, Italy 
be canceled, in view of its different location. Chief, 
Naval Staff has approved this request, which. was put 
forward on 21 Sept. during his visit to Toulon. Naval- 
Staff recommends direct operational control of Commander, 
Submarines, Mediterranean by Operations Division. 

Chief, Naval Staff approved the proposal which was made 
in agreement with Submarine Division. 

Special Items 

I. Foreign Armies West has estimated the situation in 
the Mediterranean on 7 Oct. as follows: 

"The' course of the. fighting at Termoli again confirms 
the previous experience that the Eritish only carry out 
such 'operations after thorough preparations and with 
ample forces. The developments further indicate that 
the enemy attaches much importance to an extension of the 
areas gained on the Adriatic coast of Italy. This is also 
indicated. by the considerable increase in freighters and 
landing craft lately observed at the port of Taranto. 
Enemy air attacks, which have been' intensified kince 4 
Oct. in the entire Greek area against our a-.irfields, 
probably aim, by eliminating German air forces, at 
protection of further transports of troops and materiel 
to Apulian ports and of naval operations in the Aegean. 
The increased use of light naval forces in the Aegean Sea 
shows that the enemy is taking advantage of his. naval 
supremacy. The future target and result will be progress iv 
cutting-off first of the German f orces . in advanced 
positions on the Dodecanese islands and then of 'Crete. 
In the near future attempts to- recapture the island of 
Kos, with its important airfields, and operations against 
other Aegean islands must be expected. The fact that the 
British troops operating on Kos were transferred from the 
Egyptian and Palestinian area is a further indication that 
the island of Cyprus does not play any decisive part in 
enemy plans in the eastern Mediterranean." 


. a /^TvT-m-r-r\TTiT\Trn-r a t 


II. Operations Division, in view of information received 
from Armed Forces HighvCammand, Operations Staff, Navy 
transmitted the following instructions to German Naval 
Command, Italy on 5 Oct., -with copy to Army Group B. : 


A General Staff Officer sent by Armed Forces High Comma nc 
Operations Staff Into the area of Army Group B, reports 
on his trip from 26 to 30 Sept., as follows: 

"The Army Group requests instructions as to what is to 
be done with Italian ships lying in ports of northern 
Italy, which could be useful to the enemy in case of 
landings. There has also been no order as to whether port 
entrances are to be closed and, if so, which ones." 

2. Instructions on what is to be done with war material 
captured from the Italinn Navy and with ships of all 
kinds were given l/Skl, 25995 Gkdos. of 16 Sept. (to 
German Naval Command, Italy by radiogram). 

3. Measures planned and prepared for the closing of port 
entrances prre to be reported as soon as possible. 

4. Close cooperation with Army Group B. is to be ensured. 
The Naval Liaison Officer is to be kept continuously , 
informed of all basic instructions issued by Naval-. 
Staff and of plans and measures taken in that area 

as far as they may be of interest to Army Group B. 

Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy reported in this 
connection on 7 Oct.: 

"Do not understand .teletype. The Naval Liaison Officer 
brought up enquiries regarding ships in ports of northern 
Italy with this Command. Transfer to ports in southern 
France had already started. Regarding the closing of harbors, 
a full report was made by the Sector Commander of the 
Deputy Commanding General, Army Group B., which was 
approved, and measures were already started by order of 
10 Sept. in all harbors. Sinking of blockships, net and 
boom barrages and mine laying were prepared. Army Group B. 
has been continuously advised of all orders, measures and' . 
plans. The General Staff Officer referred to did not 
report to Naval Offices. The Naval Liaison Officer was 
also not advised of his trip, so that cooperation of 
German Naval Command, Italy was impossible. Please ensure 
that unfounded reports are not made to Armed Forces High 
Command, Operations Staff". 


9 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIA L 

Operations Division has informed Armed Forces High Command, 
Operations Staff, Navy of this exchange of teletypes. For 
order l/Skl 28095/Gkdos . see War" Diary, Part C, Vol XIV. 

III. Foreign Affairs/intelligence Division gives the 
following report from a Turkish source at the end of 
September: • • .;.,.... 

"During the next few days an important naval converence 
will take place in London, which will be attended by 
representatives of the British Admiralty, the U. S. 
Fleet Staff and the Navy Department in Washington, 
According to well-informed circles, the sole item on the agenda 
of the conference will be a certain regrouping of the 
British -and American Fleet forces. This regrouping h.°s become 
necessary through the changed situation in the Mediterranean 
The increase in -power of the Allied Fleets in the . Mediterranean 
through the Italian naval forces, makes, it • possible for part 
of the U. S. Fleet, which was recently ; ordered to the Med- 
iterranean, to be recalled and put into operation elsewhere. 
According to information from an agent,, these U. S. Fleet 
forces have been ordered to ports in England. " ' 

IV. Naval Intelligence Divion, Foreign Navies Branch has 
drawn up a report on the handling of tank landing craft 
(LCT's), during landing operations, on the basis of a 
captured British service manual. For copy as per l/Skl 
30284/43 geh. see War Diary, Vol. "Evaluation of Intelligence 
on Foreign Navies." 

S ituation 9 Oc t . 

^ • War in Foreign Wate r s : 

Obviously on the basis of Information obtained from the 
Italians (the EKTREA, the CAG-NI or other sources), the British 
have announced the border between the Japanese and German 
operational areas in the Indian Ocean as 70 degrees East. 
The Japanese Admiralty therefore recommends that point 
"Tannewald" be moved to 24 degrees S, 8l degrees East, since 
this point has so far lain in the former supply area of the 
SCHLIEMANN and on the route of the AQUILA submarines. The 
fact that the new point is nearer to the Sunda Strait must 
be accepted under present conditions. 

Operations Division has confirmed the ne-w position by cable 
on 5 Oct. to the Naval Attache in Tokyo. 

Otherwise nothing to report. 



II. Situation West Area: 

1. Enemy Situation: 

Over the Bay of Biscay 12 planes were detected 
on operation. One British vessel was located' at 0519 in 
CK 7220, one at 0815 in AL 6130, one at 1521 in AL 5240 
and one at 0019 (10 Oct,) in AM 4510. 

In the channel targets, presumably PT boats, were 
continuously located in lurking position from 0015 to 
0445 off Fecamp and Le Havre. 

2. Own Situation: 

Atlantic Coast: 

Mine -exploding vessel "5" vas heavily damaged 
through striking a mine on the approach route off La P^llice 
but entered port under her own power. Exercises by the 
8th Destroyer Flotilla were postponed because of the mine 
situation and weather condition. 

Channel Coast: 

At 0035 Army Batteries fired three salvoes on 
targets located off Fecamp. The motor minesweeper depot 
ship V.D.LIPPE had engagements with two enemy PT boats 
during the night of 8 Oct. off Cape de Heve at 0^12 and 
0407. One enemy boat was probably sunk and another damaged 
Our damage and casualties were slight. For brief action 
report see teletype 0845. PT boats S "142" and S "143" 
were transferred from the Hook to Boulogne. Four boats 
of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla proceeded in the evening 
from Cherbourg to Peterport and started back again at 
2400 after taking on torpedoes. 

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters 
1. North Sea : 

Eight ELM/<J mines were swept northwest of Ijmuiden, 
The steamer SUMATRA and ten boats of the 9th Motor Mine- 
sweeper Flotilla left Ijmuiden at 1700 for the Elbe river 
via the outer route. 

2. Norway, Northern Waters: 



Enemy Situation: 

Over- the North Sea 13 planes were .detected on 
operation. Slight gunfire was reported in the Petsamo area. 
At 0950 one plane was detected in the Alta area. At 0515 
southeast of Sandoey havy. engine noises were heard, presum- 
ably from a PT boat. At 1536 on 8 Oct. a northbound convoy 
■was unsuccessfully attacked by two planes south of Stad- 
tlandet. One plane was reported south of Egersund. Naval 
Command, Baltic is of opinion that the locations reported 
on 8 Oct.. off Ekkeroey were possibly connected with a 
mine laying operation or a channel sweep for blockade runners 
from Gothenburg. Naval Command, Norway, however, presumes 
a false location due to fog at sea. According to statements 
of prisoners, 14 British or American warships participated 
in the operation on K Oct.' off Bodoe, including the U. S. 
Carrier RANGER with 60 planes . The carrier force left Scapa 
at noon on 2 Oct. and was on the morning of 4. Oct. off 
Bodoe, including the U. S. carrier RANGER with 60 planes. 
The carrier force left Scapa at noon on 2 Oct. and was on 
the morning of 4 Oct. about 300 km. west of Bodoe. The 
RANGER is said to have been stationed in the Scapa area 
for at least six months. For particulars see teletype 

Own Situation: 

According to a report from Naval Command, Norway 
only 1 man was killed out of the 835 men aboard the 
SKRAMSTAD; 27 are missing end 40 wounded. The previous 
figure of 200 lost is incorrect. 

With reference to the objections of Commander, Minesweepers, 
Norway, the Naval (Ship) Construction Division has requested 
Quartermaster Division to approve the release of the HILASCARAN 
for project "Paul 1 .- 1 (repairs to the TIRPITZ in Alta), .on 
condition that short, urgent submarine repairs' have priority. 
Otherwise adherence to the repair schedule of the TIRPITZ 
is doubtful. (See teletype 1330). 

No reports on shipping movements have been received. 
Special Items : 

Naval Command, Norway has submitted to Naval Staff 
and Group North/Fleet considerations and suggestions regard- 
ing operations by Fleet forces in case of enemy operations 
against Norway. For letter of 6 Oct. as per l/Skl 3041/43 Gkdos 
see file l/Skl I op. VIII, 1. 

Naval Command, Norway does not consider that the conditions 
for previous operational plans still exist: 

No more convoy traffic in Northern Waters; intervention in 


9 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL ■ 

case of enemy lending can only be effective right at the 
landing point, in view of our limited forces and the air 
situation; a landing with a distant objective will probably 
not be made in northern Norway, but further to the South. 
The transfer of our Fleet base to the south is therefore 
necessary. Operational effectiveness and danger from the 
air must be weighed up against one another. If the enemy 
operation does not include the Jutland area, operational 
command must lie with Naval Command, Norway. Direct defense 
operations against landings must be controlled by the command 
which has all forces of the entire coastal defense at its 
disposal and knows how to cooperate direct with the Army 
and Air Force. Furthermore, it Is advisable to increase the 
number of submarines by operational ones and by boats of 
the Ant i- Submarine School, Finally, the part to be played 
by Admiral, Northern Waters should be investigated. In 
order to settle views on these matters it might be useful 
to carry out a war game based on written plans from a 
wide circle. 

Naval Staff assumes that Group North/Fleet will first of 
all comment on the above. 

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea 

1. Enemy Situation: 


A fire in the Siemens plant at Copenhagen was 
presumably caused by sabotage. Between 1026 and 100 a large 
U. S. air formation of 400 -450 planes flew into the Baltic 
area via Denmark and penetrated as far as Danzig Bay. 
Amongst other places Gdynia, Danzig and Elbing were . 
attacked. Return flights over the same route began at 1215 
and lasted until 1600.' 

In Kronstadt Bay minor harassing gunfire and normal tug 
traffic were observed. Over Luga Bay there was lively 
air activity. In the afternoon a group of 26 small 
minesweepers penetrated as far as vest of Vigrund and then 
turned away to the North. 

2. Own Situation: 

In the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic 
52" vessels were engaged in check-sweeping. Transports and 
convoy traffic went through In the whole Baltic Sea area 
without incident. In the area of Naval Command, Baltic 
seven enemy planes shot down for certain and four were 
probably shot down by fighters, five of which were lost, 
in addition five planes were shot down by naval anti- 
aircraft guns. With regard to the damage sustained in Gdynia 



9 Oct', ,194.3... CONFIDENTIAL 

sustained in Gdynia, the folio-wing is reported: the 
command office was slightly damaged, the local administration 
office and the harbor railway-station heavily damaged 
and the billeting and stores huts of the Naval Communications 
Office totally destroyed. Ship "47" and submarine chaser 
"1210" sank. The hospital ship STUTTGART 5?as towed out of 
port on fire and can probably -not be saved. The steamer 
CUXHAVEN sank after a direct. hit. The tugs SASPE and REVA 
and the Finnish Steamer REWJORN sank. The steamer GINHEIM 
was damaged. The -2,500 ton 'dock 'carrying the tug ATLANTIK 
sustained a direct hit. The Deutsche Werke dockyard was 
partly destroyed. Ships of the Training limit, Fleet and 
two accommodation ships were undamaged. 

No reports about our own defense have yet been recieved. 
•Regarding damage, Gdynia itself seems to have come off 
comparatively lightly. Above all the submarine base seems 
to be almost untouched. 

Operations in the area of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic 
.were badly hampered by unfavorable weather.. 

V. Submarine Warfare 

'In an operation against a convoy in AL submarine U 
"645" probably sank' a steamer (6,500 G.R.T.) on course 
90 degrees at 0627 in the mist. None of the submarines 
of Group "Rossbach" sighted, or reported the convoy 
itself. The- operation was discontinued in . the morning, as 
planned. From altogether five boats which participated 
position reports have not been received. 

By day on 21 'Sept* submarine U "123" scored two certain >. 
▼) and three probably hits on several Liberty ships in convoys 
EP 44. This submarine assumes that traffic is moving on the 
200 m. line between Trinidad and Freetown in a very large 
circle with constant air patrol..-' 

A further report of success was received from the Mediterran- 
ean. According to the, estimate of Quartermaster Division, Sub- 
marine Branch, our submarine losses in September 1943 
amount to 9,8$ for the Atlantic, ,9-. 1$ for Northern Waters, 
25/6 for the Mediterranean and none for the Black Sea, 
calculated on a monthly average of submarines on operation. 
The corresponding figure in August .for the Atlantic was 51^. 

Losses in relation to the total number of operational sub- 
marines (175) amounted in September to 4.9$, on a mean 
average since the. beginning of the war 5.9% and since- 
January 1943.9.9^. 



The corresponding figures for August -were 19.2% 6^ end I&.6$ 

M> . 

VI. Aerial Warfar e, 

British Isles and Vicinity: 

The 3rd Air Force had 16 planes out on operation over 
England, 2 over the Atlantic and 64 over the Mediterranean. 

In free-lance fighter operations over the Bay of Biscay on 
8 'Oct. 2 Thunderbolts were shot down, 7 BF 110' s being 
lost. During defense against an enemy attack on the 
airfield at Brest-South 4 Spitfires were shot down, 4 
BF 110' s being, lost. The crews of. two of them were saved. 

The enemy raided two airfields in the occupied raest area. 

Heavy formations flew into the eastern part of northern 
Germany in the morning. A formation which approached Berlin 
from the north was driven off by our- fighters. Targets 
were Anklam, Gdynia, Danzig and Marienburg. At Anklam 
and Marienburg the raid centered on the Ar-^do and Focke- 
Wulf works. Damage was considerable. For particulars see 
"Dally Situation". The attack on Gdynia Is reported under 
"Situation Baltic". Single planes flew at the same time 
as far as Mannheim and Strassburg/Alsace with out attack- 

During the night of 9 Oct. only minor enemy flights are 
reported. Ten fast bombers dropped a few bombs on Berlin 
from a great altitude. 

Our fighters, numbering 570 shot down during the day 36 
four-engined enemy bombers for certain and probably shot 
down 37 more. Twelve of our fighters were lost. 

M editerranean Theater: 

The 2nd Air Force reports attacks on enemy shipping 
targets southeast of Plume and off Krk. One freighter was 

The 3rd Air Force had 54 bombers out on an unsuccessful 
operation against e large convoy which had detected in the 
early morning west of Cape Tenes . The operation had to 
be broken off because of weather conditions were deter- 

Thirty-nine planes of the Air Force Command, Southeast 
attacked shipping' targets in the harbor of Leros and 
sank one steamer of 1,500 G.R.T. 



9 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENT IAL 

RecoimaCssance ; detected at 0515 a force of 1 or 2 cruisers 
and 3 or 4 destroyers in the Leros area on easterly course. 
During an attack in the afternoon on the force, which was 
withdrawing, one destroyer was- sunk and one cruiser heavily 
damaged in the Scarpanto' S-trait. Reconnaissance also reported 
off Cape Sidero (northeast coast of Crete) a large group 
of vessels on easterly course, so far unidentified. 

The enemy carried out lively attacks over the front and 
against. supply routes in Italy. In the Greek area altogether 
seven airfields were attacked. For damage see "Daily 
Situation". The enemy also carried out lively reconnaissance 
over the Aegean Sea. 

East ern Front: 

Nothing to report. 

VI - • Warfare in the Mediterranean an d Bla c k Sea; 

1 .. E nemy Situation Med i terranean : 

A convoy of 7 loaded freighters and 1 tanker 
in ballast, together with 9 escort vessels, which left 
Gibraltar at 15^0 for the Mediterranean put in again 
at 1710 for unknown reasons. 

At 0645 on 9 Oct. a convoy of 1 tanker, 8 freighters pnd 
9 escort vessels put out into the Atlantic and. joined a 
convoy of 29 freighters, 3 tankers and 16 escort vessels 
passing through from the Mediterranean. Ten friighters 
in ballast and k escort vessels put into Gibraltar from 
the Mediterranean. 

The eastbound convoy reported on the morning of 8 Oct. 

off Alboran'was detected by planes of the 3rd Air Force 

at 072OIO miles north of Arzeu, consisting of 64 merchantmen 

and 4 escort vessels on course eastnortheast, , after it had 

been joined by further ships, presumably from Qran. For 

report on unsuccessful air attack see "Aerial Warfare". 

At 0310 our air reconnaissance sighted 60 miles north- 
northwest of Messina 3 vessels, presumably warships, 
proceeding a.t high speed on northwesterly course and at 
1300 22 miles west-southwest of Salerno 4 transports 
with escort vesseal, no course and speed being' stated. 

No new reports have been received from Salerno Bay. 
Increased unloading from landing craft was observed in 
Naples . 


9 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIA L 

This part is presumably being used as a submarine base. 

German Naval Command, Italy is of opinion that extensive 
operations from Naples and Salerno, and also from Termoli,, 
must be expected. 

Further troops were landed at Termoli. 

A small convoy leaving Apulian ports, presumably bound for 
Malta, was reported 70 miles east of Catania; no time 
was stated.. ; ■ 

No reconnaissance reports have been received from the 
eastern Mediterranean. 

Own Situation Mediterranean: 

c . 

Around midnight on 9 Oct. a steamer of 4,000 GRT 
was torpedoed by submarine U "616" in CJ 9443 and left 
burning. This submarine also sank a destroyer south of 

Four PT boats left Spezia on a minelaying operation. 

The monelayer JUMINDA carried out her. minelaying operation 
on the east coast of Corsica according to plan. The mine- 
layer KEHRWIEDER had to break off her operation because 
of engine trouble. Check of the coastal route south of 
San Remo was continued without result. 

Transport traffic along the west coast of Italy was 
carried out as planned and without incident. 

3. Area Naval Group South: 

a. Adriatic Sea: 

The minelayer LAURANA is scheduled for a minelaying 
operation from Anc ona, Transfer of the ship- has been post- 
poned because of weather conditions. The steamer ROSELLI 
left Durazzo for Corfu in the evening. She was shelled 
without effect off Valona in spite of the fact that 
Army offices had been advised. Group South haa changed its 
former views and confirms that the Naval Liaison Staff, • 
Croatia is to be put directly under Group South. 

b . Aegean Sea : 

In the enemy air attacks on our airfields in 
Salonika two Ju 88 ' s were destroyed by fire. The landing 
strip is out of order. Heavy enemy air attacks on other 
airfields caused, however, only relatively slight damage. • 



9 Oc-t. 1943 •■■••' CONFIDENTIAL 

In view of the enemy forces reported by our air 'reconnaissance 
in the early morning in the Leros area, the convoy of 
submarine chaser "2102" and the INGEBORG was first, ordered 
to turn away but later to continue to Kos. 

The minelayer DRACHE carried out her mine laying operation 
on the evening of 8 Oct. as planned. 

Group South transmits a report from Admiral, Aegean on 
the intended landing on Leros. The attack is to be 
carried out in three assault groups and through landing 
of a parachutist company. 

In the evening Group South reports that operation "Leopard" 
has been postponed for another 24 hours for the following- 
reasons; afternoon reconnaissance sighted strong enemy 
forces south of Rhodes on northerly course; the airfield 
at Kos is not ready' yet; the convoy of the INGEBORG with 
the reserve battalion will arrive late; the Air Force has 
been put to too much strain by operations during the last 
few days. Furthermore, the possibility of an enemy operation 
against Kos is foreseen. 

Army Group E has ordered, however, that the most favorable 
opportunities for attack be utilized if developments in 
the situation £ How. 

In view of the afternoon reconnaissance which sighted two 
cruisers and four destroyers south of Rhodes, proceeding 
at high speed on northerly course, the convoy of INGEBORG 
was ordered to withdraw to 'the west for the second time. 
In addition reconnaissance of the shipping concentrations 
have been ordered in Kos . 

So far 1,027 men of the OLYMPOS convoy have been rescued and 
about 150 are still missing, according to a report from 
the Naval Liaison Officer to Army Group F„ 

Survivors aboard the BULGARIA state that further German 
soldiers were taken aboard by four British submarines. 

Our motor minesweepers with further survivors aboard are 
on their way to Kos. ■ ' •*'■■■'•' 

A new operation against Symi starting from Rhodes was 
planned for 9 Oct. with a reinforced, assault group. 

Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation Office 
of the Armed Forces Overseas has ordered that five Siebel 
ferries, which were transferred to Trieste overland and 
destined for operations in the Aegean Sea, are to remain 



at Trieste until further notice. Group South has advised 
that it vill raise objection. 

c . Black Sea : 

E nemy S 1 1 ua 1 1 on : 

According to radio intelligence, the destroyers "F" 
and "E" probably left Tuapse to the south on the evening 
of 8 Oct. 

At 1910 on 9 Oct. e submarine south of Sudak. It was 
probably this submarine "which vas unsuccessfully attacked 
at 2140 by a PT boat 20 miles southwest of Feodosiya. 
Another submarine was located in the evening 45 miles . 
southwest of Sevastopol on easterly course. 

Submarine U "24 " reported in the morning one PT boat 
proceeding on easterly course at high speed at the point 
where the three Russian destroyers went down. 

Own Situation: 

Evacuation of Kuban bridgehead has been completed. 
The last troops were transferred at 0400. The transport 
formations are on the way from Kerch to Sevastopol. The first 
unit was attacked at 0700 by seven enemy plane's; one Siebel 
ferry was lost and one plane shot down. There was no fighter 
cover due to fog at the airfield. 

Further air attacks carried out on the convoy unit during 
the day caused no damage. The remainder of the convoy con- 
sisting of 4 naval landing craft and a tug with naval 
artillery lighter "4" and 6 combined operations boats left 
Kerch for Feodosiya at 1800. 

The 1st PT Boat Flotilla is being sent out from Ivanbabe 
as remote escort for the large convoys. Further remote 
escort Is being carried out by . three German and three 
Italian submarines. '-•.-. , . .■ 

On the morning of 8 Oct. our convoy from Feodosiya to 
Sevastopol was unsuccessfully attacked by 18 enemy planes 
off Cape Aitodor. One plane was shot down by ships' anti- 
aircraft guns'. 

VIII. Situation East Asia 
Nothing to report. 


10 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIA L" 

Items of Political Importance ? 

According to German agency reports., competent quarters 
in Lisbon deny that a secret session of Parliament took 
place on 8 Oct. and that Salazar made a statement. 

According to Reuter and other sources, however, there 
are definite signs that important decisions -were made or 
are imminent. Amongst other things, Lisbon will -be blacked 
out from 10 Oct. The publication of weather reports has been 

The left-wing newspaper "New Leader" writes on 2 Oct.: 

"Europe is fast drifting into an Immense political conflag- 
ration. The. issues' do not concern so much the military con- 
flicts between the Allied Nations and Germany as the 
political, conflict between America and England on the one 
hand and the' Soviet Union on the other. In all these conflicts, 
which concern the treatment of the Baltic States, Eastern 
Poland, the Balkans and above all the treatment of Germany 
after the war.,. America and Grea.t Britian stand on one side 
and Soviet Russia on- the other. The chances of clearing * : 
up these differences of opinion at the forthcoming Foreign-- • 
Ministers' Conference are small. In the conflict about the 
establishment of a "second front" in the Vest', it is less 
a matter of helping Russia than of occupying Germany with 
British and American' troops before the Red Army comes in. 
The "New .Leader" takes the view that all these differences 
can only be solved by Establishing United Socialist States 
of Europe . "' ' 

It seems appropriate to note these extreme comments as they 
state in plain language what is actually going- on- at 
present. ...-., 

According to Reuter, American and British Generals and 
Admirals are now gathering in New. Delhi for a large 
conference, in .order to assist Lord Mount-batten in 
working out details of the Allied- plan for attack 
in the Far East. Chunking's Foreign Minister, Soong, 
is also participating in these discussions,. 

Conference on the Situati on wit h Ch ief, Naval Staff' 
I. Army Situation:. 

On the eastern front enemy attacks have increased along 
the whole line. The enemy is moving new forces into the area 


10 Oct, 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

of his break-through near Nevel, but he -was only successful 
in extending it to the north. 

The enemy has also started to advance in the sector 

of Army Group North, in order to carry out reconnaissance 

on our movements . 

Fighting in Italy and in the Balkans has not increased 
any further. 

II. At the recommendation of Operations Division, Chief, 
Naval Staff orders the following personal teletype to be 
sent to Admiral, Black Sea with copy to Group South: 

"The operational control, organization and readiness of the 
units and naval forces which participated in the evacuation 
of the Kuban bridgehead played an important part in making 
this combined operation a complete success. I express my 
special appreciation to you, to the Chiefs, Commanders, 
Staffs and crews of the units, nrval forces and offices 
concerned. " 

III . Report of Operations Division, International Law 
and Prizes Section on the proposal of Naval Staff for a 
reply to Spain regarding the submarines BLUM and BRANDI, 
as per notes in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII . 

Chief, Naval Staff agrees, but he thinks it advisable to 
proceed in such a manner that the liberation of Lt. (s.g.) 
Brand.i Is not interfered with. Moreover, it is best to 
make the Spaniards to some extent morally responsible in 
order to pave the way for future incidents. 

IV. Quartermaster General: 

a. The objections raised by Group South against the order 

of Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation Office 
of the Armed Forces Overseas to leave five of the Siebel 
ferries destined for the Aegean at Trieste have now been 
received. Group South requests that the neces.snry arrangements 
be made for the release of these vessels. 

Since the Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed 
Forces Overseas usually complies with the requirements 
of Naval Staff, it will be possible to support the request 
of Group South effectively. 

Chief, Naval Staff agreed. 

b. The request of Naval Command, Norway for permission to 


10 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

change the destination of the Harbor Defense flotillas -in 
its area to' Patrol Boat Flotillas -has been declined by 
Quartermaster Division for basic reasons of organization. 

V. Chief, Operations Branch,' Operations Division:- 1 

II ■ ■ l «H 'I ■■■■ M l ■ I I I ' ll ■■ ■ ■■ — -. ■ ■ 1 i ■■ I ■III -«■■—■ m* I — -II ■ ■■!' W l» » . W W II I ■■! ■— + **m •■■■ ■ — ' ■!■ II .!■■ ■ ■■■■, 

a. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has sub- 
mitted a preliminary report on the discussions -with Marshal 
Graziani on 9 Oct.' According to ; this report, the folio-wing 
has been agreed on: 

1. It is important that Italy contribute as much as 
possible to the future of the War effort and it is, there- 
fore necessary that: 

a. those parts of Italy occupied by us are not treated 
as. enemy but as allied territory, 

b. the authority and independence of the new Italian 
Government is "established and strengthened, 

2. With this in mind, the operational area of Command- 
ing General, Armed -Forces, South and of Army Croup B will 
be limited to a suitable area behind the front lines of 
Commanding General, .Armed Forces, South and to certain 
areas on the nor theas tern 9 northern and nor thwes tern 
boundary of Italy, in order to protect communications to 
Germany and France. The whole remaining territory /will be 
handed over to the Italian Government for administration. 

On the coasts, • operations 1 zones are planned which, however, 
will become operational areas only in case of an enemy 
landing. Until such- time the coastal areas will also be 
under the administration of the Italian Government In 
the territory administered by the Italian Government a 
Military Commander (General Toussaint) will be appointed, 
who will be under Chief, Armed Forces' High Command, His 
tasks in General will be: 

a: to represent and see to execution of the military 
'demands of the German Armed Forces with Italian 
•■ ' Government or subordinate Ita lian' authorities, ' 

b: to assist the Italian Government and its author- 
ities, not only with regard to its own Government 
measures, as far as this may be required, but also 
in dealing with German forces. /•' 

3. The intended defense of the line provided for this 
purpose is of decisive importance for the common fight. 
With the loss of Rome, Italy would actually c&sse to be a 


10 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

Therefore, every resource of the country must be mobilized 
immediately in order to help defend the deep flunks and 
long coastlines and release German forces to a great 
extent for operations on the main fronts. For this purpose 
the Army Groups, the Navy and the Air Force are to cons- 
cript an unlimited number of Italian volunteers, fit for 
military service, for the folio-wing categories: 

a. Navy and Army coastal gunners 

b. Anti-aircraft gunners 

c. Construction troops 

d. Engineers and railway engineers 

e. Air -warning and ground personnel 

f. Communications personnel 

g. Harbor office personnel and crews for 
harbor defense flotillas. 

Military Internees do not come into question for these 
formations. Should the Italian High Command be unable to 
secure volunteers itself, recruiting is to be carried 
out by our forces. Each unit of the above -mentionned 
categories must establish at least a second unit, part 
of the personnel of -which is German. The volunteers will 
be treated as regards pay and care in the same way as Ger- 
man soldiers. The Italian Government will at the same time 
ensure a. favorable provision for the families and depend- 
ents of the volunteers . 

4. The new formation of large Italian units is 
planned at troop training camps outside Italy. 

5. Orders for 2) to 4) will follow. For 3), however, 
preparatory measures in accordance with this preliminary 
advice are to be taken at once. 

1) and 2) of this order might seriously hamper our own 
freedom of action in the military and especially in the war 
economy sphere. However, political reasons may have been 
decisive. As regards 3) executive orders must be awaited 
in order to see whether and, if at all, to what extent, 
formation of actual Italian Armed Forces is still complicated 
The matter of a flag is also still to be decided. 

b. Quartermaster General recommends that for the time being 
Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy be advised ^n6 instruct- 
ed to begin preparations, as ordered, together with Admiral 
Legnani. If necessary it may be advisable to create a 
specific Staff within Naval Staff with the sole task of 
dealing with questions of orga inization arising from 
cooperation with the Italian Navy. 


10 Oct'.:. 1943. CONFI DENTIAL 

Special Item s 

I. According to intelligence reports from Portugal, two 
islands of the Azores, allegedly Fayal and Flores, -were 
occupied by the Americans and British during the night 
of 9 Oct. In Lisbon there has been no news at all from 
Ponta Delgada since 8 Oct. According to another report 
dated 7 Oct., a Brazilian Military Mission has arrived 

a.t Ponta Delgada, -which is presumably to make preparations 
for a landing. Exceptionally large quantities of -war materiel 
are at present being landed on the Azores. 

According to a report of our Naval Attache in Lisbon, cable 
communication with Azores is normal, as far as he can 
ascertain. Current rumors about an occupation of the 
Azores are so far not confirmed. He does not regard it, 
however, as out of question that the enemy will intensify 
diplomatic pressure in order to obtain bases without 
resort to force. On Inquiry the Foreign Office states 
that it regards also the report concerning the summoning 
of the Portuguese National Assembly as piire invention 
and that the German envoy in Lisbon has given a very 
"Pacifying" tendency to his reports. For details see War 
Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII. 

II. According to information from Quartermaster Division, 
the construction of naval landing craft has lately shown 
ever Increasing delays. Compared with, the production schedule 
of 109 naval landing craft from April to August 19^3* there 
is a deficit of 39 • Delays continue to assume serious 
consequences. For instance, not one of the 1? naval landing 
craft scheduled for September at dockyards at home and 

in occupied areas has been completed. Naval Staff has 
drawn the attention of the Main. Committee for Shipbuilding 
to the fact that important- war tasks cannot be fulfilled 
if these delays continue amd has learned to its regret 
that even the allocation of a priority /<rmed Forces number 
has shown no result. Naval Staff requests that immediate 
steps be taken to change this situation and draws attention 
to the fact that the allocation of a priority number was 
restricted and expires on 30 Nov. ighj>. 

Situation 10 Oct. 

I. War in Foreign Water s 

The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports that the BRAKE and 
the BOGOTA have been supplied with a list of reference 
points and waiting areas, as ordered, and that all outgoing 
blockade runners and supply ships have been informed of the 
new approach points. 


10 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDE NTIAL 

The No vol Attache enquires whether the waiting areas for 
the BRAKE and the BOGOTA are still in force. 

II. Situation West Area 

1 . Enemy Situat i on: 

Over the Bay of Biscay eleven planes were detected 
on operation. One British vessel was located at 1222 in AM 
4110, one at 1444 in AL 63 and one at 1857 in AM 4640. 

Continuous radar locations were reported in the Channel 
on the evening of 9 Oct. In the area between Cape de la 
Hague and Alderney and from 0500 to 0558 on 10 Oct. in 
the area north and west of Point de Barfleur. 

2. Own Situation : 

Atlan tic Coast : 

Five submarines were escorted' out of Brest, Lorient 
and St. Na zaire. one ELM/J mine was swept off the Gironde.. . 
Damaged mine -exploding vessel "5" put in to La Pallice. 
Because of the mine situation and weather conditions no 
exercises were carried out by the 8th Destroyer Flotilla. 

C hannel Coast : 

Nothing to report. 

II. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters 
North Sea : 

It is now reported for 9 Oct. that one boat was 
damaged in an enemy air attack on boats of the Rhine 
Flotilla on 9 and 10 Oct. 14 ground mines were swept 
in the area between Scheveningen and Heligoland. 

The convoy of SUMATRA was carried out as planned. 



10 Oct. 19^ CONFIDE NTIAL, 

near holder the' operational :caDle of the 8o8th Naval 
Artillery Battalion was damaged by sabotage. Action 
readiness is unimpaired. Twenty-nine Dutch workmen were 

Noway, Nothern Waters : 
^ • E nemy Situ a t 1 on : 

Over the central and northern parts of the North 
Sea. 23 planes were detected on opera tion. ; 

From the Petsamo area slight gunfire and air reconnaissance 
are reported. On 9 Oct. off Battery "Hovde", at the entrance 
to Trondheim Fjord, a small fast vessel proceeding without 
lights was sighted. A search conducted by four harbor 
degense vessels has so far proved fruitless. At 0425 on 10 
Oct. at the entrance to Nordgulen a loud engine noise wps 
heard.. Gulen was searched without result. 

2 . Own Situation : 

In the area of Naval Command, Norway 12 ships 
were escorted north, and one south. In all 22 ships were 
left lying In harbor owing to lack of escorts. 

Naval Group North/Fleet has 'decided, at the request of the 
Task Force, that operation "Paul" be made known to a 
larger circle, with corresponding security restrictions. 
Arrangements for leave for the crew depend on the question 
of transport, which will be settled between Naval "Command, 
Norway and Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway. 
Leave Transports by sea from Trondheim to the Skagerrak 
are entirely out of question. (See teletype 1252.) 

Group North/Fleet also advised Naval Staff for information 
that assumption of the, command of Northern Waters by 
Rear Admiral Bey must take place during the week of 
25-30 Oct. (See teletype 1325.) 

I V . Skagerrak, Baltic Sea En t rances, B altic Sea : 

1. Enemy Situation: 

At 1715 heavy detonations were observed on Lavan- 
saari. Southwest of Vaindlo and east of Rotskaer our vessels 
had a brief engagement with PT boats which turned away when 
fired on. 


10 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

At 0633 on 9 Oct. bombers unsuccessfully attacked the 
steamer WINDAU off Lyserort. At 0635 on 10 Oct. probable 
mine laying south-west of "Windau was reported by the s termer 
HOLLAND. During an air attack on our barrage patrol south 
of Porkalla one plane was shot down. 

2. Own Situation: 

In the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, 
Baltic 26 vessels were engaged in check-sweeping. Two ground 
mines were swept ne^r Shulzgrund and one near H^lsb- n rre. 
Eight troop transports with 3 defense vessels, 3 steamers and 
1 tanker were escorted. 

The casualties aboard the hospital ship STUTTGART, which 
caught fire after being hit by a bomb at Gdynia on 9 Oct. 
and was sunk by our gunfire, amount to: 2 medical officers, 
1 medical cadet, 4 enlisted men, 2 Red Cross nurses, 17 
civilian members of the crew and about 12 patients killed a 
and 29 wounded. 

The following were also sunk in the harbor: the 2,500 
ton dock with the tug ATLANTIK, Ship "47" (fishing vessel), 
the former minesweeper N0RDP0L, the Swedish steamer A. K. 
FERNSTROEM (863 GRT) with a cargo of 1,200 tons of coal, 
the submarine depot ship EUPEN, submarine chaser "1210", 
the Finnish steamer VIPJOERN, the steamer CUXHAVEN (2,500 
GRT) and the tugs 3ASPE and REVA . 

Operations to salvage submarine chaser "1210", Ship "47", 
the NORDPOL, the SASPE and the REVA have been started. 

At Neufahrwasser on the same occasion the steamer 
NEIDENFELS was damaged by a hit on her forecastle. One 
member of the ship's anti-aircraft crew was killed. 

The 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla made a search sweep 
of the area between Tyters and Vikallagrund. 

V. Submarine Warfare 

The operation of Group "Ross bach" against the 
enemy convoy must be considered a failure with the probable 
loss of five of our submarines. Three of these were 
presumably lost by enemy air attacks near Iceland. 

Submarine U "214" carried out a mine laying operation 
off Colon (Panama Canal). 


10 Oct..; I943 ; ' CONFIDEN TIAL 

VI. Aerial Warfa re ••; .• ;v 

British Isles and Vicinity: 

No important missions were flown by the J>rd Air Force 

Muenster (Westphalia) was raided from 14 10 to 1600 by 
200 Fortresses in two waves, with fighter cover up to and 
on return from the "Dutch area. Heavy damage was caused. 
Further attacks were carried out on Coesfeld, Ha Item -and ■ 
Emschede. Our fighters numbering 4l6 went up and shot 
down 4? Fortresses and 3 Thunderbolts for certain; 22 
further planes were probably shot' down. Our losses amount 
to 26 fighters and 28 men. 

Mediterranean Theater: 

The 2nd Air Force reports altogether 136 planes, 
including 98 fighters, out on operation. 

Air. Force Command, Southeast had 56 bombers, 37 Stukas, 
23 fighters, 23 reconnaissance planes and 4 3 transport 
planes out on operation, including 33 bombers and 35 Stukas 
against Leros. No reports on results have been received. 

The enemy attacked the harbor of Cattaro and the airfields 
of Tatoi, Candia and Gadura., Heavy damage was caused at some 
points. Four Fortresses were shot down. 

Eastern Front: 

The 5th Air Force had 37 Planes out on close convoy 
escort. .. 

VII . ' Warfare in" the Mediter ranean and Black Sea : 

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean: 

On the afternoon of 9 Oct. Ceuta reported a 
small convoy of four freighters passing through from 
the Atlantic to the Mediterranean, No reconnaissance -reports 
have been received from the western and eastern Med- 

In the Italian area warships were detected for the first 
time on the east coast of Sardinia. Thirty miles east 
of Olbia there were four PT boats making for the Straits 
of Bonifacio. 


10 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

only slight traffic was observed at Naples and in the 
Gulf of Salerno. German Naval Command, Italy is of opinion 
that the patrol activity of destroyers and the heavy escort 
even of snail convoys is due to our PT boat and submarine 
attacks . 

According to photographic reconnaissance there was a large 
number of merchantnent, landing boats and destroyers in 
Bari. At Termoli six landing boats were identified, but 
no freighters. 

2 . Own S ituation Mediterranean : 

Submarine U H 8l" fired five misses in CN 33^2 
on landing craft and has started on return passage since 
all her torpedoes are expended. 

The operation which submarine U "73" carried out for the - 

Intelligence Service was to land an agent on the Alerian 
coast between 1 degree 50' E. and Oran. Commander, Submarines, 
Mediterranean has submitted the operational order for this. 
For copy as per l/Skl 3054/43 Gkdos. Chefs, see War Diary, 
Part C, Vol. XIV. 

Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean has also submitted 
the operational order for mining by submarines U "453" 
of Erindisi roads. For copy as per l/Skl 3055/43 Gkdos. 
Chefs, see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV. 

The mine laying operation by PT boats on the west coast 

of Corsica was carried out during the night of 9 Oct. 

was planned, Minesweeping in the area south of San Remo was 

still without result. Coastal traffic w^s carried out as 

planned. German Naval Command, Italy reports that all 

captured Italian vessels are in need of extensive repairs. ^2 

Some of these ships were damaged by Italians, To put these 

ships into operational readiness at short notice is, 

therefore, in most cases impossible. German Naval Command. 

Italy has insturcted Submarine Flotilla, Pola at once to 

take over the test and laboratory equipment of the Naval 

Optical Institute at Pola. 

3* Area Naval Gr oup South: 

a . A driatic Sea : 

On 8 Oct. between 2300 and 24.00 enemy 
naval forces shelled the coast twelve miles north of 
Durazzo without effect. At 0705 on 10 Oct. enemy planes 
unsuccessfully attacked ships in Cattaro Bay. The Anti- 
aircraft guns of the tanker KNUDSEN shot down one pl^ne. 
The steamer LEOPARDI left Cattaro for Durazzo. Five 
special naval commands arrqived on 6 Oct. at Split. 



to :■■ < 


10 Oct. 1943. • ■ : . ;, r ;r; ■ '■ CONFIDENTIAL 

A radio station'has been .set ;up.. ; ' Railway communication 
to the interior is interrupted. 'The 623rd and 6l2th Naval 
Artillery Battalions, except for two batteries, have been 
on the -way. from Trieste to land since 8 Oct. 

b • - Aege an Sea : 

During the night of 9 Oct. several enemy reconnais- 
sance, planes .flew into the southern Aegean- and. the area , 
between the Peieponnesos and the Lonian islands. At noon 
on 9 Oct. an enemy reconnaissance plane reported to,. 
Alexandeia sighting submarine chaser "2101"' and the 
steamer SALVATORE on Kalymnos roads and the minelayer 
DRACHE west of Kalymnos. The enemy reconnaissance plane, 
while over Kalymnos, probably spotted all the vessels 
hidden on the bays. Northing is known of the whereabouts 
.of the enemy group reported at 1650 on 9 Oct. off Castell 
Rosso.' The enemy force reported at the same time in the 
area northwest of Rhodes consisted of 1 light cruiser, 
2' destroyers and 2 escort boats, according to a new 
report. Following the air attack on the morning' of 9 Oct. 
the cruiser was sighted lying stationary with her forecastle 
burning heavily. One destroyer was missing. 

The DRACHE reported at 0^30 on 10 Oct. off the east coast. 
of Kalumnos two destroyers which were searching the coast 
with starsheels and searchlights. At 12^9 our air reconn- 
aissance definitely sighted two enemy destroyers , of the 
ALFRIDI Class putting into the Turkish port of Azuen Kalesi. 
This will bo investigated by our Nvval Attache ,in Istanbul. 

The destroyers left again a few hours later and were re- 
ported at 1920 by the DRACHE once more off Kalymnos. Our 
Air Force plane to attack these destrouers with bombers. 

The DRACHE has received orders to lay the barrages planned 
for the night of 9 Oct., during the night of 10 Oct. 

At 0853 the convoy of the -steamer INGEBORG received orders 
to enter Mykjonos temporarily, owing to the uncertain enemy 
situation and because the' Captain and four of the crew of '■'--.■•■-• 
the steamer INGEBORG were wounded in an enemy air attack. 
The convoy dropped anchor on the. west coast of Mykunos at 1430. 
If it proves impossible to br'Ing this -convoy through to Kos, 
motor minesweepers or. even planes, may possibly fetch 
particularly valuable' parts of the cargo 'or small groups 
of men. Since the weather deteriorated in the course of 
the afternoon, the scheduled execution of operation "Leopard" 
became doutful. A final decision was postponed until the 


10 Oct. 19^ ; :;■;-■;.: ■■■■ .,,;,•_. CONFIDENTIAL 

The convoy of the steamer INGEBORG, received orders to stand 
by in immediate readiness on the lee" side of the island of 
Delusa from daybreak on 11 Oct. However, this order could 
not be carried oiafe because of weather conditions. In the 
evening operation "Leopard" was postponed for another 24 
hours . 

So far 302 men of the BULGARIA have been reported rescued. 
Further figures sre still awaited. 

With regard to the Fuehrer Directive of 6 Oct., Naval Staff 
has informed Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, 
Navy, Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters and Group South that 
the latter will, in accordance with the Fuehrer's order, use 
all facilities for the task ordered. 

"It is known that the Navy can occupy and supply the islands 
in the. Aegean Sea only as allowed by its small facilities and 
at a great risk in view of the enemy naval and air superiority. 
Commander in Chief, Navy reported this to the Fuehrer verbally 
and by teletype of 8 Oct. This fact must be taken into consid- 
eration. " 

Naval Staff furthermore points out that a copy of the Fuehrer's 
teletype to Commanding General, Armed Dorces, South, with copy 
to Group South, was not received by Naval Staff unitl 9 Oct. 
Nay£l Staff was therefore advised very late of the measures 
ordered bv the Fuehrer. ' 

c. Black Sea: : 

1 • Enemy S i tuation: 

No enemy forces were sighted by our air reconnaiss- 
ance during the day. No shipping was observed off the Caucasian 

2. Own Situation: 

The transport convoys arrived at Sevastopol in 
the evening. They were repeatedly attacked by enemy planes 
from daylight on, but were well covered by our fighter 
escort. One naval landing craft out of the third convoy was 
sunk by an enemy submarine at 1325 south of Yalta. In an 
air attack on Yalta. at 1^35 one combined operations boat 
and the tug BAIKAL were damaged. 

Submarine U "23" left Constanta for operations. Submarine 
U "20" is on return passage to Constanta. 


10 Oct. 19^3 . CONFIDENTIAL, 

The 1st PT Boat Flotilla left Ivanbaba in the evening for 
convoy escort. : , ; 

Barrage "K 15" vas laid according , to plan. 

Admiral, Black Sea has submitted a ! brief report about the 
Navy's share in the evacuation of the Kuban bridgehead. 
Since 7 Sept. the Navy evacuated the following: 

97,9^1 tons of war material 
12,437 -wounded 

6,329 soldiers 
12,383 civilians 
1,195 horses 
2,265 head of livestock 

260 motor vehicles . . "' : 

770 horse-drawn vehicles 
... . ; : 82 guns . ." 

Besides this transport task the Navy's main duty was to 
protect the sea transports and to prevent enemy landings 
behind our front. This entailed numerous engagements with 
the enemy. For copy of brief report see teletype 0^00. 

VIII. Situation East Asia 

• The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports: 

"Wake attacked on 6 end 7 Oct. by carrier-borne and shore- 
based planes, -which came from Midway. On both days the 
attacks were carried out by about 300 planes in four waves. 
Most of- the Japanese bombers on the airfield were destroyed 
right at the beginning of the attack. The remaining ones did 
not succeed in reaching the enemy aircraft carrier. Fighters 
and anti-aircraf.t guns, shot down 20 planes on each day. 
No attempts at landing were made. Damage was mostly on the 
airfield. Forty killed c No ships in port. 

During the night of 6 Oct. a destroyer engagement took place 
in the waters of the Solomon islands. One Japanese destroyer 
was heavily damaged and 'three enemy destroyers probably sunk. 
Full particulars are still unknown. Ja-penese troops at 
Colombagsrsi and Vella le Vella (northern islands of the 
New Georgia Group) were evacuated to Choiseul, except 
for rear guards. Heavy fighting In progress near Finschhafen 
(New Guinea). Enemy submarine activity in September insign- 
ificant. " , 



11 Oct. 1945 CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Political Importance 

"DNB" reports in connection -with the situation in Portugal 
that, contrary to the sensational reports in the Allied press , 
the situation has not changed. Parliament is not expected 
to meet before 2 Nov. 

The Intelligence Service reports, on the other hand, that 
there has been no communication with Ponta Delgada since 

7 Oct. The station has probably been wiped out. 

The Intelligence station at Horta reported at 2200: 

"All Germans on the island of Faya.l have been arrested and 
brought in to Ponta Delgada by the steamer ALF0NZ0 ALBUQUERQUE. 
In Horta searches and oonfiscttion of radio sets and trans- 
mitters are taking place. All traffic to and communication with 
the island of Sao Miguel is interrupted. A convoy of 3 
freighters with war materiel and provisions, 4 minesweepers , 
2 tugs and 4 destroyers arrived at Horta on the morning of 

8 Oct. (Agent did not give nationality of the ships. 
Presumably American vessels.) The destroyers put out again 
the same afternoon. The minesweepers remained in harbor, 
hoisted the Portuguese flag and took Portuguese crews on 
board. Another 6 transports and 100 minesweepers dropped 
anchor on the roads. Further ships are expected. An allied 
naval base is probably being established." 

The Naval Attache in Lisbon refers Naval Staff to report to 
the Intelligence Station, with which there is close cooper- 
ation on the situation in the Azores. 

Following the reference by the Naval Attache to reports 

wired by the Ambassador in Lisbon on 6 and 9 Oct.. Naval 

Staff tried in vain to gain an insight from the Foreign f 

Office into these reports. These are obviously the ones 

whoes "pacifying" tendency was referred to already on 

10 Oct. 

Conference on the Situation with Chief , Nqval Staff 

Ao Re: Planning of Schedules for delivery of submarines 
ty-qes XVII, XVIII, XIV, and XX. ... ' 

Chief, Naval (Ship J Construction Division, explained the 
"prefabrication" (section construction) process planned 
by the Main Committee for Shipbuilding Order Control Office 
and referred to the objection that in the case of the two 


11 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 


western groups five out of ten sections of the entire 
monthly output of 25 submarines (the eastern group wi: 
take over another 18 "submarines ) will lie at one and the' 
same dockyard. However, a still greater objection is 
that the' change-over to prefabrication will necessitate. . 
the non- completion and breaking-up of altogether 180 sub- 
marines under construction. 

Naval (Ship) Construction Division proposed that the submarines 
under construction be continued until the workers are actually 
required for pregabrication and also that the Emden and the 
Stuelken dockyards be made use of, bseides the Germania 
Dockyard , for the construction of special submarine types 
XIV, XVIII o and XX. Director Schuerer doubted whether the 
schedules of the Main Committee could be adhered to. The 
steel mills, prefabrication dockyards and assembly dock 
yard each have only two months for one submarine, including 
transport. Although Director Merker has accept sole 
responsibility for pregabrication, the Naval (Ship) 
Construction Division feels obliged to recommend that 
in the case of the first submarines the prefabrication 
dockyards be omitted. It fears that the prefabrication 
process will undoubtedly lead' to increases in the time 
required for final work and trials. As an increased out- 
put oo submarines, as planned by the Main Committee, is 
to be achieved not by increasing manpower but exclusively 
through an improvement in production methods, Naval (Ship) 
Construction Division doubts whether the scheduled date of 
1 April 19^4 for the first four submarines -can be adhered to 
without, however, being able to give proof of this. The 
Naval (Ship) Construction Division is in a difficult position 
since cancellation of current orders depends on the new 
schedules laid down. 

Commander in Chief, Navy orders that the above objections 
be first discussed throughly by Naval (Ship) Construction 
Division and Director Merker. Prom an operational point 
of view, it is only important that the planned output be 
ma inta ined . 

Further to the conference on 8 Oct. the Chairman of the 
Shipbuilding Commission reported on the submarine program 
for ■ the Germania Docyyard at Kiel. For copy of notes of 
the discussion held on 10 Oct. with diagram of the 
schedules planned see War Diary, Part B, Vol. V. 

B • Situation: 

1. Army Situation : 

The fact that htere will apparently be no muddy season 
on the eastern front this year is being exploited b;y the enemy 


11 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDE NTIAL 

for continuation of his attacks. It was possible on the 
whole to repulse hi Is large-scale attacks between Melitopol 
and Zaporozhe. At Zaporozhe an attack by more than ten 
rifle divisions was repelled. Our attacks against the enemy 
bridgeheads on the southern Dnieper were discontinued. Heavy 
pressure is being brought by the enemy on the area west of 
Smolensk. In the area of Nevel we have put the 1st Army 
Corps of Army Group North into action. 

From Italy tnd Greece only local fighting is reported. 

II. The Fuehrer has suggested that the NIELS JUEL be used 
as a floating anti-aircraft battery. Admiral, Fuehrer 
Headquarters is to be informed that this has already beeni 
ordered by Quartermaster Division and -that preparations have 
been made accordingly. 

III. A compilation of losses and damage to our own ships or 

those sailing for us through enemy action in September 1943 fe 

is contained in list as per l/Skl IE 28437/43 Gkdos . copy 

in War Diary, Part D, File "Own Shipping Losses 1943". 

Fifty- three ships totaling 62,644 G R.T. became total losses 

and 50 ships totaling 43,357 G.R.T. were damaged, not counting 

the losses suffered in ports. Total loss: 103 ships totaling 

106,001 G.R.T. About 30fj of the losses were caused by mines, 

about 30^ by submarines, about 20^ by planes, 1276 by PT 

boats and Qfo by gunfire. 

IV. Quartermaster General reports that the request for a 
special allocation of one million 2 cm. cartridges monthly, 
mostly required for submarines, has been rejected by Armed 
Forces High Command, Commander in Chief, Navy orders that the 
reasons for this request be submitted once more to Armed 
Forces High Command. 

Special Items 

I. Chief, Foreign Affairs/intelligence Division, Armed Forces 
High Command has submitted notes on a discussion with Japanese 
officers at the Fuehrer Headquarters on 29 Sept. 1943. Copy 

as per l/Skl 28784/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XV. 

The Japanese officers were given information on the situation 
as a whole and on the individual theaters of war. 

II. Since Portuguese weather reports from the Azores area 
have ceased since 0200 on 8 Oct., Chief, Meteorological 
Branch, Hydrographic and Meteorological Division requests 
Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, with copy to Operations 


11 Oct. 19^3 


Division and Submarine Division to see that other . reports from 
this area be passed at. once to the Meteorological Service. 
They are of utmost importance for advising Commanding Admiral, 
Submarines of the weather in the Atlantic operational areas 
as yell as for advising all branches of the Armed Forces 
in the Atlantic coastal areas of western and northern Europe., 

Possible measures are under investigation. 

Situation 11 Oct. 

I . War in ForeJgn W aters 
Nothing to report. 

II. Situat ion Wes t Area 
1. Enemy Situation : 

Over the Bay of Biscay 25 planes were detected on oper- 
ation. One British vessel was located at OSlO in AM0150 and 1 at 
1021 in BF 1873 • Cur air reconnaissance reported at 1010 in BF 
1989(120 miles west of -Brest) 2 destroyers and 1 steamer (about 
3,000 GRT) on courso 2^0 degrees. 

2. Own Situation .- Atlantic Coast: 

Five submarines were escorted In and one out. 

C hannel Coast: 

Mine -exploding vessel "180" was escorted from Cher- 
bourg to Lezardrieux. It is planned to transfer the vessel 
to Brest during the night of 11 Oct.; escort will be provided 
by torpedo- boats T "22" and T "25". 

Otherwise nothing to report. 



III. Nor th Sea, Norway, Northern Waters 

North Sea: 

Altogether seven ground mines were swept north of 

Convoy "463" Elbe Hook (2 steamers and mine -exploding vessel 
"153" with 2 escort vessels and the 1st Minesweeper Flotilla) 
left the Elbe at 1000. 

In Zeeland waters six convoys with a total tonnage of 
29,597 GRT were carried through. 

Otherwise nothing to report. 

Norway, Northern Waters : 

1. Enemy Situation : 

Over the North Sea 15 planes were detected on 
operation. Minor reconnaissance was reported on 10 Oct. 
in the areas of Nordvaranger, Petsnmo, Trondheim and 
Lis ter -Egersund . 

Reuter reports officially: "British midget submarines damaged 
the battleship TIRPITZ in Norwegian waters." 

From the time and form of this report is is highly probable 
tha t : 

B j. Return of the submarines has so far been awaited 
in vain. 

b) Nothing is known of the course of the operation. 

c) The announcement is the first attempt to elicit a 
comment from us . To this end all means and tricks 
of journalism will be used. 

2. Own Situation: 

In the area of Naval Command, Norway 2J> ships 
were escorted north and 22 south. For altogether 14 ships 
there were not sufficient escort vessels. 

Otherwise nothing to report. 


11 Oct. 19^3 C ONFIDENT IAL 

IV. Ska gerr a k , Br* 1 1 1 c Sea E ntrances, Baltic Sea 

1 . E nemy Situation: 

Nothing to report. ■ ' 

There was a minesweeper formation between Great 
Tyters and Lavansaari east of the "Seeigel" barrages. 

2. Own Situation: • ■•• 

Mine laying unit "Ostmark" put out for laying of 
Sjagerrak barrage "XIX" (Operation "Natrium"). This is to 
be carried out during the night of 11 Oct. 

The NIELS JUEL has been refloated and it is planned to 
tow her to Kiel on 12 Oct. 

Otherwise nothing to report. . . 

V. Submar ine Warfare 

In the North Atlantic an operation is planned with 
twelve submarines against the ONS convoy in the area 
AK 10, AD 30. 

Submarine U "220" carried out a mine laying operation off 
St. Johns (Newfoundland). 

Submarine U "532", operating in the Indian ocean, reports 
lively traffic consisting of- single vessels and vonvoys 
with light escort close to the coast at the souUierntip of 
India. This submarine sank the steamer PORT LONGWELL 
(presumably 7,000 GRT), the steamer DIPLOMAT (8, 000 GET), 
one auxiliary warship cf 9,000 GRT, which was equipped with 
anti-torpedo nets, and one steamer (6,000 GET) out of a 
convoy; in all about 30,000 'GRT. 

Further successes have been reported from the Mediterranean. 

Naval Staff advised that Naval Attache in Tokyo that the 
first MONSUN boat, submatine U "188", is. coming from the 
Gulf of Oman and that the second one, submarine U "183", 
is proceeding from Mombasa to Penang for repairs and will 
arrive on 28 Oct. Route and course of approach are requested 
(see teletype 214^). 


11 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

v ^ • Aerial Warf are 

Briti sh Is les and Vic i nity; 

No important missions ■ or- events to. report. 

In the air attacks of 9 Oct. on Anklam and Gdynia 63 four - 
engined enemy planes were shot down. Ten of our planes 
were lost. 

Mediterranean Theater : 

The 2nd Air Force reports 15 planes out on reconnaissance. 
Air Force Command, Southeast reports 56 bombers, 42 Stukas, 
20 fighters, 27 reconnaissance and 37 transport planes out 
on operation. One enemy destroyer or escort boat was driven 
ashore by continuous attacks in the south c-nn bay of Levitha 
(Aegean). Continuous attacks were also carried out on Leros. 

The enemy carried out lively air activity over the Italian 
front. In the Greek area 52 enemy planes approached the 
area 90 km. vest of Salonika via Valona in the morning, but 
were forced to turn back owing to deteriorating weather 
conditions. The steamer ROSELLI was heavily damaged in an 
attack by nine planes on the port and the airfield of Corfu. 
Eight reconnaissance planes were deteceed over the Aegean 
Sea and ten planes supplying insurgents over Greece- 

Eastern F ront; 

The 5th Air Force reported 33 planes out on operation 
without soecial event. 

VI I . Warfare in the Mediterrane a n and Black Sea 

■ 1. Enem y Situation Mediterranean: 

The INDOMITABLE with a destroyer escort was out at 
sea east of Gibraltar for a few hours during the day. A U. S. 
Cruiser of the HONOLULU class and a destroyer put in to 
Gibraltar from the Mediterranean. 

No reconnaissance reports have been received from the 
western and eastern Mediterranean. 

One Of cur submarines contacted a westbound convoy at 0109 
20 miles north of Bougie. 



11 Oct. 1945. .-. .; #: , CONFIDENTIAL 

In the Gulf of Naples a further, increase in destroyers and 
merchantmen /was observed on the afternoon of 10 Oct. These 
had obviously brought up reinforcements for the land front. 
This might also veil be an assembly for a new landing oper- 
ation in the opinion of German Naval Command, . Italy. The 
number of ships in the Gulf of Salerno has decreased- 

During 10 Oct. ten small vessels, were sighted on the supply 
route from Bari to Termoli. Around 0230 on 10 Oct. the coast 
near Pescara was shelved from the sea, apparently by two 
destroyers and mo t or ^/gunboats . Rumors of an enemy landing at 
this point have not been confirmed. However, the danger to 
the open coastal flank is clear. 

During the night of 9 Oct. PT boats advanced into the area 
of Piombino and north of Elba. There was an engagement with 
one of our submarine chasers. Further interference with 
convoy traffic in the Ligurian Sea must be expected. 

2 . O wn Situation Mediterr anean: 

Submarine U "116" registered a hit each on two 
LST's (each 3,000 GRT) with "Zaunkoenig" torpedoes at 0530 
in CJ. The vessels probably sank. At 0019 submarine U "371" 
heard by hydrophone an impact on the leading destroyer of ' 
a westbound convoy detected north of Bougie. Further 
observation was impossible due to ant i -submarine measures. 

The minelayers JUMINDA and KEPIRWIEDER left Spezia on a 
minelaying operation. • 

Mine search off San Remo was broken off without result. 
It has not been proved that the POMMERN sank through 
striking an enemy mine. A submarine torpedo hit : does not 
appear out of question,, It has not been possible to clear this 
matter up finally. • 

German Naval Command, Italy reports that Chief, Supply and 
"Transport, Italy is on his way to Trieste with personnel 
for three complete sea transport offices, in order to set 
up these offices on the Dalmatian coast in agreement with 
Admiral, Adriatic. 

After conclusion of the Corsica operation the most important 
task on the west coast of Italy is the evacuation by sea of 
materiel from the area Ga eta -Leghorn. 

In view of strong enemy action by planes, PT boats and 
submarines, it is impossible to use large vessesl. 


11 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

Traffic, however, has proceeded smoothly despite great 
difficulties encountered in bringing up end loading during 
constant air attacks on the ports and approach routes. 
Supplies to Elba have also been carried out as planned, 
using Siebel ferries and harbor defense vessels, anti- 
aircraft protection being afforded by specially armed 
Siebel ferries. An intensified submarine chase has been 
started in this area. Evacuation of large quantities of 
iron from Piombino with large ships is being prepared. 
Coastal traffic between Leghorn and Genoa is being 
carried out by small vessels. Traffic between Marseilles 
and Italy has not been resumed yet. Only naval landing craft 
are heing sent to the Italian area. The large ships which are 
not required will be distributed among small ports in Italy 
and southern France. 

Traffic along the east coast of Italy is at present being 
carried out by auxiliary sailing vessels. At first 6-8,000 
tons monthly will have to be carried by sea for supplies 
to our forces, and later on 15,000 tons monthly. The seizure 
and fitting-up of escort vessels and submarine chasers is 
being pursued as an urgent necessity. 

The Office of the Under State Secretary of the new Italian 
naval Organization has begun Its funcitons. An Italian Lia- 
ison Staff is attacked to German Naval Command, Italy at 

German Naval Command, Italy request the 2nd Air Force to 
lay aerial mines close to shore and in shallow water in 
Salerno Bay off Salerno and Pesto and in the Bay of Naples 
off Naples, Caste llama re, Torre Annunciate and Pozzuoli- 
Niside-Miseno. According to information from Commander 
in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff to Naval Staff, the 
2nd Air Force will be ordered to mine the occupied 
Italian ports from the air. On acconnt of this information 
German Naval Command, Italy has requested the 2nd Air Force 
also to carry out extensive mine laying of the harbor entrances 
and inshore waters of Taranto, Brindisi, Bari, B-rletta, 
Manfredonia and Termoli. 

3. Area Naval Group South: 

a . A driatic Sea : 

The minelayer LAURANA is again out of action. 

The steamer LE0PARDI arrived at Durazzo and is to proceed 
to Corfu during the night of 11 Oct. The tanker KNUDSEN is 
to be tdansf erred on the evening of 11 Oct. from Cattaro to 
Durazzo; she is to go on from there during the night of 
12 Oct. On the morning of 13 Oct. 3 Siebel ferries, 
5 infantry landing boats, 1 coastal defense boat and the 
steamer H.FISSER are to put out from Pola to Zara with 
150 men and the staff company of Naval Shore Commander, 
DaLmatia aboard. I63 CONFIDENTIAL 

11 Oct. 1943 .. CONFIDEN TIAL, 

The steamer ROSELLI is lying damaged at Corfu, the steamer 
BOCCACIO in Cattero, and the steamers MERANO and POZA RICA 
in Zara . 

Group South has ordered that the five Siebel ferries already 
assembeed at Trieste are to be assigned to Admiral, Aegean 
Sea as soon as possible. 

b. Aegean Sea : 

Submarine chaser !l 2110" and the steamer SALVATORE 
•with 1,200 Italian prisoners aboard left Kos on 10 Oct. 
This convoy was seven miles "west of Samos at 0600 on 11 

During the night of 10 Oct. the DRACHE again sighted east 
of Kalynnos the two destroyers reported there on the 
evening of 10 Oct. The DRACHE destroyed her secret documents. 
Apare. documents- are to be forwarded to her py plane. Coast 
patrol boat GA "45" reported at 2209 on 11 Oct.: 

"DRACHE is in an engagement with destroyers" 

No detailed report has yet been received. 

Our air reconnaissance sighted at 0630 on 11 Oct. a 
destroyer or escort boat 20 miles northeast' of Levitha 
on course 240 degrees. Our planes attached this vessel, 
damaged thr and drove her ashore. Air attacks are being 

Isola Vecchia on Kalymnos was shelled by enemy destroyers 
around 2250. Submarine chaser "2102" and ;£lthe; steamer INGEBORG 
were delayed at Mykonos because of weather conditions. 

According to a report from Group South the start of 
operation "Leopard" has again been postponed for 24 hours 
because of weather conditions, i.e. until 0130 on 13 Oct. 

Group South transmits the following views on the situation 
from High Command, Army Group E. : ■■•■ 

"The decision to carry out operation "Leopard" as soon as 
possible must be adhered to. The task of Assault Group 
"Mueller" is to start off,- disregarding all risks, as 
soon as seaway a. Hows and a direct intervention by enemy 
warships is not to be expected. It is impossible to await 
a favorable phase of the moon. Attacks on enemy warships 
by the Air Force has been continued unceasingly. Complete 
elimination is, however, impossible. 


11 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

Reconnaissance shows that the Aegean se* will probably 
be free from surface forces on 11 and 12 Oct. Thus the 
necessary tactical conditions for operation "Leopard" 
to start on 12 Oct. are favorable. The possibility of 
carrying it out from the navigational point of view crn 
be decided on the spot". 

The comments by Group South state that the deterioration 
of the situation regarding operation "Leopard" is due to 
loss of tine owing to weather conditions, the full moon, 
the bringing up of enemy forces , the weskening of our Air 
Force and the losses in our shipping. 

The Army also has no new forces available, unless such are 
brought up from Crete. The elimination of Leros is, never- 
theless, still the most important operational target. The 
longer the delay lasts, the more necessary it is to exhaust 
all possibilities to maintain the assembly of vessels and to 
protect the operational base of Kos by provision of addition- 
al Army forces and strengthening and Air Force. The request 
for submarines is again urged since other operational vessels 
are not available. The suggestion made by Admiral, Aegean 
to occupy the islands of Stampalia and Levitha meanwhile 
cannot be agreed to. The proposal of Army Group E to allow 
General Mueller to issue orders himself, in agreement 
wuth the local Naval Commander, when weather conditons 
improve is agreed to. 

Armed Forces High Command has issued instructions that, 
on orders from the Fuehrer, the islands mentioned in the 
Fuehrer Directive for the defense of the southeastern 
area, i.e. Crete, Rhodes, Corfu, Ce lpha Ionia, Zante, 
Scarpanto, Milos, Kos, Chios, Mythilene, Lemnos, Leros 
and Samos are to be provided beforehand with supplies of 
every kind to last for six months' fighting, in the same 
way as Crete, if a constant supply is not sssured on account 
of their proximity to the coast. 

c. Black Se a: 

Enemy Situation: 

Our main direction-finder station at Eupatoria- 
de tec ted four submarines in the northwestern part of the 
Black Sea and in the area of the Crimea. At noon on 10 
Oct. a submarine was bombed by one of our reconnaissance 
pianos 20 miles south of Sudak. Another submarine was sighted 
five miles east of Alushta . 

Own Situation: 

As soon as our large convoys had arrived at 
Sevastopol the submarines acting as remote escort returned 
to the operational area off the Caucasian coast. 


11 Oct. 19^3 CONF IDENTIAL 

Three Italian midget submarines started on return passage 
to Sevastopol. Otherwise there -was. no convoy . traffic, 
mines weeping or PT boat operations, because of bad weather. 

VIII. Situation East Asia 

According to a report from Allied Headquarters, the 
Japanese base of Vila on the island of Colombangara was 
occupied without resistance. Japanese bombers escorted 
by fighters attacked Allied positions in the area of 
Fins chha fen. 

According to Reuter, Japanese positions on Wake Island were 
attacked by naval and air forces. In the course of this 6l 
Japanese planes were destroyed on 5 ^nd 6 Oct. The attack 
was carried out by aircraft carriers and Liberator bombers 
of the Naval Air Force. 


12 Oct. 19^5 CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Political Importance 

According to a Swedish report, the Three Power Conference in 
Moscow is to start on 17 Oct. find will last until the end 
of the month. It is believed in London thpt it will be 
possible to solve the Polish problem, but not according 
to the wishes of the Polls Exile Government . The American 
press too' is now more optimistic about the prospects of 
the Conference, since concessions may be expected from all 
sides in order to reach a reasonable compromise. The question 
as to how Germany is to be treated after the war still remains 
the most difficult problem. 

The waters of the Azores are patrolled by Allied worships 
according to an "AP" report from Bern. 

In Croatia all Ministers have sent in their resignation to 
Poglavnik, in order to open the way for the formation of a 
new Government. The political situation inside this country 
is extremely tense. 

Conference on the Situation yith Chief _J£a 

I . Army Situation 

Continued attacks have given the enemy no important 
gains on the eastern front. 

In southern Italy the enemy has apparently completed his 
assembly at the Volturno and the attack is now a waited. 

Mopping-up of Istria is completed. 

Chief, Naval Staff referred to the necessity of checking 
the smoke screen defense of Gdynia. At the same time he 
repeated the order that leave for the TIRPITZ crew is to 
be arranged in such a way that adequate defensive readiness 
of the ship at her repair berth is still assured. 

II. Chief, Naval Staff approved the sequence of priority 
for batteries in the west area proposed by Quartermaster 
Genera 1 . 

For the 30,5 cm. battery with all-around range the Peteamo 
area has priority over the Atlantic Coast. 


12 Oct. 1943'. . CONFIDENTIAL 

Chief of Staff/ Naval Staff gave as reasons for this recommend- 
ation by Quartermaster Division the uncertain political sit- 
uation in the northern area (Finland), less danger to the 
battery there from the air without a concrete covering and 
the probably lack of naval targets for heavy guns on the .. 
Atlantic Coast. 

Chief, Naval Staff agreed to the proposal. 

Special Item s 

I. Commander in Chief, Navy has decided on the recommendatinn 
of the General Naval Administrition Bureau that a submarine 
base should, be established at once at Memel, "which is at 
present being built up as a naval port. Furthermore, investig- 
ations are to be made as to whether the southern entrance to 
the merchant harbor can be closed temporarily for the winter 
months, in order to acquire a protected winter anchorage for 
submarines at once if possible . Commanding Admiral, Submarines 
had requested that the southern entrance, to the merchant harbor 
be definitely closed by a mole. The Reich Minister for Water- 
ways and Power and the Reich Commissioner of. Maritime Shipping 
have raised well-founded objections against this project in the 
interests of merchant shipping. 

II. Naval Intelligence Division in brief Report on the Enemy. 
Situation No. 19/43 deals with the following matters regard- 
ing submarine warfare, amongst others: 

1. Enemy reports about the convoy battle In the North 
Atlantic in September 1943. 

2. War losses of neutral merchant navies , 

3. Alleged enemy successes in the Mediterranean; also; 
operations by airctaft carriers during the enemy land- 
ings at Salerno, in which the UNICORN, HUNTER, BATTLER 
STALKER, and ATTACKED participated. Fighter cover was 
provided fy the ILLUSTRIOUS and FORMIDABLE. 

This brief report also contains the announcement of the British 
Admiralty regarding the operation of the Home Fleet against 
our shipping in Bodoe area on 4 Oct. as well as statements 
on; the French and Italian Fleets. 

Finally, the report deals with the statement, already mention- 
ed,, of a spokesman of the Committee for Mobilization in the 
Lower House, according to which 2| million men are expected 
to be transported overseas from the U. S. before Christmas. 



12 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

The Committee estimates the total ava liable shipping of - 
the Allies, including tankers and coastal vessels, as over 
50 million tons. The statement then goes on: . 

"The sharp decrease in the sinkings by enemy submarines in 
conjunction with the record-breaking construction of new 
ships give us 3 million tons more than provided for in the 
military plan for 19^3 « Three million tons of shipping - 
•which means in a year nine million tons of freight - are 
sufficient to equip If million more troops for the European 
theater. The collapse of Italy gives us an additional \ a 
million tons, possibly even more. 

At the beginning of the year the "War Department announced that 

it planned to ship- altogether nearly 5 million men oversees 

and that by December 19^2 1 million U. S. Troops had been 

sent aboard. The plans provided for a further \\ million men, 

fully equipped, to be shipped by December 1943. The targets 

set for this year will definitely be reached." . I 

Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch 
comments on the above as follows: 

"The estimate that the total tonnage available to the Allies, 
in overseas and coastal shipping including ships under repair, 
amounts to 50 million tons (these are tons dead-weight) = 35 
million GRT, corresponds with the findings of Naval Intelligence 
Division. According to our findings the surplus of new const- 
ructions during the nine months from January to September 19^3 
amounts to about 4J million GRT, i.e. an average of \ a million 
GRT per month. In June, August and September the surplus of 
new constructions was considerably above the average and 
amounted to 0.9, O.76 and 1 million GRT, respectively. No 
opinion can be foremed as to how far this result surpassed the 
expectations of the enemy. 

The spokesman reckons with a shipping surplus of 3 mill! on 
tons dead-weight= 2 million GRT over and above the military 
plan, with which 9 million tons d.w. of freight can be 
transported, in order to equip if million further troops 
for the European theater. This means that the enemy reckons 
with three round trips in one year(3 x 3 million d.v.= Nine 
million tons dvw.) ; and uses 4 GRT per man (3x2 million 
GRT for if million men = 4 GRT per man) for the transpor- 
tation of gear and equipment. 

According to our own experiences, frequently confirmed, it 


12 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENT IAL _ 

must be assumed that 8 GRT per man are necessary for the 
transportation of equipment and gear and that in one year 
about 6 round trips can be carried out on an average from the 
U. S. to the European -theater. With these figures the same 
final result is arrived at. However, this is provided that .. 
all gear for ij million troops is brought over from the 
United States and is not drawn from the European area". 

For copy of brief report as per l/Skl 30885/43 geh. see 
War Diary, File "Data on the Enemy Situation 1943". 

Situation 12 Oct. 

I. War in Foreign Waters 

Naval Staff advises ell vessels in foreign waters of 
enemy shipping movements with Radiogram 1847. 

Otherwise nothing to report. 

II. Situation West Area 

Enemy Situation: 

Over the Bay of. Biscay 43 planes were detected on 
operation. One British vessel was located at 1606 in AM 

2. Own Situation: 

Atlantic Coast: 

Off Brest two submarines were escorted out and one in. 

On 11 Oct. one ground mine was swept off La Pellice. Group 
West does not plan to carry out the exercises of the 8th . 
Destroyer Flotilla until the foggy weather has cleared. 

C hannel Coast: 

Torpedo boats T "22" and T "25", "acting as -remote 
escort for the convoy of mine- exploding vessel "180% sighted 
two enemy PT boats at 0048 six miles north of He de Bas: after 


12 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

firing torpedoes which missed, they withdrew from our gun- 
fire "behind a smoke screen. 

Mine-exploding vessel "180", which swept two mines e^st 
of Les Heaux, put in to Brest st 0800 escorted by the ■ 
2nd Minesweeper Flotilla. Torpedo boats T "22" and T "25" 
followed shortly after. 

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters 
North Sea : 

In the Elbe -Ho ok convoy "^63" mine -exploding vessel 
"153" sustained "damage through a mine detonation in AN 
8326 and is being towed in to Borkum. The rest of the 
convoy proceeded on to Helder after a temporary stop on 
Borkum roads . 

Minesweeping in the Heligoland 3ight was hampered by fog. 

N orway, Northern Waters: 

1. Enemy Situation: 

Over the North Se^ 10 planes were detected on 
operation in the morning and 17 in the afternoon. On 11 
Oct. a battery on the Ribachi Peninsula unsuccessfully 
shelled en incoming Petsamo convoy with 110 rounds. Our 
own battery returned fire with 70 rounds. Minor reconnaissance 
activity is reported from the areas of Petsamo, Trondheim 
and Bergen. 

2 . O wn Situation: 

The steamer AMMERLAND (5,38l, GRT), carrying 
fodder for Kirkenes, sank at 07^8 ten miles west of Nordkyn 
after striking a mine. The area had been closed. On 11 Oct, 
a mine, which had drifted ashore at Utsire, exploded killing 
three men and wounded one of the Mining and 3arrage Command. 

Thirty- one ships were escorted north and 29 south. Six ships 
were delayed due to shortage of escorts. 

The Task Force reports that the stern of the midget submarine 
first sighted has been salvaged and beached next to one 
already raised. Search for the third boat was discontinued 
without "result owing to current, heavy silting-up and water 


12 Oct. 19-^3 CONFI DENTIAL 

Destruction seems certain for the following reasons: numerous 
hits by gunfire observed for certain; a series of depth charges 
dropped right at the last diving point; the submarine's 
vulnerability to depth charges; protracted discharge of oil; 
knocks definitely heard after 24 hours. 

Naval Command, Norway reports: 

"Four-fold torpedo net barrage completed in the La ngf iordbotn. 
This barrage is situated about one mile vest southwest of 
Vaddekei lighthouse. The barrage was- laid in order to provide 
a provisional substitute for the berth at Sobnes . In the 
Sobnes net enclosure the anchor-chain for the mooring buoy was 
broken. The nets from Sobnes were used for the torpedo net 
barrage at Landf iordbotn. Immediate restoration of the net 
enclosure at Sobnes with deep-protection has been ordered." 

I V . Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances , Fa 1 tic Se'a 

1. Enemy Situation : 

A smoke screen was put up at Kronstadt from 1630. 
In Kronstadt Bay there was lively gunfire on both sides. Seven 
parachutes were seen to be dropped from a plane near Tyters 
at 2120, presumably carrying mines A smoke screen was put 
up at Lavansaari in the afternoon by guard boats. 

2 • Ow n Sit uation: 

Mine laying operation "Natrium" in the Skagerrak 
was carried out as planned. The NIELS JUEL is being towed to 
Kiel. A fire broke out in the stern of the transport MAR DE: 
PLATA of the transport Unit Copenhagen-Oslo; cause unknown. 
Her crew was taken over by the escort vessel LEDA and the 
convoy proceeded. The MAR DEL PLATA put in to Frederiksha vn 
after the fire had been extinguished. The considerable transport 
and convoy traffic in the Baltic was otherwise carried out 
without incident. 

Six Italian soldiers of the smoke screen company^ t Gdynia 
have refused to serve, probably because of the employment 
of Italian Prisoners of war in that area. 

The area of Training Unit, Fleet is closed because of 
the danger of mines. 

Nothing to report from the area of Commander, Minesweepers, 
Baltic and Admiral, Baltic States. 


12 Get. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

V. Submarine W arfa re 

Lively enemy ? ir activity -was observed near the supply 
position in 3D 3 : , "which necessitated transfer. 

Submarine U n 6c8 i: fired two FAT torpedoes, which missed, 
on a fast motorship oroceeding on course 235 degrees in 

BE 1776. 

In CF 64l6 two destroyers were reported and in BE 5656 9 search 
group of three vessels. 

Submarine U "536" sank a steamer of 9,000 GRT proceeding 

on course 260 degrees in CC 52 (500 miles south of Newf oundland) 

In view of the situation in the Azores area (see War Diary, 
Part C, Vol. VIII), submarines U "154" end U "516" received 
orders by radiogram at 2329 to take up position in the waters 
off Ponta Delhada and Horta ps temporary operational areas. 
Assignment-;: Attacks on enemy warships and merchantmen^ 
but outside territorial waters only. Portuguese ships are 
to be treated as neutrals. Incidents with the Portuguese 
are to be avoided. 

VI . A erial Warfare 

B riti sh Isl es and Vicinity: 

The 3rd Air Force had seven Ju 68 ' s out on free-lance 
fighter operations over the Atlantic without result. Four 
planes were out on nuisance raids against London. 

No enemy air a c t i v i i t y w or th men 1 1 on ing . 

Mediterranean Theate r : . 

The 2nd Air Force reports 6? planes out on a bombing 
operation against the harbor and 17 against the airfield 
of Ajaccic. Good hits were scored. Otherwise only reconn- 
aissance flights . 

Air Force Command, Southeast reports only reconnaissance 
activity. Enemy activity with ground-attack planes was 
lormal over the front in southern Italy. Bombs were drop- 
ped on Civitavecchia. In the Agean sir- field at Maritza 
was unsuccessfully attacked. 

Easter n Front ; 

The 5th Air Force reports' the sighting of four submarines 



12 Oct. 1945 CONFIDENTIAL 

Olenya Bay and destruction of one submarine in the entrance 
to Kola Bay by one of our planes. 

VI I • Warfa r e in the Mediterranean and Black Sea 
1. Enemy Situation '.Mediterranean: 

In the afternoon a convoy consisting of 1 transport, 
37 freighters and 5 tankers entered the Mediterranean from the 
west. Five freighters and one tanker put in to Gibraltar from 
the. Atlantic . Two freighters left Gibraltar, -westbound. 

Our air reconnaissance sighted at 1440 15 miles southeast 
of Gaeta two troop transports and also five minesweepers on 
alternating courses, obviously out sweeping our barrages. 
No new information has been received from Sardinia and Corsica 
In the Bay of Pozzubli a slight increase in landing craft was 
detected and in the harbor of Naples a large increase. At 0525 
there were two destroyers 35 miles north-northeast of Bari one 
course northwest. On the east coast of southern Italy contin- 
uous convoy traffic with destroyer escort was observed as far 
as Termoli. 

2. Own Situation Mediterranean: 

A mine laying operation by the JUMINDA and the 
KEHRWIEDER off the mouth of the Tiber was postponed because 
of weather conditions. 

Escort vessel LIDI was commissioned in Venice on 11 Oct. and 
PT boats MS "75" §nd MAS "554" on 12 Oct. 

German Naval Command, Italy reports plans to return a large 
number of French steamers from Genoa to ports in southern 
France and proposes that French shipping circles be informed 
and three crews for a shuttle service be provided, since 
Italian ports must be evacuated Immediately. The transfer 
will be carried out in agreement with the Deputy for German 
Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean, escort being prov- 
ided by the 6th and 7th Coast Patrol Forces; for large ships 
a strong air escort will be provided. 

Naval Staff approves this plan of German Naval Command, Italy 
and considers it necessary to carry it cut with a;] possible 
speed. The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping "has 
been informed accordingly and requested, if he agrees, to make 
the necessary arrangements with the French regarding supply 
of the shuttle crews. 


12 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL 

German Naval Command, Italy submitted on 11 Oct. views on 
the situation regarding the Adriatic Sea: 

1. Supply routes along the extended, flat vest coastline, 
which is particularly suited for landing operations of 
all kinds and for shelling from the sea, are so 
endangered that coastal traffic is essential. This 
open flank is only occupied by a small number of Army 
forces. There is artillery defense only at Ancona and 
Venice. No naval forces are available for defense of 
coastal -waters. An effective coastal defense is, 
therefore, only possible by minelaying. 

2. Operations Division has transferred the responsibility 
for the Adriatic Sea area to Group South. Italy is now 

the center of developments, as confirmed by Quartermaster 
Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch in 
connection with the transfer of a Naval Artillery 
. Battalion from northern France to Italy. Defense 
measures on the east coast of Italy in the Adriatic 
should, therefore, have priority. 

3. As long as Admiral, Adriatic is not yet fully equipped, 
German Naval Command, Italy will assist with the means 

a. Immediate aims: mining of the harbor entrance 
Ortona - Pescara, coastal defense barrages 
between Ortona and Ancona. For this only naval 
landing craft MFP "^85" is at present available. 
The minelayer LAURANA has been withdrawn from 
operations because she is not seaworthy. 

b. The torpedo boat AUDACE is being prepared as a 
minelayer. It is necessary to leave her under 
German Naval Command, Italy. If ready in time and 
if the . enemy situation permits, she is to lay 
mines between the coast and Tremiti. It is essent- 
ial that the minelayer FASAN, now nearing complet- 
ion at Trieste, be transferred so that the coastal 
area Ancona -Venice can be mind. 

c. Group South is asked to carry out operation 
"Pelagosa" 1 as ordered by Naval Staff, immediately 
and with all the means available. In addition, 
attempts should be made to close the Tremiti- 
Lagosta area completely. This would, at the same 
time,, also protect the Dalmatian coast. 

4. Escort of coastal traffic and the minelaying operation 
planned are essential. Suitable vessels lying in Venice 
are being equipped for this purpose. 


12 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENT IAL 

5. Summary: Effective defense of the open flanks on the 
east coast of Italy is of decivive importance. Provision 
of the necessary means (minelayers and mines) is essential. 
A request for German mines -will therefore be unavoidable, 
as the stocks and quality of Italian mines are inadequate. 
The 2nd Air Force has been' asked to mine . the enemy-occupied 

ports in southern Italy, as requested. by Commanding General 
Armed Forces, South and Naval Staff. 

Group South agrees in principle that, until Admiral, Adriatic 
is fully equipped, operational vessels should again be made 
available temporarily to carry out the task of German Naval 
Command, Italy and also in future from time to time after 
these tasks have been synchronized -with those of Admiral p 
Adriatic. Group South has given up the plan to lay the barrage 
Tremiti-Pelagosa -Lagosta , because of the large quantity 
of mines needed without corresponding prospects of success, 
since the barrage will not be patrolled. A new plan will be 
drawn up. 

Operations Division decides as follows: 

On I. Views on the situation are agreed to. 

On 2. The order given by Quartermaster Division, Organization 
and Mobilization Branch on 10 Oct. was misunderstood. 
Italy is the focal point only as far as. the west area 
is concerned. Security measures oh the east coast of the 
Adriatic Sea are still just as urgent as those on the 
Italian Coast. 

On 3, a' and b Naval Staff agrees with the plans submitted. 
Water depths permit extensive use of goound mines. .. 
The AUDACE is temporarily placed at the disposal of 
German Naval Command, Italy for operations. The FASAN 
will, as soon as completed, be assigned to Group South, 
as mining of the coastal area north of Ancona must at 
present take second place to the operations of Group 

Q n 3, c. On the line Tremiti -Lagosta mine laying only is 

Qn z i Approval for continuation of measures reported 

has been given separately. 

Qn 5. Request for an allocation of further mines is awaited. 

It must be added, with regard to the Fuehrer Directive on 
further conduct of the war in Italy, that German Naval Command, 


12 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

Italy on 7 Oct. drew attention to the fact that the task 
assigned to the Navy of coastal defense against enemy landings 
cannot be carried out if Army coastal defense is not avail- 
able or is inadequate, as in the case vest of Genoa and south 
of Piombino. Small parts of naval artillery battalions are 
tied down for batteries and Sea fortresses. Naval forces 
for patrol of coastal waters are inadequate. Absence of 
Army coastal defense may also jeopardize coastal traffic. 
German Naval Command, Italy has requested that influence 
be used with Armed Forces High Command not to withdraw 
coastal defense but to build it up in the area from Savoha 
to the French border, since the Navy can only support but 
not take over the tasks of the Army. 

Armed Forces High Command already transmitted on 8 Oct. 
the Fueher's decision on this matter, which is dealt with 
in War Diary of 8 Oct. 

3. Area Naval Group South : 

a. Adriatic Sea: 


According to report from the Port Commander, 
Dubrovnik two vessels of unknown nationality passed Dubrovnik 
on northerly course eta distance of six miles at Ou^O on 
11 Oct. Because of the danger of a landing a state of readiness 
was ordered until daybreak. 

On the afternoon of 12 Oct. the steamer BOCCACIO left Cattaro 
for Durazzo, the steamers PROCARICA and MERANO left Zara for 
Cattaro and the tanker KNUDSEN left Durazzo for Corfu. The 
steamer LEOPARDI arrived at Corfu. The steamer MARIO ROSELLI 
sank in Corfu due to the bomb damage sustained. The steamer 
H. FISSER (5*1*5 GRT) caught fire in Pola and had to be beached. 

b. Aegean Sea : 

Enemy Situation: 

On 11 Oct. single planes were on reconnaissance 
over the southern Aegean. At 1042 the harbor and town of Corfu 
"were bombed without damage. On the evening of 11 Oct. strong 
formations attacked the town of Rhodes and the airfield of 
Maritza . 

At 0105 on 12 Oct. our air reconnaissance sighted 15 miles 
north-east of Sirina two torpedo boats on course southeast. 
The boats were not located again after daybreak. In the early 
afternoon there were 2 cruisers and 2 destroyers south of 


12 Oct. 19^ 


Castell Rosso on course northwest ' end .1 cruiser and 1 des- 
troyer in the Kasos Strait (east of Crete) on course north- 

During the night of 11 Oct. the battery on the southern 
point of Leros shelled the Bay of Isola Vecchia ( 'JB* lymnps ) . 

Own Situation: 

The DRACHE reported at 0153 oy radiogram. She was 
lying camouflaged in Penconda Bay during the night of 11 Oct. 

Group South has submitted to- Army Group E the following views 
with regard to operation "Leopard"; 

"1. The first task of the Navy, which was to bring up Army 
forces, landing craft and naval forces to the assembly 
areas around Kos, has for the most part been carried ;>ut. 
The offensive mine barrage, planned in connection with 
this landing operation as protection for the landing units 
which has been partially laid. As far as the Navy is 
concerned with this landing operation, all available 
forces are in close proximity and ready to start off. 

2. The actual operation upon lancing must be carried out 
i- by the Army and Air Force in the absence of effective 
naval forces. The tasks which still fall to the Navy 
depend, not counting weather conditions, decisively 
on the strength of our Air Force, which has to make 
up for the weakness of our naval forces, ensure prot- 
ection for our landing units by eliminating enemy 
naval forces and make attacks on enemy shore install- 
ations, thus making up for the lack of support by 
naval guns-- 

3 Therefore any comment as to the advisability of further 
adherence to the present operation planned against Leros 
and estimation of the most promising date depend con- 
siderably on information regarding the development in 
strength of our own Air Force compared with that of 
the enemy and its effectiveness against enemy naval forces. 
This will in the long run also decisively influence the 
continuation of the operation. 

4. The importance of effective operations by our Air Force 
new 1163 particularly in preventing the smashing of ^ur 
forces; enemy naval forces must be kept away from the 
landing unit in the assembly areas during the landing, 
enemy batteries must be neutralized in the landing area. 


12 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

and assistance rendered, by attacks on enemy naval and 
Air Forces, in assuring reinforcements by sea for the 
operation going on against Leros and supplies to the 
assembly area of Kos . 

5. If the Air Force can fulfill these expectations with the 
new forces brought up or those still to be brought up, 
then the situation and decision accordingly reached to 
continue the operation against Leros is clear.' 

6. In this connection it must be emphasized once more that 
'• the Dodecanese can only be held with Leros, if at all, 

For reasons of naval strategy, it is necessary to hold 
Leros in order to occupy the entire Dodecanese. It is 
therefore necessary that the Air Force supply itself part- 
icularly to carrying out operational tasks at sea in 
connection with the movements of supplies necessary for 
holding the islands. 

7. The Navy is raady to carry out the landing, though with 
very scanty forces. These will just suffice for the present 
operation, if the Air Force supplements them, but they 
represent all that could be provided at present although 
losses sustained so far have been slight. 

■8. No further naval forces can be brought up at present, ?wing 
to the situation in the Mediterranean as a whole. The re- 
quest of the Army Group for additional air forces is also 
urgent as regards naval operations." 

A report of the Coast Patrol Flotilla, Attica to Chief, Naval 
Communications Division states that one of the .s ix . na va 1 
landing craft which were lost in the convoy of the OLYMPOS 
is lying pillaged in a bay of Stampalia. It must therefore 
be assumed that secret documents have fallen into the hands 
of the enmy. For details see Radiogram 2241.' Chief, Naval 
Communications Division will take the necessary steps. 

Mopping-up of Naxos by three patrol boats of Coast Patrol 
Flotilla, Attica is planned for 12 Oct. A report on this 
has not yet been received. 

A heavy net barrage has been laid off Pont.iconisi (north of 
Trikerri). The convoy of the steamer SALVATORE with 1,200 
prisoners from Kos arrived at Piraeus and the convoy of the 
steamer TARQUINIA carrying German troops arrived at Pe-tra.s. 
from Zante. The steamer LEOPARDI with Italian prisoners 
aboard is' being escorted from Corfu to Piraeus by submarine 
chaser "2101". 



c. Black Sea: 

No- PT boats were out on operation because of stormy 
■weather. Convoy traffic -was canceled. Eight harbor defense 
boats sank or were smashed in stormy weather at Kerch, while 
in Jbodosiya 1 tug, 1 lighter and. 3 fishing smacks sank. The 
net barrage was heavily damaged. In the Strait of Kerch 
numerous drifting mines were sighted, some of which drifted 
ashore . 

An anti -torpedo barrage was laid in front of the floating dock 
and dry dock at Sevastopol. 

For request of Group South and Admiral, Balck see with regard 
to the organization of the naval artillery battalions in the 
Strait of Kerch and in the sector Ivenbeba /Feodosiya see 
teletype 1145. This matter will be settled by Quartermaster 

VIII. Situation East Asia 
Nothing to report. 



13 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

I tems of Political Imports nee. 

According to Reuter, Churchill announced in the House of Commons 
on 12 Oct. that the Portuguese Government , at the request of 
Great Britain, has agreed to make certain concessions on 
the Azores in order to ensure better protection for merchant 
shipping in the Atlantic. Agreements ere said to be of a 
temporary nature. All British forces will be -withdrawn from 
the Azores at the end of hostilities. Great Britain will 
provide the Portuguese on the Azores with the necessary 
military and other supplies. The desire of the Portuguese 
Government to continue its policy of neutrality on the 
European Continent is not affected. 

The Portuguese Government has officially announced In this 
connection that Portugal had pointed out on each occasion' 
when she defined her neutrality that she was honestly deter- 
mined to maintain this but that she considered it to be 
qualified by the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. The Portuguese 
Government has kept her obligations, under the non-aggress- 
ion pact with Spain and has already notified Spain accord-, 
ingly. The present concession gives new force to the old 
alliance between Portugal and England and is a proof that the 
friendship already exisiting has become closer. 

It is officially announced in London that the United States 
were kept informed, of the negotiations with Portugal and 
that they approved the signing of this agreement. According 
to Reuter, Roosevelt has stated 'that the United States will 
use the bases on the Azores together with the British. If 
necessary this will also be done by other nations at war with 
the Axis powers . 

It is stated that Churchill and Roosevelt decided in May 
at Washington to try to have the bases placed at their 

Franco has announced, also according to Reuter, that Spain 
will also continue to maintain watchful neutrality. 

It is unnecessary to set down further considerations on this 
event. The fact that the Portuguese can allow themselves 
now to give way to British pressure without fear of German 
retaliations Is en indication of the evaluation of our 
situation. The strategic effects of the occupation of the 
Azores at the expense of our war against merchant shipping 
and in favor of increased enemy freedom of movement in the 
central Atlantic are obvious. They actually demand very heavy 
attacks with every means available on the island bases and 
would also justify treatment of Portugal herself and all her 


13 Oct. 19^3 


possessions ss enemy territory. It would be necessary for 
this to use adequate naval power; this is at present no 
more possible than it was in 19^0 end 19*11, when the question 
of an' occupation of the Atlantic islands as a precautionary 
measure was considered and har to be rejected ay. Naval Staff. 
Further comments on this matter are continned in W.^r Diary, 
Fart Cy Vol. VIII. 

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff 
Army Situation: 

The enemy launched new large-scale attacks at various 
points on the eastern front. In the Zaporozhe area the 
situation is tense. Before the sectors of the 4th 9th Armies 
of the Central Army Group a full defensive success was 
gained. Only in the area of Vitebsk did the enemy gain 
some ground and reach the Upper Dvine . 

An enemy attack on a broad front is expected in Italy. 

Otherwise no special conferences and decisions to report. 

Special Items 

I. Requirements of mines and anti-sweeping devices for all 
theaters of war'vill be exceptionally high next spring. 
Operations Division has requested Naval Ordnance Division, 
Underwater Obstackes Branch to state what quantities monthly 
of EMC. EMF, EMR, UMA and UMB mines and cutting floats can 

be expected for the next six months within current production 
and when the special program of" the Ministry of Armament and 
Ammunition will commence and what the output will be. It may- 
be necessary to report on this matter again to Commander in 
Chief, Navy and to request him to petition Minister Speer 
to speed up the mine program. 

II. Group North/Fleet has recommended, at the request of 

the Commander, Destroyers, that destroyer z "30" be transferred 
to the west area instead of destroyer Z "34" for reasons of 
. assignment to .different flotillas." Since fulfillment of this 
request would mean consumption of an addional 1,000 -com. of 
furnace oil, Operations Division has not approved the proposal 
but left open a change in assignment of the destroyers to 
different flotillas. 

Otherwise Naval Staff agrees to the recommended transfers. 



13 Oct. 1943 . . '.,. i CONFIDENTIAL 

III. Foreign Affairs/intelligence Division reported in 
Enemy Situation Report No. 18 of 2 Oct. amongst other things 
as follows: . 

1. Owing to the approaching Nordic -winter, large-scale 
landings in northern Scandinavia are hardly to be expected 
any more this year. The possibility of a restricted landing 
operation in central and southern Norway, however, still 
exists . 

2. The large number of reports, so far fanaastic, on 
operations which are allegedly imminent on the North Sea 
and Channel coasts as well as on the French Atlantic coast, in- 
indicates a plan to conceal and misconstrue facts. Strategic, 
but especially politicll, reasons indicate that the large- 
scale Allied offensive in the west has been postponed for 
the time being and that it is hardly likely this year. 
Operations with restricted objectives are, however, still to 
be expected. • ■ 

3. It seems that the Iberian Peninsula is not intented as a 
base for a thrust into Eurppe until the final phase of the 
war. There is talk of the Azores being a demand by the 
United States to compensate for the weak attitude of Portugal 
towards Japan on the Timor question. 

4. Only commando operations ere to be expected at present 
against the south coast of France and the Ligurian coast. .: 
Plans for large scale Anglo-American operations against 
southern France may have been postponed for the present. 

5. The development of the situation in the Balkans is det- 
ermined by the trend of relations between the Soviet Union 
and the British and Americans. Since no clarification is 

expected in the near future and large-scale operations in % 

th4 Balkan area during the winter can hardly be carried out, 

the British and Americans will restrict themselves during 

operations against the east coast of the Adriatic to attempts 

to build bridgeheads in order to attain their political 

objective of forcing Hungary and the Balkan States out of 

the Axis through cooperation with the insurgents and through 

air attacks. The British interests in the Balkans are very 

great, while the Americans have only strategic interests there. 

6. Turkey will not take any action against Germany es long 
as the Balkan States are dependent on the Reich. She would 
probably only join in the war on the side of England in order 

to defend her position on the Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles, 
Tr.N.) against Russian aspirations and in attempt to win the 
other Balkam States over to an alliance under British leader- 


13 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENT IAL 

7. In the Eastern Mediterranean only operations for the 
further, occupation of single Greek islands and perhaps against 
Greece are to be expected during the current year. _ . 

Foreign Affairs/intelligence Division has reached the con- 
clusion that no large-scale operations are likely this winter 
so that the intensification of the -war against Japan urged 
by Roosevelt would naturllly follow. 

Situation lg O ct, 

I. War .in Foreign Waters _ 

1. Enemy Situation: . 

According to en intelligence report of 12 Oct. naval 
and air bases on the Cape Verde Island are also said to have 
been placed at the disposal of Great Britain, Troop Transports 
are said to be lying ready in Gibraltar for a landing in Lagos 
and Lisbon in case of a German decaaration of war on Portugal, 

2. Own Situation: 

No messages have been received from Ship "28" since 
15 Sept. On the basis of her fuel supplies, Naval Staff 
estimates that she is crossing the border of the operational 
area just now, so that she is expected to arrive in Japan 
during the first days of November. 

Naval Staff has instructed the Naval Attache in Tokyo to ■ 
notify the Japanese Navy that Ship "28" is returning through 
the North Pacific and to request freedom of action on return 

Ship "28" has been advised accordingly by Radiogram 23.09 
and instructed to refrain from attacks outside the opera tiara 
area until a reply has been received from the Japanese. 

The Japanese Liaison Officer has stated that the TANNE will 
leave Kure on Tj> Oct., dock in Singapore and leave Penang 
on 12 Nov. Oil will be supplied in the Indian Ocean from 
German Ships. The passage from Penang to the German sphere 
of influence will take about two months, Cargo for Germany 
consists of 100 tons of tin or tungsten. Docking will be 
necessary for unloading. Besides the new Naval Attache for' 
Berlin, Admiral Hojlma, there are fourteen other passengers 


13 Oct. 19^3 


Submarine Division has been advised accordingly end asked 
to decide port of destination as soon as possible. For copy 
of order l/Skl I opa 3073/^3 Gkdos. Chefs, see War Diary, - , 
Part C, Vol. IX. 

The Naval Attache in Tokyo has been advised by Radiogram 
2150 that the waiting areas for the BRAKE and the BOGOTA are 
to remain in force, since they were not known either to the 

Naval Staff informs all vessels in foregin waters by Radiogram 
2121 on the tankers sailing udner the American flag in the 
Indian or Pacific Ocean and by Radiogram 2219 of the state- 
ments made by Russian deserters regarding Russian traffic 
from the United States to Siberia. This traffic proceeds 
from Vancouver, Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Los Angeles, 
and along the North American coast, Aleutian Strait, Kuril 
Strait, La Perouse Strait to Vladivostok; partly also to 
Anadyr, Nagaevo, Petropa vlovsk/Kamchatski, Alexandrovsk/ 
Sachalinj the ships sail singly. Cargo to the Soviet Union 
consists mostly of foodstuffs. Ships return to the United 
States generally in ballast,. The United States are said to 
have handed over about 60 ships in the Pacific to the Soviet 
Union. Armament of the Soviet ships in the Pacific: on the 
bow one heavy and one normal anti-airctaf t machine-gun, on 
the bridge two twin anti-aircraft cinch ine- guns , sometime 
hearvy ones, the same on the boat deck. On the stern one anti- 
aircraft guns of 76-122 a.m. Armament is of American Manu- 


II. Situation West Ar ea 

1 . En emy S i t ua t i on : 

Over the Bay of Biscay 4.1 planes were detected on 
operation. One British vessel was located at 2032 in BF i960, 
one at 2323 in AM 7720 and one U. S. Vessel at 13^9 in BD 

The Intelligence Service transmits the following report from 
a reliable agent in Romania, which is confirmed at the same 
time from a reliable Swiss source: 

"There are 10,000 ('. ) landing boats, with a capacity for 
200 men eacg, lying ready for operations in British ports. 
The Chief of the operation will be Marshall, who is on 
his way from the United States to Great Britian. It is said 
that the landing will take place during or shortly after 
conclusion of the Three Power Conference in Moscow'. This 
conference will be held during the week from eleven to 



13 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIA L 

18 Oct. The landing places will be in the area between - 
Boulogne 9 Dieppe and Rotterdam. Should no agreement be 
reached in Moscow about the Balkans States, landings are to 
take place in Greece from the Aegean Sea in the direction 
of Salonika, cutting off the penissula of Chalkidike." 

Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division, Secret 
Intelligence Section, Naval Liaison reports in this 
connection: "The sources are obs'.Cure. It is possible that 
this is information circulated by the enmey" . 

2. Own Situation: 

Atlantic Coast: 

' One ELM/J mine was swept off La Pallice and two 
moored. mines on the outward route from Brest. Off Brest, St. 
Nazaire and La Pallice two submarines were' escorted out and- 
one in. Exercises by the 8th Destroyer Flotilla are scheduled 
for Ik and 15 Oct. 

The port of Douarnenez has been closed since 6 Oct. ps it is 
suspected that five overdue fishing boats, which had been 
properly cleared, have fled to England and as further attempts 
to flee may be planned. 

The change of flageof the three Italian blockade runners will 
take place at 1600 and 15 Oct. 

Channel Coast: 

Nothing to report. 

III. N orth Sea, Norway, Northern Waters 

1, . North Sea : , ■; - ': 

Convoy -"463" Elbe -Ho ok was carried out. 

Mines weeping in the, area of Commanding Admiral, 

Defenses,', North was only partially carried out because of fog. 

The vessels escorting convoy "463" swept three "ELxM/j mines 
and one ETM mine. 

The Swedish steamer P.IEGEL ran aground off Rotersand. 


13 Oct. 19V3 

2 . Norway, Northern Waters : 

Enemy Situation ; 

Over the North Sea l*f planes were detected on operation. 
At 2100 on 12 Oct. three PT boats were sighted in the skerries 
north of Stavanger. The steamer (*+,500 GRT) which was damaged 
by our Air Force on 6 Oct, at the landing stage in Toross, 
sank according to observations by reconnaissance later on. 
Regarding the destruction of a submarine in Olenya Bay on lk 
Oct. see teletype 1135. 

• Own Situation : 

At 130*+ an eastbound convoy, consisting of 5 steamers and ' 
h tankers escorted by M- minesweepers, 7 patrol boats, 3 sub- 
marine chasers, the escort vessel BSLI and K"3", apart from 
fighter cover, was attacked off Vardoe by eight bombers and 
torpedo bombers. No damage was sustained.- 

According to a report from Air Force General Staff, 25 out of 
60 attacking enemy planes were shot down during convoy escort 
operations in the Vardoe area. The convoy sustained no damage. 
This is obviously one and the same operation. Clarification 
is awaited. 

Thirty-one ships were escorted north and 26 south. Eight ships 
were left lying in harbor due to shortage of escorts. 


The Task Force proposes the following as security restriction 
for those on leave from the TIRPITZ: "Scheduled leave from Alta 
since overhaul in the northern area is more suitable than in 
home waters and saves transfer." Since the damage to the 
TIRPITZ is said to have become known to the enemy, Group North/ 
Fleet recommends that this fact be included in the security 
restrictions and slight damage admitted (see teletype 1200). 

Operations Division will ask Commander in Chief Navy for a 

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea 
I . Enemy Situation ; 

No information worth mentioning has been received. 



13 Oct. 19V3 

. 2 . , Own Situation : 

Berths for large battleships along the harbor railroad 
station at Gdynia o.annot be used as a result of bomb hits, since 
the quay installations are gradually dropping down. 

The steamer ALMUT was unsuccessfully attacked at 0*4-15 hy an 
enemy plane 20 miles west of Oesel„ 

Otherwise nothing to report. 

V. Submari ne Warfare 

In the North Atlantic Group "Schlieff en" , consisting of 1*+ 
submarines, will at midnight on 3.5 Oct. be disposed in patrol 
line AK if 877 - AK 67 5S where convoy OnS 206 is awaited. This 
assumption is based on the mention of AK 65l6 as the point 
for stragglers in radio intelligence intercepted. 

Naval Staff advises the Naval Attache in Tokyo that the two 
MONSUN submarines now on passage to Penang have not yet used 
up all their torpedoes and that they are therefore proceeding 
via the operational area of the southwestern point of. India. 
The Japanese Navy is to be advised that these submarines will 
steer a direct. apurse for the rendezvous position from this 
operational area. For copy of this signal see fUdiogram 2150. 

VI. Aerial Warfare 

1. ■ British Isles and Vicinity % 

The 3rd Air Force had 51 planes out on operation in the west 
and 7 over the Mediterranean, ^o special reports of success have 
'been received. 

There were only minor enemy penetrations during the day and night 
of 13 Oct. 

2 „ Mediterranean Theater ; 

Our Air Force carried out reconnaissance flights in the 
Italian area. Twelve fighter-bombers were out en operation agains' 



13 Oct.. 19^3 

shipping targets west of Ischia and scored one hit on the stern 
of a large ship and one near miss. close to the side of a heavy 

In the afternoon enemy ground-attack planes were again over the 
Italian front. In Albania the airfield at Tirana was attacked 
by strong forces. Eighteen of our planes were destroyed on the 
ground and 12 slightly damaged, altogether 22 of them being 
Italian planes. 

3. Eastern Front ; 

The convoy escort success is reported under "Situation North- 
ern Waters", Otherwise nothing to report, \ 

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea 

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean : 

At 1130 2 KING GEORGE V class, the FORMIDABLE, the 
INDOMITABLE, 1 HONOLULU class and 8 destroyers left Gibraltar, 
westbound. The cruiser put in Tigain at 1315, while the h large 
vessels passed Tangier at 1330 making for the Atlantic. 

At 1215 Tres Forcas sighted 1 battleship proceeding towards the 
Mediterranean. One transport with 2 destroyers put in to 
Gibraltar from the Atlantic towards noon. 

Air reconnaissance sighted at about 0700 northeast of Alboran 
an eastbound convoy which consisted of 30 Merchantmen. This 
is presumably the same convoy as the one reported on the 
afternoon of 21 Oct, to be entering the Mediterranean c The 
convoy was not detected again later, 

At 11^0 an 'eastbound convoy was sighted north of Philippeville. 
German Naval Command, Italy presumes that this convoy was 
assembled in African ports. A submarine was reported to have 
been sighted 60 miles south of San Remo. No new information 
has been received from Sardinia and Corsica. 

According to the situation report of Commanding General, Armed 
Forces, South, the coast near Mondragone (25 miles northwest of 
Naples) was shelled from the sea. - Eight vessels, presumably 
minesweepers, were forced to turn away from the mouth of the 
Volturno by our gunfire. Fifteen km. south of the mouth of 
the Volturno loadings or unloading s were apparently taking 


13 Oct. -191+3- ' 

•place under cr-uiser protection. Shelling of the coast immedia- 
tely north of the mouth of the Volturno was continued from mid- 
night on 12 Octo Minor tank and infantry forces were landed 
on the northern bank in the mouth of the Volturno at noon 
Two heavy vessels, seemingly one battleship and one heavy cruiser 
were standing by as protection off the Volturno, Our Air 
Force . reports hits on a light cruiser and destroyer off the 
mputh' of the Volturno, MLnesweeping was extended to six miles 
south of Gaeta under destroyer escort. 

In Naples a heavy increase' in the number of ships was observed; 
100 - ISO ships of- various typed were counted. According to 
photographic evaluation, the shipping withdrawn from Taranto 
has been moved forward to Bari and Brindisi, At Termoli an 
increase in landing craft was detected. 

No reports have been recieved from the eastern Mediterranean. 

2 . Own Situation Mediterran ean s 

At 0^17 submarine U "371" sank a destroyer of a west bound 
convoy with a "Zanunkoenig" torpedo 50 miles northwest of 
Philippeville. The JUMINDA £nd the KEHRVftEDER have carried out 
the minelaying operation off the Tiber as planned. Convoy 
traffic was carried out without incident,. The Pontine Marshes 
are to be swamped again and water dammed in the Ostia area, 
since encircling enemy landings are expected. Gaeta will be 
evacuated, the harbor demolished and blocked e The last of our 
vessels will leave the port on the vevening of 13 Oct. 

The Operations Staff of German Naval Command,. Italy will transfer 
from Santa Rosa to Levico (Northern Italy) within the next 
few days, obviously in agreement with Commanding General, 
Armed Forces, South* 

Tfcds measure is not absolutely in line with the Fuehrer's inst- 
ructions to hold the front south of Rome. . 

Motor minesweepers R "190" and R"191" left Chalons for Marselles* 
Anti-aircraft corvette SH "13" has been decommissioned and one 
Italian motor minesweeper has been commissioned in Genoa as 

RA "1". \ :• 

German Naval Command, Italy reports on the status of the Italian 
Fleet as follows s 

"Following the appointment of Admrial Legnani as Under State 
Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Ferrari resigned as Deputy 
Chief of the Admiralty c 



13 Oct. 19V3 


Admiral Varoli Piazza and six officers will go with German Naval 
Command , Italy to Levico as Liaison Staff. Total personnel 
of the Italian Admiralty with all divisions is about 100 officers 
and 3,000 assistants. The "Commandanti di Service della 
Marina Italiana" will be attached to Naval Shore Commanders, 
Italian Riviera ? West -Adriatic and North Adriatic as working 
staffs. They will be under the Naval Shore Commanders, as 
regards operations and under the Italian Admiralty as regards 
technical and personnel matters. They will take up their 
duties at first for harbor services, communications, coastal 
reporting and lighthouse services, dockyard and arsenal work. 
They will also assign volunteers for coastal batteries and 
auxiliary warships and perhaps also assign volunteers for 
coastal batteries and auxiliary warships and perhaps also 
eacortvessels. Start of the organization is at present very 
slow, since there are as yet no clear, uniform directions for 
control of German and Italian Commands^ The Italian officers 
have therefore not set aims yet and no enthusiasm for their 
assignment. At present everything here is guided by the 
principle that no independent Italian naval offices are to 
be allowed to exist." 

. 3 * Area Naval Group South : 

a. Adriatic Sea : 

The fire aboard the steamer H.FIS3ER in Pola has been 
put out. Mining and Barrage Command, Pola took up its duties. 
It is planned to have a convoy of three steamers put out from 
Pola to Trieste on lh Oct. Four Siebel ferries and five 
torpedo boats will be transferred on 13 Oct, from Pola to Zara. 

Group South advises Naval Staff for information of the request 
to German Naval Command, Italy for data on all naval vessels 
and merchantmen found in harbors of Naval Shore Commander, 
West Adriatic, so that they can be distributed over the whole 
Adriatic in accordance with operational considerations. .When ' 
distributing the ships for the west Adriatic, coastal traffic, 
Group South will give due consideration to the shipping ' 
requirements, already reported, for 15,000 tons of supplies. 
Operations Division (Naval Staff) has also been asked to 
submit data available. (See teletype 1850.) 

b. Aegean Sea ; 

Enemy Situation : 

The harbor and the sea area of Kos were attacked by 
planes between 1300 and 2000 on 12 Oct. One plane was shot 


; -191- 


13 Oct. 19^3 

* ■ . 

The two* destroyers reported on the afternoon of 12 Oct, south 
of Castell Rosso are escort vessels of the HUNT class, accord- 
ing to photographic evaluation, At 1900 on 12 Oct,, 1 cruiser 
and 2 destroyers were located in the Scarpanto Strait, One 
motor boat, 1" barrage vessel and 1 vessel, apparently a motor 
boat, were lying in Alinda Bay %Leros) at the same time accor- 
ding to photographs. 

According to a report from Commander,. Submarine- Chasers, there 
were 2 destroyers on alternating courses from 2000 on 12 Oct 
off Kos 9 Pserino and Kalymnos, They definitely withdrew to 
the north into Turkish territorial waters „ 

At 01^5 on 12 Octo the DRACHE reported two destroyers east of 
Kalymnos, course not stated, and from 2155 at the same position 
again two destroyers on southerly course. 

Weather conditions made reliable air reconnaissance impossible 
on 13 Oct. 

At 1600 on 12 Oct. there was a submarine • south of Kalymnos. 
Our own decoy vessel registered no further location after 
two depthcharge' runs. 

Own Situation ; 

Group South reports further postponement of operation 
"Leopard" until 1*+ Oct. because of wind strength 6 and 
seaway 5. 

The convoy of the steamer INGEBORG was detected by enemy air 
reconnaissance and put in to Syra. Since the weather deteriora- 
ted, passage to Kos was not continued e 

The DRACHE laid two new barrage sections east of Kalymnos, 

Commander, Submarine Chasers reported on 12 Oct. that the 
regular appearance of enemy destroyers shortly after darkness 
shows that a direct threat to the weak landing flotillas for 
operation "Leopard" must be expected at any time. 

The steamer SANTORINI -was attacked by enemy planes while on ; 
passage from Kos to Piraeus and returned to Kos, Most of her 
Greek crew jumped overboard* The unarmed crew of a rubber 
dinghy, sent ashore on the Turkish peninsula of Akri-by- armed 
fishing vessel KFK "2" in order to pick up survivors sighted 
there, was' overpowered by soldiers, apparently Turkish, who 




13 Oct. 191+3 

suddenly appeared, KFK"2" left Turkish territorial waters 
again after a short stay. 

The steamer SALVATORE put in to Piraeus with more than 1,000 
British prisioners. The tanker Knudsen arrived at Corfu. So 
far approximately 1,200 Italians have been evacuated from 

In the enemy air attack on Corfu at noon on 11 Oct. 35 men. 
were killed and 100 wounded in the Italian prisoner of war 
c amp , 

Teletype communications "between Sofia and Athens will probably 
be interrupted for a long time. 

One inquiry from Naval Staff regarding operations by our sub- 
marines in the Aegean, Group South reports; 

"1. The plan is to have onesubmarine each. operate east, of 
Leros and Kalymnos, the second submarine to operate, according 
to the situation, in the sea area west of Leros, Kalymnos and 
Kos against enemy destroyers and perhaps cruisers which are 
operating every night in that area and especially from the 
east cut of Turkish territorial waters against thelanding which 
is about to- take place. 

2. The continuous presence of enemy surface forces in 
this sea area very much endangers the assembly of units for the 
landing operation and might lead to the smashing of our forces 
before the landing operation, at present held up by bad 
weather, is started. 

3. The purpose of our submarine operations is therefore 
not the sinking of enemy shipping but the warships endangering 
our operation* These warships are at the same time carrying 
out reinforcement of defense on enemy-occupied islands. 

h. No enemy submarines have so far been discovered in 
the narrow waters between Leros and Kalymnos. Cessation of 
submarine chase is not of great importance for our naval and 
air forces in this area, since already only the most limited 
forces are available in the entire Aegean area for submarine . 
cha& ; - and these are mainly participating in thelanding operation. 

5. The appearance of our submarines in the areas where 
landings are planned would, apart from direct prospects of 
attacking enemy warships, considerably limit the enemy T s present 
unobstructed freedom of movement and thus substantially facili- 
tate our tasks in occupying and holding the Dodecanese." 


13 Oct. 19^3 

Finally Group ^outh submits thefollowing observation: 

"The population in Greece has expressed general satisfac- 
tion about numerous recent enemy air attacks. In Piraeus the 
appearance of enemy planes was greeted with jubilant demonstration 
This proves that our propaganda has so far been inadequate and 
requires immediate intensification. " 

c. Black Sea s 

Admira a Black Sea reports ; 

1. Bad weather continues, so that there has been no resumption 
of convoys yet; no patrol lines were taken up„ 

2. The storm and high water have caused the mooring jetty 
at Genichesk to break away; naval artillery lighter MA.L "11" 
drifted away and ran aground at the bow. An attempt to tow 

her off was unsuccessful owing to the present weather conditions. 

3. The jetty at Eupatoria was heavily damaged. The possibility 
of loading is considerably restricted. 

Submarine U "20" put in to Constanta from the operational area. 

Group South reports that the Bulgarian Ministry of War has 
agreed to further use of the ZAR FERDINAND and the BURGAS in 
the Balkans for supply traffic if these ships are in future 
used only; 

a. between Bulgarian and Romanian ports, or 

b. in the area between Salonika and Piraeus. 

These ships can therefore only be used for supplies from the 
Black Sea to the Aegean on transfer passage. 

VIII. Situation East Asia 
Nothing to report. 



lh Oct. 19^3 

Items of Political Importance 

In the first commentary on the Three Power Conference "Pravada" 
rejects all conjectures which deal with the problem of Russian 
borders or the status of the Baltic States. The most urgent 
problem is the quickest possible concentration of joint war 
efforts so as to shorten the war. The solution of post-war 
problems after the collapse of "Hitler Germany" is dictated 
by the interest of all Allied countries. The Spanish 31ue 
Division has been withdrawn from the eastern from, according 
to Reuter. 

The foregin press represents Portugal 1 s conduct with regard to 
the Azores as an example for other neutral countries, e.g. 
Sweden, Ireland and Turkey. A Swiss paper writes that the 
decision taken by Portugal, who despite her neutrality on the 
Continent has joined in the war on the side of the Allies, 
will enable Allied pressure to be increased on Spain and 
Argentiana. It is . saidin Lisbon, according to Reuter, that 
the German Ambassador assured Salazar on 12 Oct. that 
"Germany appreciates Portugal's difficult position. Germany 
will still regard Portugal as a friendly neutral*" 

This statement sounds absolutely unreliable. 

The Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate has 
adopted a resolution in which the United States pledge them- 
selves to post-war cooperation for the maintenance of world' 

The Badoglio Government has announced a declaration of war 
on Germany. At the same time Badoglio Italy has been 
recognized by Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet 
Union as an ally. This does not affect the armistice terms. 

Conference on the Situation with Chief. Naval Staff 

I . Army Situation . 

On the eastern front the Russians have pushed into our lines 
in the Zaporozhe sector. 

On the Volturno front it was possible on the whole to repulse 
the enemy attack., 



l 1 * Oct. 19'+3 

II. Quartermaster General reports: 

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Division has not 
approved the withdrawal of a naval artillery battalion from 
France to Italy* German Naval Command, Italy has meanwhile 
reported that Commanding General, Army Group B regards £he- 
coastal sector Venice-Grando as particularly vulnerable to 
landings and has requested mining by the Navy and' reinforce- ■■ 
ment of coastal guns especially by long-range guns. Commanding 
General, Army Group B-has also requested that a basic change 
in emplacement of the batteries be considered, since they • 
are known to the enemy and not always set up correctly from 
the tactical point of view. German Naval Command, Italy ■ 
has replied: 

"Investigations regarding the possibilities of- setting up ■•... : 
further batteries in the area of Naval Sliore Commander, West ■ 
Adriatic are being mad: 

This depends particularly on the available personnel. The Navy 
at present has no reserves. Requests have been made repeatedly 
to High Command, Navy to assign the naval artillery battalion 
as planned but this is not to be expected before a month from 
now. In general it will be impossible to move stationary bat-: 
teries as this would require a long time and much labor.' The' 
question of long-range guns is under investigation*". 

I I I o Chie f , Ope r ati o ns Branch. Op e rati o ns Division : 

— — «— J— — i7"i. i i i i — ii — ^«K Wjp — ap— <^>w p it i | I in jl i.Mi n. i w i il m i iirni mm ah ui ■ i n I ; n i n ■ ■ ■■■ — 

a. Naval Staff proposes the following security rulings 
within the Navy with regard 'to operation "Paul" (repairs to 
the TIRPITZ) : 

"The dockyard period of the TIRPITZ, planned already for 
some time to take place this winter, will be carried -out in 
the northern area since both at Wilhelmshaven and at 'Kiel the 
TIRPITZ would be' too much exposed to sudden enemy air attacks 
There are already so many other ships of the Fleet in Gdynia . , 
that this harbor can no longer accommodate the TIRPITZ, Other 
ports 'In home waters are out of question for the dockyard period 
of the' TIRPITZ, Furthermore, the serious fuel situation makes 
it undesirable to transfer her to home waters and later 
back to the northern area. Damage sustained by the TIRPITZ 
through British midget submarines is not the cause for 
carrying out repairs in the northern area." 

Chief, Naval Staff agreed,. Instructions to this effect will 
be sent by order 1/Skl I op 28785A3 Gkdos. Copy in War 
Diary, Pafct C, V 1. Ha. 


. -I96- 

lh Oct 19^3 

A recommendation that slight damage be admitted to the Naval 
Attaches of foreign navies was not approved by Chief, Naval 
Staff since the British certainly know nothing definite and 
are simply beating about the bush with Mil their assertions 
so far, 

b, Commanding General, Armed Forces, South has advised 
Naval Staff, for information, of the request from Armed Forces 
High Command, Operations Division to the effect that at least 
one operational minelayer from the area of Group South be 
assigned at once to German Naval Command, Italy for tasks on 
the west Adriatic coast. Futther more, that the shipping, 
including escort vessels, required on the same coast for 
supplies of up to 600 tons daily be left with German Naval 
Command, Italy and not be transferred to Group South. 

IV. Chief, Naval Ordnance Division reports that a request has 
been sent to the Ministry of Armament and Ammunition to place 
the 15,000 tQns of iron seized for the Navy in Italy at the 
disposal of Commander in Chief, Navy, so that this quantity 
does not go entirely to shipbuilding. Commander in Chief, 
Navy is not yet certain whether the entire quantity will be 
seized for the Navy, as difficulties may have to be expected 
during collection in Italy. 

In a Highly Restricted Circle ; 

V . Chief,, Operations Branch., Operations Division s 

The request of Group South regarding submarine operations in 
the Aegean is approved in principle by Naval Staff. It is 
proposed that Conmander, Submarines, Mediterranean by instructed 
to transfer a submarine to the Aegean Sea. % 

Chief, Naval Staff agreed. 

VI. Quartermaster General reports that six war transports 
built in the Black Sea have already been fitted-up and comm- 
issioned as submarine chasers.. Another eight are still under 
construction. The Navy also cannot do without these eight 
vessels as submarine chasers* It is, therefore, impossible 
to hand over to the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping 
these constructions, or iron for eight other constructions 
from the Navy quota. 

Chief, Naval Staff agreed, 

VII. A meeting took place on 13 Oct at the office of Commander 
in Chief, Navy with the Chariman of the Main Committee for 
Shipbuilding, Director Merker ; Chief Naval (Ship) construction 
Division participated. For notes on this meeting as per 

OKM k. Stb 2812/Gkdos see War'- Diary, Part B, Vol. V. 


Ik Oct. 19^3 

Special It ems 

I. Armed-Forces High Command, Operations Staff has. requested 
Commander in Chief, Navy, Commander j_ n chief, Air Force and 
Commanding General, Armed Forces, South and Army Group B to 
report the number of purely Italian formations which already 
exist, subdivided as to categories, and which might later be 
taken over intact into the Italian Armed Forces. 

Armed Forces High Command futhermore advises that no change 
in the boundary between Army Groups B and F is planned and th 
that the area from Fiume to Susak will remain an operational 
area in its previous form* 

Both of these matters will be dealt with further by Quartermaster 
Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch, 

II. Chief, Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command has 
issued the following instructions to Army General Staff, 
Ari Focre, Operations Staff and Naval Staffs 

"In the interest of authenticity of Armed Forces reports and 
of military communiques it is imperative that the Branches of., 
the Armed Forces release for publication even reports which 
are unfavorable for us. Experience has shown that rumors of 
such events circulate through large sections of the pouplation, 
assisted by enemy propaganda^ and are only enchanced by our . 
silence. Reports can and should be made public when 'circum-- '••••' 
stances make it certain that the enemy. has full knowledge of 
the events. Anyhow the Fuehrer will decide in each individual 
case whether and in what form unfavorable news is to be 
made public. 

However, for this it is necessary that such news be submitted 
at least in draft and in the desired form and not be hushed 
up altogether." 

III. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff on 13 Oct. 
established the new tasks of the German Armistice Commission. 
Copy of order as per 1/Skl 29030A3 Gkdos.. in- .War Diary, Part 
3, Vol. V. 

IV. Naval Intelligence Division has issued in "Evaluation of 
Intelligence on Foreign 'Navies" statements about fast new 
submarines of the U. S. Navy. The information concerns 
twelve submarines of the TAMBOR class of l $ h75 tons, launched 
from 1939 to 19^1, which are said to have a surface speed 

of 21 knots. The submerged speed is unfortunately unknown. 



l*t Oct, 19J+3 


The constructional form above the waterline is striking in 
that, when the bow is seen from a great distance, it may lead 
to confusion with destroyers, escort vessels or submarine 
chasers. The new CATO class of 72 submarines, launched 
19^1/19^2 and having a displacement of 1,525 tons, shows only 
slight variations. Of this class another 120 boats are said 
to have been ordered _. Attempts are being made to shorten the 
time required for construction to nine months. Naval 
Intelligence Division also reports in "Brief Intelligence on 
the Enemy Situation" No. 20 A3 on: the joint declaration made 
by Churchill and Roosevelt; a statement by the Secretary of the 
Navy with regard to submarine warfare; new German torpedoes; 
the attack by British midget submarines; British and Greek 
shipping losses; the strength of the U.S e Fleet on 1 Oct., etc. 
For copy of brief report as per 1/Skl 3 1379 A3 goh* S ^ G War 
Diary, Part D, "Data on the Enemy Situation". 

V. A summary of enemy intelligence gained by radio decipher- 
ing and radio intelligence from *+ to 10 Oct. is contained in 
Radio Monitoring Report No, L t-lA3 of ^hief , Naval Communications 
Division. No special comments are necessary. 

Situation A Oct . 

I . War in Foreign Waters 

1. Enemy Situation: 

Radio deciphering now shows that the U.S. Commanding 
Admiral, Pacific requested "Nortra"on 23 .iug. to report by 
radiogram whether three of his whaling ships were at approxim- 
ately 21° 30 * S 70° 20 T on 27 Aug. On 20 Sept. "Nortra" 
received a further radiogram from the same command . transfers over the North Atlantic decreased in August 5 
378 planes vere dste-ctod on flights to England and 126 on 
return flights to the west; 8*f planes flew from Brazil to 
Africia to England and 172 in the other direction. 

All vessels in foreign waters were advised of the enemy situa- 
tion by Radiogram lbl3. 

2.. - Own Situation : 

The Naval Attache in Tokyo reported at 0810 (received 



l*f Oct. 19^3 . ; .:. 

at 1639) : 

"Ship "28" reports; Position largo grid square OD 69. Rende,zvou; 

Contrary to our estimation, therefore, arrival of the auxiliary 
cruiser at Yokohama is to be expected already on 17/13 Oct. A 
fuller report as to why the operation was cut short- is to be 
awaited Instructions given by Naval Staff on 13 Oct. are 
anyway < superseded. 

The Naval Attache in Tokyo also reported; 

"1. The TANNE left Kure for Singapore on 13 Oct.; plans 
to leave Penang on 12 .Nov. at twelve knots for position 
"Tannenwald" , where she will arrive about 20 Nov. 

2. The BOGOTA leaves Singapore on 9 Nov. through the 
Sunda Strait for position "Tannenwald" via point "D" . 

3. The KIEFER will leave Japan for Singapore probably 
on 5 Nov." • 

Operations Division has drawn up sailing orders for the block- 
HIMALAYA, PIETRO ORSEDLO and FUJIYAMA and sent the orders to 
Group West or the Naval Office at Bordeaux for temporary 
delivery to the captains of the vessels. Copy of order 
1/Skl I k 2761 A3 Gkdos. Chefs, in War Diary, Part C, Vol, 

The ships are to carry goods to Japan. They will be ready 
to put out from the end of October or end of November. 

Permission to depart will be ordered separately by Naval 

Group Wes t , which will control their passage as far as 
30 IaT. , will , fix the exact dates for departure. 

II. Situation West Area 

1, Enemy Situation ; 

No reports have been received on air operations over the 
Bay of Biscay. OneeBritish vessel was located at 20l7 200 
miles southwest of Rockall Bank and one around midnight on 
1*+ Oct, 3^0 miles southwest of this Bank. Our air reconnai- 



. : : :.: CONFIDENTIAL . 

lh Oct, 19V3. 

saance sighted at 1035 in CF3121 (*+00 miles west of Cape Ortegal) 
a southbound convoy of 60 merchantmen with 1 cruiser and 12 . 
escort vessels. 


2. Own Situation 

: Atlantic Coast ; 

The 8th Destroyer' Flotilla (destroyers Z "23", Z "2V',. 
Z "32", Z "37") with torpedo boat T »lV ! , the FaLKE and the 
KONDOR left Royan at 0800 for torpedo firing exercises in the 
southern paet of the Bay of Biscay. The route from Brest to 
the Bay of Biscay ("Liebesbank" ) has been closed because of 
mining. Four ELM/J mines were swept off St.. Nazaire and one 
off Lorient, Six submarine chaser are on patrol on route 
"Liebeslaube" . One submarine was escorted from Royan to 
La Pallice. 

Channel Coast : 

It is planned to transfer three boats of the 5th PT Boat 

Flotilla from Dieppe to Boulogne during the night of lVOct. 

Patrol positions in the Channel were not taken up because of 
bright moonlight, ; . ■ 

Otherwise nothing special to report,, 

III . North Sea, Norway. Northern Waters 

North Sea s 

North of Terschelling, northwest of Borkum and southwest 
of Helder altogether five ground mines were swept in front of 
convoy uL i-63" on 13 Oct. Between lM+5 and 1523 an enemy for- 
mation of about 30 planes flew to 150 km. north of Terschelling 
on easterly course, later oh southerly course t& 70 km., north 
of Borkum and from -there to the west. 

The steamer RIEGEL was refloated from Rotensand. 

Norway . Northern Waters 

1 . Enemy Situation: ■ •'•- • 

Over the North Sea 26 planes werede.tected on operation. 



lh Oct 19V3 

Our air reconnaissance over the area of the Faroe Islands and 
of Jan Mayan was without tactical result,, 

On 12 and 13 Oct, single reconnaissance planes were sighted in 
the areas of Vardoe, Banak, Stavanger and Utsire One Airacobra 
was shot down off Vardoe « Boats of the 30th M.T e B. Flotilla 
were at sea west of Stavanger during the night of 1*+ Oct., 
according to radio intelligence. 

2 » Own Situation .. 

PT boat chase north of Stavanger was carried out without 
success on 13 0ct o 

The steamer AMMERLAND , lost on 12 Oct„ near Nordkyn, was probably 
sunk by a torpedo 'hit according to observations of the escorting 
BV 138. 

Naval Command, Norway reports, with reference to the air attack 
on our eastbound convoy on .13 Oct. off Vardoe; 

"Our eastbound convoy, consisting of 5 steamers, h tankers and 
16 escort vessels, was attacked in AC 3*+33 at' 1255 on 13 Oct. 
by about 10 IL 2 r s which approached at a low altitude. They 
dropped bombs and fired their machine-guns, A light hit was 
scored on the bow of the steamer ALSTERDAM, There were some 
casualties through gunfire. Two planes were shot down by an 
escort vessel, At 130^ there was a high-altitude attack. 
Three torpedoes were dropped by parachute from an altitude of 
2,000 m. After hitting the water the torpedoes ran on the 
surface with alternating courses. Bombs were also dropped; 
no damage to the convoy There was subsequently an attack 
by three- Bostons which approached at a low level and dropped 
two torpedoes, one detonated in the middle of. the convoy 
and the second sank down. The torepdoes were dropped from 
a height of 15" m. and a distance of 2,000 m. Two planes 
were shot down by an escort vessel Two men were wounded." 

Commander in Chief, Air Force Operations Staff replied as 
follows to the inquiry from Naval Staff see War Diary 7 Oct.): 

"1. Further reconnaissance and fighter formations for the 5th 
Air Force are impossible at present. 

2. The 5th Air Force is investigating possibilities of a 
transfer of fighter forces from the area of Northern 
Finland to central Norway in order to strenghten convoy 
escort in this area when the Arctic nights begin. 


1*+ Oct. 19V3 

3« The air fuel situation will be settled independently of 
this." . .-•-.- 

IV. Skagerrak. Baltic Sea Entrances. Baltic Sea 

:■ 1. Enemy Situation ; 

At 0022 minesweeper M "30" was unsuccessfully attacked by 
a submarine south of Tyters (surface runner). Depth charges 
were dropped. The submarine was not located. 

In Kronstadt Bay there was minor gunfire. Slight traffic con- 
sisting of tugs and guardboats was observed, 

2. Own Situation: 

The patrol position in the ^kagerrak against blockade- 
runners was occupied by four boats. At 1830 on 13 Oct. a 
patrol boat in the Sound captured a Danish motor fishing . 
vessel with three Danish officers and three civilians who were 
trying to escape, A Swedish bomber, which flew over one of 
our patrol boats in the Sound, was fired on. In the Baltic Sea 
entrances 27 vessels were out sweeping channels. In the Samsoe 
Belt one mine was detonated. At 2120 on 13 Oct. the escort 
vessel TELDE of the Aalborg-Oslo unit struck a mine in Aalborg 
at a position which had been passed over 22 times since 
the last enemy flight. 

On the morning o.f 1*+ u ct, mine-exploding vessel "131" of the 
Oslo-Aarhus convoy detonated two mere mines south of Anholt* 
Naval Command, Baltic draws attention to the danger of mines 
on route "38" because of the shallow water depth and the almost 
continuous crosscurrent. Escort vessel BATAVlA'.XlI was lost 
in 19^2 on the same route, Naval Command, Baltic recommends 
that convoys, from Aalborg to Oslo and vice versa be suspended 
at once and a transport service from Frederikshavn to Frederi- 
kstad l3e inaugurated instead with' fast single vessels. Until 
this is done it is suggested that convoy traffic from 
•aalborg to Oslo be transferred to the Aarhus-Oslo route. 

On 9' Oct. a torpedo recovery boat of the Air Force sank after 
striking a mine outside the swept area off Gdynia. On. the 
afternoon of 13 Oct. a mine detonated north of Gdynia roads 
300 m, from a steamer. The firing area in the Putzieger Wik 
has been closed owing to suspicion of mines. 

Convoy and transport traffic in the entire area of Naval 
Command, Baltic was otherwise carried out without incident, 


1*+ Oct. 19^3 

Naval Command, Baltic submits the following reports; 

I . From Commander , Minesweepers, Bal t ic; 

"li The Russians are taking advantage 'of any possible 
weather conditions to s\\reep the "S.eeigel" barrage. 

2. It is deduced from press reports that the enemy plans 
to push forward south of Veliki Luki in a northwesterly direction 
towards Riga, He is therefore preparing mine-free routes now 
as far as possible, so that he can then land .troops at once in 
large numbers on the Estonian coast west of Hungerburg, This 
would make the situation for the northern flank of the eastern 
front particularly difficult. It is requested that Commander, 
Minesweepers, Baltic and Admiral, Baltic States be kept informed 
continuously on the course of the fighting, so that counter- 
measures can be prepared in good time should -the situation 
become-more tense. In this case it is planned to reinforce 
"Seeigel" barrage 6 A and 7 A as far as Kiskolku Riff with 
cutting floats and mines with snagline," 

Naval Command, Baltic approves this plan., 

II. From Admiral, Baltic States ; " 

Z "According to advice received from the 18th Army Command, 
a large-scale attack from the Leningrad area is to be expected 
soon against the Pushkin sector as. far as the coast." Railway 
Battery "Biuecher" will, therefore, be withdrawn during the 
night of 1m- Oct. in agreement with the 13th Army Command. 
This Battery is restricted to the railroad route near the 
front. The 13th Army Command .plans to use it near Krasnoye 
Selo« Since sea targets cannot be shelled from this position 
Admiral, Baltic States will try to have the 13th Army 
Command, set up the Battery elsewhere. The outcome will be 

V. Submarine Warfare 

I. Enemy Situation ; 

The Polish Admiralty has announced the loss of the 
destroyer ORKaN, according to Reuter. The destroyer was 
sunk while escorting a convoy which was destined for Russia 
(presumably via Basra) and was crossing the Atlantic. 


Ih Oct. 19^3 

2 Own Situation ; 

Submarines U ,,L f-55 n and U "631" collided in the North 
Atlantic in xik 5255. 30th submarines sustained damage.. Two 
meeting points for stragglers of the awaited convoy ONS 20 have 
become known through radio intelligence. A rendezvous in Al 
2955 on course 290° has been intercepted for 1300 on 15 Oct. 
The convoy has obviously been delayed by the continuously heavy 
westerly winds. 

Commander in Chief, Air Firce, Operations Staff advises Naval 
Staff, in reply to the request of 5 Oct. (see War Diary 5 Oct.) 
regarding the use of BV 222' s in the Atlantic, that it is 
planned to use these planes, as long as the air situation 
permits, even after assignment of the 5th Long-Range Reconnai- 
ssance Group (Ju 290 , s)| further expansion of the ground 
organization at Biscarosse is impossible at present owing to 
lack of workers. Therefore until further notice not more than 
two flying boats can be out on operation at the same tim; 


VI o serial Warfare 

British Isles and Vicinity : . 

No special reports have been received from the west area 
on daytime activity. Detection of the convoy in the Atlantic 
has been reported under Situation "West Area" . 

Shortly after noon a heavy bomber formation of 300 - 350 planes, 
with heavy fighter escort as far as Holland, flew into Germany. 
The armament works in Schweinfurt were heavily attacked by 
about 250 'Fortr esses and were seriously damaged. The main 
works, especially the ball bearing plants, are temporarily out ' 
of action. Traffic installations also were badly damaged. In 
all 333 fighters and heavy fighters' of Air Force Command, Center 
were sent up and the enemy was engaged. The 3rci Air Force ■ 
reports *+9 planes on operation but no engagements with the 
enemy. According to reports'received up tcrnow, 121 enemy 
planes were shot down. Fourteen of our planes were lost and 
15 damaged. The enemy only admits the loss of -63 planes in •'•■ 
all and claims to have shot down 121 German planes. This proves 
how unreliable American figures are. In the evening- and 
during the night of 1*+ Oct. no important operations took 

Mediterranean Theater ; 

No bombing operations against naval targets by us in the 


1*+ Oct* 19^3 ;.-'•' 

Mediterranean are reported. Reconnaissance was limited to the 
Italian area and the Southern. Aegean.. .In the morning the enemy 
attacked the station and railroad ' installations in Terni (north- 
east of Rome), Three freight cars with ammunition and nine with 
heavy bombs exploded. Two of the attacking planes were shot 
down. Further attacks were carried out on Grosseto, Orbotello 
and Tarquinia. •• ... 

In the Aegean, the airfield: of Argos was, attacked. One of our 
planes was damaged and one shot down in aerial combat. No 
planes were shot down by us. 

■ Eastern Front ; 

Nothing to report. ... 

VII. War fare in the Mediterranea n and_.J31ack Sea 

1. Enemy Situation Mediter r anean ; . 

Nine freighters and 1 tanker,, all in ballast, put in 
to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean* A convoy of 20 freighters 
and 3 tankers, left Gibraltar for the. Atlantic, 

Our air reconnaissance sighted at 0735 20 miles north of Araeu 

1 cruiser, 3 destroyers and 5 fighters on southwesterly -course. 

At 0955 6. miles from Cape Tropez a submarine fired on one of 
our convoys consisting of 5 barges, 1 naval landing craft and 

2 harbor defense boats* The submarine submerged when our 
boats returned fire, •■ One bare .sustained slight .damage. 
Another' submarine position was reported at 2250 110 miles, west 
southwest of Ajaccio, ••':.•< ■ •'.."' 

In the Naples area an increase of cruisers and minesweepers 
was noted, On the afternoon of 13 Oct, a convoy was observed 
putting into the Strait of Otranto. »;•;•' 

Radio intelligence intercepted at noon on lA Oct, lively 
operational and tactical rac^io traffic in the eastern 
Mediterranean* A British vessel, 'presumably the leading, ship 
of light naval forces in the Aegean, transmitted a tactical 
signal to Alexandria. 

The U e S. Navy Department announced that two U.S. destroyers have 
sunk as a result of underwater explosion off Salerno and at 
another point in the Mediterranean. 




ih Oct, 19V3 

2 a Own Situation Mediterranean: 

German Naval Command, Italy will transfer to L evico 
during the night of I 1 * Oct, 

According to a report from German Naval Command, Italy, Command- 
ing General, Armed Forces, South has made urgent demands for 
closing of the Leghorn Wall over Elba to Nettunia and also for 
coastal defense barrages on the east coast of Italy; this is 
in addition to immediate mining of Gaeta and the coastal streteche 
as far as Nettunia which are vulnerable to landings. 

This demand exceeds the program planned. German Naval Command, 
Italy has begun the mining of Gaeta, in view of its urgency, 
and intends to carry out further operations within the next 
few days. Naval Staff is asked to approve this. 

3. Area Naval Group South ; 

a. Adriatic Sea ; 

Enemy, Situation ; 

• On 13 Oct. our air reconnaissance sighted a submerging 
submarine 30 miles southwest of Zara. An enemy plane dropped 
bombs on Durazzo. 

Own Situation ; 

Traffic from Pola to Fiume is closed. A fuller 
report has not yet been received. Departure of the steamer 
B0CCACI0 from Durazzo to the south is planned for the evening 
of 1^ Oct, Transfer of the Siebel ferries and infantry land- 
ing boats from Pola to Zara has been postponed. 

The following former Italian naval batteries are reported ready 
for action, but are temporarily manned by the Army: 

Valona: batteries with three l*+.9 cm. and four 12 cm guns; 

Sasseno; battery with six 15.2 cm. guns;. 

Durazzo sector; batteries with four 12 cm. and four 7«6 cm guns. . 

The 621st Naval Artillery Bate Hi on is manning in Pola two 
medium batteries and in Fiume and Trieste one light battery > 
each. ."'■"-' 



Ik Oct. 191+3 

According to a report from Admrial, Adriatic the 623rd Naval 
xi.rtillery Battalion has arrived at Ljubljana, without the pos- 
sibility of further transport* 

b« Aege an Sea; 

Enemy Situ ation; 

On 13 Oct. a single reconnaissance plane was sighted 
in the southern. Aegean. At noon three planes dropped bombs 
on Gavdos 

During the night of 13 Oct. leaflets were dropped on Kalymnos 
stating that the British would land on 16 Oct. 

During ; the night of 13 Oct.. between 2250 and 00 50 two destroyers 
were' repeatedly sighred in the area cf Kos, The radar station 
at Scarpanto located between 0220 and 03*+0 about 25 miles east 
of Scarpanto tow shipping targets on' southeasterly course. On 
the evening of ih Oct. several units were again operating in 
the area between Kos and Kalymnos as well as off the island 
of Nisyros south .of, Kos, 

The following were sighted; 

At 2230 two naval .vessels four miles south of Nisyros and 
At 2250 two destroyers south of Kalymnos on northeasterly 

.= course^ 
At 23^0 submarine chaser "2101" reported an engagement 

■ • with two enemy PT boats, presumably 'off Kalymnos 
roads „ 

: ■" Shortley after midnight on 1*+ Oct. two destroyers 
' shelled Kos .; 

At 0955 an attack was carried out by 76 planes on the airfield 
of Argos. Most „of the bombs fell on. the town and some' on the 
runway. Heavy damage was caused to buildings in. the town. 
Seven Germans were killed.. 

Own Situation ; 

The steamer MARGUERITA of the convoy from .Vrgostoli to 
Patras sank at 21^0 on 13 Oct. 30 miles west of Patras, 
apparently through striking a mine. Five German soldiers 
are missing. Of the 900 Italian prisoners aboard 350 were 
rescued. The steamer TARQUINIA (7^3 GRT( caught fire in the 
harbor of Argostoli and was beached. The origin of the 
fire is unknown. Most of the crew was rescued. 


1*+ Oct. 19^3 

, The tanker KNUDSEN with 2,000 prisoners aboard and 
submarine chaser "2105" dropped anchor off Leucas at 0630 on 
1*+ Oct. Further passage to Patras is planned for the evening. 

The hospital ship GRADISd is to leave Patras at 0^00 on 15 Oct, 
for the exchange of wounded. The ship will be escorted by a 
coast patrol boat as far as eight miles southwest of Argostoli. 

In connection with operation "Leopopard" the convoy of the 
steamers KARI and TRARaNI, carrying German troops and escorted 
by two submarine chasers and one motor minesweeper, left 
Piraeus for Kos at 1550. The convoy of the INGEBORG will 
follow 2h hours later „ The steamer GERDa TOFT, with German 
troops aboard, coming from Patras dropped anchor off 
I stria in the morning. 

Admrial, Aegean reported on 13 Oct. to Group South as follows: 

"Experiences of the last few weeks in the operational use of 
freighters as troop transports reveal continuous difficulties 
between the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, the 
Mediterranean shipping office and my demands. The civilian 
office is naturally not in a position to know the requirements 
and plans of the operational command. It therefore manages 
shipping as it thinks fit, which is quite out of proportion 
under present conditions. 

as Commanding Admrial I am there fore restricted in may 
freedom of action in my very own sphere, i,e. in the use of 
all shipping. At the present moment I must regard all trans- 
ports as naval war materiel. T ese conditions cannot be . i- 
allowed to continue, especially as operations are being 
intensified. They are caused, however, by the financial 
basis of the Mediterranean shipping office, which has to 
cover the costs of its organization from freight charges in 
free traffic. It is therefore imperative- for the future that 
the Commanding Admiral, Naval Forces have transports at his 
disposal to a greater extent." 

Gdoup South transmits this report to Naval 'Staff and the Reich 
Commissioner of Maritime Shipping with the comment that the 
Group is of the same opinion and, in view of the present 
naval situation and the operational tasks assigned to the 
Navy, considers it essential to give Admiral., Aegean the 
right to decide on the use of all available shipping in '. the 
Aegean Sea until futher notice. Group South has ordered 
this as a command ruling. ;.:'. '........ 




1*+ Oct 19^3 

c. Black Sea ; 

Convoys have not yet been resumed because bad weather 
continues o ... •■ 

Patrol lines have not been taken up. . . : 

VIII. Situation East A.sia 

Nothing to report. 

4 ^-^ yW *A^ "Jr* K A* ^L* ^* ^A* ^^ ^^ sj^ N^ jj^ -*J-i" ^*- ^L* *X* sLf <J-J X^ *X* ^L* *J> J< 



15 Oct. 191+3 ' 

I tens of Political Importance 

Tho article . in "Pravda" on the Moscow Conference (see War Diary 
1*+ Oct,) has caused a considerable stir in Anglo-American 
circles, as was to be expected. "United Press" reports on the 
general opinion, with the comment that the points for discussion 
between the three parties at the Conference were not ciearecb 
up without some trouble. 

It can be assumed that England would not have sent her Foreign 
Minister or political advisers to Moscow had the Russian 
Government been unwilling to discuss political matters. 
Attention is also drawn in London to Churchill f s statement 
according to which no subject was to be excluded from the 

Conference on the Situation with Chief. Naval Staff 

A , Report by Naval (Ship) Construction Division on the cond- 
ition of the TIRPITZ 

.1 survey report on the first tubines has been received 
from Vice Admiral Stiegels it appears that repairs can be 

carried out on the spot despite rather serious damage. Damage 
of a constructional nature and to armament can also be 
repaired aboard. Naval (Ship) Construction Division 
estimates that entire repairs will take four months. 

This, of course, makes necessary the transfer to Kaafjord of 
quite a number of auxiliary vessels (two repair ships, power 
and heat ships, diving tenders, caissons and small vessels). 
Accommodation for tho 600 workers to be assigned from home 
ports presents the most difficult task and is planned en the 
very large passenger steamer STAVANGEHFJOED-. 

Commander in Chief, Navy decides that all possible measures 
must be taken to protect this large assembly of ships from 
the enemy attacks which are to be expected. In particular the 
workers must be accommodated on shore and aboard the TIRPITZ 
in place of the crew, part of which is on leave, in order to 
spare the large and very conspicuous passenger steamer. He 
orders Quartermaster Division to make the necessary arrangments 

- -211- 

15 Oct. 19^3 

B. Situation; 

I . Army Situation : 

During the heavy defensive battle, which reveals several 
points of concentration, our lines in the sector of Zaporozhe 
were penetrated. It may be impossible to hold the bridgehead. 

II . Q uartermaster General reports on the command ruling of 
Group South regarding rights over merchant shipping in the 
J^egean Sea by Admiral, Aegean, as per report in War Diary ih 
Oct. Objections have already been raised by the Reich Comm- 
issioner of Maritime Shipping. It is suggested for the time 
being that Admiral, Aegean be asked to state concrete cases of 
inappropriate control by the Reich Commissioner of Maritime :.'• 

Chief, Naval Staff agrees. 

In a Highly Restricted Circle ; 

III. Chief. Operations Branch. qOperations Division ; 

a. The Military Attache at Bangkok reported on 8 Oct.: 

The Japanese Command is actually making preparations for 
defense against the enemy outflanking operation against Burma, 
but expects that this operation will only be on a small scale. 
It will be impossible for the Japanese to attain air superiority 
since only about 1,000 planes can be made available for this 
sector. Lack of shipping hampers the dispatch of troops. 

b. The exchange of German and British seriously wounded 
started today with the departure of the hospital ships 
.provided. For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol, VIII.. 

Special Items 

I. The telegrams exchanged between the Emperor of Japan and 
the Fuehrer -on the occasion of the presentation of the two 
German submarines, are to be found, as per 1/Skl. 27263 A3 Gkdos. 
in War Diary, Part 3, Vol. V. 

II. According to an intelligence report, based on information 
from the British Ministry of Transport and shipping circles, 
the Allies will have sufficient shipping available by the end 




15 Oct. 19^3 

end of 19*+3 to transport 6-7 divisions without having to 
resort to traffic engaged elsewhere; this is due to present 
favorable conditions in the war against merchant shipping and 
the present shipbuilding situation in Great Britain. 

Sufficient shipping for 12 - lh divisions will be available in 
spring 19^+, if present developments contineu* Only for a 
large-scale offensive in the west will it be necessary to make 
still further large provisions of shipping. 

This report is under investigation by Naval Intelligence 

III. Lt. Cdr. Becker has made a report on the interviews which 
Captain Grossi and Commander Borghese had with the Duce, Marshal 
Graziani and Admiral Legnani. For copy of report see War Diary, 
Part C, Vol c XIV. 

Situation 15 Oct . 

1 . War in Foreign Waters 

1. Enemy S i t uati on : 

: Nothing to report o 

2. Own Situation : • 

By radiogram 1105 Naval Staff confirms to ^hip "23" the 
report on her position, transmittedby the Naval attache in 
Tokyo as being in 0D 69, and adds that Radiogram 2309 of 
13 Oct.. is superseded by this message. 

By Radiogram 2318 the following instructions are dispatched to 
Ship "28" and the Naval Attache in Tokyo: 

"1. Contrary to the views expressed in Radiogram 2258 of 15 
Sept., Naval Staff presumed that Ship "28" might remain 
longer in the operational' area, ' since "the requested report of 
arrival was not received. Therefore a new assessment of the 
situation was dispatehed on 13 Oct. by Radiogram 2309. 

2. Should there be any difficulties with the Japanese 
■about the delay .in reporting the return of Ship "23", you 
are to assert that fuel shortage forced her to return and 
that the report on this from Ship "28" was not heard." 


15 Oct. 19^3 

The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports that the waiting areas for 
the BOGOTA became known to the commanders of the AQUILLA sub- 
marines in discussions regarding intermediate supplies. As 
these waiting areas are the same as for supplies to combat 
submarines, disclosure is to be assumed. A change will, there- 
fore, be necessary after all, 

II. Situation West Area 

1. En emy Situation: 

I , II - ■!.! ■■■ .. — " I T» Ml , 1 I II I IJ I I 

Over the Bay of Biscay V6 planes were detected on operation, 
One British vessel was located h-5 miles south of Rockall Bank, 
one 120 miles southeast of Rockall Bank, one 350 miles west- 
southwest of Brest and one 270 miles west of Rockall 3 ank. 

2. Own Situation : 

Atlantic Coast : 

Exercises by the 8th Destroyer Flotilla with three torpedo 
boats have been carried out as planned. The destroyers are 
putting into the Gironde and the torpedo boats into La- 

One ELM/J mine was swept off Lorient, one northwest of La- 
Pallice and one south of Archacon. Six submarines were 
escorted out and two in. 

The Sth Destroyer Flotilla has submitted its report on the 
torpedo firing exercises , For copy see teletype 1950. It is 
especially noteworthy that a light gray paint over the entire 
boat has again proved superior to a camouflage paint of 
alternating colors „ Smoke sceens again did not afford 
sufficient protection. 

Channel Coast : 

Patrol positions were not taken up. Three boats of the 
5th PT Boat Flotilla were transferred from Dieppe to Boulogne 
as planned. Two of the boats continued their passage to 
Le Havre, where they arrived at 2230. 


15 Oct. 019^3 , 

III . North Sea, Norway, Nort hern Waters 

North Sea; 

Convoy "h6h" Elbe - Hook, consisting of two steamers and 
three escort boats, left at ' 1^+00 „- 

Mine escort operations were partly hampered by fog. 

Otherwise nothing to report. 

Norway, Northern Waters ; 

1. Enemy Situation: 

Over the North Sea ^3 planes were detected on operation, 
presumably flying in the direction of the north Norwegian coast . 

Our air reconnaissance sighted at 1020 20 miles northeast of 
the Faroes (AE 9615) 1 aircraft carrier, 3 cruisers and 2 
destroyers on course 2 l f0° e Group North/pleet presumes that an 
operation against our shipping was broken off owing to the 
weather. Air reconnaissance has been out again* 

According to a report from the reconnaissance plane, the group 
was again located by radar at 1650 in AE 9869, No observations 
were possible owing to showers. The plane was fired on by 
light anti-aircraft guns. 

2. O wn Situatio n; 

At 0710 on 13 Oct. an. enemy submarine unsuccessfully 
attacked one of our convoys between Bas Fjord and Sylte Fjord. 
At 13^0 on ih Oct. an incoming Petsamo convoy was unsuccessfully 
shelled with 62 rounds by a battery on the Ribachi Peninsula, 

Naval Command, Norway reports that, in view of the submarine 
danger close to our prescribed channels off Vardoe, it is 
planned to lay two deep LMB barrages there across the ship- 
ping route, which barrages will be passed over by our ships. 
Naval Command, Norway plans to draw enemy submarines on to 
this barrage during attack and mine-laying and requests 
approval of this plan and provision of the mines. For 
situation of the barrage see teletype 1.600. 

Naval Staff has decided as follows: 



15 Oct. 19^3 

"1. Reliable clearance of mined areas is not achieved, as 
is shown by the loss of the steamer AMMERLAND and the sweeping 
of three more mines five weeks after the enemy minelaying off 
Nordkyn was ascertained. 

2. Deep barrages on the route prevent effective mine- 
sweeping and anti-mine escort against the remains of old 
minelaying and new minelaying expected at this point by Naval 
C ommand , Norway . 

3. If no time setting has been ascertained, the minelaying 
must be regarded as a protection against operations by enemy 
submarines in the same area for about a year. 

h. Deep flanking barrages will prevent enemy submarine 
operations against our convoys only if laid not too far away. 
Comments on Route "Gruen", which is urged by Coast Patrol 
Unit, Arctic Coast, are still awaited." 

Thirty ships were escorted north and 22 south. In all 18 ships 
were delayed owing to shortage of escorts, 

Group North/Fleet transmits views of the 5th Air Force on a 
request made by it on 3 Oct. regarding air reconnaissance. The 
5th Air Force agrees with the opinion of the Group but is 
unable to carry out the required reconnaissance because of the 
order to save aviation fuel. A concentration of fighter forces 
in Bodoe does not offer any adequate defense for prevention of 
attacks. Heavy long-range fighter planes would be required 
but such are not available at present, since every one is being 
used for home defense. The 5 th Air Force has suggested that 
in this area also single ships be assembled into convoys, 
so as to strengthen defense. Group North/Fleet again requests 
Naval Staff to prevail upon Air Force, Operations Staff to ease 
fuel restrictions. It assumes that Naval Command, Norway 
will take over responsibility for the request regarding air 
escort for convoys and will inform the 5th Air Force that 
in this particular case it was not single ships that were 
involved but a convoy of four vessels. 

Naval Staff cannot do anything further in this matter, since 
Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff has already 
replied in the negative to the request made by N a val Staff on 
7 Oct. A separate investigation of the fuel question is 
promised. Group North has been advised of the views of 
Commander in Chief, Air Force. 




15 Oct. 19V3 ;; 

IV. Skagerrak. Baltic Sea Entrances. Baltic Sea 

1, Enemy Situation; 

During the night of 13 Oct, three PT boats were sighted 
17 miles southeast of Helsinki, On 15 Oct. there was a 
minesweeping group of 27 vessels off Vigrund. 

2. Own Situation : 

In the Samsoe Belt one ground mine was swept. The NIELS 
JUEL arrived at Kiel on the afternoon of 1*+ Oct. 

Otherwise nothing to report. 

V. ■ Submarine Warfare 

In the North Atlantic a convoy, consisting of more than 
30 steamers, was detected at 21^+0 by submarine U"3¥+" in AL 
1822. This is presumably the expected westbound convoy. Th 
submarine lost contact after being dept-charged for three 
hours. Group "Schlieff en"'' has been ordered to move at mid- 
night on 16 Oct. 120 miles further north, since the position 
detected lies about 30 miles north of the ONS route. 

Otherwise nothing to report. 

VI . Aerial Warfare 

British Isles and Vicinity : 

The 3rd. Air Force had *+3 planes out on operation over the 
west area and 13 over the Mediterranean. 

A convoy of 12 steamers and h escorts was detected at 1025 off 
Start Point on easterly course. At 1300 the unit was again 
reported, consisting of 20-30 steamers. 

Air Commander, Atlantic Coast plans armed reconnaissance on 
16 Oct. against the convoy preceeding towards Lisbon and 
radar reconnaissance against a northbound convoy southwest of 
the Portuguese coast. 




15 Oct. 19V3 

During the day two enemy formations flew into Air Force area, 
Holland, but did not attack. Fighter formations which flew in- 
to western France also carried out no attacks. Only in 
northern France did single planes attack a transformer plant 
south of Boulogne. In the evening nine of our bombers started 
out against London and one plane each against Southend and 

Only very small enemy air formations were on operation over the 
Norwegian and Dutch coasts and over Poland; also from the south 
into the area of Prague via Klagenfurt. The flights to Poland 
and to Prague were presumably made for landing agents. 

Mediterranean Theater: 

No bomber operations were carried out by the 2nd Air 
5 Command, Southeast. Ii 
only reconnaissance was flown, 

Force Command, Southeast. In the Italian and Greek areas 

Enemy air activity was lively over the Italian front. Army 
anti-aircraft guns reported one plane shot down, 

During daylight attacks on the airfields of Sedes and Maga 
(Salonika) four of our planes were destroyed and nine heavily 
damaged. Our defense measures were unsuccessful. During 
the night of 15 Oct, 50 high-explosive bombs were dropped on 
the airfield of Maritza (Rhodes). No report on damage has 
been receivedyet. 

From Italy harassing raids on Tarquinia and Chiampino were 

Eastern Front ; 

Over the Army front 50 enemy planes were shot down on 
1*+ Oct, The *+th Air Force carried out photographic reconnaissance 
over ports in the northern part of the Black Sea.. 

Reconnaissance evaluations of the 5th Air Force in the North 
Sea have already been dealt with under "Enemy Situation Norway' 1 „ 

VII . Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea 

1, Enemy Situation Mediterranean; 

No reconnaissance reports have been received from the 
Gibraltar area or from the Western and Eastern Mediterranean. 




15 Oct. 19V3 — ~~~ 

One submarine was sighted off Toulon and one in the Elba Strait. 
There were two futher submarines at 1900 30 miles southwest 
of Cannes. No shipping movements were observed in Gaeta Bay* 

2 . O wn Situation Mediterranean 1 

During the night of Ik Oct. specially armed Siebel fer - 
ries three times had engagements with enemy motor gunboats in 
the Piombino Strait. Shore Battery "Elba" took some part in 
the .engagement. One enemy boat' was sunk .and another set on 
fire.. One of our. Siebel ferries caught fire and sank after 
return to port. Six men were killed and eleven are missing. 

Demolitions in the port of Gaeta were continued. The coastal 
routes from Spezia to Leghorn were checked, since mines were 
suspected after a mine barrage was located by echo-ranging eleven 
miles southeast of Spezia running across the coastal route. 

German Naval .Command, Italy reports in connection with the order 
received from Quartermaster Division to prepare for transfer 
of motor minesweepers R "190" and R "191" from Genoa to' the 
Adriatic via Placenca, that transport is impossible at 
present since the bridge at Genoa is blown up and investigation 
of the waterway of the Po River is not yet concluded . 

The hospital ship AQUILIA left Spezia at 1900 for Oran. 

With regard to the request made by Commanding General, Armed 
Forces, South (see War Diary 13 Oct.), Armed Forces High Command, 
Operations Staff has decided as follows, in accordance with 
the advice from Naval Staff % 

The Navy has o take the requirements of all parties concerned 
into consideration when distributing the vessels. 

Re 1) The shortage -of minelayers in the Aegean Sea and the 
risk involved prohibits withdrawal of a minelayer from the 
Aegean. High Command, Navy has placed the Italian torpedo 
boat AUDACS at the disposal of German Naval Command, Italy 
for this purpose in the West Adriatic. 

Re 2) It is planned to assign to German Naval Command, Italy 
one third of all naval landing craft becoming available, 
up to ten, and $0% of Siebel ferries, also- 'up to ten. ' Further- 
more, the formation of harbor defense flotillas has been 
ordered. •- - ' ■■•- - 




15 Oct. 19^3 

The measures taken will require some time to come into effect; 
until then coastal traffic must be carried on provisionally 
with the vessels in operation." 

3. Area Naval Group South : 

a. Adriatic .Sea : 

Durazzo reports three minesweepers ready for operation. 
The steamer OLYMPIA left Trieste for Durazzo. The steamers 
ITALIA and ARGENTINIA are to proceed in the evening in convoy 
from Trieste to Durazzo via Pola and Zara, Five Siebel 
ferries and five infantry landing boats left Pola for Zara. 

The steamer H. FISSER sustained only slight damage and is -to 
bring the rest of her cargo of provisions to Zara. The Italian 
torpedo boat MISSORI supported the advance of the Army from : 
the sea east of Fiume, passed through the _ Moral acco Channel and 
carried out reconnaissance of the area around Veglia, She 
was fired on several times by the enemy. Her crew suffered • 
slgiht casualties and, in spite of its willingness, proved 
inefficient for any serious situation. The boat is lying • 
in Trieste out cf war readiness. 

b. Aegean Sea : 

Enemy Situation : 

Our air reconnaissance sighted at 2120 on 1*+ Oct a 90 
miles east-southeast of Castello Rosso 2 naval vessels of an 
unidentified type on course 300°. According to a sighting 
report 1 vessel, presumably a cruiser, and 3 small naval 
vessels were lying in Castell Rosso at 1520 oh 15 Oct. 

During the day our radio intelligence intercepted lively 

air reconnaissance in the Aegean area; our convoys, primarily 

landing boats, were reportedseveral times. 

The DRaCHE reported at 1216 sighting a submarine off Pezcnda 
Bay (Kalymnos). This submarine submerged at 13^0 after 
destroying a sailing vessel and withdrew eastward. 

A submarine, presumably the same one, shelled Pezonda Bay at 
1503 and, after being fired on by a decoy ship, submerged 
again at 1630 south of Kalymnos. According to a further 
report fron the DRACHE, two destroyers passed westward 10 
miles north of Pezonda Bay, one at 1506 and one at 1515. 
Shore batteries from Leros shelled the northern point of 
Kalymnos at 1610. 



15 Oct. I9V3. 

Own Situation ; 

The enemy submarine detected south of Kalynrios was 
probably sunk by coast patrol boat GA uI f 5" . 

Radar Station Scarpanto was fired on by insurgents on the 
evening of lV Oct, Mopping-up operations on Naxos continued; 
l^f Italians have been transported to Piraeus. 

The tanker KNUDSEN put in to Patras from Corfu at noon'. 

The convoy of the' KARI and theTRAPANI , on passage' -from Piraeus 
to Kos'j, was detected by enemy reconnaissance east of Naxos .in 
the morning and turned about at 1325 northeast of Amorgos, as 
ordered. A submarine chaser escorting this convoy reported 
at 1702 enemy naval forces in sight from a position four 
miles southwest of Darusa, Admiral, Aegean plans to have 
the convoy proceed on from Naxos to Kos on the morning of 

16 Oct. The- convoy of the INGEBORG is to follow 2k hours 
later . 

The DRaCHE received orders in .the afternoon to break through 
northward- to Piraeus, taking advantage of the enemy forces 
withdrawing to the west. 

Start of operation "Leopard" has been fixed for 17 Oct. at the 

The hospital ship GRADISCA left Patras at 0515 for Oran. 

Convoy traffic in the central and northern Aegean was carried 
out as planned. Group South suggests, in connection with the 
order received from Operations Division for one -submarine to 
be transferred immediately for operations in the Aegean, that 
she be put- under the command of Admiral, Aegean. . . 

Chief, Naval Staff will be asked for a decision. 

Commander, Submarines 5 " Mediterranean reports, in connection 
with the same order, that immediate transfer of a submarine is 
impossible. ; All submarines in the Eastern Mediterranean are 
at present at the dockyard in Pola. U nl +53 M will be ready 
on 23 Oct., and is then to carry out a mine laying operation 
off Brindisi. U "^-07" will be ready on 21 Oct., and/U "596" 
and U "81" probably not until the middle of November. 
Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean considers a withdrawal 
of submarines from the .Western Mediterranean to be unsuitable. 


15 Oct. 19^3 

Group South reports that, owing to disclosure of the order for 
closed areas for submarine chase through ransacking of the naval 
landing craft in Stampalia, these areas in the Aegean have been 
renamed. For particulars see. teletype 1330. 

c . Black Sea; 

Enemy Situation; 

According to photographic reconnaissance the following were 
detected on 15 Oct.: at Gelendzhik 12, at Novorossiisk l f 
landing boats; at Primorskoye 100 and at Yeisk 75 boats. 
Other evaluations are of no great importance. 

Between 2025 and 20^+0 the coast at Cape Opuk was shelled 
from the sea. 

Own Situation 

Ship "19" and three armed fishing vessels left Sevastopol 
for submarine chase in Eupatoria Bay. 

Submarine U "2h" unsuccessfully attacked a coastal vessel off 
Suchum with torpedoes. 

Convoys on the west coast have been resumed, In order to 
relieve congestion at Sevastopol a convoy of ^3 vessels put 
out via Ak Mechet for Odessa. 

In view of recent losses in naval landing craft and the 
difficulty of quickly replacing small vessels in the Aegean, 
Naval Staff will ask the Foreign Office to approach Turkey 
regarding transfer of naval landing craft from the Black 
Sea through the Dardanelles. Naval Staff expects, however, 
that this attempt will only be successful if naval landing 
craft, to be spedially marked, are finally stripped of their 
character as naval vessels and we undertake not to use them 
for operational assignments but solely for transportation 
purposes on certain routes, with civilian crews, civilian 
captains and flying the merchant flag. 

Group South and, for information Admiral, Black Sea, are 
advised accordingly and the former ordered to cable whether, 
under these restricted conditions, a withdrawal of naval 
landing craft from the Black Sea will be acceptable there and 
if so to report the number. 

Return to the Black Sea for use as auxiliary war vessels will 
be out of question. Group South is also to report for Naval 
Staff's information numbers, state of readiness and operational 



15 Oct. 19^3 


plans for naval lair'ing craft in the .Black Sea. 

VIII. Situation East Asia 

According to an Allied report, Rabaul-was attacked on 
13 Oct. by strong British air formations.. In this attack 
177 Japanese planes are said to have been destroyed, 3 
destroyers, 3 merchantmen, V3 small freighters and numerous 
harbor vessels sunk and 1 submarine and 3 large supply 
ships damaged. 

According to a further report, the entire island group of 
New Georgia is in the hands of the Allies. 



16 Oct. 19^3 

Items of Political Importance 

According to a report from "Domei", the Japanese Ambassador 
in Lisbon has been instructed to make representations to the 
Portuguese Government on the occupation of the Azores by 
British troops and their use as a military base. This action 
by Portugal, it states, is a violation of her neutrality. . 

According to Reuer, Willkie intends to run again for President 
in 19^ • He blames the Roosevelt administration for not having 
armed in time for the unavoidable war with Japan or Germany 
or with both.. 

Iu Argentian three members of the cabinet,, who had agitated 
for a breaking-off of diplomatic relations with the Axis 
powers, have resigned under pressure of the military opposition, 

Chief, Naval Staff is absent from Berlin for discussions at 
Fuehrer Headquarters. 

Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff. Naval Staff 
I • Army Situation 

On the eastern front hard fighting has broken out 
along the entire line. Seven centers of attack are apparent; 

1 Melitopol/Zaporozhe, 

2. Kremenchug, 

3, South of Kiev, 
h. South of Gomel, 
5»' Orsha, 

6, Smolensk and ' 

7. Veliki Luki/Nevel. ■ 

Concentration of exceptional numbers of enemy guns caused 
heavy losses to our troops at places. 

In Italy an offensive has started on the entire Volturno front. 
Centers of attack are at Campobasso and in the area of Capua. 


16 Oct. 19V3 

II. N aval Situation ; 

No special conference or decisions 

Special Items 

I . The Japanese Liaison Officer transmitted the following 
report on 16 Oct,: 

"The Russian Naval Attache in Stockholm recently paid a visit 
to the Japanese Naval Attache in Swed en, in order to introduce 
the newly arrived Russian Assistant Naval Attache. The 
latter had traveled to Sweden via Vlandivostok, the United 
States and England. In the course of the conversation the 
Russian repeatedly stressed that it was very fortunate that 
friendly relations were being maintained between Russia and 
Japan. The Japanese Naval Attache is of opinion that the 
emphasis placed on this friendly relationship was not 
formal but quite -genuine. . 

In reply to the question by the Japanese as to the presumable- 
advance of the British and Americans, the Russian replied that 
for various reasons it was very probable that the British 
would penetrate into the Balkans. In reply to the question 
of the Japanese Naval Attache as to whether this undertaking 
would not be against Russian interests, the Russian smiled 
and did not answer. On the question as to how far the - 
Russi3.ns plan to advance on the eastern front, he said that 
he was not informed en this matter, since he was an Attache 
In Sweden j moreover he seemed to be unwilling to. enter into 
a discussion on the situation on the eastern front." 

II. 1. Commander in Chief, Navy has ordered that equipment 
of submarines with 3.7 c -» anti-aircraft guns be carried out 
as a priority measure of submarine warfare. For the present 
single 3.7 cm. guns are entailed. 

2. The first four submarines are already being re-equippad. 

3. ^s soon as the 3.7 cm. guns of the serial production 
can be regarded as ready for operational use, which is 
expected to be in October 19^3, the submarines will be 
equipped with 3*7 cm. anti-aircraft guns as they become 
available, in place of the quadruple maching-gun. 


16 Oct. 19V3 

*+. Priorit " of equipment: 

Submarines in Western France, •' 

Operational submarines from home waters, 

Submarines in Northern Waters and in the' 

Newly constructed submarines . 

5. The number of guns available is still small, 
Production will be speeded up. 

Situation 16 Oct . 

I . War in Foreign Waters 

1. Enemy Situation: 

Radiointelligence reveals the following figures regarding 
single vessels during the second half of September (first 
figure - British, second figure - U.S. ships): 

South Atlantic as far as Freetown 
West coast of South Africa 
East coast of South America 
Indian Ocean, Northern part 
Indian Ocean, Southern part 
East coast of South Africa 
Pacific, Southern part 
Unidentified area 

This survey is incomplete, All vessels in foreign waters 
were advised by Radiogram 1813. 

2, Own Situation : 

The Naval Attache in Tokyo is given the following in- 
struction by Radiogram 2130 5 

1. Since position "Tannenwald" lies very far to the east, 
. Naval Staff suggests that supply should not be carried 
' out at position "Tannenwald" but only a meeting and 
agreement on a new rendezvous about 3 - *+ days ! run 

• -226- 



1 1 





















16 Oct. 19^3 

further west, depending on weather conditions and 

Give your views. 

2. No change in waiting areas and points in the sailing 
orders is intended; they remain in force as reference 
areas and points. Waiting positions and rendezvous 
will be ordered specially according to the situation. 

The photostat copies forwarded by the Naval Attache 
in Tokyo of the 'War Diary of Ship "28", of the 
UCKERMARK and the copy of "Current Doctrine Cruisers 
USF 21" are blurred and unreadable. The Naval 
Attache in Tokyo has been ordered to submit new 
copies when possible. 

II. Situation West Area 

1. Enemy Situation: 

Over the outer part of the Bay of Biscay 37 planes 
were detected on operation. One British vessel was loce'ted 
180 miles southeast of Cape Farewell (Greenland) .and one 3o0 
miles west-northwest of Belfast. 

according to an intelligence report received.. via Lisbon, the 
following ' ships carrying troops and war materiel put in from 
the United States and Canada during the last two weeks of 
September : ' 

. at Plymouth 12 

at Cardiff- ' . 70 

at Swansea- . . .18 

at Liverpool 62 

at Middlesbrough .• • .25 

at Hull " 35 

Since the middle of September no transports- which had arrived 
in England have started back to America. Portuguese military 
circles assume from this plans for 'invasion on .the western front. 
According to a further intelligence '.report,, leading members of 
the sabotage organization which' has been discovered in France 
and is directed from England have, -upon apprehension, revealed 
the code word which is to signal the Anglo-American invasion 
in France. It is a message (for context see teletype 1215) 
which is to be given out by the British radio in two parts, 


16 Oct. 19^3 


as a warning and as an executive signal. A further intelligence 
report from Toulouse states that 25 Oct. is the date fixed for 
the large-scale landing operation on the north coast of France. 
Simultaneously acts of sabotage are planned in Germany, amongst 
other things an attempt on the life of the Fuehrer. ... 

2 • Own Situation : 

Atlantic Coast : 

Destroyers Z "2h" and Z "23 M left for Pauillac. Five sub- 
marines were escorted in» 

Three Italian supply ships have been taken over by the Naval 
Office in Bordeaux, 

Channel Coasts 

Patrol positions were not taken up because of bright 
moonlight. Group West advises Naval Staff for information 
that three boats of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla are to be 
temporarily placed under Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West 
for combatting enemy 
is to be carried out 

PT boats in the Channel. The operation 
fiuring the coming new-moon period. 

Subsequently the boats will be transferred back to the west 


Commanding /idmrial-, Defenses 

West is to transfer 

the FALKE and the MO EVE to Le Havre as soon as 

possible. Torpedo boat T "lV 1 , which is to go -on to horn-: 
waters during the coming new-moon period, will join 


these boats. 
;do Boat 

Group West expects the first operation by the . 5th 
Flotilla to be carried out at the earliest on 21 Oct. from 
Le Havre, For copy of relevant order see teletype 2355. 

Ill " North Sea. Norway „ Northern Waters 

North Sea ; 

Our patrol boats at position "Kairo" repulsed an attack 
by five enemy PT boats at 0100. ' One PT boat was probably sunk; 
no casualties were suffered. For brief report see teletype 
19^1 . 

Convoys "1183" Hook - Elbe and "h6h" Elbe - Hook 'Were carried 
out as planned. So far no incidents have been reported. The 
westbound convoy has put in to Helder temporarily. 



16 Oct. 191+3 

Norway. Northern Waters : 

1. Enemy Situation ; 

Over the North Sea 20 enemy planes were detect 3d on 

On 15 °ct, three flights were reported in the Vardoe area and 
on 16 Oct. and attack by six planes on the Army coastal battery 
in North Fjord.. 

2. Own Situation; 

Thirty ships were escorted north and 18 south. Fifteen 
ships were delayed owing to shortage of escorts. 

Naval Command, Norway reports the disposition of our forces as 
on 15 Oct. For copy as per 1/Skl. 28923A3 Gkdos. see War 
Diary, Part C, Vol Ila. ?■ . ; 

In connection with the exchange of seriously wounded, the 

British hospital ships ATLANTIS and EMPRESS OF .RUSSIA are on 

passage to Gothenburg. Positions of both vessels are given 
regularly and continuously. 

IV. Skagerrak. Baltic Sea Entrances , Baltic Sea 

1. Enemy Situati on; 

- - - i *i ■ ■ - i - i 

North' of Kogland minesweeper M "18" had a brief engagement 
at 0153 with three PT boats, which put up a smoke screen and 
withdrew to the northeast. At 1200 a gun carrier leaving 
Kronstadt Bay was shelled in the channel, so that it was 
forced to return after putting up a smoke screen. 

2. Own Situation ; 

In AhTbaek Bay one mine was swept by a plane. Altogether 
33 vessels and 3 planes wer engaged in minesweeping in the 
area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses', Baltic.' Transport and 
escort operations were carried out as planned. On 15 Oct. one 
of our steamers observed mines being dropped by a plane north 
of Pristerort. The area has been. closed. 


16 Oct. 19^3 

Finnish PT boats have mined the area west of Lavansaari and 
laid a barrage south of .Aomeri. Minelaying northwest of 
Schepel could not 'be carried out.'.by our coastal: minelaying,' 
as the boats were driven off by Bussian patrol vessels. A 
naval landing craft is stranded in the harbor of. Tyters.- 

The hospital ship METEOR and RUEGEN are leaving .Swinemuende 
for Gothenburg for the exchange of seriously wounded, 

According to a report from Admiral, Baltic States the. l8th 
Army Command has recommended that Battery "Bluectier" be 
withdrawn at once in view of the enemy situation. ' As the 
track was unwisely blown up by the Army when the Battery 
was brought up, return will not be possible until the track 
has-been repaired. According to the report of Admiral, Baltic 
States (.for. copy see teletype 08 1 +5) the Army postsare rather 
strained so that further blunders are expected... 

V. Submarine Warfare 

Enemy Situation: 

According to an intelligence report, there was a convoy 
of 9 freighters escorted by 3 destroyers and 7 PT boats at 
0600 on 13 Oct* off Casablanca on westerly course. On the sa 
same day at 1800 19 freighters, h destroyers and 5 gunboats' 
left Casablanca, with air escort, to the southwest. 

2. Own Situation ; 

The westbound convoy in the North Atlantic was again 
detected towards 2000. The shadowing submarine torpedoed a 
steamer of 6^000 GRT in AK 3739 but was subsequently driven, 
off by a destroyer. The. enemy- was obviously employing 
heavy air formations. Four submarines have reported. attacks 
by planes. One was sunk.. in a bombing attack." The operation 
is being continued. From the Indian Ocean submarine U "168" 
reports no targets off Bombay- en 29 and 30 Sept. Six 
freight sailing vessels were sunk by gunfire. On 2 Oct. a 
freighter of. ^,000 GRT was sunk in MH. 67. . ' ' 

VI.' Aerial Warfare 

British Isles and Vicinity . 

Forty-six planes of the 3rd Air Force, were out on operation 

.0 ■ .... 


16 Oct. 19^3 


over the west area (6 of them FW 200 f s) and 13 over the Mediter< 

ranean. During the night of 16 Oct; 3 bombers were sent out, 
on a harassing raid on London and k fighter-bombers against 7. 
Hastings. .Minor enemy forces carried out machine-gun attacks , 
on vessels and radar stations on the north coast of France 
during the day and harassing flights in the west of Germany 
in the evening. 

Mediterranean Theater ; 

Our Air Force carried out teconnaissance in the Italian 
sea area and over the southern Aegean- One He 111 unsuccess- 
fully attacked .an enemy destroyer off Leros e Eight Ju 88's 
attacked battery positions on Leros with. good results. 

In Italy the enemy attacked the railway station at Ankara 
and the airfields of Chiampirii and Marcigliana near Rome In 
Greece he attacked our vessels west of Kos and the airfield of 
Skutari. In the evening and during the night of 16 Oct, ten 
enemy reconnaissance planes were detected over the Aegean 
and three supply planes over the Balkans area. 

Eastern Front ; 

The 5th Air Force reports an engagement in ' the morning 
between three FW 190 T s. and enemy PT boats 90 miles west- 
northwest of Bergen, One PT boat was machine-gunned. • One 
FW 190 sustained damage. 

The Vth Air Force reports - photographic reconnaissance of 
Primorsko and Yeisk, according to which altogether 25 landing 
boats and!05 other boats were spotted. 

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea 

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean : 

No reports on shipping have been received from the Gibr-: 
altar area and the western Mediterranean. 

The two submarines reported at 1900 on 15 Oct, 30 miles 
southwest of Cannes had unsuccessfully fired their guns on 
a unit of naval landing. craft and five barges the same 
morning near St.Tropez and had submerged when our vessels 
returned fire. The submarines were attacked by seven Arado's 
success is possible.. Submarine chasers " 2208" and " 2211" 
were probably successful in destroying., a submarine on the 
day west-northwest of Spezia. 


16 Oct. 19^3 

On 16 Oct. there were two PT boats and two patrol vessels off 
the Strait of Bonifacio $ presumably sweeping our barrage. Most 
of the ships in Salerno Bay have meanwhile been moved to 
Naples. Supplies from Sicily to the Bay of ^aples are carried 
by single vessels. 

Traffic between Malta and Alexandria is increasing heavily, 
according to radio intelligence. 

2. -' Own Situation Mediterranean : 

No operations were carried out by PT boats owing to 
weather conditions. Minesweeping south -of Spezia was continued. 

The minelayer JUMENDA left Spezia southwardbound. for a minelay- 
ing operation. Minelaying operations by naval landing craft." 
on the west and east coasts were- carried out unnoticed and 
according to plan. 

On 15 Oct. submarine U "371" sank a freighter of 6,000 GRT out 
of a westbound convoy in CH 7729; a further- one was probably 
sunk* The .Naval Communications Officer at Toulon is contin- 
uously transmitting the positions of the hospital ship 
AQUILIA from Spezia and the GRADISCA from Patras, both on 
passage to Or an, 

Leghorn is at present without anti-aircraft defense. Request 
for transfer of a fresh anti-aircraft battery has been dispatched 
The harbor of Ortona was demolished by the Army on the evening 
of 15 Oct., according to plan. 

3» Area Naval Group South : 

a . Adriatic Sea : 

Enemy Situation: 

On air reconnaissance sighted two submarines at 1900 on 
15 Oct, south of Hvar. In. the. morning of the same day 15 
planes were observed over Valdna. 

Own Situation : 

At Dubrovnik the steamer SAN GIGI (3,666 GRT ) was hit by 
a bomb and sustained damage. Naval Shore Commander, South 
Adriatic has taken over his duties at Durazzo, 


16 Oct. 19^3 


Two small passenger steamers, 2 tugs, 3 steam boats, h motor 
boats and one former Austrian torpedo boat of 78 tons are 
reported in operational readiness at Cattaro. 

b. Aegean Sea ; ■. 

Enemy Situation : 

,0n 15 Oct. at 1600 two vessels .were, sighted between . .... 
Kalymnos and Nera; this has given. rise to suspicion of mines, 
In the evening two destroyers, withdrawing to the north at 
high speed ten miles west of Kalymnos, were attacked by our 
planes. At OV35 on 16 Oct. the' attack was repeated 6n ' 
destroyers proceeding south in the same area. In the early 
.morning four small vessels were lying in Stampalia Bay 
according to our air reconnaissance. 

At 1500 there were 1 cruiser and k destroyers .making for 
Rhodes 90 miles southeast of Crete and at l5*+0 2 destroyers 
and 2 merchantmen on northwester ly course 70 miles south- 
southeast of Rhodes. According to radio intelligence, the 
Italian radio station on Levitha received orders in the 
afternoon to offer resistance under all circumstances and to 
destroy code, material in case of danger. During the day 
much tactical radio traffic was intercepted, probably in 
connection with the Aegean operation* 

Own Situation : 

It is now reported that on the afternoon of 1*+ Oct, a short 
exchange of gunfire took place between two harbor defense 
boats and a surface submarine in the Kasos Strait east of Crete. 
No damage was sustained by our vessels. 

The convoy of the KARI AND TRAPANX'-was "again' detected by enemy 
air reconnaissance at 0800 and attacked at 1100 by a submarine 
between Amorgos and Levitha. — ■'*--■ 

The steamer KARI (1,925 GRT) with 500 troops aboard was sunk. • 
No. success was observed from depth-.charging. The TRAPANI and 
one submarine chaser continued their passage. One motor 
minesweeper remained at the point where the steamer sank. 
Fifty survivors from th? KARI are prisoners on Levitha. The 
ING2B0RG convoy was detained as there are no safe berths 
available in the Kos area in view of- the present number ol 
ships there. 

The DRaCHE is on passage from Kalymnos to Piraeus. 


16 Oct. 19^3 

During the night of 15 Oct. Kos, Xalymnos and the airfield of 
Maritza on Rhodes were attacked by enemy planes.. No damage is 

In the Santa Maura Channel west of Levkas aerial mines are 

The tanker KNUDSEN dropped anchor in Corinth. The steamer 
LEOPARDI took over 1,000 Italians from the KNUDSEN and is now 
on passage from Patras to Piraeus. The steamer BOCCACIO 
arrived at Corfu from Durazzo. 

For- brief report of the 21 st Submarine Chaser Flotilla on the 
destruction of the OLYMPOS convoy on 7 Oct. see teletype 1200. 

c. Black Sea : 

On 15 Oct. the coast near Cape Opuk was shelled,: apparently 
by PT boats or motor gunboats. During the night of 15 Oct. 
Feodosya and Cape Hi were bomber and amachine-gunned by 
enemyplanes. No damage was sustained. 

Ship "19" and two submarine chasers attacked and probably 
destroyed a submarine located west of Eupatoria in the afternoon, 

Four naval artillery lighters left Gelendzhik to shell enemy 
batteries near Stepanovska and enemy positions on point Lolot- 
shnoye . .... 

The 1st Battery of the 6l3th Naval Artillery Battalion on Cape 
Takil has three guns ready for action. Convoy traffic was 
carried out as planned and without incident. 

VIII. Situation East Asia 
Nothing to report* 

*^0 *A^ ^L* ^to ^L* *^£ *^ *4r* S^g *j^ *b' ^r -A ■ -i* *^^ -.Lf -N^ ^^ ^^ ^Lf ~±r m^f 

-23 1 +- 

17 Oct. 19V3 

Itoms of 'Political Importance 

According to Reuter, "Isvestia" stated in its leading article 
of 16 Oct., presumably on official orders, that all matters 
which might be discussed at the Moscow Conference such as, for 
instance, the treatment of a conquered Germany, would have to 
take second place to the questionof opening the second front. 

According to "DNB M , the German Government' also handed the ■' 
Portuguese Government a note ' of protest on 15 Oct. about the 
facilities afforded the British Government on the Azores, which 
are described as a serious violation of Portugal's neutrality. 
Details in War Diary, Part C, Vol, VIII. 

Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff. Naval Staff 
No special conferences or decisions e 

Situation 17 Oct . 

I . War in Foreign Waters 

1. Enemy Situation; 

recording to an intelligence report from an official 
Portuguese source, Great Britain is demanding Lagos as a 
naval base. The troops which were sent to the Azores as 
reinforcements are to be -"^brought back to Portugal as available 
shipping permits,. Calling up of reserves who served from 
1935 to 1938 with the infantry and engineers is imminent c 

2. Own Situation: 

The BRAKE has been given orders by Radiogram 1336, super- 
seding previous instructions, to arrange departure in such a 
way that she reaches KU 27, left lower corner, on 5 Nov. and 
to be ready to supply three submarines. The individual supply 
operations will take place at long intervals, with a waiting 
period of about four weeks between. The waiting area will be 
grid square KU. 


17 Oct. I9V3 

II . Situation West Area 

1. Enemy Situation ; 

Over the Bay of Biscay ^9 planes were' detected on operat- 
ion. One British vessel was located at 2122 in AM 1 +530, one 
at 2130 in AM 5^0 and one at 21^2 in A M M+50. 

according to intelligence reports, 6 British steamers escorted 
by 1 destroyer and 2 corvettes left the mouth of the Tagus 
southward on the afternoon of 16 0ct o Five other steamers 
are lying in the Tagus ready to sail and are to join a convoy 
bound for England on 17 Oct. .,.'-..'.* ■ 

The operation by six FW 200 T s against a part-convoy expected 
in Lisbon on 16 Oct. was without result. 

In the Channel targets were located byradar from 0205 to 0^20 
between' lie des Bas and Les Sept lies. 

A landing exercise was carried out in the Portsmouth - Isle of 
Wight area, according to radio intelligence. 

2. Own Situation : 

Atlantic Coast : ... 

Two submarines were escorted out and one in. South of 
the Girode one SLM/J mine was swept. At 1030 mine-exploding 
vessel "180" and a patrol boat were attacked by six enemy 
fighters while on a check sweep for ground mines off 3rest c 
Casualties were sustained. One attacking plane was shot 

The torpedo boats F.iLKS, KONDOR and T M lV" are to tnansfer to 
Brest and will leave La Pallice at 1900 on 18 Oct. 

Channel Coast : . "■■ 

At 1710 Battery "Lindemann" fired ten rounds on three 
British prtrol vessels off South Foreland. One of the 
vessels was probably damaged. Patrol positions were not 
taken up because of bright moonlight. 


- -:■ '.'•-. CONFIDENTIAL 

17 Oct. 191+3 

III. North Sea. Norway. Northern Waters ■ 

North Sea : 

One EL W J mine was swept off Terschelling. Otherwise 
nothing to report. , . 

Norway. Northern Waters : 

1. Enemy Situation : 

Over the North Sea 18 planes were detected on operation 
in the afternoon. On 15 and 16 Cct, single planes were 
reported in the Banak and V^rdoe area and over Alta Fjord. 

2. Own Situation : 1 

In the area of Naval Command, Norway 18 ships were 
escorted north and 25 south. Twenty-two ships were left 
lying in harbor owing to shortage of escorts 

Group North/^leet submits a request from the 5th Air Force to 
Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff for an increase 
in fighters on the Norwegian coast in view of- experience's 
regarding fighters on the Norwegian coast in view of experiences 
regarding the enemy operation on k Oct. in the Bodoe area. 
For copy of request see teletype l*+50. The request states 
amongst other things: 

"Our observations during and after the attack,, supplemented 
by statements of prisoners and numerous enemy. radio and 
press reports, reveal the following facts: 

a) The attack was meant to hit our supply traffic at its. 
weakest point. Strong air defense was not expected. 

b) The German Fleet was to be drawn into battle at the same 
time. Since it did not put out for -defense enemy photo- 
graphic reconnaissance, which observed an oil trace by 
the TIRPITZ, is taken as a confirmation that the TIRPITZ 
was damaged by the midget submariheoperation and that 
the German Fleet is therefore out of action. Enemy 
reports and comments further show that the Home Fleet, 
strengthened by UrS, units, has now become free to 
operate at another- points It must certainly be expected, 
however, that the obvious lack of bomber and fighter forces 
will be a strong inducement to the enemy to repeat such 
operations in central Norway and in the Lofoten area." 


17 Oct. 19*+3 - 


Group North/Fleet quite correctly; observes that the statements 
of the 5th Air Force Command stress its own requests regarding 
intensification of air reconnaissance and fighter cover. 

On 18 Oct. : the 5th Air Force plans evening reconnaissance in 
the western, outlet of the Skagerrak as. far as 30° E'. fo] 
laying operation "Kalium". 

IV. Skagerrak. Baltic Sea Entrances. Baltic Sea 

— — — i iti^i n i ■■■ ■ niijii nm — — .i m i mi . iiwumii t m i iw i mimmm *m v* «— i mm mmm p— >' ■ tmmmm ■■*■■■■■■■■■ ■■■ i 

1. Enemy Situation ; 

* No new information obtained, 

2 . Own Situation: 

The hospital ship METEOR and RUEGSN are proceeding' to 
Gothenburg through Swedish territorial waters under control of 
the Swedish Navy. The British hospital ships ATLANTIS and 
EMPRESS OF RUSSIA will be off Lindesnes at 0600 on 3,8. 'Oct. 

No special reports have been received from the areas of 
Commanding admiral, Defenses, Baltic and Commander, Minesweepers 
Baltic. Convey and escort operations were carried out as 
planned e 

Naval Command, Baltic transmits the following report from 
Admiral, Baltic States regarding the situation with the, 1st 
Army Corps and the 18th Army Command on. the evening of 16 Oct.: 

"It may be assumed that preparations for the anticipated 
large-scale attack on the Leningrad front are generally completed, 
considering the enemy's inactivity. S'tart of the attack is 
to be expected within the next day or two . Preparatory 
local attacks must be 3xpected at any time. In the remaining 
area of the 18 th Army there is the same tendency,- with concen- 
tration at the Volchov bridgehead north of Novgorod," 

Naval Command, Baltic also advises Naval Staff of the difference 
of opinion between Admiral, Baltic States and the 18th Army v : . 
Command as regards changing the position of Battery . "31uecher" . 
Naval. Staff has been asked for a decision.. For copy see | 
teletype '1^53 • 'Naval Staff thereupon despatched the following 
teletype to the Naval Liaison Officer with .irrny General Staff ; 

"'1 .' Naval, C ommand , 'Baltic, cables ;• : 

,0- ••/^:; !; ' ; . - ' ! "" ; " : :>r r.' ■■ CONFIDENTIAL 


17 Oct. 191+3 


a. The 18th Army Command has requested that the plan to 
change the position of railway Battery "Bluecher" be 
canceled and that it be used at Krasnoye Selo, since 
a railway coach is not available on account of the 
transport situation 5 the Battery could take part in the 
heavy ground fighting expected near Krasnoye Selo and 
could still also be used against sea targets. Naval 
Command, Baltic has stated in reply that Battery 
"Bluecher" must be withdrawn at once for the following 
reasons; it is urgently required for defense of the 
Estonian coast near Kunda; the situation regarding 
ammunition of captured Russian 15«2 cm. guns demands 
economic use; the crew of Battery "Bluecher" is not 
trained for firing on land targets; its position at 
Krasnoye Selo is absolutely unsuitable from the naval 
point of view. Naval Command, Baltic has' therefore 

ordered that the Battery be moved to Kunda, ( 

b. The transport gear for the parts of Battery "Prinz 
Heinrich" is on its way to Reval, except for special 
coaches for firing cradles and barrels, These will 
only be released by the 13th Army Command for immediate 
use, A request has been made to make them available 
within three days. The track for withdrawal passes 
1,200 m, behind the main defense line and can already 
only be used at night u 

2. Naval Staff is of opinion that naval batteries in the 
Leningrad area should not be used up in the land 
fighting, as they represent the only available coastal 
artillery for reinforcing the Estonian coast. The 
matter should therefore be brougnt to the attention of 
Army General Staff and views regarding immediate 
dismantling reported." 

V. Submarine Warefare 

The operation against the convoy in the North Atlantic 
was continued. Nine submarines report altogether 1*+ air 
attacks. Several losses are to be feared* The enemy has 
obviously adopted a considerable deviation, presumably west 
to southwest, so that shifting of our patrol lino north will 
lead to failure. So far only one steamer of 6,000 CRT has 
been sunk. 

The absence of our air reconnaissance sets Our submarines 
andimposible assignment. Search for the enemy by the submarines 
themselves is not only hopeless but also involves losses, 
in view of the exceptionally strong enemy air cover. The 
Naval Attache in Tokyo receives the following instructions by 


17 Oct. 19^3 

Radiogram 1/Skl. I.U.3190A3 Gkdos, Chefs. 

"1. Schneewind will relieve Schaefer as commander of 
submarine U M l83". Schaefer will take over the 
duties of Schneewind. k 

2. Submarine DOMMES is to be equipped with six G 7a and. 
nine G 7c torpedoes. 

3. Attempt will be made by three MONSUN submarines to 
■call at Penang. 

^o The submarines from the operational areas of the Gulf 
of Aden and off Bombay are now operating in the Gulf 
of Oman. The one off Bombay reported on 29 and 30 
Sept. no targets off and in the harbor. Very heavy 
traffic consisting of cargo sailing vessels in all 
directions, especially in the northwest close to 
shore. Six cargo sailing vessels- sun& by gunfire on 
2 Oct. northwest of Bombay. One freighter of 
^,000 GRT sunk 5 no naval, patrol. On 5 Oct. strong a 
air activity by twin-engine planes during the day." 

No further reports of success have been received from the 
Indian Ocean. 

VI . Aerial Warfare 

British Isles and Vicinity : 

Sixty-eight planes of .the 3rd a±t Force were out on 
operation over the west area and 12 over the mediterranean. 

During the night of 17 Oct. 19 planes were out on operation 
against London, There was only a small number of enemy , 
flights during the day. During the night also only minor 
formations were on operation in the coastal areas of the west 
area and over the western part of Germany. Nine high- explosive 
bombs were dropped on Aachen. For particulars see Daily 

Mediterranean Theater ; 

Nospecial reports have been received from the Italian 
area. In the area of .iir Force Command, Southeast our formations 
attacked Castell Rosso and Porto Lago (leros). ''An enemy unit 
south of Rhodes was also attacked c Two direct hits by SC 2^0 
bombs were scored on a cruiser. One enemy plane was shot down 


17 Oct. 19^3 ' 

]astern Fronts 

Nothing to report, 

VII. v/arfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea 

!• Enemy Situation Mediterranea n; 

On the afternoon of 16 Oct, h tank landing craft and 2 
destroyers and in the morning of 17 Oct, 3 U.S destroyersand 
6 gunboats put in to Gibraltar. 

A convoy of 10 freighters in ballast, escorted by 2 destroyers, 
passed through the Straits of Gibraltar at 1715, westbound, 

No reports have been received from the western and eastern 
Mediterranean, On 16 Oct, 10-15 vessels, presumably PT boats, 
were detected in the harbor. of Ajaccio. A submarine was 
reported off -Sestri Levante at 1300 

2. Own Situation Mediterranean; 

No report on minelaying operation "Juminda" has .yet 
been received. There were no PT boat operations because of 
weather conditions , MLnesweeping on the coastal route from 
Spozia to Leghorn was without result* This route is now open 
to traffic. The harbor basin of Ortona was mined. Submarine 
U "73" fired a spead of four torpedoes which missed- -on a -large 
westbound freighter and a destroyer in CH 8511. ... • . ,, • 

The attention of Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean is 
drawn by aval Staff to the fact that the situation demands 
mining of'Brindisi as soon as possible. Thus an advance in the 
date when submarine U "^53" is ready for operations is 
necessary as far as this possible. Commander, Submarines, 
Mediterranean, reports in this connection that date of 
departure cannot be scheduled before 21 Oct., in view of the 
moon, ■;■. - ..■ : 

Naval Staff is of opinion that a few more hours of darkness 
can already be reckoned with some days before the above 

The hospital ship DJSNNE left Marseilles at 1700 and the 
hospital ship SINAJA at 2100, both bound for Oran in connection 
with the exchange- of wounded. ;. 



17 Oct. 19^3 

Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reports with regard 
to the decision of Armed Forces High Command (see War Diary 
15 Oct.) that his own request of 13 Oct. crossed with Naval 
Staff's decision about the same matter to German Naval 
Command, Italy. 

Commanding General, Armed Force, South when despatching his 
request, did not have in mind a minelayer from the Aegean but 
the minelayer FASAN, which will be ready shortly and has 
been promised' to Group South he request that this vessel be 
put under German Naval Command, Italy for a short time. 
Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reports, with reference 
to point 2 of the decision, that investigations are being 
made at present as to whether his transport requirements in 
%he Adriatic Sea can be met with the vessels which are 
available and those which can be expected, in the near future. 

Furthermore, Commanding General, Armed Forces, South advises 
Naval Staff for information of the following report to Armed 
Forces High Command, Operations Staff: 

"The naval gunners (about 2/3 of the 6l6th Naval Artillery 
Battalion) at present available in the area of Commanding 
General, Armed Forces, South are not sufficient to man 
those batteries available and ready for action which are 
absolutely necessary for the defense of Elba and the Piombino 
Strait. The three 15 cm. and one 9cm. batteries manned so 
far are already operating with a minimum of personnel and 
have to be supplemented by Italian volunteers » At least 
another two 10 cm. batteries will, have to be manned. German 
Naval Command, Italy plans to withdraw the remainder of the 
6l6th Naval Artillery Battalion, now in Leghorn, and to 
transfer it to Elba or Piombino „ The personnel to be 
withdrawn from Leghorn should be: replaced by a corresponding 
unit from the Naval Artillery Battalion at Spezia.' No 
direct agreement about this transfer has been reached with 
Army Group B. A decision is therefore requested. Particular 
reference was made before.- to- the importance of Elba by 
firmed Forces High Command." 

3« Area Naval Group South 

a. Adriatic Sea ; 

On the morning ofl6 Oct*: an unidentified ship was •• 
sunk -by our gunfire when entering the Corfu Channel. Admiral, 
Adriatic fears that it might be the steamer 30CCACI0. 

according to an enemy report, two steamers were seized by a 
British torpedo boat during the night of 15 Oct. in the North 


17 Oct I9V3 "~ 

Adriatic; one of the steamers was scuttled and "the other one 
was brought in. Group South assumes that the steamers' involved 
are the POCARICA and the MSRANO which were on their way from 
Zara to Cattaro, Steamers which have to use the routes west 
of the Dalmatian islands are geing detained for the present. 

The steamer POTESTA was damaged by a bomb in an air attack on 
Cattaro and beached.. 

The steamer ITALIA put in to Zara from P©la on the afternoon 
of 16 Oct.; she was unsuccessfully shelled by enemy batteries 
during her passage.. 

b. Aegean Se a; 

Enemy Situation ; 

"Kds was bombed on 16 Oct, At 0037 on 17'. Oct * two destroyers 
attacked the convoy of the steamer TlAPANI and submarine chaser 
"2109" on the east coast of Kalymnos. The convoy put in to 
Atti Bay, where submarine chaser "2109" was shot up at 0100 
from close auarters. The, steamer vTRAPANI and naval landing 
craft MFP "333" were set on fire. 

During the same night enemy PT boats were detected in the 
Kalymnos area. 

At 03^3 two destroyers shelled the steamer SANTORINI in Vathi 
Bay (Samos) . 

At lM+5 a naval vessel was. sighted 15 miles north of Samos on 
easterly courses and a cruiser with three torpedo boats 120 
miles south-southeast of Scarpanto on course 3^0° • In "the 
evening two enemy destroyers swelled Calino. ■ ; 

It is now reported. fron the night of 15 Oct. that light PT 
boat LS "5" was shot up in an attack by seven enemy planes 
northwest of Kos and beached on the evening of 16 Oct, on 
the north coast of Kos. 

Own Situati on ; 

— — — — — — — — ~— .— — v 

1- he DRACHE and submarine chaser "2110" .put in to Piraeus. 
When submarine chaser "2109" was destroyed in Atti Bay five 
of the crew were killed^ 



17 Oct. 19^-3 

Motor minesweeper R "211" was unable to rescue any survivors 
of the steamer KARI because of heavy seas. Two crash boats 
despatched from Milos had to return because of bad weather. 
A Do 2h sea-rescue plane had an accident when taking off and 
sank. Only submarine chaser "2110" was able to rescure 
180 survivors, some of whom were badly wounded. Later, coast 
patrol boat G "h2" searched the scene of the disaster without 
success, another 50 survivors are- on Levitha. They cannot be 
taken off the island on account of the unsettled situation 
and weakness of our naval and air forces.- Another 20 
survivors have been brought to Kos by a Do 2h plane. ■ 

According to a report from coast patrol boat GA nl +l", the 
steamer SaNTORINI was heavily damaged in Vathi Bay when shelled 
by two destroyers. 

Coast patrol boats sustained no damage e 

At 1853 Naval Staff despatched a report by teletype on the 
above losses to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, 
Navy and to Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, 
Naval Liaison, Order 1/Skl. 29103A3 Gkdos, in War Diary, 
Part C, Vol. XIV. 

The tanker MUDS EN is on her way through the Corinth Canal 
to Piraeus, The steamer LEOPAKDI dropped anchor off Corinth 
on the afternoon of 16 Oct. 

Co Black Sea ; 

On the morning of 16 Oct. Feodosiya and Cape Hi as 
well as ships on the roads were bombed and machine-gunned. 
No damage was sustained. 

On the morning of 17 0ct o air attacks, also unsuccessful, 
were reported on the southern point of the Crimea and near 
Cape Chauda. 

The large evacuation cnnvoy from Sevastopol, comprising Army 
landing boats, was twice attacked on 17 Oct, by enemy planes 
with torpedoes, bombs and machine-guns off the western point 
of the Crimea. One naval landing craft was heavily damaged 
by a torpedo hit; however, it was impossible to tow it into 
Ak Mechetc The convoy proceeded on to Skadovsk. 

Four naval artillery lighters shelled the north coast of the 
Sea of asov in the area of Stepanovka with good results,, 
Slight resistance, by heavy enemy guns was ineffective. The 
shelling could not be repeated during the night of 17 Oct. 
owing to weather conditions, 


17 Oct, 19V3 

PT boat S rrl +7" was transferred from Constanta to Ivanbaba. 

.it 2131 on 15 Oct. submarine U "23" torpedoed a freighter of 
2,000 GRT out of a convoy off Poti. Sinking was not observed. 

VIII . ' Situation East Asia 
Nothing to report. 




18 Oct . I943... . CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Political Importance 

According to Reu'ter a report issued by the Naval Committee 
of the U. S. Senate states, that the crisis in submarine 
■warfare is now on the decline. The Battle of the- Atlantic is, 
however, still heavy and subject to hourly changes. 

In two reputable English publications, the "Yorkshire Post" 
and the "Quarterly Review* , anxiety is expressed about British 
merchant shipping. After the war the United States will 
probably; possess two to three times as many freighters as 

Great Britian. The British merchant Navy has lost its best 

ships. New ships, which are much inferior, have taken their 

place. The revival of normal trading. is in danger,, since 

Great Britain is still dependent for her whole existence 

on overseas trade. 

Conferenc e "with Chief, Naval S te f f 

A. Notes on discussions held at the Fuehrer Headquarters 
on 16 and 1? Oct as per l/Skl 3392/^3 Gkdos. Chefs, are 
contained in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VII. 

B. Discussion wi th Air Commander Atlantic C o^st, Lt. 
General Kessler: 

Chief, Naval Staff stated that submarines had during the 
last weeks searched the North Atlantic unsuccessfully for 
enemy convoys. No air reconnaissance is carried out in the 
North Atlantic. It was true that in one case a convoy, which 
was within the range of the long-distance reconnaissance 
planes, was contacted, but transmission of beacon signals 
by the plane did not lead to the target. Obviously also 
the position was incorrect. Air Commander, Atlantic Coast 
replied that new navigational aids (Radiosonde: devices 
for recording weather conditions and wind speed at great 
altitudes - Tr . N. ) had considerably increased the- accuracy 
of fixes by the planes . 

Commander in Chief, Navy stated that the purpose of the 
discussion was to ascertain what assistance the Air Force 
could give to submarine warfare in the near future, espec- 
ially by reconnaissance from Norway and Western France* ■•■ 

Air Commander, Atlantic Coast replied: - 

1. A squadron of He 1 TT i will be available on 23 Oct. 
-Single Ju 88 H2's will probably be on operation from 
the beginning of November as long-range fighters. 


18 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

2. On 4 Nov, a squadron of FW-200's equipped with radio- 
controlled glider bombs and a spare tank, and " 

3. On 8 Nov.. a squadron of Ju 290' s will be on operation. 
Transfer of planes to Norway is possible, if advice 

is given on the area where reconnaissance is desired 
about 2-3 days beforehand. 

Commander in Chief, Navy considers appointment of a Liaison 
Officer of Air Commander, Atlantic Coast to Submarine 
Division in Berlin to be necessary. Air Commander, Atlantic 
Coast approved this appointment. 

Commander in Chief, Navy explained that the transmission 
of beacon signals is more important at first than the 
despatch of the reconnaissance report itself. 

Commander in Chief, Navy further inquired when action may 
be expected against the enemy air escort of convoys in the 
sea area west of Portugal. 

Air Commander, Atlantic Coast considere this certainly poss- 
ible with Ju 88 H2's and perhap with He 177' s. This matter 
will be investigated. 

Air Commander, Atlantic Coast urged that submarines utilize 
British location transmissions for taking a bearing, as 
seems possible in the. case of planes. "What he had in mind 
was the way in which the British had utilized the radiation 
of the Metox set. 

Commander in Chief, Navy considered this facility impossible 
for submarines, since the Metox was a continuous transmitter, 
whereas radar only sends out beams in a certain direction. 
Air Commander, Atlantic Coast was asked for fuller information, 
which was promised. 

C. Situation: 

I. Army Situation: 

The enemy offensive continues along the entire eastern 
front. There is heavy pressure on the area Melitopol/Zap- 
orozhe. The situation has become extremely critic 11 north 
of Kremenchug. Here the Russians have broken through with 
exceptionally strong forces end advanced 25 km. Our material 
losses through gunfire are serious. Our reserves are at 
present not ready for action. Assignemnt of the 24th 
Armored Pivision from northern Italy and of the l4th Armor- 
ed Division from France will be too late end is also badly 


18 Oct. 1943 . , C ONFIDENTIAL 

hampered by traffic difficulties. The break-through at 
Kremenchug must be regarded as extremely serious in view 
of the devisive strategic consequences. South of Cherkazy 
also the enemy succeeded in penetrating at some points. 
In the area north of Kiev the situation has also developed 
unfavorably. Here the enemy carried out no less than 23 
stubborn attacks by day. Two of our division are cut off and 
have been ordered to fight their way through. In the area of 
Gomel our forces have been withdrawn to the "Panther 11 pos- 
ition. In the area of Orsha enemy attacks have assumed 
proportions so far unheard of. The attack was preceded by 
a barrage of funfire of previously unknown intensity. One 
throusand ground-attack planes were out on operation. It 
was possible to hold our position, however, even though 
losses on our side were heavy. 

In the area of Velikl-Luki our forces gained a full-scale 
defensive success. South of Leningrad the enemy concentrat- 
ion has not yet been completed. Apart from all the above 
mentioned focal points, the enemy is assembling further 
strong assault forces in the area east of Toropez and 
Veliki Luki. 

The general situation on the eastern front is, therefore, 
extremely tense. In Italy two of our divisions from the 
north arrived at the "Bernhard" position. The enemy Is only 
following our withdrawal movement to this line with hesitation. 

In the area of Ljubljana fighting has again become lively. 

Bridges on the main traffic lines near Agram were blown up: 
this hampers our movements considerably. The center of the 
enemy's concentration is observed in the area of Sarajevo. 
A large-scale attack on this town is expected. 

II. Re: Operation "Pau l": 

Considerable objections have been raided by Commanding 
Admiral, Task Force and Naval Command, Norway against the 
instructions of Quartermaster Division regarding accommo- 
dation of 600 Dockyard workers on the STAVANGSRFIORD. 
Billetting these workers on shore, as plsnned, also 
meets with difficulties. 

Chief, Naval Staff considers it unnecessary for High Command, 
Navy to deal with all details of this matter. He merely 
requests that the workers be accommodated in such a way 
that they are protected against submarine attacks, i.e. that 
all ships which are brought up for this purpose should be 
put in net enclosures. 


18 October 1943 '-"* • CONFIDENT IA: 

Commanding Admiral, Group North/Fleet and Chief , Naval '."'* 
(Ship) Construction Division participated in the discussion' 
on this matter. Chief, Naval Staff demands that repairs to ■-/:'. 
the TIRPITZ ""be speeded up by all available means. Chief, Naval 
(Ship) Construction Division will be able to report the final 1 
date as soon as the investigation commission has returned to :j 
Berlin. According to present estimates, four months will be 
needed from the date when repairs are in full swing. This is 
provided that all the necessary facilities - tugs etc. - 
are available for operation "Paul". It is expected that 
repaird will be started at latest on 15 Nov., and will be 
completed by the middle of .March. 

III. Deputy Chief, Naval Communications Division reports that 
in the "Netzhemd" trials a setback has occurred, since certain 
necessary conditions could not be observed. 

IV. Q uartermaster General; , ; 

In connection with the ruling of Commanding Admira.l, 
Group South regarding operations by merchantmen -in the 
Agean Sea, the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping 
has submitted the. following reply: 

"1. The fact that operations and military requirements in 
the Aegean area have precedence over all others is to 
me a matter of course.. Shipping has so far been put 
into operation only according to this principle. 

2. Supplies to the areas in question have been continuously 
held up through the lack of escorts and delays in convoys, 
as can be proved. ... 

3. The Mediterranean Shipping Office' is not a commercial 
undertaking which has shipping at its own disposal. 
Shipping is managed only by the Deputy for German Sea 
Transportation in the Aegean, as a political office. 

4* I refer to the Fuehrer's order of 30 May 1942, which is 
still unchanged and in force. I refer further to the 
order of Commander in Chief, Navy of 22 April 1943- I 
have not heard of any change in these two orders. Before 
they are changed the Deputy in the Aegean should in any 
case be heard and an agreement 'reached with me on such a 
change . " 

Before further measures are taken, concrete data which Admiral, 
Aegean has been asked to produce must be awaited. 


18 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

In a Highly Restricted Circle: 

V. Group South transmits the following teletype of Command- 
ing Genera 1, Army Group E to Armed Forces High Command, 
Operations Staff. A copy of this teletype was sent to the 
Naval Group for information: 

"On the basis of personal observations of conditions 
around Kos and of the convoy battle on 15 Oct. I report: 

1. The British are not using Leros . Apart from a unit 
off Caste 11 Rosso there are always two destroyers, 
which are continuously relieved, standing by in a 
Turkish bay during the day. They come out to meet 
our convoys on receipt of an air reconnaissance 
report. During the night they sail round Kos and 
Kalymnos, escorted by search planes. 

2. I have given orders that the TRAPANI convoy be 
brought up in such a way that it reaches Kalymnos before 
dusk on 16 Oct; the troops are to be disembarked at 
once and the ships concealed individually in bays. 
Discharging later on according to the situation. 
Although the destroyers search the bays every night 
with searchlights they have found no ships so far. 
Daytime passage of the convoys under air escort may 

be successful but passage in the Kos area at night 
will lead to destruction. Nightly ferry traffic from 
Kos to Kalymnos by single naval landing craft and' 
motor sailing vessess in the periods between two 
destroyers is proceeding with minor losses despite 
intense night air reconnaissance. The submarine which 
has been disturbing our traffic was sunk yesterday. 

3. Transfer of the landing troops to Leros with many 
boats must lead to an encounter with destroyers, sine 
one trip alone from Kos to the landing point on Leros 
takes five hours. A bridgehead being. Vbuilt up could 
not be supplied and the irreplaceable naval landing c 
craft would be lost, also troops and equipment. The 
destruction of the OLYMPOS convoy on 7 Oct. has proved 
that naval landing craft are absolutely powerless 
against destroyers. In this engagement not only the 
steamer, but also her escort of six naval landing 
craft and one submarine chaser, were sunk within a 
very short time. 

4. 3$y original order to General Mueller for operation 
"Leopard" contained the condition that there was 

no direct danger from warships. This, however, is now 
continuously the case. 


18 Oct. 19^3 _ :_ , . CONFIDENTIAL 

Operation "Leopard" -has, therefore,, been delayed 
permanently unless Turkey closes her territorial 
waters or permits us to engage the enemy in battle 
there . 

5. In my opinion only two. "ways are left to us for the 

.occupation of Leros, which has not lost its importance 
to us : 

a. A landing similar to previous plans for operation 
"Leopard", with the cooperation of powerful naval 
forces, suddenly brought up. Admiral, Aegean could 
provide 2 destroyers, 2 torpedo boats, 1 submarine 
and 3 PT boats for this by 5 Nov. 

b. An entirely new operation from the north via Chios 
and Samos for gradual encirclement of Leros. Adm- 
ire 1,. Aegean favors this solution, which I do not 
propose as it would require too much time and too 

. many troops, I recommend the more risky solution 
■ a), as it would probably lead to an early success, 
and request approval, I have, however, not yet 
altered the present operational order, so that 
any chances of success which may offer themselves 
can be made use of." 

Group South has commented as follows in this, connection: 

"1. It is observed that the Air Force has so far neither 
given a clear- picture of ■ enemy naval forces in the Aegean area 
nor of enemy movements there and sottheast of Rhodes. The Air 
Forces has also been unable to eliminate enemy forees or stop 
r e inf or cements . 

2. .The increase in fighting strength through captured ^ 
Italian destroyers -and torpedo boats should not be overestim- 
ated, as they are in no way equal in armament, speed and 

training to experienced British naval forces. 

3. Group .South doubts whether the forces of the Army 
and Air Force a.rq sufficient for the landing on Leros under 
present conditions-,' but. cannot judge here. Anyhow the Navy is 
ready to use all its • facilities, for carrying out the. operation 
Group South is fully aware of the possibility of heavy .losses 
during and after Landing, owing to lack of defenses on our 
part. . -. •• 

k. Postponement of the operation, regardless of whether 
it is according to previous plans or via Samos, means a 
serious loss of time, which offers the enemy the possibility 
of further reinforcement and weakening of our forces through 
losses . 


18 Oct. 1945 '• CONFIDEN TIAL 

■ withdrawal of our forces until a Inter date in order to 
minimize such losses -would give the enemy full freedom 
of action, possibly also for an at trek on Kos . 

5. The ides of carrying out our attack via S r mos is 
not to be rejected in itself, but will require additional 
forces and we may expect the same difficulties through 

enemy naval forces and also, while we are making preparations, 
reinforcement of his position on Leros until it is impreg- 

6. Group South is therefore of opinion that the landing 
should be carried out as soon as possible, provided that 
there is a considerable strengthening of the air forces 
participating. " 

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff advises Naval 
Staff for the information of the following instructions to 
0| Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast-: 

"l. The Fuehrer has decided that present plans 'for oper- 
ation "Leopard" <sre to be adhered to and that the operation is 
to be carried out according to the situation, either in a sur- 
prise attack without awaiting reinforcement or, if this is 
impossible, after arrival of the additional light navnl 
forces provided. 

2. Permission to engage British naval forces in Turkish 
territorial waters cannot be granted. 

3. With regard to the requested reinforcements of the 
Air Force it can be expected that a bomber group will be 
■transferred to the southeastern area already in October. 
Transfer of a further bomber group is planned, but the date 
when it will be in operational readiness cannot yet be 
definitely assessed. 

4. The evacuation of- the Italians from Rhodes ■ is to be 
carried out as quickly as possible, using all available means 
and even at, the risk of losing ships and military internees. 

In order to offer an 'incentive to the Air Force to 
evacuate the Italians also by air, the Fuehrer has approved 
that all Italains removed by air are to be at the disposal 
of the Air Force as- workers . "■ 

Chief,. Naval. Staff states- .that the main point of the operation 
lies in the strategic value of the islands, Chief of staff, 
Naval Staff draws attention to the political considerations ■ 
which are devisi^-e for holding the Aegean islands. The heavy 
sacrafice of irreplaceable shipping would not be justified froi 
a purely military point of view. "The time will come when we 
will have no more vessels," 



"With regard to the report of Commanding. General, Army Group E, .. 
Chief, Naval Staff is forced to state that intervention in 
natters which solely concern naval warfare, without consult- 
ing Naval Staff, is not prenis.sable and must be rejected. 
The following personal teletype from Commander in Chief,' Navy 
is therefore dispatched to Chief, Armed Forces High Command: 

"I an: responsible to the Fuehrer for naval warfare in all 
theaters of war. I therefore request that Commanding Generals, 
Armed Forces be instructed that letters, such as the one from 
General. Loehr (Amy Group E) la 0227/43 Gkdos . Chefs, of 16 
Oct. 1943, be sent to Naval Staff at the same tine as to 
Armed Forces High Command, so as to enable me to express my 
views in time on the execution of the naval operation." 

Group South also reports the following in connection with 
operation "Leopard": 

"1. In the Kos area 1 submarine chaser, 4 naval landing 
craft, 4 motor minesweepers, 3 decoy ships, 1 armed fishing 
vessel ready. In view of last night ; s incident, no bay is 
considered 'safe any more. Request of Admiral, Aegean for 
permission to withdraw operational vessels during the night 
has therefore been approved. The remaining vessels will be 
assembled for defense, together with Army units, in the ports 
of Kos and Calino. 

2. According to a telephone converse t Ion with Army Group , 
E, it does not wish to cancel this old operational order, 3D 
that General Mueller can utilize any favorable opportunity for 
starting out. According to information received from the 
Army Group, the Fuehrer has decided that, if such an opport- 
unity does not offer itself before, the solution proposed by 
Army Group E according to the old plan shall be retained after 
however, destroyers and torpedo boats have become ready for C 

3. Admiral, Aegean has therefore been ordered to comply 
with the request of Genera 1 Mueller to utilize any favorable 
opportunity for starting out, but otherwise to effect with- 
drawal especially of slow vessels in agreement with General 
Mueller. No favorable opportunity should be missed out, on 
the other hand, the vessels are, If possible, to be disposed 
in such a way that not all of them can be found and destroyed 
by the enemy. 

For copies of teletypes as per l/Skl 3110/43 Gkdos. Chefs, 
29128/43 Gkdos. anC 3H3/43 Gkdos. Chefs, as well as order 
l/Skl 29197/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV. 




18 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

With regard to control of submarines in the Aegean, 

Chief, Naval Staff has decided that tactical control should 

rest with Admiral, Aegean "while the transmission of orders 

by radio should remain in the "hands of -Commander, Submarines, 


Special Items 

I. Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy brought -with him 
a list of Italian warships as of 11 Oct. 1943. For copy as 
per 1/Skl 29209/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV. 

II. Chief, Naval Ordnance Division, Bureau of Naval Armament, 
as Naval Representative for War Economy submitted to Commander 
in Chief, Navy on 12 Oct. a written report on the effects of 
the raw material assignments during the last quarter of 1943* 
in order to give an insight into the present situation 

The steel assignments to the Navy during the last quarter of 
1943 were, contrary to the agreements between Commander in 
Chief, Navy and Minister Speer, made for specific purposes 
and are absolutely inadequate for fulfillment of requirements. 
The following are figures in tons per month (excluding the 
warship construction quota): 

Requirements Assignments 

Guns 19,029 11,100 

Ammunition for guns 32,440 14,000 

Torpedoes 14,634 - 11,495. 

Mines • ' 36,564 20,344 
Other purposes 

(general requirements) ■ 40,034 19,800 

TOTAL: 142,701 ■'■ 76,73 9 

The tasks ordered cannot be carried out as assignments are 
below requirements. In order to carry out the most important 
and essential t^sks of naval warfare the following addit- 
ional assignments of steel (and corresponding metal assign- 
ments) are necessary for the last quarter of 1943: 


Ammunition for guns 



Other Purposes 

Total additional assignment 21,4.30 tons per mo. 




per mo. 



ti ti 



II n 



!! tl 

18 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

Warships construction (ship and ships' engines) Is not 
induced, in the above figures . 

These further assignments must be made in addition; if 
necessary they must be made available from the quota for 
warship construction at the expense of the Fleet Construct- 
ion Program. The 15,000 tons per month promised from Italy 
must be used for the above purposes. 

This assignment of raw materiel to the Navy confirms the 
demand made time and time again that a distribution for 
specific purposes by offices which are not within the Navy 
is impossible and that a total quota (including warship 
construction) must be assigned to the Navy, the distrib- 
ution of which to individual tasks of the Navy can only be 
effected according to the decision of Commander in Chief, Navy 
through High Command, Navy. For copy of the report for Chief 
of Staff, Naval Staff, with an annex showing the effects 
of the short assignment in detail, as per 1/Skl 32155/^3 geh. 
see War Diary, Part B, Vol. V. 

III. Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Navies Branch 
reports on new informatoon obtained regarding British landing 
craft, According to this report, the Landing Craft Support 
(LCS) has been supplemented by a large type of boat which is 
armed with a strong mortar battery. Probable designation 
"Landing Craft Support" (Large) I LCS (L) . Armament consists 
of J>2 mortars probably of 8.1 cm. caliber, shells weighing 
6.9 or 9 kg. and being fired electrically, either singly 
or in groups. This report also contains particulars of 
the LCM III and also of "Landing Craft Flak" (LCF) of 
a heavier type, with a main armament of four 10.2 cm. 
anti-aircraft guns in twin-mountings and four 2 cm. anti- 
aircraft guns . 

For copy of report as per l/Skl 3l65V^3 gen. see War Diary, 
Part B "Evaluation of Intelligence on Foreign Navies". 

Situation 18 Oct. 
I. War in Foreign Waters 
1. Enemy Situation: 

Nothing to report. 
2. Own Situation: 

■A.t.1331 the following message was received from the 
Naval Attache in Tokyo: 

"1. The MICHEL torpedoes! and sunk at 0230 (Tokyo time) on 
17 Oct. 



by an enemy submarine 120 miles south-southeast of 

2. At 1145 on 18 Oct. one lifeboat with Lt. (j.g.) 16 
non-commissioned officers and 53 men landin at the southern 
point of the Izu Peninsula. 

3. The Japanese Navy is searching the position with 
planes and ships for further lifeboats. 

First of all information must be awaited as to what 
security measures were taken for the ship, whose loss- 
just before completing a long and successful opera tloi 
is felt to be especially tragic. The Naval Attache in 
Tokyo has been requested to report what .measures, have 
been taken and already carried out and .whether the 
ship was escorted by naval or air forces. «. .'•'. 

II. Situation West Area; 

1 . Enemy Situation : 

Over the Bay of Biscay 33 planes were detected on 
operation. On British vessel- .was located at 18.14 in CG 4360. 

Radio Intelligence observed In the Channel practice radio 
traffic between Portsmouth and four vessels and eleven 
other stations , which indicates a tactical exercise being 
carried out in the Portshouth area . 

At 1042 two PT boats in BF 3323 were shelled with five 
rounds by our battery at Gris Nez. The boats withdraw at 
high speed. 

2. Own Situation: ■■ . 

Atlantic Coast: 

Five- boats of the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla are being 
transferred from 3rest to Concarneau for torpedo firing and 
exercises with the. Air Force. Transfer of the FALKE, KONDOR 
and T "14" has been postponed fro 24 hours owing to suspicion 
of ground mines off La Pallice. The outer Gironde is closed 
to traffic as ground mines are suspected there. On 16 Oct. 
a plane swept two ground mines off the Gironde, a mine- 
exploding vessels swept one off La Pallice and a minesweeper 
swept another one off La Pallice. 


18 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

Channel Coast 

The tanker OSTRRIEDSLAND Was transferred on 16 Oct. 
from Rouen to Le Havre." Patrol positions w^re not taken up 
because of bright moonlight. Convoy traffic was carried out 
in the Channel Islands area only. The anti-aircraft defense 
of the radar station at Gris Nez and naval anti-aircraft 
guns shot down two Spitfires in the Griz Nez area. 

At 2315 motor minesweeper RA "l 1 struck a mine off Ostend; 
she was under slung and towed into Ostend. Motor Minesweeper 
RA "2", which was assisting RA "1", also struck a mine at 
2358 and capzized, without any casualties being sustained. 
Both boats probably struck mines with snag lines. 

Group Vest has requested permission to use the "Aphrodite" 
and "Drachen" decoys for the NORDVAARD and MUEN3TERLAND 
Channel convoys. Submarine Division has raised objections, 
eearing disclosure of "Aphrodite". Chief, Naval Communications 
Division considers it doubtful whether use of the "Aphrodite" 
will be effective. Chief, Naval Staff has therefore decided 
against its use, since prospects of success, in view of its 
adaptation for submarines, are too small in comparison to the 
risk of disclosure. 

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters 

North Sea : 

Minor casualties were suffered when seven enemy planes 
attacked the ferry DINTELSAS and two boats of River Mine- 
sweeper Flotilla. Otherwise nothing to report. 

Norway, Northern Waters : 

1. Enemy Situation: 


Over the North Sea in the morning 18 planes were 
detected on operation and later on 12 planes. On the evening 
of 1? Oct. the Air Force radar station on Fed je -located a 
naval target proceeding at a very high sp@ed, possibly 
a PT boat. Admiral, West Norwegian Coast believes, however , 
that a false location is likely. 

According to a report from submarine U ll 757 ,, j there are 
submarines off Advent Bay. and Ice Fjord. It is possible 
that the base is being supplied by submarines. 


18 Oct, 19^3 C ONFIDENTIAL 

2. Own Situation: 

At 0113 the SCHARNHORST reported noises similar to sonic 
telegraphy or echo-ranging which were clearly heard first by 
the SCHARNHORST and subsequently by a barrage patrol vessel. 
The barrage patrol vessel dropped depth charges, whereupon 
these suspicious noises ceased; they were also observed by 
the destroyer RIEDEL apart from the SCHARNHORST and the 
barrage patrol vessel. The alarm in Lange Fjord has been 
lifted, but intensified security measures remain in force. 

In the area of Naval Command, Norway 23 ships were 
escorted notth and 31 south. Twenty-t-wo ships were delayed 
owing to shortage of escorts. 

Weather observation ship KOBURG reports her position as 75 
degrees 20' N 1? degrees 30' V in heavy peek- ice. Alternative 
camps are planned on the ice and on shore. Commander in Chief. 
Air Force, Operations Staff advises Naval Staff for inform- 
ation of orders to the 5th Air Force that reconnaissance 
for operarion "Bassgeiger" is regarded as unnecessary, 
but that supplies by air which become necessary are to be 
carried out. 

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Batlic Sea 

1. Enemy Situation: 

Nothing new to report from the are^ of Admiral, 
Baltic States and Commander, Mineweepers , Barlic. 

2'. Own Situation: 

Mine laying operation "Kalium" in the Skagerrak :,"■ 
was carried out by the minelayer ROLAND with four minesweepers 
and two patrol beats. The hospital ships METEOR and .R-UEGEN 
put in to Gothenburg at 1100. The two British hopsital ships 
are expected on 19 Oct. 

The Haval Liaison Officer to High Command, Army, Army General 
Staff reports that Chief, Army General Staff agrees with the 
view held, ; by Naval Staff- regarding withdrawal of Battery 
"Bluecher" and that Army Group North has been advised. The 
questions of using the naval batteries in the Ipnding fight- 
ing has been settled with Admiral, Baltic States. 

Otherwise nothing to report 


18 Oct. 1945 CONFIESNTIAL 

V. Submarine Warfare 

The operation against the convoy in the North Atlantic was 
discontinued at noon, as interception seemed unlikely and the 
submarines are too far apart for further operations. 

The convoy "was reported at 2000 in AK 0115. The submarine 
giving this report observed strong night air activity. The 
complete failure of this operation -was undoubtedly due 
to the strong air escort. The main point of defense of this 
convoy was obviously the air escort, since sighting of only 
one destroyer was reported during the entire operation, it 
must therefore be assumed that the majority of the six sub- 
marines missing were lost through air action. Thus the enemy 
has now adapted his defesse to our tactics which led to 
success in the convoy operation "Leuthen". It will be 
necessary to strengthen the anti-aircraft defense of submarine 
by an increase in caliber. 

VI. Aerial Warfare 

British Isles and Vicinity: 

In the afternoon an enemy formation of about 150 Fortresses 
with strong fighter escort flew Into the area Aachen - . 
Malmedy - Cambrei via the Scheldt estuary and Le TrepoPt; 50? 
of our fighters went into operation. One Spitfire was shot down 
and we lost five planes. 

Minor formations also flew into the areas of Bremen and 
Frankfurt on Main, but carried out no attacks. In the even- 
ing another concentrated attack was carried out by strong 
enemy formations on Eanover, which caused ■considerable 
damage especially to the outskirts of the city and to indust- 
tial installations. Further damage was sustained -in Ne us s , 
Duisburg and at the August Thiessen Foundry at Hamborn. Our 
fighter defense consisting of 2^6 planes has so far reported 
15 enemy planes shot down. During the same night four of our 
planes were out on operation against London. 

Mediterranean Theater : 

Our air reconnaissance extended as far as the Oran area. 

The enemy attacked the airfields at Viterbo and Siena and, 
in the Aegean Sea, the airfields of Candia end Antimachia 
near Kos . Further air attacks are reported from Skolpye, 
where railroad installations and a German transport train 
were hit. 


18 Oct. 19^3 CONF IDENTIAL 

One of our convoys was successfully attacked in the Aegean 
Sea. (The steamer SINFRA). 

Eastern Fronts . 

The 5th Air Force had altogether 43 planes out on 
operation. No special reports have been received. 

VII • Wa rfare in the M editerranean and Bl ack Sea: 

1 . Enem y Situation Mediterranean; 

A small amount of shipping, inward and outward 
bound* is reported from the Gibraltar area. Our air reconnaiss 
ance observed heavy westbound traffic between Algiers and 
Oran. Between 1405 and 1420 northwest of Oran 22 freighters, 
2 cruisers and 3 patrol vessels were reported on westerly 
course, the cruisers and patrol vessels putting in to Oran; 
also north of Arzeu 13 freighters on southwesterly course and 
northeast of Arzeu 23 naval vessels on course 240 degrees. 
Submarine U "73" detected a small westbound convoy 50 miles 
west of Algiers and probably sank a steamer of 6,000 GRT 
out of it. 

In Oran 22 freighters and 8 LST's were sighted and on the 
roads 11 freighters, 1 tanker and 1 LST. 

In Mers el Kebir there were 11 Liberty ships, 7 freighters, 
2 passenger steamers, 2 tankers, 2 heavy cruisers and 6 

Increasing ferry traffic was observed in the Strait of 
Bonifacio. According to our radio Intelligence, the transfer 
of British submarines to the eastern Mediterranean is to 
be inferred from radio traffic. 

2. O wn Situ ation Mediterranean: 

1 " ' ■"■ ■■ h ■ ■ ] — m am ■■■■ . n . i ... i.» — i , i ■ , ,. , , ... 

The minelayer JUMINDA and three motor minesweepers 
carried out a mine laying operation from Nettunia according to 
plan. This unit was unsuccessfully attacked in the morning 
by four enemy fighters south of Ostia, while on return 
passage. The torpedo boat IMPAVIDO was commissioned as TA "1" 
and the torpedo boar PAPA as SG "20," at Genoa on 17 Oct. 

According to a report from German Naval Command, Italy the 


18 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

measures taken by the Liaison Staff of . Commanding General, 
Armed Forces, South in Rome are producing very few Italian . 
volunteers. Recruiting is now being put into Italian hands. 
In addition, German Naval Command, Italy is trying to recruit 
volunteers through its own offices in the ;large naval bases. 

German Naval Command, Italy submitted mine laying plans' dated 
10 Oct. for the west coast of. Italy, the Rivera and the Ad- 
riatic Sea. A mine barrage for the defense of Spezia and 
Leghorn, having top priority, has already been laid by the 
BRANDENBURG and the POMMERN. The following have been carried out 
or are being carried out off the threatened coast from Civit- 
avecchia to Gaeta : •".'-■ 

Mine laying off Nettunia 

Closing the entrance to the Tiber mouth 

Closing of Gaeta harbor 

Mining of the coastal stretch of Terracina. 

Further, reinforcement of mine defense is being prepared 
through a barrage from Cape Linaro to north of Civitavecchia 

It is also planned to lay a mine barrage, taking in the island 
of Elba, as far as Giglio Orbetello. It is planned to start 
this in the south. 

This will be followed 'by defense of the Riviera., especially 
priority laying of a defensive mine barrage off Genoa. 

For mine defense of the Adriatic coast it is planned to mine 
Ortona, to lay a barrage belt between Tremiti and the coast 
and small flanking barrages on the anticipated coastal route 
of the enemy. Offensive use of mines is planned by mining of 
Olbia , Ajaccio, the Strait of Bonifacio and the main ports on 
both coasts. Naval Staff has approved in principle the plans 
and priority sequence of the various sectors. 

J>. Area Naval Group South ; 
a . Adriatic Sea : ■ 

The steamer BOCCACIO coming from Corfu put in to 
Patras on 17 0&t.,The apprehension felt about her loss is, 
therefore, unfounded. ■. • 

The steamer ITALIA with five Siebel ferries and five infantry 
landing boats arrived at Zara on the afternoon of 16 Oct. 
from Pola . The 6l2th and 623rd Naval Artillery Battalions 
arrived at Trieste on 18 Oct. 




18 Oct. I945 ; CONFIDENTIAL 

Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic moved on 16 Oct. 
to Duifo near Trieste. 

Group South reported on 15 Oct. details of barrage projects 
for the Adriatic Sea and mine requirements. Naval Staff has 
already. approved barrages RA "23',' "24" and "25" and assigned 
the required mines.. Naval Staff points out, -with regard to 
future, barrage projects off Cape Promontore and Cape Ploca, 
that these areas are especially favorabee for enemy submarine 
operations.. Laying of the barrages, -which are very desirable, 
is hindered by shortage of UMB mines; they can therefore 
only be laic gradually. Of the two barrages planned, the one 
off Cape Ploca appears to be the more important, since it 
protects the traffic along the Dalmatian coast. 

b. A egean Sea : 

Enemy Situation: : 

.The two destroyers -which shelled Calino on the 
evening of 17 Oct. -were reported at 2250 on 17 Oct. ten miles 
east of Stampalia on course 210 degrees proceeding at high 
speed. According to a later report, one of them "was a cruiser. 
At 0130 on 18 Oct, . destroyers or torpedo boats -were' sighted 
off the northwest point of Kali'mnos on course 250 degrees and 
subsequently putting in to Leros . At 0545 there were three 
vessels, presumably torpedo boats, east of Leros off the 
Turkish Coast. Remarkably heavy - trai fie consisting of steamers 
and sailing vessels has been o served for days off the Turkish 
coast, according to a report of Commander, 21st Submarine 
Chaser Flotilla . 

At 1446 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers were located. 90 miles' 
south of Rhodes on northerly course, At Castell Rosso, accord- 
ing to photographic reconnaissance, there were 9 PT boats, 
2 M.tG.B.s, 1 L.S.T. and 1 seaplane. According to a sighting 
report, there were at 0540 2 motor minesweepers or PT boats 
on easterly course northwest of Castell Rosso. 

Own Situation: 

Reports so far reveal that of the 500 men aboard 
the steamer KARI 320 survivors have been rescued, of whom 
180 are wounded. Fifty survivors and parts of Parchute 
Company "Brandenburg" overpoweded the British garrison on 
Levitha* A mopping-up party of Assault Division "Rhodes" 
occupied the island of Calchi without enemy resistance. On 
the afternoon of 16 Oct. two naval landing craft probably shot 
down an enemy bor..ber on the north coast of Kos . 


18 Oct. 19^3 .CO NFIDENTIAL 

According to a report from Group South, the following ships . 
have become total losses in the operations against Kos and 
Leros so far; The steamers OLYMPOS and KARI, the minelayer 
BULGARIA, submarine chasers "2 109 "and "2111" and six naval 
landing craft. 

The steamers SANTORINA and TRAPANI, light PT boat L3 "5" 
and one naval landing craft sustained damage. The TRAPAINI 
is afloat, according to the latest report. Her engines are 
undamaged but the fire in her bow has not yet been exting- 
uished. The local Naval Commander on Kos has been authorized 
by radio to carry out temporary withdrawal of the nav^I 
forces and steamers which are endangered to the Cyc lades 
area, in agreement with General Mueller, should operation 
"Leopard" not be carried out during the night' of 17 Oct. 

The steamer GERDA TOFT with 2,000 prisoners aboard put in 
to Piraeus from Cepha Ionia on the evening of 17 Oct. The 
steamer SINFRA put in to Suda on the morning of 18 Oct. 
from Candia and put out for Piraeus in the evening. 

c. Black Sea : : 

A large convoy of Army boats in two groups left 
Sevastopol in the afternoon for Nikolayev escorted by 
five naval landing craft. Ship "19" and three submarine 
chasers were sent out on anti-submarine patrol west of 
Eupatoria. Three naval artillery lighters and two combined 
operations boats left Genichesk to take up patrol line off 
the northwest coast of the Sea of Asov. 

Submarine U "24" put in to Sevastopol from operations and 
is to leave again on the evening of 19 Oct. 

VIII. Situation Wast Asia 
Nothing to report. 

•* * •* -* ■* * * -* -* ■* ■* ■* •* * * ■*•* ■* * ■* ■*"*- * •* ¥r 




19 Oct. 1943 : • - • ' ' : i • CONFIDENTIAL. 

Items of Political Importance 

Eden and Hull arrived in Moscow on 18 Oct. According to . 
an "Exchange" report, "Krasnaja Swesda ' , the publication of 
the Russian High Command, has, on the eve of the Conference, 
again commented on the problem of the second front and design- 
ated this question as decivive for the future conduct of- the 
war. At the same time "Isvestia" attributes the critical 
state of the war to the hesitant attitude of the Western 

These statements prior to the opening of the Confernnce are- 
a clear indication of the Russian plans for discussion. 

According to a Swedish press report, -well-informed circles 
in London have affirmed that Moscow intends to demand Allied 
recognition of the Ribbentrop/Molotov demarcation line of 


It is to be assumed that the above is a ruse. No stone is 
being left unturned to induce the Russians to discuss 
political matters, It is, however, obvious that the Russians 
will not discuss anything until the question of the front in 
western Europe has been dealt with. The fact that the British 
and Americans are well aware of this is proved by the really 
pitiful attitude of The Times" which attempts repeatedly 
to put forward political questions and from the start to 
offer the Russians the boundaries of 194l as a bait. 

Conference on the Situation With Chief, Naval Staff 

I. A rmy Situation 

On the eastern front, extension of the enemy break- 
through at Kremenchug is serious. The situation remained 
more or less stable at the other points of' attack. 

In Italy our withdrawals to the final defense line were 
carried out slowly and according to plan. 

In a Highly Restricted Circ le 


for the 

II. a) Chief, Naval Staff expressed his deepest regret 
the loss of Ship "28". The report on Japanese measures 
safe escort of the raider into ports, are to be awaited. It 
is hoped that these measures were equa.l to our endeavors for 
safe escort of the Japanese submarines KIRSCHBLUETE and 


19 Oct. 19^3 C ONFIDENTIAL 

b) The failure of submarine operation "Schlieffen" is to be 
attributed to enemy air action. A loss of 6 submarines out 

of 18 on this operation is most serious. Chief, N-°val Staff 
has induced Minister Speer to take the necessary steps at once 
for equipment of submarines with "Orgel" (improved light, 
multiple barrel anti aircraft guns ? Tr. N. ) 

c) Chief of Staff, Naval Staf f brought up for discussion the 
question of intensified submarine operations in the Black Sea. 
Transfer of submarines overland and long the Danube takes an 
extremely long time. The question as to whether submarines can, 
be built at Black Sea dockyards should be investigated again. 

Special Items 

1. A chart showing all naval forces and merchantmen in the 
Mediterranean as on 15 Oct. 19^3* which was drawn up for a 
report, of Chief, Naval Staff to the Fuehrer, is contained 
in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV. 

II. Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy submitted on 7 Oct. 
a proposal of the Under Secretary of the Italian. Navy to 

set up again in Berlin a Liaison Staff to High Command, Navy 
which will assume the tasks of the Naval Attache and of Admiral 
Bertoldi at the same- time. Naval Staff has requested. Armed 
Forces High Command, Operations Staff to give its approval 
that the Lt. Dr. de Mori, who is at preseht in Berlin, be 
recognized as Liaison Officer and later, according to develop- 
ments in the situation and the requirements resulting there 
from, be granted a. Liaison Staff as is requested by the Italians 
This has been approved- and the German ^aval Command, Italy adv- 
ised accordingly. 

The Naval Attache's Section has been ordered to advise Lt . Dr. 
de Mori. ..*'... ... 

III. High Command, Navy, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division 
issued the following order on 16 Oct.: 

"1. In accordance with the instructions received from Armed 
Forces High Command, Naval Staff is taking the necessary meas- 
ures, as far as the Navy is concerned, for utilization of the 
Italian' forces . 

2. Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch 
is obtaining information, in cooperation with the other offices 
of High Command, Navy and operational Commands, for drawing up 

demands to the Italian Armed Forces and will issue the necess- 
ary instructions regarding organization. 


19 Oct." 19^3 C ONFIDENTIAL 

3. Vice Admiral Welch old, "who will' remain under Chief 
of Staff, Naval Staff, will be -instructed to submit, 
the demands of Naval Staff to- the High Command of the 
Italian Navy, In close agreement -with the Organization and 
Mobilization Branch, and to come to an agreement regarding 
execution of the measures necessary for thier fulfillment. 

Situation 19 Oct. 

i. War in Foregln Waters •'•■••■ 

No new reports have been received regarding Ship 1, 28". 

II, Situation West Area 

1 . E nemy Situation; 

Over the Bay of Biscay 29 planes were detected 
on operation. 

2. Own Situation: 

A tlantic Coast: 

Two submarines were escorted out. Destroyer Z "32" 
was transferred from Le Verdon to Pauillac. Five boat3 of 
the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla carried out exercises off' 

During the night c.f 19 Oct. torpedo boats T ".14 J the FALKE 

and the KONDOR will be transferred from Le Pallice as far 
as Brest. 

Cha nne 1 Coast: 

On 17 Oct. one ELM/ J mine was swept off Zeebruegge 
Otherwise nothing to report. : . 

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Wate rs 
North Sea : 
At 1000 30 Beaufighters attacked patrol and salvage 


19 Oct. 1943 CONF I DENTIAL 

near the wreck of the STRASSBURG north of Ijnuiden; four planes 
have so far been reported shot down. The STRASSBURG caught fire 
Some of our vessels sustained damage and suffered casual- 
ties. At 1130 the hJ "07" ( the converted ABRIANA) was attack- 
ed by eight planes on the West Scheldt and was heavily damaged. 
Boats of the River Minesweeper Flotilla shot down two Typhoons". 

Four ground mines were swept off Texel. 

Convoy "465" Elbe - Hook consisting of two steamers left at 

Norway, Northern Waters: 

1. Enemy Situation; 

Over the North Sea 13 planes were detected on operat- 
ion. Our submarines off Spitsbergen reported at 1018 1 steamer 
and 2 destroyers and at 1210 5' destroyers putting in to Ice . 
Fjord. Four abailable submarines are taking up position off- 
Ice Fjord. In the afternoon 1 light cruiser with a ship's 
plane and 3 destroyers were sighted in Advent Bay and at 
2345 4 vessels leaving Ice Fjord at high speed, westbound. 
Submarine U "737" was rammed and damaged at 1655 during the 
attack on destroyers off Barentsburg but is luckily able 
to submerge and has started on return passage. The cruiser and 
destroyers from Advent Bay were reported at 2200 withdrawing 
to the west. 

The appearance of such strong forces at Spitsbergen is 
worthy of note. Economic reasons can hardly be decisive 
for this . On the other hand, the strategic value of the base 
seems to be rated very highly by the British now, which 
is easily understood In view of the Russian interests in 
this area. From this aspect operation "Zitronella" now gains 
Increased value. 

Minor reconnaissance activity was reported in the Petsamo/ 
Vardoe area on 18 Oct. 

2. Own Situation: 

In the area of Naval Command, Norway 36 ships were 
escorted north and 26 south. Owing to shortage of escorts 
21 ships were left lying in harbor, 

Group North/Fleet submits a report from the SCHARNHORST about 
the noises heard on 17 Oct. For copy "see teletype 2333* Neither 
the Task Force nor Group North/Fleet are able to account for 
the incident. 



19 Oct.. 19^- ' • '• ••' ..- CONFIDENTIAL 

Group North/Fleet has no operational objections to barrages 
"WW' 62" and "63" planned by Naval Commend, Norway. 

IV. S kagerrak , Baltic -Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea .• 
1 • Enemy Situation: 

In the evening our coast on Kronstadt Bey was shelled 
from the sea, presumably by guardboats. A minesweeper unit 
southeast of Little' Tyters was fired on at noon by mines - 
sweepers of our barrage patrol-; it put up a' smoke screen and 
withdrew to the north. 

The British hospital ships went on at 0715 from the anchorages 
a through Swedish territorial waters to Gothenburg.-. 

2 . Own Situation: 

Minelaying operation "Kalium" is the Skeggerrak was 
carried out by- unit ROLAND according to plan. . --. 

One ground mine was swept north of Arknoa and one north of 
Seelands Rev. 

In view of the enemy's minesweeping operationa and the. 
expected enemy offensive in the Leningrad area, Naval Command, 
Baltic has approved the plan of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic 
to. reinforce :"Seeigel" barrages "6a" and "7a" at once. 

The Finns have laid a shallow minefield at the northern point 
of Hogland. . .- " : 

Naval Command, Baltic transmits the following report of 
Admiral, Baltic States on the situation in the area of the 18th 
Army Command: 

"1. Southern Sector: . 

Following the increased railroad traffic observed lately • 
from the direction of Moscow towards Mai -Vishera, heavy- 
enemy attacks from the Volkhob bridgehead, must be expected. . 
in this area. Since 18 Oct . the enemy has "been attacking here . 
in groups up to the strenghh of a company. 

2. C entral Sector; " : . . ' . . • 

The second local point of the expected attacks is on the 


19 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

front of the 28th Army Corps in the direction of Lyubaii . 
with the object of reaching the highway and thus dividing the 
Army into two parts. -,-■ : ,; - . 

3 . Northe r n Sector : 

Heaviest concentration of attacks in front of the 50th 
Army Corps; the direction assumed is Gatshina. Out of the 650 
enemy planes known to be in the whole area 450 have been 
assembled, according to latest observations; it is therefore 
to be expected that the attack will be carried out with strong 
assistance from ground-attack planes and also tanks. The attack 
is to S:tart on 20 Oct., according to statements made by 
deserters. It must be assumed that the enemy has completed 
all preparations, since everything was quiet in this area 
yesterday. No reconnaissance could be carried out yesterday, 
as the enemy did everything to prevent this. 

Own preparations: 

The sector of the 170th Infantry Division has been made 
smaller and the 215th Infantry Division has been moved into 
position between the 170th Infantry Division and the 8 1st 
Infantry Division. A further division has been withdrawn 
from the sector east of Mga and is being held in readiness 
for the points of concentration to be expected. Anti-tank 
defense has been reinforced." 

V. Submarine W arf are .-. 

In view 00 the expediences in convoy b^t&le . "schlieffen" 
attempts will be made in the next operation, by keeping the 
submarines closer together, to enable quicker approach or the 
dispersal of defense.- Should too strong enemy air escort 
be encountered attempts will be made, by breaking off the oper- 
ation in time, to avoid excessive losses. It is necessary to 
strengthen the anti-aircraft armament of submarines. 

Submarine U "154" was off Ponta Delgada from 14. to 16 Oct., 
but sighted nothing. The harbor was empty. 

Submarine U "648." intercepted on 11 Oct. in BF 57. and 48 
a momentary location transmission on the centimeter wave. 

Regarding submarine warfare in Northern Waters see Situation 
Northern Waters, 

A pleasing report on successful operations has been received 

from the Mediterranean. ■ : 


Wr • 

19 Oct. 1945 C ONFIDENTIAL 

VI. Aerial Warfare 

British Isles and Vicinity: 

The 3rd Air Force had 58 fighters out on operation in the 
west and seven planes in the Mediterranean. 

During the night of 19 Oct. six bombers were out on operation 
over London, 

During the day the enemy carried out machine-gun attacks in 
the west area, besides the attack reported on the S.TRASSBURG. 
Two dredgers were damaged. 

Mediterranean Theater: 

Our Air Force carried out reoonna issance over the western 
Mediterranean and the Italian area. Air Force Command, Souty- 
east now reports regarding 14 Oct. that a destroyer which 
was attacked in the Aegean Sea by two He Ill's was probably- 
damaged. On 19 Oct. ten Ju 88' s attacked the harbor and sea- 
plane base in Cartani Bay (Leros), One Ju 88 attacked a freighter 
or in the harbor of Samos. 

During the day the enemy attacked the airfields of Tuscania 
(west of Viterbo), where one Ju 88 was destroyed by fire; :>ne 
Spitfire was shot down by anti-aircraft guns. Further attacks 
were carried out on the sea -rescue station of Crete and on 
Syros. Six reconnaissance planes were detected over the Aegean 
and nine west and south of Crete. 

Eastern Front: 

During an attack by 30-35 enemy planes on one of our 
convoys off Kybert our fighter escort shot down 14 planes. 
The convoy sustained no damage. No report on this has yet 
been received from naval offices. 

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea : 
1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean: 

Three destroyers left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean. 
At 1600 a convoy of 43 freighters and 1 tanker, all in ballast- 
passed through the Straits of Gibraltar, westbound. Six 
freighters and 21 tank landing craft put in to Gibraltar from 
the easto 


19 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

Three U. S. destroyers, 5 gunboats, 9 tank landing. craft, 
2 freighters and 1 tanker left Gibraltar in the afternoon, 

Cape Spartel reported at 1500 a convoy of about 40 ships 
heading for the Mediterranean. 

Submarine U "431" detected and then successfully attacked a 
-westbound convoy at 0306 in CH 7^96. Two freighters of 
10,000 and 8,000 G.R.T. -were sunk, 1 freighter (10,000 GRT) 
probably sunk and 1 steamer (12,000 GRT) torpedoed. 

According to evaluation of photographic reconnaissance the 
folio-wing were identified on 18 Oct.: freighters amounting 
to 226,000 GRT and 9 loaded LST's on the roads in the harbor 
of Oran; freighters amounting to 153,000 GRT and tinkers 
amounting to 16,000 GRT in Mers el Kebir, also 36 L.C.I.s 
proceeding towards the harbor. According to evaluation of 
photographic reconnaissance of Algiers, there were 88 merch- 
antmen in port at 1230 on 19 Oct. Reconnaissance sighted at 
1305 50 miles northeast of Algiers 7 destroyers on easterly 
course. Ferry traffic across the Strait of Bonifacio was 
still lively. It is likely that minesweeping operations are 
being continued. On the afternoon of 18 Oct. there was a 
convoy consisting of 7 freighters southeast of Cape Spar- 
tivento on northerly course, presumably carrying supplies 
to Taranto. At 0935 on 19 Oct. two submarines were sighted 

20 miles east of Toulon. The steamer AVERSA (3,723 GRT) 
was sunk at 1212 off Rapallo. 

Naval Intelligence Division, Enemy Situation Branch summarizes 
British submarine operations in the Mediterranean during 
September 19^3 s s follows: 

The number is assumed to be unchanged at present, being about 
50 submarines . 

The success of operations against our shipping makes it un- 
likely that a withdrawal of submarines from the Mediterranean 
can be expected in the near future. The route between Corsica 
and the mainland was the main center of operations in Sept- 
ember and next to it the Aegean Sea . 

Sufficient targets will be offered in future by the traffic 
between Italy and Greece, along the Dalmatian coast, 
'coastal traffic in southern France and Italy and especially 
in the Aegean Sea. Furthermore, supplies to the Insurgents in 
the Balkan area may assume an important part. 

Enemy submarines in the Mediterranean sank in September 
altogether 13 of our merchantmen totaling 15,246 GRT, 1 Ital- 
ian submarine 




19 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

Enemy submarines in the Mediterranean sank in September 
altogether 13 of our merchantmen totaling 15,246 GRT, 1 
Italian submarine chaser, the minelayer BRANDENBURG and 
3 auxiliary warships, Two merchantmen totaling 11,23^ GRT 
were damaged. 

The approximate achievement of the submarines is estimated 
at 4l GRT per submarine per day. The corresponding figure 
for July and August were 40 and 49 GRT respectively. 

Both we and the enemy reported only the Greek submarine 
KATSONIS sunk in September. 

The First Lord of the Admiralty stated on 16 Sept. that 
4l British submarines have been lost in the Mediterranean 
since the beginning of the war. 

According to data available to Naval Intelligence Division, 
out of the total of 62 British submarine losses so far known, 
of which 58 are confirmed by the .Admiralty, 28 were estab- 
lished to be in the Mediterranean. It has been ascertained that 
another 12 submarines were sunk outside the Mediterranean. 
It is quite possible that of the 18 sinkings, the locations 
of which have not been determined and which we cannot yet 
account for, 13 took place in the Mediterranean. 

2. Own Situation Mediterranean: 

Coastal traffic consisting of small vessels was 
hampered by bad weather. No PT boat operations were carried 
out for the same reason. 

German Naval Command, Italy reports that the JUMINDA carried 
out her operation on 16 and 1? Oct. with Italian mines, min- 
ing strip one mile wide to sea from the 10 m. line be- 
tween 13 degrees 14 ' East and 13 degrees 17' E. One naval 
landing craft each mined Gaeta and Ortona on 15 and 16 Oct. 

The hospital ship DJENNE put in to Oran. 

Group West has reported, V ith reference to the return of 
French steamers to southern France, that no German crews 
are available in southern France and that French sailors 
refuse to go to Italy on account of the armstice conditions 
and losses sustained. Group West has hesitations about French 
ship owners being involved, since the plan to return the 
steamers would thus become known to the enemy. 

Naval Staff does not consider the last reason to be sound, 
since our plans would in any case not remain secret to the 
enemy. German Naval Command, Italy, for information Group 
West, is therefore ordered to investigate and report how 


19 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

high danger- ■ of loss is estimated to be, taking risks into 
consideration, and -whether the efforts expended for return 
will be justified by advantages attainable. The attention 
of Group West is drawn to the fact that participation of 
French s&ip owners does not rest with the Naval Office at 
Marseilles but is a matter for the Reich Commissioner of 
Maritime Shipping. 

3. Area Naval Group South : 

a . A driatic Sea: 

The Army plans to occupy the islands of Previci 
and Zlarin near Sibenik on 19 Oct. The Navy has made five 
Siebel ferries and four infantry landing boats available. 

The steamer E. H. FISSER (5,1^5 GRT) was sunk by a submarine 
at 1550 on 18 Oct. six miles off Dubrovnik. The crew was 
rescued. The steamer MERANO (3,705 GRT) and the tanker POZARICA 
(7,751 GRT) are overdue en route from Zara to Cattaro. This 
might confirm the report of 17 Oct. of one steamer being 
seized by enemy torpedo boats and scuttled. 

b. Aegean Sea : 

Enemy Situation: 

The following were located: on the evening of 18 
Oct. two shipping targets passing through. the Scarpanto Strait 
at high speed; during the night of 18 Oct. two other ship- 
ping targets proceeding at high sp.eed on southerly course 
in the Ka sos Strait. Air reconnaissance sighted at 0050 ten 
miles south of Kasos two vessels, apparently destroyers, on 
course 30 degrees. At 2030 and towards 2400 on 18 Oct. the 
town and harbor of Kos were shelled by two destroyers. At 
09^5 on 19 Oct. a cruiser and two destroyers shelled the 
harbor of Kalymnos. At 0530 a damaged destroyer was seen 
being towed by another destroyer on southerly course in the 
southern bay of the Gulf of Medella . 

Own Situation: 

Unloading of the damaged steamer TRAPANI is being 
continued. The steamer SINFRA (4,470. GRT) was sunk en route 
from Suda to Piraeus by enemy bombers at 0237 north of Suda . 
The ship had 204 German and 2,389 Italian soldiers and also 
71 Greek convicts aboard, apart from her cargo. According to 
reports received so far, 566 men have been rescued, includ- 
ing I63 German Soldiers . 




19 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

During rescue operations one Do 24 Was sunk by enemy planes 
and a crash boat and a rescue veesel damaged. At 10^0 coast 
patrol boat GK "51" "was sunk by an enemy plane north of 
Cape Sparta without any casualties being sustained. 

Group South requests that reports on submarine sinkings 
should not be published as a general rule so that, even 
when the enemy presumes a loss, he is kept in the dark 
regarding its cause and, for instance, may think it -was 
due to mines. 

c . Black Sea : 

Enemy Situation: 

The radar station on Cape Takil reported naval 
forces at 2007 2 miles south of the Strait of Kerch on 
southerly course and at 2021 in the same area -what -were 
presumably heavy forces on -westerly course. According to 
radio entelligence an enemy reconnaissance plane transmitted 
a report on one of our convoys vest of Cape Tarshanskutki 
to seven submarines in the operational area. The convoy was 
unsuccessfully attacked at 0748 by two torpedo bombers. 

Own Situation: 

Shelling of the north coast of the Sea of Asov by 
naval artillery lighters has been postponed until 20 Oct. 
at the request of the 44th Army Corps. Barrage "S 71" has- 
been laid as planned. 

The steamer THEODERICH ran aground on 18 Oct. ten miles west 
of Ochakov, while en route from Nikolayev to Odessa. Salvage 
operations are under way. 

Chief, Submarine Branch, Quartermaster Division has made 
investigations with regard to the possibility of repairing 
submarines at Salonika and of expanding the base. Group 
South has submitted a preliminary report. According to this, 
it will be possible within six months to set up emergency 
submarine repair facilities for three VII C type submarines 
and six smaller submarines with the present installations at 
Salonika. A final solution lies in the construction of a 
protected ase at Tusla, 20 km. southwest of Salonika. At 
least two years will be required for its construction. , For 
copy of report see teletype 1050. This matter will be dealt 
with further by Quartermaster Division in cooperation with the 
Main Committee for Ship Construction. 


19 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIA L 

Group South reports that Admiral, Aegean plans' to use 
naval landing craft -which are transferred to his area 
solely for transportation purposes, as further merchantment 
In view of the lack of merchant marine personnel, Admiral, 
Aegean has suggested that naval personnel be given civilian 
clothes and papers accordingly. Group South does not consider 
this course practicable and requests that civilian crews be 
made availabel. Admiral, Black Sea estimates that at least 
90 naval landing craft are required for cureent tasks. How- 
ever, Group South is of opinion that in view of the situation 
in the Aegean Sea eight naval landing craft must be trans- 
ferred from the Black Sea, as soon as Turkish persission for 
passage through the Dardanelles has been obtained (see 
teletype 2135). 

Quartermaster Division has advised the Reich Commissioner of 
Maritime Shipping and Armed Forces High Command, Supply and 
Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas that Army 
Group A has urgently requested Group South for further sea 
transports for dispersal of forces from the Crimea; an incr- 
ease of the previous daily average transport from 500 tons to 
1,500 - 2,000 tons is required. Quartermaster Division points 
out that it is necessary to lay down the tasks on which 
available shipping in the Black Sea is to be concentrated by 
the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping. 

VIII. Situation East Asia 

Nothing to report. 



r ' 

20 Oct. 19^3 C ONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Politic al Importance 

A few statements of a speech by Smuts on 19 Oct. are 
noteworthy. He stated, amongst other things, that all 
branches of the Armed Forces must be concentrated for the 
final large-scale assault on the fortress of Europe - 
and they will be next spring. It is quite possible that 
American troops -will play a decisive part in these oper- 
ations. A decision is to be forced next year as early as 
possible. The Allies will first concentrate on Europe, then 
on Japan. The future organization which will be respon- 
sible for security of the nations after the war can only 
be effective if it carries out its work with steadfast 

Commenting on the situation in the various theaters of war, 
Smuts emphasized that the battles for Stalingrad and El 
Alamein were the turning points in this war. Referring to 
the Russian losses, Smuts declared that the maintenance of 
Russian attacks following their heavy losses was aston- 
ishing and British admiration unbounded, but that this should 
not lead to underestimating one's own achievements. The 
Allied air offensive has assumed proportions which are 
equivalent in effect to a large additional front. Plans 
were laid quietly and much progress had been made. Still 
greater progress can be expected with confidence, espec- 
ially in southern and southeastern Europe. The ring around 
the fortress of Europe will be closed in the coming winter 
and preparations are being made for the attack next year. 
The manpower of the United States will be ready for the 
decisive battles in this attack. 

♦ > 

Smuts then outlined conditions in occupied Europe and stated 
in this connection that there is little time left and that 
from now on every moment is valuable. The morel and physical 
conditions, especially in the occupied conn tries, are In- 
describable. If Europe is to be rescued from unspeakable 
misery, endeavors must be made to finish the war as quickly 
as possible. In conclusion, Smuts declared that the Atlantic 
Charter already outlines the future security plan. 

Smuts' statement about the offensive in Europe are described 
in Washington as a preliminary clarification for the Moscow 

Reporting on the opening of the Moscow talks, "Exchange 
Telegraph" states that there is basic agreement with regard 
to the agenda. The subjects of a purely military nature will 
be dealt with when discussing each individual theater of war 
No communiques on the progress of the discussions will be 
issued, according to Reuter. Stalin will not participate 
personally in the discussions. 


20 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

"Associated Press" reports that Hull, in contrast to Eden and 
Molotov, is not authorized to make final resolutions, so that 
the British and Americans can always evade embarrassing 
situations -which may arise during the proceedings. 

According to "DNB", Turkish and neutral circles in Ankara 
are impressed by fears which the British Ambassador there 
has expressed abouththe Russian plans for Europe. The 
Ambassador is said to have declared that the pro-Soviet 
tendency of certain British newspapers, which would like to 
promise large areas of Europe to the Soviets, are in no way 
shared by official British quarters, The present united war 
against Germany does not exclude the fact that England will 
also find it necessary one day to stop the Soviet advance 
into Europe. 

According to a Swedish press report, it is expected in London 
that the British and Americans will request at Mpscow the 
concession of air bases in Russian territory for attacks on 
Japan. The fact that Russia is not at war with Japan must at 
all events be obviated. 

According to a radio announcement from London on 19 Oct., a 
new lend-lease agreement has been signed between Great Britian 
the United States, Canada and Russia; this is said to provide 
for considerable increases of war materiel to Russia. 

According to Radio Daventry, the British aircraft carrier 
DETROIT (23,000 GRT) has been placed at the disposal of the 
U. S. Navy for operations in the Pacific Ocean. 

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff 

I. Army Situation: 

Heavy defensive fighting continues at the centers of the 
Russian offensive. At the critical point of penetration 
north of Dnepropetrovsk our thin defensive line is being 
built up. Things were comparatively quiet in front of the 
9th and 4th Armies and in the area of Nevel. The enemy attack- 
expected for days on the northern sector of the eastern front, 
has not started yet. 

The situation on the Italian front is more or less unchanged. 

II. The Naval Liaison Officer to High Command, Army, Army 
General Staff has reported to Chief of Staff, Naval Staff on 


20 Oct, 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL 

the Crimea. For copy as per l/Skl (space left blank - TR.N) 
Gkdos. Chefs, see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XlVa . 

III. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff points out that we^r 
and tear to shipping in the Aegean endangers the supply 
situation. It is therefore inexcusable that the establish- 
ment of building sites for naval landing craft at Salonika, 
requested by Naval Staff, makes no progress. Chief, Nav^l 
Staff orders that Minister Speer be approached direct on 
this matter. 

IV. Quartermaster General reports that taking over of very 
heavy Italian guns of English manufacture, as urged by Field 
Marshal Rommel, is being investigated. 

In a Highly Restricted Circle" 

ft V. By order of Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division 

issued on 13 Oct. the following instructions to Commanding 
Admiral, Task Force and to the TIRPITZ, with copy to Group 

"1. In view of the possibility of further attacks, the 
nature of which is unknown, sufficient manning of damage 
control and anti-aircraft guns must be assured when granting 
leave. Guns for firing at nav- n l targets must also be in 
defensive readiness should heavy nav^l forces penetrate into 
Alta Fjord. Please confirm. 

2. The situation may demand thpt the TIRPITZ be used 
elsewhere as a floating battery, for instance if a landing 
in northern Norway is detected in time. State your oponion 
about possibilities of use for this and of transfer." 

*■ Commanding Admiral, Task Force gave detailed views in this 

connection which were transmitted on 17 Oct. by Group North/ 
Fleet. After dealing in general with the psychological value 
of leave for the TIRplTZ crew, these give particulars of 
readiness with regard to personnel and materiel: 

I. a) until the dockyard period commences all weapons, with a 
few exceptions, are ready for action; 

b) from the beginning of the dockyard period the following 
will be ready: 1 heavy turret, 1 medium gun turret, 50^ of 
anti-aircraft guns and corresponding fire control ^pp^ratus 

c) leave for 100 men per week means 5^ reduction in 
gunnery personnel. The lowest number will be reached on about 


20 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL 

5 December. 

d) -with this minimum figure the following van be manned: 
1-J- heavy gun turrets, 2§ medium gun turrets, 60fo of anti- 
aircraft guns and corresponding fire control. There will, 
therefore, be sufficient reserves on boatd in relation to the 
material facilities during the dockyard period; 

e) leave schedules provide that the increasing readiness 
of guns at the end of the dockyard period is fully met as 
regards personnel. 

2. Engines: 

a) The turbines have been out of action since 22 Sept. and 
will remain so even until the final date for constructional 
repairs. Readiness of all power installations and, at about 
the same time, restoration of a "limited" sailing readiness 
will thus not be possible before the final date owing to 
dependence on constructional repairs. 

b) About 125 bottom valves must be opened and examined or 
repaired after cover boxes have been fitted." The ship can- 
not be moved until then, 

c) It is planned to repair the rudder with a large caisson 
(diving chamber). As long as this Is out (date and length of 
time unknown) the ship cannot be moved. 

d) Two thirds of the crew iill always be aboard and 
defense of the ship therefore assured. 

3. a) Leave has been promised; it is considered necessary 
and has started. Under the above conditions any interference 
appears to be undesirable, since only up to the beginning 

of the dockyard period will personnel fall a little below 
material readiness; on the other hand, keeping anytiing 
more than the weapons named under l.b in action readiness 
will prolong the docktard period. The letter also applies 
to maintenance of towing readiness owing to the current work 
by divers on the bottom of the ship. 

b) In our opinion transfer with the assistance of tugs 
during the dockyard period is out of question, especially for 
the reasons specified under 2. a-c) and in view of the 
slight degree of readiness of ship's weapons; also owing to 
the long time required, which might certainly exceed the 
warning notice to be expected in winter. 

c) Should such an operation be ordered only Raftbotn, Leir- 
botn, Talvik and Aaroeysd can be considered as operational 
points in view of the state of readiness of the ship. It will 
hardly be possible 


20 Get. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

to control the ship with tugs in battle. Anchoring will be 
extremely difficult. The tug situation "will be most critical 
in case of alarm, owing to reguirements for the SCHARNHORST, 

4. To sum up, Commanding Admiral, Task Force is of opinion 
that the consequences which were foreseen from the decision 
to have the dockyard period in the northern area must all be 
borne and that use of weapons during this period, the dur- 
ation of which is to be curtailed by all conceivable means 
of a materiel and personnel nature, will only come into 
question for the ship's own degense at her anchorage, util- 
izing smoke screens and with the aid of an advanced gunnery 
observer, which will be impossible at any other place. All 
other exceptions are unrealistic and formulated without 
sufficient consideration of existing conditions. 

A Group North/Fleet reports in addition: 

We fully concur with the comments of Commanding Admiral, 
Task Force regarding the operational possibilities of the 
TIRPITZ, as they correspond with the earlier views of this 
Group which are already know. We request that for the time 
being, i.e. until the ship is again re^dj to proveed to 
a certain degree,, the TIRPITZ should still remain at her 
present anchorage, as this offers the b-°st facilities for 
defense. It the TITPIYZ, whiah would be moved with difficulty 
were towed from this position it might entail operational 
possibilities for her guns, few of which are anyway in read- 
iness, against surgace forces but, on the other hand, would 
make the immovable ship considerably more vulnerable to 
enemy bombs, torpedoes and other weapons. Group North/Fleet 
therefore requests that from now on any transfers be definit- 
ely ruled out and that all efforts be concentrated on the 
0\ fegense of the present anchorage and on speeding up the 

dockyard period. 

Naval Staff cannot agree to a definite tying-down of the 

Situations may arise which may force use of the battleship's 
weapons elsewhere. In an emergency, batteries which are 
ready for action must not lie idle. The accusation of an un- 
realistic conception must be rejected. This matter will be 
dealt with further by Quartermaster Division, with Operations 
Division participating. 

Chief, Naval Staff agrees with the views of Naval Staff. • 


20 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

Special Items 

I. In order to ma Ice preparations in time for further 
supplies to and possible evacuation of the Crimea by sea, 
it is. absolutely necessary for the Navy to know to -what 
extent supplies or evacuation over land are considered 
possible and accordingly what demands must be expected 
for sea transports. 

Naval Staff therefore request High Command, Army, Army General 
Staff, via the Naval Liaison Officer, to see that the Navy is 
informed on this as scon as possible. Group South and Admiral, 
Black Sea are being instructed to make preliminary invest- 
igations in their areas. Copy as per teletype l/Skl 29592/43 
Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XlVa . 

II. Army General Staff, Operations Division has urgently 
requested that for the time being the projected withdrawal 

to the Adriatic of naval crews from six Army batteries in the 
Crimea and of 500 seamen from the coastal defense of Genichesk 
should not be carried out, as the Crimea is. now already very 
sparsely occupied and it is impossible to man batteries with 
Army personnel, a decision as to whether the Crimea can be 
held will have to be arrived at within the next few days. 
Admiral, Black Sea has already, on his own initiative, stop- 
ped the evacuations ordered by Group South, at the request 
of the Army. High Command, Army, Operations Division is 
advised first of the following views of Operations Division, 
Naval Staff without prejudice to the decision of Chief, Naval 

"The withdrawal of naval gunners from the Crimea was 
ordered despite the expected developments, since not all of 
these men can be employed there at present on the tasks for 
which they have been trained. However, they are urgently 
needed for naval tasks elsewhere (it Is planned to use them 
for reinforcing the entirely inadequare Adriatic coastal 
defense). It is therefore an impossible state of affairs 
that these men are being, detained in the Crimea for Army tasks, 
just because they were passing through there, while the urg- 
ent tasks for which they are required elsewhere are left 

Insofar as the men are in action at present, their 
release will of course not be possible until reliefs can be 
brought up by the Army. " 

III. German Naval Command, Italy has drawn attention to the 
special hydroplane for two torpedoes, speed 40 - 45 knots, 
range 360 miles, which is being developed in the Italian 
Navy. Operations Division instructs Quartermaster Division to 
take up this project if it does not affect the Fleet Construct- 
ion Program 1943. 


20 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL 

IV. A discussion on 18 Oct. bet-ween Naval (Ship) Construct- 
ion Division, Naval Ordnance Division and Ngval Staff regard- 
ong plans for submarines types XX B and XXIV revealed that 
the new type XXB (supply and transport submarine ) proposed 
by Naval (Ship) Construction Division is out of question. 
Submarine Division rejects this type as a supply boat. Endeav- 
ors made to arrive at a combination of types XX and XlVa have 
thus fa iled . 

Type XIV can therefore at present not be abandoned. Whether 
another type (XXI ) can take its place is still to be Invest- 
igated. The discussion further showed that type XXIVA is appr- 
oved on the -whole.. 

V. Naval (Ship) Construction Division dre-w up on 15 Oct. 
notes on the origin of the joint directive of Commander in 
Chief, Navy and Minister Speer. This matter is dealt -with in 
War Diary of 5 and 7 July 19^3. Copy of notes as per l/Skl 
29566/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V. 

VI* For report of Quartermaster Division regarding evaluation 
of current -war experiences as per l/Skl. 31927/43 geh. see 
War Diary, Part B, Vol. V. 

VII. By order of Quarter master Division of 11 Oct. 19^3 
Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean comes directly under 
Naval Staff (Operations Division) as regards operation. 

Situation 20 Oct. 

I. War in Foregln Waters 

1. Enemy Situation: 

For advice to all vessels in foreign -waters on the 
strength of the United States Navy on 1 Oct. 1943 see tele- 
type 1955* The large number of aircraft carriers and auxiliary 
carriers is noteworthy. It is known that In all 62 such vess- 
els are in service or under construction. 

2. Own Situation: 

Regarding the loss of Ship "28" the Naval Attache in 
Tokyo reports that at 0230 onll7 Oct. at 33 degrees 31' N 
139 degrees 05' E in bright moonlight the ship was hit by the 
first torpedo, causing her engines and current to fail, so that 
no radiogram could be transmitted. The attacking submarine was 
obviously submerged since she could not be seen 


20 Oct. 1945 CONFIDENTIAL 

•although starshells -were used. Five minutes later a second 
torpedo glanced off the starboard side aft but shortly 
after-wards a third one hit her at this point. A fourth 
torpedo missed and a fifth hit her on the port side, 
forward end of the bridge. The auxiliary cruiser sank 
quickly stern first at 0245. At the same time a sixth 
torpedo missed forward. After the second hit the order 
was given: "Abandon ship". Heavy smoke lay over the scene 
owing to explosion of the smoke floats. Following the 
sinking the submarine was seen surfaced and seems to 
have taken survivors on board. One cutter and two rubber 
dinghiss landing on Izu 33 hours later. A search started 
immediately by the Japanese Navy was without result up to 
1925 on 20 Oct.; it is being continued. 

According to interrogations so far, the ship was proceeding 
almost as in peacetime, no zig-zag courses, only one officer 
on watch (Lt. j. g, Horn), no Wartime watch, the order that 
watertight doors be kept closed not strictly enforced, ell 
personnel not on watch below deck undressed in their bunks. 

This report does not give an answer to Naval Staff's enquiry 
about measures by the Japanese Navy to meet the ship e The 
information given about the state of readiness of the ship 
is almost unbelievable. If true, it means that where was extra- 
ordinary laxity. 

Naval Staff has asked the Naval Attache in Tokyo for inform- 
ation regarding the schedule date of departure of submarine 
DOMMES and the AQUILA submarines. 

II. S ituation West Area 

1. Enemy Situation: 

Over the Bay of Biscay 36 planes were detected on 
operation. One British Vessel was located at 1943 in AM 7920. 
Aerial reconnaissance sighted at 1200 on 19 Oct. in Plymouth 
harbor, 1 battleship, 4 destroyers, and 3 minesweepers. 

According to an intelligence report via "Ostrov", the RENOWN 
put out to sea from Pembroke on 25 Sept. Two other large 
battleships put in to this port, including on 24 Sept. the 
ANSON with several cruisers. 

According to further intelligence reports from sources as 
yet not proved, an Anglo-American landing near Brest and 
Morlaix is said to be planned for 20 Oct. For details see 
teletype 1050. Furthermore Lagos is to be occupied from 
Gibraltar on 23 Oct. (see teletype 1840). 


20 Oct. 19^3 C ONFIDENTIAL 

2 . O wn Situation; 

Atlantic Coast: 

Two submarines were escorted out from La Pallice. 
Exercises by the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla are so far proceed- 
ing to plan. Boats will start on their return passage to Brest 
at 0200 on 21 Oct. Two ELM/J mines were swept off La Pallice 
and one off the Gironde. 

Torpedo boats T "14", the KONDOR and the FALKE put in to Blest 
at ll^O and proceeded on to Cherbourg at 1820. 

Channel Coast : 

Nothing to report. 

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Water s 

North Sea ; 

Convoy "465" Elbe - Hook was carried out as planned. 
Seven ELM/J mines were swept north of Terschelling and one 
north of Ijmuiden. The report that two Typhoons were shot down 
on 19 Oct. by the River Minesweeper Flotilla has not been 
confirmed. Mines weeping activity in the Heligoland Bight was 
hampered by stormy weather. 

Norway, Northern Waters : 

1 . Ene my S 1 1 ua 1 1 on : 

Over the North Sea five planes were observed on 

MTB "626" (30th MTB Flotilla) was at sea at 1120, according 
to radio intelligence. 

From Spitsbergen (ice Fjord) no new information is reported. 
Light gunfire was reported in the Petsamo area on the after- 
noon of 18 Oct. At 1616 on 19 Oct. batteries on the Ribachi 
Peninsula shelled an outgoing Petsamo convoy with 100 rounds, 
forcing it to return. Fire was returned wtth 99 rounds. 

2 . O wn Situation: 

The success by fighters reported by the 5th Air Force 


20 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

On 19 Oct. was achieved at 1435 near Kybert, while escort- 
ing our westbound convoy. Besides the fourteen enemy planes 
shot down by our fighters, one plane was shot down by naval 
batteries. Around 0200 on 20 Oct. the steamer ZEROD of the 
transport fleet "Speer" was machine-gunned by two Planes 
west of Askevolt. 

Twenty-six ships were escorted north and 25 south. Altogether 
15 ohips were delayed owing to shortage of escorts. 

Group North/Fleet reports the following fin^l plan for the 
transfer of the deetroyers: 

"1. Destroyer Z "27" will be transferred with 
destroyer ZH 11" during the October new- 
moon period to the west area 


2. The destroyer RICHARD BEITZEN and Z "38" 
will be tansferred on 22 Oct. to the north 
ern area. On their arrival the destroyers 
turn to home waters for dockyard period. The 
destroyers will stop over at Kristian- 
sand South for three days for operations 

against blockade -runners, the first 2 on their 
north end the other 2 on their way home. 

3- The destroyers ERICH STEINBRINK and Z "34" 
with Commander, Destroyers will be trans- 
ferred on 1 Nov. 1943 to the northern area, 
without stopping at Kristiansand South. 
Upon their arrival the destroyers KARL 
GOLSTER and Z "31" will return to home 
waters. Whether they are to stop over at 
Kristiansand South on their way has not yet 
been decided. " 

The Task Force Reports: 

"1. Investigation of the midget submarine by 
a techinal commission has been concluded. 

2. The Task Force proposes that the TIRPITZ be 
assigned scrapping of the remains of the submarine after 
the magaetic survey has been effected." 



20 Oct. 19^3 ."' "- CONFIDENTIAL 

IV. Sk agerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea . 

The hospital ships METEOR and RUEGEN As veil as the 
British Red Cross Ships EMPRESS OF RUSSIA and ATLANTIS and 
the DROTTNINGHOLM will leave Gothenburg at 0700 on 21 Oct, 

Naval Command, Baltic and Admiral, Baltic States have.. been 
informed by Naval Staff as follows: 

"1. Army General Staff agrees with the views held by Naval 
Staff that the naval batteries in the Leningrad area should 
not be used up in the landin fighting, as they are the only 
available coastal guns for reinforcement of the Estonian 
coast. Army General Staff has therefore agreed to withdrawal 
of Battery "Biuecher". Army General Staff has advised Army 
Group North accordingly. 

2. It is pointed out once more that naval batteries should 
remain as long as possible in the Leningrad Area for use on 
the naval front. They will not we withdrawn until the sit- 
uation demands it. The decision as to when the batteries should 
be removed will be reached by Admiral, Baltic States according 
to an estimate of the locat situation. Naval Staff is of opin- 
ion that dismantling of all batteries which must be trans- 
ported by rail must now be started, whereas batteries which 
can be transported by road can remain at the front for the 
time being." 

Otherwise nothing special to report, 

V. S ubmarine Warfare 
* Nothing to report 

VI . Aerial Warfare ■- . 

British Isles and Vicinity : 

During the day there -were many flights by the enemy into 
the occupied west areas and the Rhine/Westphalian industrial 
area. Here a formation of 200 Fortresses -with fighter escort 
attacked various places including Troisdirf and Dueren from 
Altitudes at times ranging between 9,000 and 10,000 m. ; in- 
dustry sustained heavy damage. Although 453 of our fighters 
went up only 1 enemy plane was shot down for certain and 6 
probably shot down. 


20 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

In the evening about 300 planes flew into Germany and 
assembled in the Magdeburg - Stendal area, from where a 
large-scale raid on Berlin was expected. The bulk of planes, 
however, flew off the other way. Part-formations dropped 
bombs over the industrial area of central Germany. Bombs 
were reported to have been dropped on Emden, Bremen, Berlin, 
Leipzig, Moelkau, in the district of Leipzig - Torgau and also 
in the area of Coblenz-Trier. Air Force General Staff assumes 
that weather conditions prevented the enemy from carrying 
out a concentrated attack. 

Further flights by small enemy formations are reported in 
the areas of Coblenz, Cologne, Crefeld and via Stolp as far 
as Warsaw; also, coming from the south, via Klagenfurt into 
the area of Pilsen. 

Thirty-eight planes of the 9th Air Corps carried out a 
harassing raid on London and 51 attacked the town end harbor 
of Hull. 

Mediterranean Theater : 

Our Air Force carried out reconnaisaance. In Italy the 
enemy attacked Ancona, the road at Grosseto and the airfield 
of Marcigliani north of Rome. In the Balkans Nish was attack- 
ed by a strong enemy formation, Furthermore, twelve planes 
raided Kos . At Marcigliani and at Nish a number of our plans 
was destroyed or damaged. No defense successes are reported. 

Eastern Front: 


Nothing to report. 

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea: ( 

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean: 

Of the eastbound convoy which was reported by 
Cape Spartel on 19 Oct., 10 freighters entered Gibraltar, while 
9 freighters, 1 tanker and 1 gunboat joined the convoy from 
there. At 1735 it was detected consisting of 57 ships 20 
miles east of Alboran. At 1550 air reconnaissance sighted 
60 miles north of Oran 2 destroyers and 1 merchantmen on 
easterly course and at 1440 50 vessels leaving Algiers. 
Reconnaissance of Corsica and Sardinia was incomplete 
owing to weather conditions. The following were sighted: 
off Bonifacio 1 transport and 1 destroyer; at Maddalena 
sixPT boats presumably engaged in harassing our coastal 
traffic, and 3 merchantmen; at Olbia for the first time 
2 destriyers. On the supply routes 


20 Oct. 19^3 CONF IDENTIAL 

to the Gulf of Naples only light traffic was observed. For 
the first time again for days, a large convoy of 14 steamers 
and 2 escort vessels was sighted on northerly course 20 miles 
northeast of Ustica, presumably carrying supplies to Naples. 
There was a large number of ships in the Gulf of Naples but 
only a few vessels were lying in Salerno Bay. Three PT boats 
unsuccessgully attacked our convoy of the steamer GIORGIO at 
0110 on passage from Piombino to Genoa . No shipping movements 
were observed on the east coast of Italy and in the eastern 

2. Own Situation Mediterranean: 

Four PT boats left Civitavecchia in the afternoon 
for an operation in the area Salerno - Ustica. Coastal traffic 
was again carried out as planned. Bombs were dropped on the 
center of Rome during the night of 19 Oct. At noon on 20 
Oct. a heavy raid was carried out by J>6 four-engined bombers 
with strong fighter cover on the coastal area mine miles north 
of Civitavecchia. Enemy landing preparations in this sector 
must be reckoned with, although landing craft located in . 
Naples at present are sufficient only for the transportation 
of 0.4 U.. S, Divisions. 

The hospital ships AQUILEJA, GRADISCA and SINAIA arrived 
at Oran; they are to sail for Marseilles together with the 
DJENNE on 21 Oct. 

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has decided, with 
regard to the request of Commanding General, Armed Forces, 
South of 17 Oct. that the plan of German Naval Command, Italy 
to transfer the 6l6th Naval Artillery Battalion further south 
should be carried out. 

3. Area Naval Group South 

a . Adriatic Sea: 

The steamers MILANO and SANSEGO were unsuccess- 
fully shelled by an Insurgent battery on Cherso (east of 
Pola). Air Commander/ Croatia has been asked to bomb this 
battery. The convoy of the steamer SEBENICO was unsuccess- 
fully shelled by the 10. 5 cm. battery at Morto (Northwest 
of Sibenik), Fire was returned, effectively assisted by our 
battery. At the barrage gap at Asinello an auxiliary sailing 
vessel had a brief engagement with an armed auxiliary sailing 
vessel and was shelled from shore near selve lighthouse and 
again attacked by two auxiliary sailing ships near Isto. 
The vessel put In to Pola with casualties. A seaplane on a 
flight to Split with part of the staff company of the Naval 
Shore Commander has been overdue since 0700 on 19 Oct. 


20 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

Occupation of islands of Previci and Zlarin near Sibenik 
was planned for 20 Oct. Execution of this operation has not 
yet been reported. 

According to a report from the Port Commander at Cattaro, 
5 vessels, suitable as minesweepers , 2 floating docks (4,000 
and 1,500 tons), 6 launches, 2 tugs, 2 floating cranes and 12 
barges have been seized in the Bay. 

Admiral, Adriatic has transferred to Belgrade. 

Group South emphasizes the necessity of our Air Force 
operation in the following teletype to Naval Staff and 
Army Group F: 

"1. Supplies to the entire Adriatic coast are only possible 
by sea. Required in this connection: 

a) The ports must be serviceable; 

b) Repair of the ships requisitioned (warships and 
merchantmen) and continuation of new constructions. 

It is therefore necessary that dockyards, dock installations, 
etc. continue to function. 

2. The large dockyard capacity at the Adriatic ports must, 
if possible, also be made us of for the Aegean area, since 
it is impossible to bring up shipping from other areas. It 
is also planned to build submarines here. Maintenance of cap- 
acity is therefore decisive for fighting at sea and on land. 

j5. Defense of harbors, dockyards, etc. from attack by sea 
is a matter for the Navy. Such defense will be built up by 
Admiral, Adriatic. 

4. On the other hand, dockyards and ports are defenseless 
against air attacks. The enemy knows the location and import- 
ance of the objectives in the area, especially through Ital- 
ian betrayal. The dockyards particularly are large and 
vulnerable targets. Enemy bases are in the immediate vicinity. 
The formation of Close Combat Unit "Middle East" in Southern 
Italy indicates such aims. 

5. Therefore immediate introduction of strong air defense 
is very pressing in order to avoid this elimination of fac- 

idi 4 1 ? 3 f° r buildln g and repairing vessels for the Adriatic 
and the Aegean and to avoid crippling of sea traffic and 

a'rflnca'lculalle!"" " instailations > the consequences of which 



20 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

v. Aegean Sea : 

Enemy Situation: 

At 2300 on 19 Oct. 3 destroyers and 2 fast escort 
boats were attacked by our Air Force south-west of Kalymnos. 
The destroyers -withdrew to the northwest and the escort boats 
to the east. At 23^6 surface forces attacked Kalymnos Bay. 
No details have yet been reported. During the night of 19 
Oct. light PT boat LS "5" and naval landing craft F "l^l" were 
torpedoed and sunk by attacking PT boats on the northern 
shore of Kos . Naval landing craft F "330" burnt out north 
of the harbor of Kos - cause still unknown; the ammunition 
aboard detonated. An enemy plane spotted the convoy of the 
steamer INGEBORG at Syra . Radio traffic Indicates that an 
attack is imminent. This assumption is strengthened by the 
sighting of several destroyers and escort boats southeast 
of Scarpanto on northwesterly course at 1605 on 20 Oct. 

According to an intelligence report from a reliable source, 
the Balkan operation, especially the attack on the islands, 
was to have been carried out during the sefond half of 
September/beginning of October. The operation was postponed 
for political reasons, in order to await the outcome of the 
Moscow confernece, but is in any case still to be carried 
out • 

Own Sitiation: 

The troops aboard the convoy of the steamer INGEBORG 
were disembarked in view of the enemy situation. The airfield 
of Kos is reported unserviceable due to the air attack during 
the night of 19 Oct. Syra may only be entered on prescribed 
routes . 

Preparations are being made for mopping~up of Stampalia. From 
Crete and the other islands 21,100 Italians and 270 British 
are still to be removed. 

Group South plans to use transport- submarines for supplying 
the islands in the Aegean Sea, in order to relieve surface 
supplies which have now almost come to a standstill and which, 
will later also be very risky. Group South considers that 
transport-submarines will be required even after the islands 
have been mopped- up and the enemy bases in the Aegean Sea 
eliminated. It therefore requests investigations regarding 
speedy availability of these submarines. Quartermaster Div- 
ision will deal with this matter further. (See teletype 2020). 



20 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

c . Black Sea : 

Enemy Situation; 

The report regarding heavy enemy forces south of 
the Strait of Kerch on the evening of 19 Oct. -was based on 
a false location. Our PT boats, sent out to investigate, 
sighted nothing. At 0050 our night reconnaissance planes 
sighted six miles south of Anapa 3 boats, presumably motor 
minesweepers, 2 coastal vessels and 2 PT boats on northerly 
course. Minor enemy forces are reported to have attempted 
a landing in the evening towards 2200 near Cape Chauda. 
Our PT boats which were sent out detected nothing at the 
landing place. Three gunboats and three PT boats were out 
to sea on easterly course. 

The Intelligence Service has submitted a report on the C 

new composition of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and 
personnel, based on statements made by naval officers who 
had deserted. For copy as per l/Skl 31709 and 31710/43 
geh. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XlVa . 

Own Situation: 

Three naval artillery lighters and three naval 
landing craft left Genichesk in the afternoon to shell the 
north coast of the Sea of Asov. Four PT boats were transferred 
from _ from Nikola yev to Sevastopol via Feodosiya. Submarine 
U "24 i! left Sevastopol for the operational area. Mine laying 
operation "S72" was carried out as planned. 

The Danube Flotilla is making preparations for an operation by 
five vessels on the Sava against insurgents. 

On 17 Oct. the ALEXANDRA assisted our Army patrols by firing 
for an h^ur on mountain positions opposite Orsova. The steam- 
er THE0D0RICH, which ran aground near Ochakov, is being light- 
ened . 

Convoy traffic proceeded as planned and without incident. 

VIII. Situation East Asia 

Nothing to report. 


21 Oct. 19^3 '"' ' 

I.tems of Political Importance 

In connection with the lend-lease agreement, signed in London 
on 19 Oct., a Spanish report from New York states that shipments 
to Russia particularly of fighters and scarce raw materials, 
such as nickel, tin, copper and aluminum, are planned. 

According to a Swedish report from New York, the appointment 
of General Marshall, at present Chief of the U.S B General 
Staff, as Supreme Commander for the invasion of Europe is to 
be announced on 25 Oct, The appointment will be announced 
from Moscow and it is hoped fchat this will contribute to ' 
realization of at least the limited results of the Conference 
which Washington has resignedly accepted. These are said to 
consist of an agreement on military plans and the creation 
of one or more permanent organizations for inter-allied 
consultations „ 

According to a Reuter report from Moscow, England is showing 
considerable interest in the "Free German Committee" said to 
have been set up in Russia. 

According to a further Reuter report, the speech -by General , 
Smuts predicting a large-scale Allied attack on Europe for 
next year has taken- the Allied representatives in Moscow by- 

Conference on the Situation with Chief. -Naval Staff 

I . Army Situation 

An enemy attempt to land with minor forces near Feodosiya 
was repulsed. 

i ' ■■ . • ■ 

The situation! s serious, in the area of the large break-through 
in the direction of Krivoi Rog, which the enemy was able to 
extend. : r \ ■ 

A further;. break- through with a depth of 20 km.' has occurred 
south of Orel. 

Altogether there. are about 256,000 persons in the Crimea, 
including Rumanian forces, the Todt Organization and all 
others. "Evacuation has not yet been ordered. 

Army General Staff, Foreigrl Armies West believes that an 
attack on the; west coast of France must be considered possible, 


21 Oct. 19^3 

according to fresh news on invasion preparations in the west 

Fighting in Italy was slight. A new landing behind our lines 
somewhere in the area of Civitavecchia is considered possible. 
Our supply lines in Italy and in the Balkans are subjected to 
constant and intense attacks by enemy air forces. 

An attack on Agram by insurgents is expected. 

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has issued the 
following instructions to ensure supplies to the 2nd Tank 
Army Command; 

"Continuous supplies to an accumulation of winter stocks for 
the units of the 2nd Tank Avmy Command stationed on the r 

Dalmatian and Albanian coasts is impossible merely overland by 
rail and trucks. 

An additional transport by ships of about 100,000 tons per 
month, at latest starting on 1 Nov, 19^3 will be needed. The 
following measures are necessary .for this: 

1. Army Group B is to clear the railroad .Ljubljana-Fiume of 
enemy forces by the end of October and is responsible for 
continuous and effective defense of. this railraod. 

2. Chief, Armed Forces, Transportation will see to it that 
the railroad Ljubljana-Fiume is repaired at onee and costantly 
kept in operation, so that from about 1 Nov. 19*+3 a daily run 
of 9 trains of ^00 tons each is guaranteed on this line to 

3. Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation 
Office of the Armed Forces Overseas, through the Reich 
Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, will see that the 
required shipping for the transportation of 100,000 tons 
per month is provided. 

h. High Commandj Navy, Naval Staff, Operations Division is 
requested to provide the necessary escort forces. 

5. Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast is. to protect 
coastal traffic by mopping-up the Dalmatian coast as far as 
possible, and will clear the islands from which insurgent 
gunfire harasses our shipping. 

6. Commander in Chief, Air Force is requested: 

a. to ensure, as from 1 Nov., adequate air defense for 
the supply base of Fiume, 


21 Oct. 19V3 

b. to assist the supply convoys proceeding along the 
coast by sea reconnaissance and air escort, 

c. to keep down any insurgent gunfire which might occur 
while our supply convoys are passing. 

7. Army General Staff is requested to ensure the turn-over 
of 100,000 tons per month in Fiume from 1 Nov. by preparing the 
storages and providing the necessary manpower and trains." 

II. In order to carry out this directive, which Naval Staff 
has transmitted to Group South, Admiral, Adriatic and, for 
information, to German Naval Command, Italy, Naval Staff orders; 

"1. Fitting-up and commissioning of the three torpedo boats 
and six escort vessels provided for the 11th Coast Patrol 
Flotilla is to be speeded up by all available means. Besides 
this, all vessels in the area of Admiral, Adriatic which are 
suitable for escort duty are to be requisitioned, fitted-up 
and commissioned as soon as possible. Admiral, Adriatic is to 
regard it as his most important task to ensure supplies to 
the 2nd Tank Army Command by sea and especially to provide 
the necessary es c ort forces for this. 

2. German Naval Command, Italy will carry out mine-laying 
operations on the east coast of Italy, for which torpedo boat 
AUDAC2 (TA " 20") is required, if possible in such a way that - 
TA "20" can be placed at the disposal of Admiral, Adriatic at 
the beginning of November." 

vtfith reference to h) of the instructions from Armed Forces High 
Command ( provision of the required escort forces by Naval 
Staff), Naval Staff reports to Armed Forces High Command, 
Operations Staff, Quartermaster Division, with copy to 
Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, N a vy, as follows: 

"1. The 11th Coastal Patrol Flotilla is being formed under 
Admiral, Adriatic. Three Italian torpedo boats (one already 
in service) and six steamers converted into escort vessels 
have so far been requisitioned for this Flotilla and are 
being fitted-up. All these vessels are expected that 
further vessels suitable for escort duty will be taken over. 
Instructions for speedy requisitioning, fitting-up and commis- 
sioning of such vessels have been given. 

2. Besides the above, steps have been taken to transfer 
motor minesweepers and PT boats from the western Mediterranean 
overland (Genoa-Piacenza-River Po). These vessels are, however, 
not expected to be in operational readiness in the Adriatic 
until December. 


21 Oct. 19V3 


3« Naval Staff points out that the weak defense forces 
which can'be made available in the Adriatic will make it 
possible to assure supplies to the extent requested as 
soon as the enemy sends out major forces from ports and 
airfields in southern Italy against this traffic. Cosider- 
ably less transport and quite serious losses must then be 
expected. 1 ' 

Ill . -According to a report from Armed Forces n igh Command, 
Operations Staff, the Fuehrer has ordered the following with 
regard to an increase of small shipping in the Aegean Sea: 

"1 The development of the war situation in the Aegean Sea 

requires unusual measures in order to increase small shipping 

since the present transfers of barges from France via the 

Danube and Siebel ferries from Holland, as well as the C; 

delivery of new constructions and converted vessels, can no 

longer be awaited. 

2. Altogether it will cause a decrease of shipping in the 
Black Sea which will be hard to bear, 1,500 to 2,000 tons 
capacity of small shipping are to be transferred as quickly 
as possible through the Dardanelles to the Aegean Sea, in 
agreement with Armed Forces High Command, Supply and 
Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas,, 

3. Since Turkey at present prohibits the passage of warships, 
including naval landing craft, through the Dardanelles, 

samll vessels purely for supplies, such as Siebel ferries and 
motor ships, must be made available for these purposes. 

h. Army General Staff, Quartermaster General agrees to the 
transfer of the above tonnage, provided that it is replaced 
as quickly as possible. Steps must, therefore, be taken to 
see that either one or two large ships are transferred from 
the Aegean to the Black Sea or that equivalent shipping 
which is being converted at the Danube dockyards for the 
Aegean Sea is withdrawn. In addition investigations should 
be made as to whether a balance cannot be effected by 
barges from France, the transfer of which is planned via the 
Danube a 

5. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff and Commanding 
General, Armed Forces j °outheast are to be kept advised of 
measures taken.," 

Quartermaster Division will inform Armed Forces High Command 
that the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping is responsible 
for carrying out this Fuehrer directive, 



IV. Group South has now submitted, as requested, concrete 
expamples in connection with its command ruling regarding 
merchant shipping in the Aegean Sea being at. its disposal. 
Group South reports altogether five cases during the period 
from 2 to .10 Oct. in which measures taken by the shipping 
companies are contested. However, these cases in no way 
affect the basix aspect of ' this problem. This would only 
be the case if the requests of Admiral, Aegean for shipp- 
ing for military or operational tasks had been met inadequately 
or not at all by the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping. : 
Quartermaster General is therefore of opinion that the command 
ruling of Group South cannot be upheld. unless the basic 
Fuehrer directive is altered* Group South has itself 
reported that its, ruling does not affect the rights of the 
Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping to have at his . 
disposal the .supply shipping not required by Admiral, Aegean, 
The ruling was issued with the sole intention that -the 
demands of the Naval Commander, as opposed to the Reich 
Commissioner of Maritime Shipping as a civilian authority, 
might be assured in accordance with the requirements of 

naval operations and might be speeded up and simplified. 

Chief, Naval Staff agrees with the views held by Quartermaster 
General. Group South and the Reich Commissioner of Maritime 
Shipping are to be advised accordingly. Quartermaster 
General will take the opportunity to discuss this matter 
personally with the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping 
during the armament meeting at. Gdynia. 

V. Quartermaster General r eports that the teletype ( see 

Mar Diary 20 Oct.), which it was' intended to send to Minister ■' 
Speer with regard to the erection of building sites for 
naval landing craft in Salonika, will be held back until the 
outcome of today ! s new discussion with the chairman of the 
Main Committee for Ship Construction is known. If the matter 
is not arranged according to the wishes of the Navy at this 
discussion the teletype will be despatched. 

Chief, Naval Staff agreed. 

VI. Quartermaster Division. Submarine Section reports on the 
results of the investigations by Chief, Submarine Section on 
the cons^rvlQtion of a submarine base at Salonika. 

The recommendations are the same as those contained in the 
report by Group South, already dealt with on 20 Oct. 

Quartermaster General proposes that the recommendation of 
the Group and Chief, Submarine Section be approved and that 
a decision be reached to construct at first an emergency, 
unprotected submarine base in Salonika, the final solution - 
the construction of a protected submarine base in Tusla - 
being started at the same time. 


21 Oct. 19V3 

Chief, Naval Staff decided' on this. 


VII ». ' Naval Command, North has requested that I tali an : prisoners 
of war should not be employed at dockyards where free Italian 
workers and voluntary soldiers are working at the same, time, 
in order to avoid psychological difficulties which arise from' 
different treatment of the Italians. .-.-.. 

Commander in Chief, Navy does not agree with the objections. . 
-raised by Naval Command, North. He believes that, if - 
f l,rmly exercised, such different treatment can be used very 
effectively to the advantage of labor discipline. 

In a Highly Restricted Circle 

VIII «, Operations Division, Naval Air and Air Force. Liaison 
Section r eports on the general aerial warfare situation.. For 
copy of this comprehensive and clear review see files 1/Skl I 
L 2, Vol. Vie 

Special Items ; 

I . A summary of enemy intelligence obtained by radio decipher- 
ing and radio intelligence in the period from' 11 to 17 Oct. is 
contained in Radio Monitoring Report No. ^2/^3 , Noteworthy: 
For the diversions and delays as intercepted during combat 

of convoys in the North Atlantic see pages h and 5. 

II. According to an intelligence report from an agent on the 
destroyer PINDOS, this vessel has been equipped with the 
latest depth charges which have .rocket" propulsion. 


Situation 21 Oct . f ' '■ , 

I o War in Foreign Waters 

1. Enemy Situation: 

According to an intelligence report from, a diplomatic ','■ 
source in Lisbon, the U S. Government is said to have asked . 
Portugal to place at its disposal and aircraft base on the 
Atlantic coast, allegedly for purposes of the Clipper Line. : 
Bolama in Portuguese Guinea is mentioned* 

According to a further intelligence report from the same 
source, a convoy carrying coastal guns, other war material and 
provisions for the Azores bases sailed on 15 Oct. from ports; 
on the east coast of America. These bases are to be used .*•>*' 
by the United States with : the same rights as England.. A . . 
U S. mission, is said to- be expected in Madrid at the', 
end of the month, in order to take up discussions on the 
lease of bases on the Balearic Islands and in Northern Spain. 
Vigo is mentioned. 


21 Oct. 19^3 

According to another unconfirmed report, England, under pressure 
from the U.S.A., is said to have made a request on the day 
following the Azores agreement for Lagos Bay. This was, 
however, definitely rejected by Salazar. 

2. Own Situation; 

Nothing to report „ 

II. Situation West Area 

1, Enemy Situation: 

Over the Bay of Biscay 23 planes were detected on opera- 
tion • One British vessel was located at l*+32 in AM 7&10 and 
one at 1815 in AM 5^30; one D,S. vessel was located at 1631 
in BE 2610. 

2. Own Situation ; 

Atlantic Coast ; 

The hVa Torpedo Boat Flotilla put in to Brest at 0330 
after completion of exercises. ...... 

Channel Coast; 

The KONDOR, FALKE and T "ih" of the 5th Torpedo Boat 
Flotilla put in to Lezardrieux in the morning and went on 
at 1800 to Cherbourg.. 

Otherwise nothing special to report. 

Ill . North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters 

gorth Sea : 

North of Schiermonnikoog and north of Terschelling' four 
ELM/J mines were swept „ A fishing smack Struck a mine and 
sank 16 miles west of Neuwerk. At Dordrecht one harbor 
defense boat sank in the dock, probably owing to sabotage 
at the quay. 

It is now reported that eight planes (not four) were shot 
down- by naval anti-aircraft guns in the enemy attack on the 
wreck of the STRASSBURG at noon on 19 Oct. 

Norway. Northern Waters ; 


21 Oct. 19^3 

ii ';'• Enemy. Situation : 

Over' the North. Sea Ih. planes were detected on .operation. . 
At L t-55 a submarine alarm was given off Vnrdoe. .-''. 

According to an intelligence report from the Secret State 
Police in Oslo, a convoy is said to have sail, .from Murmansk 
on 20 Oct, A convoy is said to have left United States ports 
for Murmansk at the same time., '../:..: 

2. O wn Situation '^ "' • - • ■• 

Thirty-five ships were escorted north- and.. 35 south* ■ Alto- 
gether 18 ships were delayed due to shortage of escorts e 

Admiral, Northern' Waters reports that submarines have been 
withdrawn from positions off Ice Fjord to northern attack 
areas in the Bear Strait, 

Submarine U "355" has been despatched to the north for weather 
operation "Kreuzritter." 

Reconnaissance of the bays in Ice Fjord by Submarine U "956 M 
revealed nothing new. 

IV . Skagerrak, Baltic Sea E ntranc es, Baltic Sea 

1 . . Enemy' Situation s 

There was a group of minesweepers at 0750 four miles south 
of Lavansaarie 

According to an intelligence report from Sweden, the DICTO 
and the LIONEL have, changed their berths and have been 
located 10 km„ west "of UddeValla,' fully manned and ready to 
sail. . * . . 

2. Own Situatio n: 

One mine was swept 30 miles south- southwest of Ahholt. 

The hospital ship RUEGEN and METEOR left Gothenburg- at the 
same time as the British hospital ships and proceeded through 
Swedish territorial waters first to Treileborg. The three 
ships proceeding to England anchored at the southern outlet 
of Oslo Fjord in' the evening. 

In the area of Commander, Minesweepers^ Baltic five naval 
landing craft are lying ready at Kotka for minelaying operation 
"Seeigel Villa". . .. 

Naval landing craft MFP u l" : 3". was damaged by a mine off 

Reval outside the channel, but was able to put into port under 



21 Oct. 19^3 

her own power and without casualties. Repairs on the Juminda" 
net barrage were hampered by bad weather; for the same reason 
minelaying off Schepel by coastal minelayers had to be 

Battery "Koenigsberg" was shelled from the sea at 2125", 
presumably by a guardboat. The battery returned fire and 
observed one hit. 

V. Submarine Warfare 

Two anti-aircraft submarines in the Bay of Biscay report 
having driven off one enemy plane each. 

The supply point of submarine- tanker ,,L f-88" was moved to BD 
2819, as the rendezvous was detected by an enemy carrier-borne 
plane . 

In the Indian Ocean submarine U "532" on 20 Oct. attacked a 
oonvoy of ten ships including four freighters in MS 8230. 
One ship of 6,000 G.R 6 T. was probably sunk„ Operational 
conditions were unfavorable because of strong phosphorescene 
of the sea and smooth water . The submarine is proceeding to 
Penang for a brief overhaul. 

VI. Aerial Warfare 

British Isles and Vicinity ; 

The 3rd Air Force had hS planes out on operation in the 
wesf'^Yea and 6l In the Mediterranean. 

During the night of 21 Oct, four bombers and thriteen fighter- 
bombers raided London, Single enemy fighter formations approach- 
ed the coast of the west area during the day without carrying 
out any special attacks. 

Single reconnaissance planes were reported over Germany. 
During the night of 21 Oct. a few bombs were dropped in the 
areas of Dortmund and Duesseldorf e 

Mediterranean Theater ; 

At lMf5 an east bound enemy convoy of about 50 ships was 
detected 20 miles north of Mostaganem. This convoy was attacked 
between 1&+5 and 1905 by 13 Do 217 »s of the 2nd Group of the 
100th Bomber Wing and 28 He Ill's and 8 Ju 88 ' s of the 1st and 



Groups of the 26th Bomber Wing, The convoy put up a smoke., 
screen. Fifty-four aerial torpedoes and twelve H3 292 bombs 
were dropped. According to reports received so far, 15 
steamers and 1 tanker totaling 108,000 G.R«T.. and 1 destroyer 
were hit and heavily damaged. Only two targets were hit by 
bombs; the remaining success must be ascribed to the aerial 

During the night of 21 Oct. 113 planes of the 2nd Air Force 
attacked shipping targets in Naples. In Italy strong enemy 
forces attacked traffic targets in the area Viterbo-Terni and 
Civitavecchia during the day. Harassing flights were also 
carried out in the Bolzano area. 

Eighteen enemy planes raided Skoplje in the- Balkans, where rail- 
way cars and locomotives were destroyed* During the night of 
21 Oct. the airfield of ^aritza on Rhodes was again attacked. 
Planes were also reported on reconnaissance over the Aegean 
and supplying insurgents in the Balkans. 

Eastern Fron t: 

Over the Black Sra reconnaissance was carried out. 

Nothing special to report 


VII ,. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea 

1, Enemy Situation Mediterranean ; 

Seven transports with troops put in to Gibraltar from 
the Atlantic, a large convoy of 4 ^9 freighters and 9 tankers 
with 8 escort vessels entered the Mediterranean in the after- 
noon. Parts of this convoy put in to Gibraltar* In addition, 
1 French battleship of the RICHELIEU class with 2 destroyers 
passed through the Straits of Gibraltar, bound for the 
Me d i t err ane an . 

It is now reported from 20 Oct. that 13 LCT's put in to Gibraltar 
from the Mediterranean. On 21 Oct. futher craft of the new 
U.S.LCT type arrived at Gibraltar. 

The withdrawal of alanding craft from the Mediterranean 
and their assembly in Gibraltar attracts attention. 
The transfer of merchantmen, which has increased in 
the last few days, is also noteworthy, Unfortunately 
there is no knowledge of the extent to which this 
shipping is destined for the Mediterranean itself and 
is not passing on through the Suez Canal. 

The eastbound convoy reported east of Alboran on the afternoon 
of 20 Oct, was detected again at 070*+ 10 miles of Arzeu consist- 


21 oi-t. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

ing of 50 ships, including h2 freighters, on course east-north 

In the harbors of Corsica and Sardinia there was only a snail 
number of ships. No assembly for new operations is to be seen 
here. On the supply route from Palermo to Salerno only single 
vessels were sighted. The number of ships in Apulian harbors 
was still small. 

Enemy air activity over the area of Civitavecchia has increased. 

2. Own Situation Mediterranean : 

Our PT boats operated unsuccessfully during the night of 
20 Oct. in the area of Salerno-Ustica. Six boats will repeat 
this operation during the night of 21 Oct. 

,i ) Submarine-chaser "2110" carried out an attack on a submarine 

north of Porto Ferraio. Destruction of the enemy submarine is 

The minelayer JUMINDA left Spezia southbound for a minelaying 

The group consisting of naval landing craft MFP " 5l^ M and motor 
minesweepers R "187" and R "201" was attacked by numerous enemy 
planes while proceeding to the area north of Civitavecchia on 
a minelaying operation. One plane was shot down and no damaged 
was sustained by our boats. 

The Italian Liaison Staff to German Naval Command, Italy arrived 
at Levico» 

<5 > 

The four hospital ships are on passage from Oran to Merseilles 
according to plan. 

3. Area Naval Group South : 

a. Adriatic Sea : 

Our morning air reconnaissance observed numerous small 
fishing boats near the islands of Mljet, Korcula, Brae and Hvar. 
The islands of Alupca, Prvici and Tijat have been occupied 
without any fighting „ 

The operation against Zlarin has started. In the F arising Channel 
northeast of Pola two steamers were again unsuccessfully shelled 
by insurgents, 

A battery with four modern 9.^3 ecu anti-aircraft guns has 
been occupied north of Fiume. There are no range-finders. 



21 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

Submarine U !,I f53" left Pola for a minelaying operation off _ . 

b, Aegean Sea 

Enemy Situation s 

Ships' guns shelled the port of Rhodes with 15 rounds at 
2350 on 20 Oct. Kos was shelled without effect by 1- cruiser 
and 2 destroyers at 21*+8 • 

According to our air reconnaissance . there were 2 destroyers 
and 1 freighter escorted by 3 fighters 20 miles south of Gastell 
Rosso on course north-northwest at 1200 on 21 Oct. ; at 1520 
there were 1 cruiser and 5 destroyers on course 330° *+0 miles 
northwest of Castell Rosso. One of our shadowing planes was 
shot down by the enemy fighter escort, At 1000 a submarine 
was attacked by one of our planes east of Cape Sideros (east 
coast of Crete). The British scouting unit from Leros which 
landed on Kalymnos on 19 Oct, has been taken prisoner. 

Own Situation: 

The report on the torpedoing of light PT boat IS "5" off 
the northern shore of Kos has not been confirmed. 

The Corinth Canal was temporarily closed to shipping, as a 
lighter had sunk due to a landslide caused by engineering work. 

The INGEBORG convoy is lying at 2h hours 1 readiness. 

c. Black Sea ; 

The enemy landing on the Kerch peninsula near Cape Chauda 
was carried out by 250 men, who embarked again at 0^00 . During 
the night of 20 Oct. continuous flights were reported into the 
areas of Stary Crimea, Sudak and the Yeila Mountains, presumably 
for landing troops. 

An enemy submarine torpedoed and sank a naval alanding craft 
off Yalta on 20 Oct. 

The north of the Sea of Asov was shelled by three naval landing 
craft during the night of 20 Oct. 

Three PT boats took up patrol line off Cape Opuk during the 
night of 21 Oct. 


21 Oct, 19*+3 

VIII . Situation East Asia 
Nothing to report. 





22 Oct. 19^3 

Items of Political Importance 

No news of special interest has been received. 

Conferenc e on the Situ ation with Chief, Naval Staff 

I. Army Situation 

The heavy enemy pressure on the eastern from continues 
unabated, especially in the sector Melitopol-Zaporozhe and in 
the area of the break-through northwest of Dnepropetrovsk, 

II. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has sent the 
following instructions to Chief, Army Equipment and Commander, 
Replacement Army, Commanding Generals ? \rmed Forces, West , 
South, Southeast, Netherlands, Norway 9 Baltic States and 
White Ruthenia, Army Group B, Commander, Armed Forces, Denmark 
and the 20th Mountain Army Command, with copy to Naval Staffs 

"In future all reports submitted direct to Armed Forces High 
Command which concern naval warfare are also to be sent to 
Commander in Chief, Navy who is responsible for naval war- 
fare in all theaters, so that he is able to express his views 
in good time with regard to carrying out naval operations." 

The request made by Chief, Naval Staff on 18 Oct. has 
thus been compJ.i.e..dwith 8 

III . Admiral Legnani was fatally injured in al motor accident 
near Venice on 20 Oct. 

Commander in Chief, Navy has sent a telegram of condolence to 
Mar shal Gr azi ani • 

Marshal Graziani has mentioned, to Admiral, German Naval Command, 
Italy Admirals, Vaoli, Tur or Falangola as possible successors 
to Legnani and asked that the views of the German Navy be 
obtained. For discussion of this question and decision of 
Chief, Naval Staff see notes by Chief, Operations Branch, 
dated 22 Oct; and remarks of Naval Intelligence Division as 
per 1/Skl 3225A3 gen. in War Diary, Part C, Vol- XIII. 

Chief, Naval Staff has left Berlin to attend the armament 
meeting in Gdynia. 




22 Oct. 19^3 

Special Items 

I, In accordance with the decision reached by Chief, Naval 
Staff, Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch 
has despatched the following teletype in connection with the 
command ruling of Group South regarding merchant shipping in 
the Aegean Sea (see War Diary 21 Oct.); 

I. To Group South and Admiral, Aegean; ' 
"Commander in Chief, Navy orders that; 

1. The order issued by Group South that decisions on the use 
of ^11 available shipping rest with Admiral, Aegean, is to be 
canceled, since placing all shipping at his disposal is in no 
way intended. 

2. Distribution of merchant shipping for operations by Admiral, 
Aegean is approved, insofar as from time to time the operational 
situation demands his intervention. In general the basic 
organization ordered by the Fuehrer, giving the Reich Commiss- 
ioner of Maritime Shipping control over shipping, must remain 

in force. Closest cooperation between the Naval Offices and 
the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping is necessary, 

3. The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping has been 
advised of the incidents reported. He has been asked to 
remedy these and to prevent their recurrence in view of the s 
serious effect on naval warfare, and , furthermore, to appoint 
at once a representative of the Reich Commissioner to be 
attached to Group South with authority over the. three Deputies 
for the three seas, in accordance with your request. 

h» The necessity of furnishing crews for merchantmen has 
again been pointed out to the Reich Commissioner of Maritime 

II. To the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping: 

"1. Group South has been instructed to cancel the order 
regarding use of all shipping- in the Aegean Sea. "'"' 

2. If the operational situation demands it, the Commanding 
Admiral must, however, 'intervene in the disposition of shipp- 
ing in order to assure the prompt' and suitable execution of 
operations, if this is' not guaranteed otherwise. The Fuehrer 
directive remains effective in principle. As operations have 
priority, the closest and most understanding cooperation and 
speedy execution of the tasks assigned' by all concerned is 
necessary. Details of the incidents in this connection are 
being forwarded to you 


22 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

3. The request of Group South by teletype 2^89 Gkdos, of 7 
Oct„ par. 5 9 which has not been answered up to now, is most 
definitely supported. Commanding Admiral, Group South, who .; 
is responsible for all operations in the three seas, must be 
in a position to assure the availability of shipping for 
operations direct with the representative of the Reich 
Commissioner of Maritime Shipping (who is authorized to give 
orders to the Deputies for the Adriatic, Aegean and Black 
Seas) without each Commanding .idmiral of an area negotiating 
again with the Deputy for the sea area, who in turn must ask 
Rome or Berlin for a decision. 

h. According to reports from Commanding Admiral, Group South, 
the situation with regard to crews for merchantmen in the 
Aegean Sea is such that even the execute on of operational 
tasks is hampered. An immediate remedy s essential; the 
Naval Office in Hamburg sent off 28 seamen on 20 Oct. This does 
not alleviate the difficulties „ " 

The request of Group South of 7 Oct.. referred to above, 
concerns the appointment of a representative of the 
Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping to be attached 
to the Group with authority over the three Deputies 
in the command area of the Group, 

II . Naval Intelligence Division has made the following extract 
from the "Evaluation on the Enemy Situation of 20 Oct* by 
Army General Staff, Foreign Armies West: 

"1. Area of England; 

Besides reports about major troop movements from the United 
States to England new information has been received from the 
Atlantic area regarding the gradual preparation of freighters 
loaded with dupplies (ammunition etc.)', which are to be 
assembled and held in ports of northwest England. 

2. Mediterranea ns 

The sailing of landing craft from the Mediterranean into 
the Atlantic, reported for the first time, is worthy of 
special note; also increasing reports about embarkations of. 
troops at ports on the Atlantic coast of Morocco (Casablanca) 
French vessels being primarily reported. This information is 
to be connected with the preparations in progress for an 
attack against the west coast of France. In southern Italy 
it is possible" that the relatively small success gained 
despite large expenditure of forces and' materiel nay induce 
the enemy to abandon bringing-up further forces to the 
front in favor of outflanking landings. 


22 Oct. 19V3 

adequate forces for these are available not only in the rear 
but also on Sicily, The detection of a large number of ships 
in Naples may be connected with this. Whether the shipping 
Movements in the sea area Sardinia-Corsica indicate that forces 
from this area are to participate in such an operation, is not 
yet discernible, certainly, however, it is to be assumed 
that strong air bases are being built up on these islands for 
attacks against Italy and Southern France. 

In the Eastern Mediterranean a definite increase in enemy 
naval activity (increased submarine operations, thrusts by 
light naval forces) is noticeable, directed against our lines 
of communication with the advanced island bases. The enemy's 
main target in this area will at first be building up air 
bases and capturing further ones. Further plans will be 
then to cut off completely the islands in German hands, followed 
( by intensified operations by naval forces and landings from 

the air. Heavy air attacks against important traffic junctions 
on the Belgrade-Salonika line show that the enemy is making 
endeavors to weaken our defense in the southern part of the 
Balkans by eliminating our supply routes and they are taken 
as an "indication of plans in this area." 


Situation 22 Oct . 

I . War in Foreign Waters 

1. Enemy Situation ; 
Nothing to report. 

2. Own Situatio n; 

The BRAKE was ordered by Naval Staff with Radiogram 2027 
not to put out yet, D upply at earliest on, 15 Nov. . ; ,. . 

The Naval Attache in Tokyo was advised by Radiogram 2355 that 
the thried M0N3UN boat, submarine U "532" (Junker), en route 
to Penang for repairs and supplies will arrive, as also 
submarines "Schaefer" and 2Luedden" , on about 2 Nov, and that 
the .submarines will report their exact dates of arrival when 
passing 86o E. 

The Naval Attache in Tokyo replied to Naval Staff's inquiry 
about the measures taken by the Japanese iNl avy for bringing 
Ship 28" into port (see War Diary 18 Oct.) as follows: 


22 Oct. 19V3 

"I* The Japanese Navy was advised on 2J+ Oct, about the 
position and course of the MICHEL. On the following 
day Kobe was decided as her port of call and rendz- 
zouse agreed on for the afternoon of 17 Oct. off 

2. Constant naval and air escort of the ship was not 
requested, as this is not customary for the sea areas 
around Japan, and also owing to lack of suitable 
vessels would certainly have been impossible, especially 
as over . 50 miles from the coast. Single Japanese 
vessels as well as entire convoys, which in most 

cases are escorted only by one slow escort vessel 
according to reports from captains of chartered ships, 
rely on constant air patrol of the adjacent sea areas. 
This patrol was especially reintorced for the MICHEL, 
according to information from the Chief of the Operat- 
ion Division. According to statements by survivors, 
flying boats were, however, sighted only twice „ 

3. Captain Gumprich, and especially Lt. CmdE» Trendtel 
as former chief of the Yokohama office, were fully 
aware of the situation owing to the length of time 
spent in Japan, According to a report from Behrendit 
was therefore also intended that a light PT boat be 
sent out for escort at dawn. If .this measure was 
not introduced earlier, it was probably because up 

to now submarine activity against traffic has been 
observed close to shore only," 

Fuller investigation is required as to how far it was possible 
to carryoout more extensive security measures for the returning 
ship in the limited time available. For every good reasons 
Naval Staff had ordered that her position be reported in good 
time. Therefore the fact that this order was not followed is 
possibly the key to the disastrous end of this auxiliary cruiser. 

II . Situation West Area; 

1. Enemy Situation; 

Over the Bay of Biscay W planes were detected on operation 
as far as 18° W. Our air reconnaissance reported at 1053 a 
convoy consisting of 22 merchantmen and five escort vessels in 
BE 8196 on course 60° c This convoy was detected at 1530 in 
BE 8292 on course 20°, 






2. Qwn Situation ; 
Atlantic Coast: 



Two submarines were escorted in and one out off 
La Pallice, Spanish fishing vessels southwest of the Girode 
and north of San Sebastian were searched without result by a 
group of minesweepers, as they were reported by the Air Force 
to be suspected of carrying radar. Two ELM/J mines were 
swept off La Pallice. 


on the first 

is to preceed today from Brest to Le Havre on 
of her transfer. The Channel is not to be 
of the new-moon period. Group 
West plans to transfer blockade-runner OSTFRIESLAND .from 
Le Havre to Bordeaux 

passed until around the end 

;r the blockade-runner 
on about 2h Oct. 

Five boats of the Vth Torpedo Boat Flotilla left Brest at 1800 
to provide remote escort as far as the Channel Islands for the 
MUENSTERLAND, which left the port at 1500 escorted by six 
minesweepers and two patrol boats. 

Channel Coast: 

i) \ 

Group West plans to have the convoy of the NORDVAARD 
start from Le Havre during the night of 22 Oct. or 23 Oct. 
After a stop at Kieppe and at Boulogne this convoy is to 
go on from the latter port during the night of 27 Oct., 
since an eastbound British convoy is expected to pass through 
the Channel during that night. Departure from Le Havre has 
been ordered for 2^00, with an escort consisting of 3 motor 

minesweeper depot ships, 7 motor minesweepers 

md 5 patrol 

Torpedo boats T ,, l 1 + u , the FALKE and the KOHP'OR of the 5th 
Torpedo Boat Flotilla arrived at Cherbourg at 0330, They 
will probably resume their passage in two days, after the 
necessary engine repairs on the F/J1KE have been completed. 
Transfer of the *+th and 8th PT Boat Flotillas from the Hook t 
to Amsterdam is planned for the night of 22 Oct. . ; 

III . North Sea, Norway. Northern Waters 

North Seas 

Minesweeping operations were hampered by bad weather, 
especially in the western part of the area of Commanding 



22 Oct. 19^3 

Admiral, Defenses, North, One ground minewwas swept north of 
Schiernonikoog and one west of Heligoland. Convoy "1133" Hook- 
Elbe consisting of three steamers sailed eastbound at 1330. 
A convoy of two steamers from Flushing to the Hook was carried 
out a planned. 

At 150*+ boats of the Rhine Flotilla shot down three enemy 
planes over Walcheren. In the evening naval anti-aircraft 
guns shot down one plane over Ameland. 

Norway, North e rn Water s; 

1, Enemy , Situation ;, 

Over the North Sea 23 planes were detected on operation. 
Enemy batteries on the Ribachi Peninsula and our own batteries 
exchanged fire in the area of Petsamo after one of our 
Kirkenes convoys. had passed through a 

2. Own Situation ; 

Thirty ships were escorted north and 23 south « Altogether 
33 ships were delayed owing to shortage of escorts, 

IV . Skagerrak, Baltic S ea Entrances, Baltic Sea 

1. Enemy Situation ; 

No new information has been received. The- 18th Army 
Command believes that the enemy has not yet completed his 
preparation for the expected attack, 

2. Own Situation ; . 

In order to intercept the DICTO and the « LIONEL single 
boats will be stationed in the evening in the Skagerrak patrol 
line from AO M+28 - L fl23„ During the night the patrol line will 
be moved closer to' the Swedish coast (AO M+38 - L t-l67), 

The hospital ships RUEGEN and METEOR continued their passage 
east via Trelleborg and anchored off Swinemuende at 1630. 
The three British ships passed Kr iris tia'iis and South at 1520. 

East of Neuf ahrwasser torpedo boat T "157" struck a mine and 
sank at 1725. The practice area of Training Unit, Fleet in 



22 Oct. 19^3 

Danzig Bay is again closed. 

In the area of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic minelaying 
operation !, Seeigel Villa" and one off Schepel were not 
carried out today either, because of unfavorable weather 

Transports and convoys in the entire Baltic Sea area proceeded 
without incident. 

v • Submarine Warfare 

Submarine U " 516" lay off Horta from 18-21 Oct., but had 
no opportunity for attack outside territorial waters. Five 
ships and one destroyer were observed in port. There was one 
patrol vessel off the northern, and one off the southern 
entrance and also Portuguese vessels P "1" - P nL i-" equipped 
with minesweeping gear. No planes were sighted. 

Otherwise nothing special to report from the North Atlantic and 
the Indian Ocean, 

VI Aerial Warfare 

British Isles and Vicinity : 

The 3rd Air Force had 180 planes out on operation over 
the west area and 15 over the Mediterranean, One Martin flying 
boat was shot down in aerial combat by a BV 222 at 1623 315 
miles west-northwest of Cape Finisterre. 

During the night of 22 Oct. 13 of our planes were out on 
operation against London. 

During the day strong enemy formations attacked airfields in 
northern France and Belgium. Five bombers were shot down by 
anti-aircraft guns. During the night of 22 Oct. strong enemy 
forces flew over Germany* Avery heavy attack was carried out 
on Cassel and a heavy one on Frankfurt on Main. For detailed 
report of the considerable damage sustained see Daily Situation. 
According to reports so far, 300 of our night fighters shot , 
down 30 enemy planes, while anti-aircraft guns shot down 
another one. 


22 Oct. I9V3 

Mediterranean Theater ; 

Our Air Force carried out reconnaissance over the western 
Mediterranean and the Italian area. In the Aegean Sea two 
enemy destroyers were attacked between 0128-G1H-5 in the area 
of Calino-Kos, but results were not observed. 

For further details of the successful attack on 21 Oct, by for- 
mations of the 3rd Air Force on a large convoy see Daily 

In Italy the enemy attacked the railroad and highways in the 
area of Grosseto. In Greece the airfieT of Eieusiswas 
attacked o 

E astern Fr ont; 

Over the Army front on 20 and 21 Oct, 190 enemy planes 
were shot down, six of ours being lost, 

No special reports have been received from the 5th Air Force. 

The J+th Air Force located the following by photographic 
reconnaissance at l*+00 in Anapa; 11 motor minesweepers i 2 
patrol boats, 6 tugs 3 *+l landing craft; also on the roads 
1 PT boat, 7 motor minesweepers 5 7 tugs, 3 landing craft, 
3 lighters and other small vessels,, These may indicate a 
preparation for landing operations. 

VII . Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Se a 

1 c Enemy Sit uatio n Mediterranean ; 

Of the convoy which passed through the Straits of Gibr- 
altar on 21 Octe eastbound, 3 steamers, 1 tanker and 1 destroyer 
entered Gibraltar. At 0900 on 22 Oct. 2k U.S„ LCT ? s and 28 
further landing craft with 2 escort vessels left Gibraltar for 
the Atlantic, Our air reconnaissance sighted at 1200 30 
miles east of Cape Tenes 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers on westerly 
course and at 1218 55 miles east of Cape Tenes 2 destroyers 
on northwesterly course. The large eastbound convoy attacked 
on the evening of 21 Oct. off Cape Tenes by the 3rd Air Force 
has not been detected again. 

Reconnaissance showed few changes in Sardinia and Corsica. 
There was still a large number of ships in Naples. No enemy 
sightings were reported from the' Gulf of Gaeta. A submarine 
position was reported 20 miles southwest of ^avona, An 
intelligence report states that a U.S* Submarine Chaser Flotilla 



) ) 

22 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

has arrived at Naples. The boats of this Flotilla are 
equipped -with the most modern sntl-subcm er ine devices and 
underwater acoustic gear. They also carry new radio direction- 
finder sets and depth charges of a new design with increased 
explosive sffect. The Flotilla is to be used for block- 
ading the areas around Corsica and Sardinia and on the 
west coast of Italy. 

No enemy sightings are reported from the Eastern Mediterranean, 
2. Own Situation Mediterranean: 


The PT boat operation during the night of 21 Oct. 
was again fruitless. The boats put in to Civitavecchia. 
German Naval Command, Italy is of opinion that, due to 
decrease in traffic, PT boat operations promise little 
success without advance reconnaissance and unless guided 
by shadowing planes. 

Enemy air activity in the area of Civitacecchia continued to 
be very lively. During an attack on motor minesweepers and 
one of our barge convoys only slight damage and casualties 
were sustained. 

The minelayer JUMINDA was sunk by submarine torpedoes at 
01^5 two miles west of San Stefano before carrying out 
her mine laying operation. After the second hit the Italian 
minesaaboard detonated, causing her to sink within a few 
seconds; only 16 survivors could therefore be rescued. 

are on return passage from Oran to Marseilles, according 
to plan. 

5. Area Naval Group, South: 

a . Adriatic Sea: 

The Albanian port of Milena was shelled by enemy 
warships during the night of 21 Oct. Full reports are still 
outstanding. In an enemy air attack on Split at noon on 21 
Oct. one steamer sustained damage. Escort operations in 
the Adriatic Sea were carried out according to plan. The 
torpedo boat MISSOURI is our of war readiness until 1.3 Do 

v^ . 

Group South reports in connection with the control of 
submarines : 

"I. The sending out of submarines from the Adriatic area 
carrying out operational assignments in the Adriatic 
•or Ionian Seas, apart from new distribution of 
operational areas in the Western and Eastern 


22 Oct. 19^3 

including., submarine operations there, raises the 
question as to control of the passage of submarines 
through the Adriatic and Ionian operational areas. 

2. Operational assignment and passage in these sea areas 
must be synchorized with other operational tasks of 
Admiral, Adriatic such as operations by our surface 
forces, minelaying., anti-submarine measures, control 
and escort of convoys and commitment of the Air Force 
for naval operational tasks. 

3. Submarines in the Mediterranean, and especially in 
the aforesaid operational areas is well as in the 
Aegean Ses, constitute only part of naval warfare as 

a whole and not the sole means of war against merchant 
shipping as in other operational areas far from our 
own coast such as at present the Western Mediterranean 
and areas outside the Mediterranean 5 special tactical 
commitment is required for these there and has been 
carried out. 

*+. Considering the present situation and possible develop- 
ments in the operational areas of the Mediterranean, 
command having no uniformity will clause difficulties, 
such as have already arisen with the departure of 
submarine U ,rl f53" which left for an undisclosed 
operational area and a task of Commander, Submarines. 
■Everything -must be done to avoid our shipping being 
endangered and the Air Force Commands responsible for 
the entire Adriatic Sea area (Air Force Command, South- 
east, Air Commanders , Albania and Croatia), being 
unable to coordinate their operations in time." 

Group South refers in this connection to the extract from its 
War Diary of 20 Oct,, dealing with the question of command in 
the eastern Mediterranean and requests a decision in accordance 
therewith. This question will be dealt with by Quartermaster 
Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch, together with 
Operations Division. 

b. Aegean Sea; 

Enemy Situation s 

On 21 Oct. at 2056 our planes attacked 2 destroyers west 
of Kalymnos. At 2150 our air reconnaissance sighted 10 miles 
northeast of Stampalia 1 cruiser and k destroyers on southerly 
course, ; and .on 22 -Oct. at 0128 about h miles east of Leros 
2 cruisers on course, souths outhe as t„ At 2310 on 22 Get, our 
air reconniassance detected 2 destroyers 5 miles northwest of 
Leros on southwesterly course and 20 miles south of this 
position another destroyer on southerly course. 


confidential :. 

22 Oct. 19^3 

Own Situation : 

It is now reported that in the air raid on the steamer 
SINFRA on 19 Oct. one plane was shot down for certain and 
another probably shot down. 

Mopping-up of the islands of Paros and Naxos has more or less 
been completed. The operation against Stampalia has started. 
At- 0700 two radio stations were destroyed by dive-bombers. At 
0710 one company of parachutists made a landing and an airborne 
unit of 100 men landed from six Ju seaplanes. 

The first reports state that the operation is progressing 
according to plan. German prisoners have been liberated. 

An enemy FT boat torpedoed naval landing craft F "131" with 
a surface runner during night repairs on the eastern shore of 

Escort operations in the Aegean Sea proceeded without incident. 


c. Black Sea ; 

Enemy Situation ; 

Air reconnaissance reported an increase in the number of 
ships in Anapa. 

One of our submarines sighted an eastbound convoy consisting 
of 1 tanker with 3 motor minesweepers and 2 minesweepers 20 
miles west of Suchum. Submarine U "23" sank a coastal freightei 
of 1,000 GRT 20 miles northwest of Poti shortly after mid- 
night on 22 Oct. 

Naval Intelligence Division has' made a summary of a great ; deal 
of intelligence on Russian plans for landing in the Black Sea 
and the Sea of Asov. Copy of this summary as per 1/Skl 29298/ 
>+3 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XlVa. 

Own Situation ; 

The 1st PT B-oat Flotilla in patrol line southwest ;0f 
Kerch sighted at 0130 gun flashes from a vessel, apparently a 
PT boat. Our bo-,ts did not succeed in establishing contact. 
During the night of 22 Oct. four boats of the 1st PT Boat 
Flotilla made a torpedo attack on boats assembled on > Anapa • ■ 
roads. No details have been received yet... Four Italian PT • 
boats put in to Nikolayev in the afternoon. The steamer 
THEODERICH, which ran aground near Ochakov, was refloated 
after lightening and put in to Odessa, While towing off the 
THEODERICH a tug struck a mine and sank 200 m. northeast of 
the point where she ran aground. 


22 Oct. I9V3 

On 21 Oct. units of the Danube Flotilla on the Sava. were 
several times fired on by machine-guns and small -arms 'from 
the Bosnian and Croatian area. One man was badly wounded. 

Gun trials of the heavy battery at Cape Khersones will be held 
on 22 and 23 Oct. 

Submarine U "9" is returning to Feodosiya from the operational 
area. Escort poperations were carried out without incident. 

Group South and Admiral, Black Sea have been instructed to 
advise Naval Staff of their views and plans regarding the use 
of naval forces (including naval landing c aft and. naval 
artillery lighters) for the defense of th" Crimean coast against 
enemy attempts at landing. 

In accordance with the order received from Naval Staff (see 
i/\Jar Diary 20 Oct 3 , Special Items I) Group South reports the 
^following .preliminary considerations in agreement with Admiral, 
'Black Sea about preparations for further supplies to and 
possible evacuation of the Crimea by seas 

"1, If all large freighters which are at present available in 
the Black Sea, 9 auxiliary sailing vessels, 20 tugs, 5 freight- 
train ferries, 25 lighters and 85 naval landing craft are 
used from Rumanian ports to ports in the Crimea or vice versa 
and if weather and convoy conditions are normal, it will be 
possible to transport 2c,300 tons daily, as required. Losses 
will, however, reduce the volume accordingly. It must be 
expected that the quantity transported will fall to 1,500 tons 
daily in case of bad weather and winter conditions (especially 
from January to April). 

•2..- The present Black Sea shipping and tanker's available will 
make it possible to supply or evacuate 280 tons. of furnace oil 
and fuel daily „ This is based, on previous experiences regard- 
ingtimes taken for the round trip. 


3« a. Feodosya (capable of handling up to 1,000 tons daily) 
must be included, since transhipment facilities by rail and 
truck at Sevastopol are limited to 1,5'00 - 1,800 -tons daily. 
< b. Yalta, Ak Mechef and Eupatoria are only suitable to 
a certain .extent, as further alternative ports owing to lack 
of rail connections. Priority construction of a breakwater 
at Eupatoria will be necessary. (.It is planned to sink a 
Russian monitor as part of this breakwater) , 

h. While the Danube is frozen, Bulgarian ports must also 
be used as discharging and loading ports; if small ships are 
used a large '••:... 

. ' -:''■• , CONFIDENTIAL 

.: -317- 

22 Oct. 19^3 

number of breakdowns must be expected from Constanta on, since 
lighters and tugs have only been made provisionally seaworthy." 

VIII . Situation East Asia 
Nothing to report. 

^* ^f» ^f> ^^ ^^ ^P ^^ ^^ ^1* ^P ^^ ^F ^^ *5*^^p ^^ T^ T^ ^^S ^p ^T* 

-318- " 

23 Oct. 19^3 

Items of Political Importance 

Considerable porgress is aaid to have been made at the Moscow 
talks, according to Reuter. The Coneference is presided over 
by Molotov. "The Times" writes that the impression is that 
the statesmen have already reached a closer agreement than 
has ever existed between the three Governments before. 

The British press shows anxiety about the slow advance made in 
Italy Terrain difficulties and bad weather are no longer 
accepted as a reason* 

According to an "Exchange" report regardi" ± Mountbatten's 
visit to Chiang Kai-Chek, a campaign on ^and against the Japanese 
in Burma is not to be expected as much as an amphibious 
operation which might lead to the conquest of Burma, Indo-China, 
Si am and Cantoru 

Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Nav al Staff 

I • ^rmy Situat ion 

Further advance by the enemy at the centers of attack in 
the southern and central sector of the eastern front was 
halted by very stubborn defense A strong counter-attack by 
our troops in the area of Smolensk j however, failed. Our losses 
were heavy. In the northern sector, where a large-scale 
enemy attack has been expected for the last ten days, everything 
was still quiet today. 

In southern Italy a large-scale attack was repulsed in our 
main defense line. Three of our divisions have formed a 
large pocket in the area of Ljubljana, where mopping-up is 
in progress. 

II. According to a report by Chief, Operations Branch and 
Army Liaison and Land Warfare Section, Operations Division 
on the withdrawal of naval personnel from the Crimea for 
the Adriatic (see War Diary 20 Oct,, Special Items II) Chief 
of Staff, Naval Staff has decided that the men, about 500 
in number, now stationed in the area of Genichesk are to 
remain there for the present. The remainder are, however, 
to be withdrawn as reinforcement for Adriatic eoascal defense, 
in accordance with the instructions of Group South, 

Otherwise no special reports and decisions. 



23 Oct. 19^3 
Special Items 

I. In reply to the request by Quartermaster Division regarding 
withdrawal of a naval artillery battalion from France for 
Italy, Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has decided 
as already advised for information, that weakening of our 
position in Northern France by setting up a naval artillery 
battalion for Italy cannot be agreed to. 

II. Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff requests 
High Command, Navy to issue an order directing that ships ! 
anti-aircraft guns participate in air defense while ships are 
in port or on the roads. 

This matter will be dealt with further by Quartermaster Division, 

III .Naval Staff lias issued the following instructions to Group 
South, Commander , Submarines, Mediterranean, Admiral, Aegean, 
admiral, Adriatic and German Naval Command, Italy, with regard 
to the question raised by Group South regarding control of 
submarines in the Mediterranian: 

"Present control of submarines: 

1 Commander, Submarines is responsible for conducting 
submarine warfare in the Mediterranean. 

2. Commander, Submarines will advise all Commanding 
Admirals whose areas are affected of the movements 
and operations of submarines * 

3. The local Naval Commanders will advise the necessary 
Air Force Commands. 

1 +. In case of special operations, Naval Staff will • 
order transfer of the tactical control of the 
submarines assigned for the operation in question 
to the local Naval Commander, e.g. the intended 
operation by submarine U "565" in the Aegean Sea. 

5. Commander , Submarines will establish and try out 
communication with Admiral, Adriatic at once with . 
Admiral, Aegean before the start of the operation 
by submarine U "565" in the Aegean Sea. 

6. Commander, Submarines will despatch one of his 
officers to Admiral, Aegean for the operation by 
submarine U "565"." 


23 Oert. 19V3 ■ 

IV. The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping states, in 
connection with the transfer of barges to the southeast area, 
that it is planned first to transfer 150 freight "barges and 
20-25 tank barges from the Belgian and French areas to the 
Black Sea via Dresden and Ingolstadt e Furthermore, investiga- 
tions are being .made as to whether it will be possible to 
transfer 30 Seine tankers in parts by rail to Nikplayev. 
Finally, it is planned to transfer 7 auxiliary coastal 
sailing vessels to the Black Sea by the route Rhine-Main-Lud- 
wigs Canal-Danube. ..' '■'< 

No small merchant vessels will be transferred at present from 
the Western Mediterranean to the Adriatic Sea on the overland 
route Genoa-Piacenza, since there are sufficient small vessels 
available in the Adriatic Sea 

CI « 

V. The deputy of the Naval (Ship) Construction Division for 
the building of war transports at Nikolayev has asked Op?£ations 
Division for a decision on whether final work on the completed 
war transports, KT "17" and "23 ;i , which will take a week,, is to 
be carried out or whether it is to be postponed for about six 
weeks until a netlayer is completed, as requested by Admiral, 
Black Sea. In view of the fact that the final work on the war 
transports will only take eight days whereas repair of the 
netlayer will require six weeks v Operations Division has 
decided that the war transports '.should be completed first* 

The order in question, 1/skl 29631A3 Gkdos,, is contained in 
War Diary, Part B, Vol. -V. 

VI. Baval Intelligence Division reports in its "Evaluation of 
Intelligence on Foreign Navies" on serial production of LCa's 
and on U.S„ landing engineers. Copy as per 1/Skl 32609 and 
32195A3 geh in War Diary "Evaluation of Intelligence on 
Foreign Navies". 

VII „ The Intelligence Service has submiatted photostat copies 
of Portuguese Consular reports of 16, 1" and -18 Sept, from 
Exeter, Leicester, Brington, .Norwich arid Bath, which deal with 
the question of an enemy landing from southern. England All 
reports describe very .forcibly the obvious indications., of and 
observations on preparations for an imminent large-scale . 
operation in the Channel, . One of. these reports states that 
there is nothing, to show that the .plan to attempt an offensive 
in the Channel and the North Sea has 'bean given up e The 
movement of troops from the interior into the tien prohibited 
coastal area shows, it is stated, that the plan s i ill exists 
unless it is an immense bluffintended to necessitate strong 
German forces being- tied down on the French coast while the 
attack is carried out on another front, The author does not 
feel inclined to come to this conclusion, since he does not 
believe that such a large number of personnel and quantity 

-321- - 

23 Oct. 191*3 

of materiel are involved solely for a strategic ruse. It 
remains to be investigated whether the Consular reports them- 
selves do not represent a very much easier method of tying- 
down German forces. Naval Intelligence Division has, however, 
so far no reason to doubt the authenticity of the reports. 
Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division, Naval 
Liaison is of the same opinion, 

VIII. In May 19*+3 Operations Division drew up considerations 
on a possible war with Sweden, Copy as per 1/Skl 1568A3 Gkdos 
Chefs, in War Diary, Part C, Vol. Ill; 

In view of the latest developments in the situation it now 
seems advisable to investigate and decide what measures 
would arise for the Navy in case Sweden should enter the war 
on the enemy side and according to what points of view a 
war against Sweden can and must be waged by us. The above 
mentioned consid rations have therefore been sent to Group 
North/Fleet with the request to submit a study as soon as 
possible which takes into consideration that Sweden r s entry 
into the war may also coinside with a British landing in 
southern Norway, Jutland or western Sweden. Only the most 
limited investigations and Naval Commands, Baltic and Norway 
are to participate to the extent necessary. 

Situation 23 Oct . 

I . War in Foreign Waters 

1. Enemy Situation ; 
Nothing to report. 

2. Own Situation ; 

The Naval Attache in Tokyo is instructed that submarine 
DOMMES is to put out via Penang in order to receive codes and 
for consultations with the commanders of the MONSUN boats on 
mutual experiences. Naval Staff has agreed to empty torpedo 
tubes of submarine DOMMES and the MONSUN boats being loaded 
with rubber. 


23 Oct. 19^3 

II. Situation West Area 

1. Enemy Situation s 

Over the Bay of Biscay 3*+' planes were detected on operation 
as far as 18° 30 ? W, One British vessel each was located 

at 0917' in BF V766 

. -. at 1015 .in BF >+290 

. at llJf6 in BF 3V70 ,.. ' : 

at 1856 in BE 5330 ■.- 

at 1930 in AL 6670 : ': 

at 2056 in CF 3130 '. : A 

. • . at 2351 in AL 6770 ..-.:• 

Our air reconnaissance sighted at 0905 in BE 6535 a, convoy of 
seven merchantmen on. course h0°» - .. .. 

Targets were several times located "between 0027 and 023Vin- 
the Channel about 10-12 miles northeast to north of Los 
lies. • ': .... 

2. Own Situations , ■■■ ■' 

Atlantic Coast 

One submarine was escorted in to Brest B Eight Spanish 
fishing vessels, suspected of carrying radar on board, were 
searched without result by two patrol vessels ten miles north 
of San Sebastian. . .■ A 

Channel Coast ; ■•'.,.', 

The l+th Torpedo Boat Flotilla, acting as remote escort 
for the convoy of the MJENSTERLaND , had a .vrief but successful 
engagement with an enemy cruiser and destroyer at 01^3 in BF 
2916 (north of Les Sept lies). The cruiser was sunk by 
torpedo and two destroyers were torpedoed- Sinking of at 
least one of the two is probable. Our boats'" -suffered no 
damage or casualties. The convoy arrived safely at Lezardrieux c 
For brief action report of . Commander, *+th Torepdo Boat Flotilla ■ 
see teletype' l 1 +05o . Chief, Naval Staff has expressed special' ' 
appreciation to the ^th Torpedo Boat Flotilla. 

In view of the continuation of this- escort operation-, the 
Commander of the Flotilla has proposed that the report on 
this success should not be announced before 2h Oct* and that 
participationof the torpedo boats should not -be desclosed* 
Group West, however, considers an immediate publication 
advisable, contrary to the opinion of Commander, Vth Torpedo 
Boat Flotilla. 




23 Oct. 19^3 

Operations Division has ordered that the request of the .Commander 
be complied with. 

The convoy of the steamer NORDVAARD. left Dieppe at 18^5 for 
Boulogne. The convoy of the MDENSTERLAND will be transferred 
during the night of 23 Oct. from Lezardrieux to Cherbourg „ F 
Five boats of the *+th Torpedo Boat Flotilla left St. Malo at 
1330 for reriiot escort and will subsequently proceed to Brest. 
Nine boats of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla will provide further 
remote escort. 

The KONDOR, MOEVE, FALKE and T "lV" of the 5th Torpedo Boat 
Flotilla are to proceed during -the- same night frmm Cherbourg 
to Le Havre. 

a torpedo operation from the. Hoof den. (northeastern entrance 
to the English Channel, Tr.N.) by the 2nd, Vth, 6th and 8th 
PT Boat Flotillas was planned against a northbound convoy on 
the east coast This operation had to be. discontinued because 
of, stormy weather. All. PT boats put in to I.jmuiden, Patrol 
line positions were not taken up for the same reason. 

Ill . North Sea, Norway, Northern Water s 


North Sea s 

Convoy "1183" Hook - Elbe was carried out" according to plan. 
Minesweeping activity was hampered by stormy weather* 

Norway. Northern Wat ers : 

■ ■ I l 1 " - ■■■! ■■ !—»■ ! . . ■ .1.1 1 " ■ — 

1 . Enemy Situation : 

Over the Ncrth'Sea 25 planes were- detected on operation. 
There was only minor gunfire and air activity in the Petsamo 
and Vardoe areas on 21 and 22 Oct. According to a reconnaissance 
report of the 5th Air Force, the coal mine on the southeastern 
slope of Longyearbyen, is still burning, while 500 m. north- 
east of the old brokendown transmitter. masts at: Tunheim on 
Bear Island two new masts' 10 - 15 m.> high with antenna were, 

.2. Q\m Situation ; ,' ■ . \ "f, • ... 

Thirty-four ships were escorted north and 23 south. 
Shortage of escorts delayed 2.9 ships- i';U.V 


23 Oct. 19^3 

IV. Skagerrak. Baltic Sea Entrance , Baltic Sea 

1. Enemy Situation : 
Nothing to report. , 

2. Own Situation ; 

the boat IK "32" sank at 0300 in the north harbor dockyard 
in Copenhagen, obviously owing to sabotage. 

Otherwise nothing special to report. 

V . Submarine Warfare 

Anti-aircraft submarine U "271" reports that she was 
attacked by a carrier-borne plane and four Catalinas on 21 
Oct. at the supply point and sustained slight damage. On 
22 Oct. submarine U "21V' sank a single vessel (7,000 G.R.T.) 
in DP 6178. This submarine reports lively traffic near Colon 
consisting of single vessels, some of which are escorted, 
and continuous unskilled location from shore and at sea. 

VI. Aerial Warfare 

British Isles and Vicinity : 

■ ■ i fc ■! 1— t w^ — — 1— ■ — ■— «■— — wmmmtamm i i 11 ■■■ ■ , n I , ' 

The 3rd Air Force reports 12 bombers, 16 heavy fighters 
2h reconnaissance planes and 15*+ fighters out on operation 
over the west area without special incident. • --■ 

In connection with the attack on*Cassel it is now reported 
that our defense shot down 57 enemy planes for certain. At 
' 1200 on 23 Oct. two Ju 88*s attacked nine fishing boats, ..... 
apparently Danish, outside the fishing grounds; the effect 
was not observed. '..*'■"; 

"" During an attack on a convoy of seven LST's in BE 6590 four 
FW 200 1 s probably sank one LST and heavily damaged .a second 

During the night of 23 Oct. 39 of our planes were sent out 
against Great Yarmouth and nine against London. Three Do 
217 T s were lost. 

During the day enemy planes machine-gunned trains in 
western France. Single bombs were dropped on vessels off the 
island of Cezembre v but- missed the targets. One Typhoon was 
shot down. 


23 Oct. 19^3 

Mediterranean Theater : 

Our Air Force carried out reconnaissance .in the. Italian are^.. 
Towards evening 67 planes started out again for an attack on ' 
the harbor of Naples. No report has yet been received. In the 
attack on the eastbound convoy off Tenes 3 He Ill's and 2 Ju .: , 
88 ? s were lost; 15 planes were lost during the attack on Naples 
on 22 Oct. , . 

Air Force Command, Southeast reports altogether 30*+ planes out 
on operations. Harbor installations of Leros and Porto Lago 
were attacked without the effect being observed. West of Kos 
a bomb was dropped close to an enemy destroyer »■ No report on 
the result has. yet' been received. • ,.' 

Four Spitfires approached Montenegro and 30 Lightnings flew" 
into the Straits of . Otranto, of which 6 machine-gunned the 
airfield of Tirana., All h Spitfires and 1 Lightning were shot 
down in aerial combat. 

The qenemy was very active over the' Italian front' and one 
small airship, among other things, was sent in r , Attacks were 
carried, out on railroad installations between Romeaand 
Florence, the area Bologna-Venice-Bolzano and the airfield 
of Guidonia near Rome. • .-, . 

In the Greek area the airfield of Candia and the island of 
Syros were- raid.;ed;-. Over the Dodecanese a heavy-fighter, patrol ... 
by 3-5 planes and «. reconnaissance activity were observed, 

Eastern Front: •'■ v . ; '■'... '.-,'.;■ 

A Swedish courier plane, was. shot down at 2300 oyer the 
Skagerrak a The Air Force is. interested, (for- intelligence 
reasons) in the maintenance, of courier communications between 
Sweden and. England. If a furthervintensificatipn. .of night 
fighter activity over the Skagerrack- should cause Sweden to 
discontinue her courier service, the Air^orce intends to 
propose that Swedish courier planes make an intermediate 
landing at Aalborg' by day.rn Commander in :Chief,> Air Force 
enquires: how the' Navy reacts to : - tjais, proposal in view of our 
convoy and patrol traffic. 

In the Black Sea photographic, reconnaissance of _po: ',s,was 
carried out. For re suits-/, see Enemy Situation Black Sea and . 
Daily Situation. 

VII . Warfare in the Mediterranean and.B&ack Sea 

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean: ' 

In the morning 19 LCT T s left Gibraltar for the Atlantic 


23 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

and h transports with troops, 15 freighters and ltanker .left 
for the Mediterranean. One AURORA class was reported putting 
in from the Atlantic. At 17^5 a convoy of 21 freighters and 
h tankers with h escort vessels and k corvettes passed through 
the Straits of Gibraltar bound for the Atlantic. Of this 
convoy 10 ships and the k corvettes put in to Gibraltar. 

No shipping movements were detected in the Western Mediterranean* 
According to photographic reconnaissance, altogether 5^ 
merchantmen totaling about 300,000 G.R.T. and 2 large and 17 
medium-sized landing boats were lying in Naples on 22, Oct. 
In the Strait of Bonifacio heavy traffic consisting of small 
vessels was observed and on the west coasts of Sardinia. and 
Corsica on 22 Oct. for the first time heavy supply traffic. 
In Ajaccio were lying 2 destroyers, 2 boats, apparently escort 
vessels, and 3 small freighters. There was heavy enemy air 
patrol over the west coast from the front line as far as 

No sighting reports have been received from the Eastern 

2. Own Situation Mediterranean ; 

Naval landing craft MFP " 5*+l" was torpedoed by a submarine 
and sunk on the morning of 22 Oct. near the harbor of Imperia. 
Thirteen men \\rere killed. Otherwise coastal traffic, was 
carried out without incident. German Naval Command, Italy, 
reported s 

"Evacuation from central Italy of captured goods has started 
at a great pace on the west coast. Commanding General, 
Armed Forces, South now requires also large supplies by sea 
because of the increased danger from the air to the overland 
supply routes. Owing to the great danger from the air by 
day and lack of protection from our own fighters, ships can- 
not easily make round trips sincd only night passage is still 
possible. Ports are also very open to air attacks during 
the day. Anti-aircraft guns are knot available in general. 
Siebel ferries and naval landing craft shot down six enemy 
planes between 11 and 29 Sept." 

Sighting of 1^0' enemy planes' near Olbia indicates that there 
is a large number of planes based on the airfields of Sardinia 
and .'Corsica. 

German ^aval Command, Italy reports with reference to the 
instructions of Operations Division of 21 Oct.s 

"1. The vessels SALVORE, SAN GIORGIO nnd F "1^9" at 
pres present lying in Venice are indispensable, if the 

task arising here in coastal traffic for Commanding 
General, Armed Forces, South and Army Group B- are 
to be carried out. ■ The SAN GIORGIO is at present 

•-327- ■■ 




23 Oct.. 19^3 

. being equipped as a minelayer so that the most 
urgent barrages in inshore waters can be laid, 
With order 0p e 36rGkdos. Chefs. Group South placed 
these vessels temporarily at bur 'disposal for 
operations here. . 

2. The AUDACE will require at least two weeks for 
trials after her crew is complete, since, for 
instance, men of Branch. II are almost all engineers. 
The boat will not be ready '' for- -minelaying operations 
until the first half of November. '■'■'■ - ■ ■'■■ 

3« Please confirm that the boats mentioned will romair 
und e r G e rman . N a v a 1 . C omm and , I taly un t i 1 the tasks 
■ here are completed ;" " : "~- ■ •• ' 

Group Sout states in his connection: . 

"le From the vessels allotted to It by Operations 

Division, Group South agreed to make .operational 

vessels of Admiral, Adriatic, from time to time ■ ■■ ... 

temporarily available tq German Naval- Command, Italy.. 

Group South must, however, reserve the right to decide 

whether vessels can be made available. ',-'.'. 

■ v.- ■ . .,. . 

2. Therefore all vessels, whether still being equipped 
or already in operational readiness, are solely at 
the disposal of Admiral, Adriatic until- Group South 
can make a decision on the basis of definite operations, 
. fixed as to time and location, which; are submitted' 
by German Naval Command, . Italy , ■■■-■-'. 

3 e Especially with regard to the AUDACE^ manning, 

training and decision as to' her operational readiness 
must rest with Admiral,' Adriatic., .After Group- South 
'. has advised German Naval Command, Italy of her ...-.■' 
operational readiness, the latter can submit a re- 
quest accordingly," ,. '"■'.'. 

Naval Staff thereupon despatched the ' following order to German 
Naval Command, 'Italy, with copy to .Group South and Admiral, 
Adriatic 1 • . :■ 

"German Naval Command, Italy has .been advised fully of 
the extent and. great importance of the new tasks assigned 
to Admiral, Adriatic 9 - The three torpedo boats and six 
vessels of the 11th Coast Patrol Flotilla' will hardly 
suffice for these tasks., German Naval Command, Italy 
must therefore try to carry out its operations as far as 
possible with the means available. -to it* As regards 
the torpedo boat AUDACE,. directed agreement is to be 
■ arrived at with Admiral, Adriatic:,.. ■>:$£ aval Staff agrees 
■■' to the AUDACE being left at the disposal of German 

Naval Command, Italy until about the' middle of November" 

'■- : -328- ' ■ r ...' CONFIDENTIAL 

23 Oct, .19^3 .. CONFIDENTIAL 

:" ■•- .f or minelaying operations planned on the east coast of 
Italy.:": ' .•* .;j 

The hospital ships DJENNE and SINAI A put in to Marseilles at 

0800. .:•:■; r ::■• ■ 

3« Area Naval Group ^outh : 

a. Adriatic Sea :-. 

Enemy Situation; 

According to a report from the Naval Attache in Istanbul 
of 15 Oct.. the (Japanese, Tir.N.) Military Attache in Ankara 
deduces from reports regarding withdrawal of several divisions 
of the 9th British Army from the Near East to southern Italy 
that a large-scale Allied attack on the Aegean Sea and Greece 
has been postponed until further notice and that the transfer 
to Italy signifies preparations for an operation against the 
Balkans via the Adriatic Sea. 

Our own data confirms the withdrawal of two divisions of the 
9th Army to the Italian area. The conclusions drawn by the 
Japanese are, however, in no way sound. For details see order 
1/S'kl 31922A3 geh. in VJar Diary, Part C, Vol . XIV. 

Own Situation; .'■'■•■. 

Our air reconnaissance sighted four small merchantmen at 
"112 1 + on 23 Oct. off the island of Vis and at 1150 35 miles 
northwest of Dubrovnik. Operations for occupation of the 
islands of Cirje and Murtes (off Sibenik) have started. 
Cirje-North was occupied at 1500. Guns on Murtes were 
destroyed. : 

The steamer BQjaNO and aRSIA, en route from Durazzo to Cattaro, 
have been overdue since the .evenings of 20 and 21 Oct, respecti- 
vely. Apparently the latter was seized by British destroyers 
on 22 Oct. She was seen in tow at 0800 on 22 Oct. near Cape 
Rodoni . 

Port Commander, Sibenik reports 1 torpedo boat, 1 minelayer, 
2. submarine chasers, 2 minesweepers and 3 small tugs. in 
operational readiness, and 1 PT boat, 2 minesweepers and 
several other small vessels in need of repairs, 

b. Aegean Sea ; 

:.- ffnemy Situation : ...... - • . 

According to air reconnaissance, at 1^+5 there were one 
crMser and two destroyers about. 120 miles southeast of 
Scarpanto on course 3^0°. During the day eight reconnaissance 
planes were detected over the Aegean Sea, 



23 Oct. 19^3 

O.wn Situation: 

The island. of Stampalia has been in our hands since noon 
on 22 Octo The entire garrison consisted of 670 Italians and 
100 British, .Forty -eight German survivors were liberated,, 
From the Aegean Islands altogether 29,^5*+ Italian and British 
prisoners were evacuated to the mainland by sea up to 22 Oct. 
About 6,000 men were drowned through enemy action from these 

Motor tanker ME "3" has been detained^by Turkey in the Dardanelles. 
Investigation is under way. Convoy traffic in the Aegean Sea 
proceeded according to plan and. without incident „ 

c. Black Sea ; ■•'.•'• 

^ --■ ■ Enem y Situation : ".' 

Group South reports that, according to photographic 
reconnaissance, the number of vessels in harbors of the Sea of 
Asov has increased to about 17 landing vessels and 2h small 
naval vessels since 10 Oct, . Some of these landing vessels were 
brought to Yeisk by rail". : The transport capacity of the land- 
ing vessels is estimated to be sufficient for about 2,000 
men. About 70 landing vessels and 35 small naval vessels have 
been detected at Black Sea ports, their disposition within 
the harbors varying . Transport capacity is estimated to be 
sufficient for about 2, 5'00 men. Most of these vessels are 
assembled at Anapa. 

Own Situation : .,....,•,.-,..•.,.. 

In the operation by the 1st PT Boat Flotilla against 
Anapa during the night of 22 Oct., in conjunction with night 
reconnaissance, torpedoes were fired against berths of the 
vessels located by air reconnaissance e Several torpedoes 
detonated and fires lasting a short while were subsequently o 

At 1700 four boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla left again on 
an operation against shipping targets off Anapa and against 
supply traffic off the coast* The patrol line positions off 
Genichesk and south of the Kerch Peninsula were taken up 
during the nights of 22 and 23 Oct. and during the night of 
23 oct. positions in the Strait of Kerch also, 

There were no special incidents during the night of 22 Oct. 

A ground mine was swept 25 miles eastnortheast of Odessa. 

Convoy traffic was carried out - as planned . 


23 Oct. I9V3 ■ 

According to a directive from Armed Forces High Command, 
Operations Staff to Army Group A, the Fuehrer has,' Th view of 
the exceptional importance of the Crimea as a corner-stone of 
the eastern front, now ordered extension to the entire Crimean 
fortress of the : authority- for the coastal. areas given to 
Commanding General, Army Group A through Directive No.^O 
as regards the Commands of the branches of the Armed Forces,, 
civilian offices and untis and organizations outside the 
Armed forces. Commanding General, Army Group A has been, 
authorized to transfer this extended authority to the Command- 
ing General of the 17th Army. 

VIII. Situation East Asia 

The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports, on the basis of informa- 
tion received from the Japanese Admiralty: 

"A submarine-borne plane detected the following on YJ Oct.- at 
Pearl Harbor: h battleships, h aircraft carriers, 5 cruisers 
and 17 destroyers. Another submarine-borne plane sighted 
on 19 Oct.. at Suwa (Fiji Islands) :' 8. transports, 1 destroyer-' 
and 17 corvettes. Enemy reports, about the air attacks on . 
Rabaul are ■ greatly esaggerated. On 12 Oct. only one large 
ship- was 'sunk and a few damaged \ only 19 grounded planes 
were destroyed. The situation in the area of Finschhafen has 
improved; there has. been continuous and successful support- •_.-•; 
by the Japanese Air Forces." •;..• 

«^, «^, ^. +\, y *Xm -Jir ^r -^-. -X* -^r ~£r -Jf «^ ^L- ^i- •J^ 3^ yLr ^tg 




- *■ ■ ■■ ■ CONFIDENTI AL 

2h Oct. 19^3 

Items of Political Importance ■ " 

■ I ■ !-■■ m — — ■■■ I. !!■■!■■» ■■■Ill II II I I ■lllll ■ ■ II II* Ml -I. ■■WII^HI 

"Exchange Telegraph" reports from Moscow that the course of 
the Conference so far- has strengthened the impression that 
Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt will meet before the end of 
the year. "Exchange Telegraph" is obviously endeavoring in 
its reports, on the Conference to create the impression that 
the discussions are proceeding favorably, as a matter of 
fact nothing is divulged regarding the actual course of 
affairs. .'"..' 

Conference o n the Situa tion with Chief of Staff, Naval 'Staff 

————fi — P— — C— i ■»— — II I I.I 1» — I ■ «l !■■ I i— ^— — m I —— ^»a— — ■p— w—™iw*ww V I W^W^W#M««—i^— ^M^W— »— I— » 

No special reports or decisions. 

Special Items . .,'. 

I. Naval Intelligence Division in Enemy Situation Report No. 
20A-3 of 20 Oct. estimates the 'situation as a whole as. follows : 

"According to reliable reports, transfers of troops from the 
United States to Great Britain are continuing* No indication 
is given by direct observation as to the volume. The concent- 
ration of forces in southern England for some time now 
definitely seems to have been maintained. The assembly of 
landing craft in the same area is reported from various reliabl; 
sources. There, are-- also authentic' reports ' on the assembly of 
a considerable freighter reserve (allegedly about ^.00 , 000 •• - 
500,000G.R.T.) on the west;' coast of England. These' freighters 
are loaded with war materiel and ready for immediate use a 

Even if the absence of adequate air 'reconnaissance; does, not 
permit a clear picture of the volume of landing craft and ■■ 
large ships assembled, in the English area, all information 
indicates that enemy preparations for a decisive attack against 
northern and western Europe 'are making 'constant progress *■ No 
concrete information is available about the -date of ■ the attack 
planned and its direction. It must be emphasized -that a 
continuous hindrance through weather conditions to operations 
by sea either in the northern area or in western Europe may 
not be presumed even in the coming winter months, . : 

In the North Atlantic, bases on two' Azores' islands have been 
ceded by Portugal to the Western Powers. The gap- in. the air 
patrol' of the Central North Atlantic, which so far could nnly 
be bridged-over provisionally by plane s from; auxiliary- carriers 
can now be closed by planes from thV Azores. Through the;.: •. ■ 



2h Oct. 19^3 

newly acquired bases a chain of airfields for land-based planes 
is formed on the periphery of the North Atlantic, which will 
shortly be under enemy air control along its whole length..- 

This offers enemy merchant shipping in the North Atlantic, apart 
from increased air escort, greater facilities for scattering 
traffic pver the center of the North Atlantic. 

In the Mediterranean indications of future, enemy planes are 
very difficult to conclude owing to less freauent insight into 
landing craft and- shipping, at the enemy ports.; At present no 
concentrations for new operations are reported. 

It is expected that future enemy operations in the Central 
Mediterranean will be aimed at" the Dalmatian- Albanian coast. 
Therefore the Apulia-n harbors situated closest to this area . 
require'dspecial attention.' ' 

In the We stern Mediterranean increased movements observed dur- 
ing the last few days in the Corsica area are worthy of note. 

Increased and continuous appearance of enemy surface forces 
in the Aegean Sea indicates that the enemy intends to "hold this 
aea area. It must be expected that the enemy will recapture 
the islands lost in the Dodecanese and that enemy positions 
will gradually advance further to the north along the Turkish 

■ With ...regard to the convoy situation in the Mediterranean, 
Naval Intelligence Division states: 

"Supply traffic to the Mediterranean^ was carried out as planned.. 
No troops were transferred. Between ,1 and 15 Oct. about 1,000,000 
G.R.T. o.f freighters and about 200,000 G.R.T. of tankers 
were transferred to the Mediterranean, while in the same 
period about 500,000 G.R.T. of freighters and 80,000 G.R.T . of 
tankers left the Mediterranean again through the Straits of 

Photographic reconnaissance of West Algerian ports, carried 
out in the middle of October, confirmed the presumed disposi- 
tion of large ships in the Western Mediterranean (about 1,000- 
000 G.R.T.). 

Landing craft were withdrawn from the Mediterranean for. the 

first time on 19 Oct. when 21 LCT's left for Gibraltar or . 

the Atlantic (9for the Atlantic) . The significance of this - i 

movement, which has so far been limited, cannot yet be 


No definite information has been received on the exyent of . ."._" 
traffic through the Mediterranean to and from the Indian ". .''. 
Ocean. ; " " . ■ '. .-. , 




2k Oct. 19^3 

Theoretically it is considered likely that at present about 
>+50,000 G.RoT. monthly of freighters from the former Cape . 
traffic are at present passing through the Mediterranean in 
both directions. No through-traffic in tankers is assumed i: 


II. In connection with carrying out the Fleet Construction 

Program 19*+3 j experiences gained in cooperation with the 

Main Committee have shown that it is unnecessary to establish ■...•• 

special departments within the Naval (Ship) Construction 

Division. The Ministry of Armament and : Production therefore 

agrees that the independent departments,' subordinated as 

regards technical matters to the Main Committee, .be dissolved 

and that the tasks again be taken over by the groups "of 

the Division. Effective immediately, the former organization 

of the 'Naval (Ship) Construction Division is therefore re- . : ,- 


Situation 2k Oct . 

I . War in Foreign Wa ters • 
1 , Enem y Situ ation s 

Nothing to report, 

2- Own Situations 

The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports. that the Japanese; ■■ 
Navy agrees to the proposal of Naval Staff as per Radiogram 
2130 on 16 Oct. (see War Diary 16 Oct-.)., 

The C mmander of the T'ANNS has been instructed to make the 
necessary arrangements' at Singapore with' the captain of the 
BOGOTA. ,.'■■■ \'. •' • ;•■■•' 

II. Situation West Area ' : •• ' 

~ • ... 

1* • Ene my Si tu ation ; ._ •-■ ., ..•.. r, ■'.;.;': • -.■:■*:■■■ 

Over the Bay of Biscay 51 planes were detected on 
operation as far as lk° W*- One British vessel was located- at 
1635 in BF. ^630. and one at 1902- in BE.399Q. , "■';'■' -.:•;•;. ■'."•;-■ 

Our air reconnaissance sighted at 1122 in BE 5925 a convoy • r . 
of 30 merchantmen and 5 escort vessels on course 210°, 

Our air reconnaissance sighted , at 1-515 on. 23- Oct, 3- rubber ■ 
dinghies and 1 large rowing boat, unmanned, at the scene of ; 
the. engagement, of., the Vth. Tropedo- Boat Flotilla. in BF 1921. 
The Sea Rescue Service at Brest sighted some further wreckage 

-33^r ' •• - ' L; "' '. CONFIDENT IAL ".' ■> 

2*+ Oct. 19^3 

2. Own Situation ; 
Atlantic Coast; 


Off the bases three submarines were escorted out and 
four in. Five boats of the *+th Torpedo Boat Flotilla put in 
to Brest at 0900. Minesweeper M ,,L m-3" ran aground on 23 Oct.- 
at the inouth of the Ad our and is probably lost. 

Submarine chaser "1^03" was lost from sight at 0315 in BF 5J>12,. 

when returning from anti-submarine escort. A search revealed 
wreckage. One officer and M? of the crew were brought ashore ' 
at Concarneau by a French fishing smack. No particulars 
have yet been received 

Channel Coast ; 

Transfer of the NORDVaARD from Dieppe as far as Boulogne 
was carried out as planned. 

The convoy of the iMUSNSTERLAND put in to Cherbourg at 0V30. 
The torpedo boats KONDOR, MO EVE, FALKE and T M lV« of the 5th 
Torpedo Boat Flotilla were tranferred from Cherbourg t.o 
Le Havre. 

The 5th PT Boat Flotilla was sent out, without success, against 
targets located south of Alderney, presumably PT boats in 
waiting position. The Flotilla put in to Cherbourg. It is 
planned to transfer it to Boulogne during the night of 2h . 
Oct. Five boats of the 18th Patrol ^oat Flotilla were 
unsuccessfully bombed by an enemy plane at 2205 on 23 Oct. 
while en route from Boulogne to Dieppe. 

A raid was carried out by 2*+ planes on the harbor of Cherbourg 
between 1513 and 1531... The steramer Muensterland was set on 
fire, one patrol boat sunk and the boiler ship in the arsenal 

During the night of 2^ Oct. the 2nd, hth and 6th and 8th" PT 
Boat Flotillas started a torpedo operation from the Hoofden 
jagainst a northbound convoy off the east, coast of England. 
The operation begins to appear in radio traffic' intercepted. 

At the request of Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff,' 
Navy, Group West's weather report with regard to the possibility 
of landing on the Atlantic and Channel coasts will be passed 
on daily at 1930 to Armed Forces High Command, Operations 
Staff until further notice. 


Ill , North Sea. Norway. Northern Wat pes 
North Sea; 


2h Oct. 19^3 CON FIDENTIAL 

Convoy Ml +66 M Elbe Hook consisting of h steamers and 13 
escort vessels left the Elbe at 1300. Southwest of. Heligoland 
one mine was swept. The 7th Minesweeper Flotilla and. the 
9th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla have been sent out on minelaying 
operation "Fasold" . 

Nor way, No r thern Waters ; 

1. Enemy Sit uation; 

•■ ' 
Over the N.orth Sea 26 planes were detected on operation. 
On the evening of 23 Oct. an enemy penetration was reported . 
north, of Sogne F'jord. 

2 • Own Situations 

Twenty- six ships were escorted north and 20 south. 

^ Altogether 13 ships were delayed owing to lack of escorts,. 

Naval Command, Norway has submitted the following , new barrage 
plans? ...... ...;.""-. • ■■■•■ ■••' - ' 

"1. Laying of five new flanking barrages In order to' reinforce 
those in the area between the. islands of Fugloey, Arnoey 
and Mager oey, 

2. Laying of the anti-sweeping devices 'already approved but 
not yet supplied in front of the new flanking barrages or 
the ones already laid. 

3. Reinforcement of the Rognsund barrage "Nfa f" ». ' ' <; : 
h. Measures during the dockyard, period of the. TIRPIT-Z; 

a. • Laying -of a ^arrage'in the' Vargsund,, 

b. •- .Minelaying of ■ the ;St jernsund northeast of Skarvsk.jaer ■■■■'■ 
. ••■ in case, of emergehceyV " ' ' 

5* In addition, correspondence Is .being" exchanged between . - ■ 
Naval Command, Norway ■ and the Task Force ". about 'a staircase 
barrage in Alta Fjord." ; ;/ '.'-..,.'.. .../, •• ■•;■ ;: ; . 

Naval Staff has decided' with regard 'to" the above request: as '■'■ 
follows: '■ "• -'; • ; ; -'''..'.. .-.« ' ' : " ■ 

'..■«*" * , - ■ ■ \"n ' • ' 

"Re 1. t The projected- reinforcement' of the outer barrages' has ; • ' 
no direct connection, with; -the defense of Alta Fgordj •';<■ 
it ffiannot prevent suj?afce forces entering by the deep '*■■•■ 
.waterway through the Loppa passage, which it must 
be assumed is known to the enemy*. Similarly it 

will be impossible to- -prevent- the "penetration of 

submarines through by-passing or diving under, the... A.,.:- 
barrages. The barrages in question were only reinforced 
this year and must, therefore, regarded still 'as 

-336- "..,"'",'; CONFIDENTIAL 

2h Oct. 19^3 ~ — 

effective. The mine situation as a whole prohibits 
a new reinforcement before' the stormy winter, weather 
sets in # , -\ r ■ 

re. 2. Allocation of EMR mines has started; further supplies 
of about 200 mines monthly can be expected. 

re. 3. Mine reinforcement of the Rognsund approved. ■ - 

re. h. Group North/Fleet should state its views. Closing 

of the Vargsund means foregoing the special advantage 
of second outlet from Alta Fjord; additional mine- 
ing of the Stjernsund (Naval Command, Norway should 
report on ,the exact position of the barrage) will 
mean complete closing of Alta Fjord for operational 

re. 5. Proposals are awaited." 

IV. Skagerrak. Baltic Sea Entrances. Baltic Sea 

1. Enemy Situation: 

Our patrol at the "Seeigel" barrage had an engagement off'. 
Namsi Bank between 13^7 and l^fl^ with an enemy minesweeper 
group of 2h vessels which, after putting up a smoke screen, 
withdrew to the north. 

2. Own Situation: 

In the area of Commanding admiral, Defenses, Baltic 3*+ 
vessels were out sweeping channels in the Baltic Sea entrance 
and Ik in the Baltic Sea. West of Cape Kullen three ELM/J 
mines were swept. The destroyers BEIT ZEN and Z "33 1 ' put in 
to Kristiansand South at 05*+5. The extensive escort service 
in the entire Baltic Sea area. was. carried out without incident. 

The 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla' together with five naval 
landing craft laid barrage "Seeigel Villa" as planned. Motor 
minesweeper R "120" sustained heavy damage .probably through *' 
striking a displaced Russian mine (moved from its original 
position during sweeping, Tr.N. ). The chartered' Swedish 
tanker SVEa REUTEER, on which emergency repairs following 
a torpedo hit were carried out at Riga, will be towed by the 
tug WOTAN to Stockholm via Kalmar on 2b Oct. Naval Command, 
Baltic is informed that Naval Staff attaches special importance 
to safe transfer of the ship, since the damage she sustained 
already gave rise at the time, to difficulties with Sweden. 

V. Submarine Warfare 

Submarine U "170" : reports sinking a freighter (^,500 G.R.T .) 
-in GA 3§» Otherwise nothing to report from the Atlantic and 


2k Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

Indian Oceans. 

.VI„ : Aerial Warfare 

British Isles and Vicinity 

t 6 '■ ■'...' 

Six bombers of the 3rd Air Force attacked London during 
the night of 2k Oct. dropping *+,l tons of high- ex plosive bombs. 

During the day single enemy planes flew into Germany on 
reconnaissance as far as the areas of Ealberstadt and Osnabrueck. 
In Holland three airfields were attacked and slight damage 
sustained. Airfields In BelgTurr'and/Northern France were 
also attacked by strong forces., At Montdider damage was such 

that the airfield is out of service. Three of tha attacking 

planes were shot down. Strong formations attacked an air- 
field in Western France and' also "the 'arsenal' and the harbor 
railroad station. at Cherbourg,, Altogether., seven planes were 
shot down* In the evening 100 planes flew into the Heligoland 
Bight- as far as Heligoland itself, probably on a minalaying' 
operation* Thirty enemy planes dropped single bombs over the' 
Rhine-iAfestphalian industrial area. 

Medj t er r ane an The at er : 

The 2nd Air Force reports 90 bombers., on operation against 
Naples; kk planes were over the target. Because of bad- 
weather 32 bombers broke off the operation and landed in 
southern Germany, Twelve planes have not returned yet/ Results 
of the -raid have not yet been received „ Strong night 'fighter 
activity was encountered over the target area. ; : . l 

Seven bombers of Air Force Command ,-- Southeast attacked \ : 
shipping ' targ-et area. ; ' 

Seven bombers of. Air Force Command,. Southeast attacked"' shipping- 
targets hear Leros. A small .freighter was. sunk and another-,' 
damaged* Close hits, were also observed, on :an- auxiliary- ship. :: • 
Seven other bombers successfully attacked the off ice. of- -the 
Naval Command at Porto Largo P Fighting on land- by our- troops 
on .Levi tha was supported by 8 bombers and 5 diver-bombers. 
There was a flight by 100 enemy bombers and. 60 .'fighters from 
the Italian" front via the Adriatic. Sea, Lake Balatan, west of 
Bratislava, Vienna, Leobeh and Agram into the ..area of 'Wieher- 

Several- bombs were dropped on small towns in Hungary and 50-30 
high-explosive bombs on Ebonfurt, No concentrated attacks 
could be carried out because, of fog*' Our; fighters scored no 
success for the same reason.' *" ; "' "" 

Several enemy planes were observed in the area of Bologna- '■ . 
Florence. ,it noongighways, rail installations and bridges 
in the area south of Florence were raided. The airfield of 


2h Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

of Tirana was put out of service by the last heavy air attack. 
Three of our planes were destroyed and four damaged. 

Our own as well as enemy planes carried out reconnaissance 
in the Aegean area. 

Eastern front ; 

Nothing to report. 

VII . Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea 

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean : 

Two transports with troops aboard put in to Gibraltar from 
the Atlantic on 23 Oct. One of these, a French transport, left 
for the Mediterranean after a brief stay, escorted by three 
destroyers. Altogether about 10,000 men are said to have been 
aboard four transports which entered the Mediterranean on 23 

One LOT . and one minelaying cruiser put in to Gibraltar on 

2k Oct. from the east. The AURORA class cruiser which arrived 

at Gibraltar on 23 ^ct. went on into the Mediterranean. 

According to the situation riport of Commanding General Armed 
Forces, South, altogether 180 LCT's and LCG's are said to 
have left for the Atlantic in the course of a few days up to 
noon on 23 Oct. This figure is being checked by N aV al 
Intelligence Division, since it does not correspond with our 

In the afternoon our air reconnaissance sighted only slight 
traffic in the coastal area of Oran - Algiers. The number of 
ships in Olbia and Maddalena showed a slight increase; the .. 
number in Apulian harbors was still only slight; only at . 3ari 
were there a few more landing craft, than previously detected. 

At 0752 a submarine was spotted off Genoa in an unsuccessful: 
attack on one of our convoys consisting of two steamers and 
one war transport. 

No reconnaissance reports have been received from the Eastern 

2. Own Situation Mediterranean; j :■ .'•'■ 

A minelaying operation was carried out by naval landing craft 
and motor minesweepers off the west coast of Italy as planned. 
PT boats made a thrust in' the direction of Olbia. Bay as 
flanking defense and. intercepted, four gunboats j although no 
engagement took plaOe,- : :. ■■ \ ,. ; : v. .;. 




Submarine: U ,,:i +53" carried out a minelaying operation off Brindidi 
according to plan. 

Coastal traffic was carried out without incident. The hospital • 
ship GR.iDI.SCA, without any exchange prisoners of war aboard, 
put in to .Marseilles on the afternoon of 23 Oct. The aQUILSJA 
arrived at 1030 on 2m- Oct. 

The DJENNE and AQUILEJA will leave Marseilles for Barcelona at 
noon on 25' Oct « after taking on British exchange prisoners of 
war. The GRADISCA, which consumed about 2,000 tons of coal 
on her. empty run, will be ready- on 28 Oct c for return trip 
from Marseilles, to Patras. . • .• ■ 

3. -ire a Naval Group South ; ■.. • 

■a. Adriatic Sea : 

Enemy Situation ; 

According to air reconnaissance a steamer (about 3,000 
GRT) was lying stranded 30 miles southeast of Cattaro at 1315 
on 23 Oct. Five large ships of unknown nationality and type 
were sighted at 1920 on 23 0ct o off Ml jet- (25- miles west of 
Dubrovni.k) ; recognition signals were not answered and upon 
subsequent shelling -they turned away to the north. 

O wn Situation s 

The island operation off Sibenik has been completed. About. 
^0 small vessels were seized, prisoners brought in and' old guns 
demolished. The Army has acknowledged the good cooperation 
and support afforded by the Navy. - " 

Minesweeping operations in the Faresina Channel were begun by 
five motor fishing vessels with German gear. Defense is.- ' . 
assured by an armored infantry regiment from shore. ...'•.■' . ; 

The officers and men for the torpedo boat INSIDIOSO have- arrived 
at Trieste r . '. ' . : . .■,::■ :■ - 

In order to reduce shipping losses, orders' have been" issued that 
ships are only to put out following reconnaissance and to proceed 
along the 'coast in short stages-' . •. : : ■ 

a further 15 • 2 cm. battery: is reported ready for action at f> 
Ancona. Railroad connection -with Pola has beeh restored since 
22 Oct., according to advice received from Naval Shore Commander, 
North Adriatic.. :"■..:.. 

The channel off Orsa, Bado Bay east of Pola and Medolino Bay 
southeast of Pola may be considered. as, alternative bases for 
motor minesweepers and PT boats. ' ; '' 


2k Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

Group South has ordered: 

"The 159 Croatian gunners who have been ready at Genichesk 
since 3*+ Sept. to leave for Dalmatia are to be sent to Agram 
at once. Report to the Croatian Naval Command at Agram." 

The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping has advised 
Naval Staff that the Deputy for German Sea Transportation in 
the Mediterranean regards as premature the proposal of ^niiy 
Group B already to put out of service such merchant ships 
in Adriatic ports as are not being used, as a precaution in 
order to prevent them possibly falling into enemy hands. Naval 
Staff advised Group South and German Naval Command, Italy on 
7 Oct. of this matter with instructions that a precautionary 
demolition of shipping not in use is considered premature at 
present, but that preparations for destruction of the ships, 
according to the situation and in agreement with the Mediterr- 
anean Deputy, are regarded as appropriate. A proposal of 
Group South submitted on 29 Sept. to dismantle ships not in 
use has been forwarded by Naval Staff to the Reich Ministry 
concerned, advocating; this for ships over 20,000 GRT. 

b. Aegean Sea : 

Bnomy Situation : 

The unit consisting of one cruiser and two destroyers was 
again detected at 210? and at 22^-0 on 23 Oct. The last position 
was lh miles north of Scarpano, course 330°. 

Two small ships leaving the ScarpantrStraut were located at 
2^00. According to a report from coast patrol boat GA ,,L (-5 M , 
the British escort boat HURWORTH L "23" struck a mine and sank 
at 2230 on 22 Oct. off Kalymnos. Five survivors are 
aboard the GA "h$" . 

A British commando company landed on Levitha during the night 
of 23 Oct. The western and eastern parts of the island, as 
well as the harbor, are in en:eny hands. During the same night 
the airfield of Candia (Crete) and the island of Syros were 
attacked by enemy planes. 

Group South reports that the Turkish Police Radio Station at 
Guemuesluek or Bodrum is transmitting coded situation reports 
continuously from the Kos area. Deciphering is just as easy 
for the British as it is for our radio intelligence. Group 
South has therefore asked' our Naval Attache in Istanbul to 
investigate possibilities of stopping such reports. Naval 
Staff is asked to take suitable steps to prevent these 
transmissions, which endanger our operations in the Dodecanese. 

For particulars see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII. 

From one of these Turkish reports is was learned on the evening o: 


2h Oct. 19^3 " : ' ■' : ' CONFIDENTIAL. 

23 Oct, that of 195 men aboard a British torpedo boat none could 
be saved; other dead .were buried In Guemuesluek and wounded 
brought to. Bodrum. ' . „ . :: '■ 

This may be a matter of further successes, of our mines. 

• Own- Situation: . . ■ 

Liberated German soldiers have been transferred from. . : 
Stampalia to Phaleron by air. Submarine chaser ""210V' was 
found listing and naval landing craft MFP nl +96 i ' ('of the 
0LYMP0S. convoy), which was still loaded and had been hit in 
numerous places' '-by- gunfire, was found burned out on the beach. 

Naval gunners have been .transferred to Stampalia by air to 
man Italian batteries. 

Assault Division Rhodes broke off a reconnaissance operation 
against the island of Sini (north of Rhodes) because of engine 

Mopping-up of Kasos was carried out without resistance. 

On the morning of 22 Oct, a combined Army-Navy operation under 
the Naval Shore Commander was carried out against insurgents, 
mostly Communists, in the area northwest of Kalamata. About 
*+90 men between the ages of 15" and 60 were arrested. 

Due to the shortage of escorts two steamers are unable to 
leave Piraeus for Crete; one tanker for Salonika and one for 
the Straits are also unable to leave. 

c - Black Sea: 

Enemy Situation : 

.according to radio intelligence, there were two submarines 
in the northwestern part of the Bi^ck Sea and east of the 
Crimea two approaching and one on return passage. 

Our submarines reported in the evening a westbound convoy 
consisting of four vessels 25 miles west of Suchum. At 13 L t-2 
six planes raided the harbor and town of Yalta. The anti- 
aircraft gun emplacement aboard the auxiliary sailing vsssel 
GELOJii sustained a direct hit. One plane was probably shot 


2h Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

Own Situation ; ; 

One of the guns of the 5th Battery of the 6l3th Naval 
Artillery Batallion in the Strait of Kerch was put out of 
action by enemy gunfire. No damage was sustained in dive* 
bomber attacks and shelling of the command post at Eltigen. 

The 1st FT Boat Flotilla carried out an operation against 
Anapa during the night of 23 Oct. Our night reconnaissance 
planes could not start out because of ground fog. Upon 
reaching the coast our boats at once had an engagement with 
two gunboats and two patrol vessels. They were detected by 
coastal searchlights and shelled by 7«6 cm* guns, so that 
they had to withdraw to the southwest. The rest of the 
operation proceeded without special incident. 

Submarine U "9" left Feodosya on operations. 

Convoys were carried out as planned and without incident; 

VIII . Situation East Asia 
Nothing to report. 

-3^3'- ' 


Items of Political Importance , '< 

The statements of the "Washington Post" and the "New York Times" 
which endeavor to minimise the significance of the Moscow talks 
Ere worthy of note • It is said that important decisions 
are to be left to the heads of the &:overnments. 

The Russians are accompanying the Conference in a remarkably 
obstinate way with a press campaign which pursues the call for 
a second front and effec tive military achievement by the 
'Western Powers, 

According to a Swedish agent's report from Ankara, Stalin is "",'. 
said to have appointed the Chief for Political Affairs in the 
Red Army, General Tschermagow, as Secretary of the Central 
Committee of the Party, thus strengthening the ties between. .' . 
^ the xirmy and the Party. 

Chief, Naval Staff returned to Berlin from the armament conference 
at Gdynia, ' ',. 

C onfere n ce on the Situ ation with Chief, Naval S t af f 

!• Army Situation '■•' ' : 

Melitopol was lost on 23 Oct. The enemy broke through 'our, . . 
lines south of the town,. It was still possible to repulse 
another strong attack near Zaporo-zhe, but new enemy attacks .on 
2h Oct, near Dnepropetrovsk were again successful * At Krivoi 
Rog the' workers have assumed a menacing attitude and have been 
able to arm themselves to some extent. In view of this 
development the situation in the. southern part of the eastern 
front can only be viewed .with the greatest rnxiety. After 
penetration of the Melitoppl - Z'apbrozhe line, which forms the 
last bulwark for defense of the entrance to the Crimea from 
the "north, there is- only between the front and the Dnieper . 
the absolutely flat steppe which is bare of natural obstacles' 
nnd most unfavorable for defense, It seems very doubtful 
whether bringing-up of the divisions of the 17th Army with* 
drawn from the Crimea and a few tanks and infantry divisions . 
from France, northern- Italy and the Balkans will be able' to . 
master the situation in time. 30 far no order has yet. been /'.' 
given by the .Fuehrer to evacuate the Crimea* On the contrary, 
the peninsula is to be held under all -circumstances, according 
to the latest orders.' 

- 3 M+- ~ ~ 

25 Oct. 19^3 CONFI DENTIAL 

In Italy the enemy 1 s main activity was still concentrated on 
attacks against our supply lines, 

II. In view of the possibility that the "Moscow Conference"" may 
again make an enemy invasion of France an immediate problem, 
Chief, Naval Staff orders that our minelaying plans be re- 
examined and that endeavors be made to speed up the production 
of time -setting devices « The minelaying operation off Brindisi 
is to be repeated if possible,, 

III. Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters reported on 21 Oct. that 
Armed Forces Eight Command, Operations Staff plans to submit 
to the Fuehrer the following two directives: 

a.. "Reinforcements of troops and supplies of material to 
southern Greece, Crete and the islands in the Ionian .and 
Aegean Seas, which are in great danger, demand the all-out 
use of seagoing shipping available in this area, In order to 
ensure the important supplies to this area the following is 
ordered so as to clarify responsibility and commands 

1. Army General Staff, Quartermaster General, Southeast 
is responsible for bringing up supplies overland,, Distribution 
to the ports of loading is to be effected in closest cooperation 
with the naval offices in charge of sea transport. 

2. The naval offices only are responsible for sea trans- 
port in the Aegean and Ionian Seas, Quartermaster General, Army 
Group E, who receive? his instruct Ions from Army General Staff, 
Quartermaster General, Southeast, is responsible for fixing 

the order in which shipments are made. .. ; 

3* The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping will see 
to provision and management of the necessary shipping and 
replacement of merchant shipping lost. In order to discharge 
its responsibility with regard to sea transport, the Navy is 
authorized to intervene in the plans for replacement of 
shipping and to demand of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime 
Shipping all information required for. estimating the number 
and operational suitability of ships to be provided. 

These instructions refer to, the transfer of ships by sea. or . . . 
overland as well as to replacement by new constructions and 
conversions and applies already to the Fuehrer directive issued 
with OKW/WFST/Qu 1) (M) No. OOolOl/s-3 Gkdos. of 18 Oct. . 

Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas, with copy 

In order to advise the Kight Command, Admiral, 
Aegean will report to Armed Forces High- Command, Supply and 




25 Oct. 19M-3 CONFID ENTIAL 

to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, on the 1st 

and 15 th of every month the amount of sea transport considered •. 

possible during the following 30 days,' 1 

b s Supplies to the troops in southern Greece, Crete and on 
the islands in the Aegean and Ionian Seas are in serious danger 
through shortage of suitable sea transports Exceptional 
measures are necessary to procure the necessary number of 
small seaworthy ships of adequate fighting strength, 

1. High Command, Navy, in cooperation with the Reich Commissioner 
of Maritime Shipping, will make every endeavor to have suitable 
small vessels from conversions and new cons tructions put into 
operation quickly in the Aegean Bea. 

2. The Main Committee for Ship Construction is requested to 
provide the iron quota, stated by the Navy and the Reich 
Commissioner of Maritime Shipping to be necessary, for erection 
of the construction site at Salonika and for increasing the 
construction of small vessels Reference is made to the = 
request of Chief, Armed forces Right Command to Minister 
Speer (W.F.St./Qu 1 (M) No. I f75 I +A3 geh„ of 6 Oct, 19 } +3) 
asking that the iron quota for the construction of Siebel fer 
ferries, stopped by the Main Committee for Ship Construction, 
be released again and that the Navy is granted the material, 
for' the construction of 150 ferries to start with," 

Naval Staff , Quartermaster Division rrv. poses that Quartermaster 
General, Operations Staff-, Armed Forces High Command be advised 
that the Navy holds the following views % 

"a. High Command, Navy accepts general responsibility for sea 
transports, ..•/. 

3. 1. With regard to shipping and as a theater of war, the 

Adriatic, Aegean' and Black Seas must' be regardedas 
one area 'under Commanding Admiral, Group South. 
' Therefore control of sea transports and distribution 
of shipping is only possible within the entire 
area through a uniform command, 

2. Supplies to the German economy must be included in 
the general arrangement, '■; 

3«. Re-organization in view of the transport crisis already 
existing c%n only' be effective if the local offices 
of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping are 
not dissolved and if the naval offices concerned 




25 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIA L 

have the right to issue instructions with regard to 
the use of merchant shipping. •'. 

C- !• The Reich Commissioner of Maritime -Shipping will remain 
responsible for the management and the loading and 
unloading of ships, as before. 

' 2. The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping will also 

remain responsible for provision and replacement of 
-" : shipping 5 including small vessels, as up to now. 

The requirements which arise from the war situation 
with regard- to provision and replacement will be 
submitted by High Command, Navy to the Reich Commis- 
sioner of Maritime Shipping, High Command, Navy must 
be kept informed of plans, 

3. As everything depends on. acquisistion of the necessary 
shipping in the southeastern area, the Main Committee 
for Ship Construction must make available the 
necessary quotas and facilities. 

*+. Transport requirements and priority for warfare and 
ec uioTiy should be decided by the Armed Forces Offices 
concerned, and ports of shipment and destination : 
in agreement with the Navy. v. > 

5v It is impossible to give information about the ■ 

probable amount of transport in the manner requested. 
As proposed } special arrangements must be made 
'■ ' "■';•' between High Command, Navy and the Supply and 

Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas." 1 

Chief, Naval Staff agreed. 

IV .Cu^rtermaster General reports that Armed Forces High Command, 
Operations Staff has requested the Navy to man two 21 cm.- 
Army batteries (each of four guns) and to set up two medium- 
heavy batteries (of four guns each), for strengthening the 
defense of the Channel coast. This matter is under investigation. ■ 
It may be possible to draw the required personnel from Italian 
volunteers, with the exception of officers. 

V. Chief, Naval Intelligence D ivision reports: 

Ambassador von Papen, on instructions, has tried to find out 
whether Turkey would consider taking -over the Dodecanese, ■ 
which is now in Italian hands.,- The answer was that Turkey 
would only do so with British consent, . 




25 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

I n a Highly Restricted Circle 

VI. Report by Chief ? Operations Branch Operations Divisions 

a. According to information from the Bureau of Naval Armament, 
the monthly requirements of 180 tons of tungsten (from 
Portugal) are at present short by 1+0 tons. Until autumn 19*+*+ 
the required quantities can, however, be met from stocks • 

b« Re. New plans for o p eration "Le o pard" ; Group South transmits 
the following new directive of Commanding General, Army Group 

le- Target of operation "Leopard" is still the occupation 

of Lei os by Assault Group Mueller with the Army forces 
provided so far. More light naval forces and air 
forces will be employed. Following operation 
"Leopard" the island of Samos isto be occupied at 
the earliest possible date s 

2. Lieutenant General Mueller is in command of the 

operation, in which Admiral, Aegean and Commanding 
General, 10th Air Corps will assist 

3c Start of "Leopard" (X-day) will be ordered by Army 
Group E on the day previous at the latest at l300„ - 
The earliest X-day is 6 Nov, 

h. Irrespective of the above, Lieutenant General 
Mueller is definitely to utilize any chance of 
success which may arise to carry out "Leopard" 
by surprise. Sudden enemy shipping losses, absence 
of enemy naval forces, fog etc. might create such 
a favorable situation 

5. Admiral, Aegean is to move the following to the 
.jumping-off area Kos-Calino by 5 Nov.;. 

a. all operational naval landing craft, torpedo 
boats, PT boats and motor 'minesweepers, 

b. nine infantry -landing boats from Salonika,. 

c. the sic Siebel ferries due to arrive from the 
Adriatic Sea by . 1 Nov,, 

d. all other small vessels available and suitable 
• for this operation, 


25 Oct. I9V3 . CONFIDENTIAL.. 

e. the convoy of the INGEBORG, 

f. the battalion of the 11th. Air: Force Infantry ,., 
Division, which is assembled at Piraeus. 

6, The appearance of newly assembled surface forces 
must under all circumstances be kept secret from 
the enemy, Thet may therefore not be engaged in 
other operations in the Aegean prior to " Leopard". 
This, however , does not refer to the operation of 
submarines against enemy naval forces «. 

7* British naval forces in Turkish territorial waters 
are not to be attacked. 

8. The Air Force, with the strongest formations 

possible, is to preparfe the way for the operation 
^oy attacking enemy ships and Leros itself and will 
closely cooperate, with Lieutenant General Mueller 
in supporting operation "Leopard' 1 . 

9« At 1000 on Tuesday, 26 Oct, I will hold a conference 
at the headquarters of the 68th Army Corps at Athens; 
the following will be presents 

Lieutenant General Mueller, the Commander of the 
participating naval forces, Admiral, Aegean,- 
Commanding General, 10th Air Corps, Participation 
of further officers, which is to' be limited as far 
as possible 5 is left to the commanding officers. 
At this discussion Lieutenant General Mueller will 
report in detail on his plans and Admiral, Aegean 
and Commanding General, 10th Air Corps are requested 
to state their plans *" 

Group South reports in this connection; 

"The directions given under 5 and 6 of the above, 
which interfere with the rights of Admiral, Aegean 
as the party responsible for naval operations, ■ and 
the obscurities arising therefrom will be clarified 
during the discussion on 26 Oct." 

In addition, ■ Army Group S regards' a .temporary reinforcement of 
our weak naval forces in the Aegean Sea through the allocation 
of four more submarines absolutely necessary for a^ successful 
execution of operation "Leopard" and for the- subsequent 
occupation of Samos, and remarks that the sudden appearance of 
these submarines on- and after 5 Nov. offers the best chance 
of suedes s. . • -. ' 

Group South is well aware of the fact that the submarines, 
also requested by it, are not available at present. 




25 Oct. 1943 CUBrlU ^TiAJ, 

Chief, Naval Staff orders that the outcome of the discussion 
on 26 Oct. regarding responsibility be reported, so that he 
can approach Commanding general , Army Group E once more, if 

VII, Group South has reported as follows: : ; ' ■ 

"Preliminary considerations with regard to the evacuation of 
the Crimea show the necessity of transferring shore units and 
naval forces to Transnistria, Rumania and Bulgaria. Basic 
approval of the Rumanian and' Bulgarian Governments should be 
requested now, so as to guarantee a smooth transfer of the 
offices evacuated: if such should be deemed advisable." 

This matter will be dealt with futher by Quartermaster Division, 
Organization and Mobilization Branch, 

Special Items 

1* According to the notes of the discussions held on 28 Sept. 
by the Sub-Commission "Landing Craft" of the Shipbuilding 
Commission, views have become evident on various points 
which require correction. This has been done in a letter from 
Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff of 16 Oct, addressed to 
the Main Committee, Shipbuilding Commission, Chief, Army 
Ordnance Division - High Command Army, Commander, Replacement 
Army and other Army and Air Force Commands concerned. This .: 
letter states, amongst other things: 

I,, The report on the discussion shows that the Shipbuilding 
Commission m Its discussion "Sub -Commission, Landing Craft 
and Supply Vessels" on 28 Sept. occupied itself with questions 
which are not in its sphere. The decision as to -whether cer 
tain types of ships are to be dropped- from ' the Fleet Constr- 
uction "Program for 19^5 rests solely with Naval Staff or 
Commander in Chief , 'Navy personally; this has been emphasized 
on several occasions by i ,the Chairman of the Shipbuilding 
Commission, Rear Admiral" Topp. It is a matter for the Snip- 
building .Commission to make recommendations reagding types, 
in accordnnce with instructions' of"T~0'ct7~r9 i -!3 for this 
Commission. Only mi litary offices are In the position to decide 
"whether certain types of "ships Can be dispensed with in the 
course of these discussions regarding types. This is express- 
ly stipulated in the joint order dated 22 July of Commander 
in Chief, Navy and the Minister of Armament and Ammunition, . 
reading as follows: 

"If the Commission reaches no agreement then the decision, as 
far as warship construction is concerned, rests with Command- 
er In Chief, Navy, personally." 


25 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTI AL 

Naval Staff considers it imperative to emphasize the above 
once more . 

II. With regard to the construction of small transports the 
folio-wing must he stated: Construction of small transports 
is so urgent in theaters of war -where allocation of trans- 
ports by sea or land is impossible that any delay may have 
serious military consequences. From this angle it is there- 
fore irresponsible that the construction of a building site 
for na va 1 la nding era ft at Sa lonika , as dema nded by N-*"> va 1 
Staff, has been rejected by the Main Committee and that the 
measures already taken -with regard to its construction 
(despatch of Dr. Bonny for investigation of construction 
facilities ) have been stopped. 

Recent losses of such ships show how urgently small transports 
are required in this sea area . The transport situation there 
is drifting towards a catastrophe if the measures demanded, 
i. e. the building or transfer of naval landing craft for 
this area, are not carried out at once. 

In this connection 'High Command, Navy defines its views with 
regard to further construction of Siebel ferries as follows:' 

Formerly the view .was held that 200 Siebel ferries, demanded 
by Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, could be built 
if this would not hamper construction of our ' own naval 
landing craft and. naval artillery ligr. ters , This provision 
still holds good; a reduced a liocarion of iron and facilities 
to the Navy to the detriment, of the Fieet Construction 
Program 19^3 is /impossible and mixat therefore be rejected. 
However, considering the demands detailed below Naval Staff 
considers it neces_8a_ry_^, in 'view of the general construction 
situation and the L > equ ; ests.,HGjade still to be expected from the 
other services, that the construction of Siebel ferries be 
continued, provided the r-rovision of fuel is guaranteed be- 
forehand from elsewhere, The Navy can also not untertake the 
arming of the additional new Siebel ferries. The required 
iron quotas and construction facilities must therefore be 
made available as an addition. 

III. a. With regard to the question of naval landing craft, 
Naval Staff is of the following opinion: 

"Under the Fleet Construction Program 19^3 the final 
figure called for 5^0 naval landing craft per year. 
According to the current building program approximately 
410 naval landing craft are at present under construction 
or scheduled. Together with the approximately 3^0 naval 
landing craft present in service, (excluding naval land- 
ing craft (artillery) which are purely gun carriers and 
cannot be counted since they are unsuitable as landing 
or transport vessels) this 



25 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

■total of 750 naval landing craft. This will cover 
(about ..20$ per year being taken into ■■ 
' account) requirements- Of naval warfare, including 
considerable transport ^tasks for the Armed Forces so 
far as these can be carried out by the naval landing 
craft. - . . _• ^ . 

In" '.tliisV connect ion it. must be borne in mind that: 

"I.. Any future . operational requirements of the Army 
. (f orpins tance a large-scale . landing operation) 
have 'no j: been taken into account, because they 
a^e unknown. 

2. New demands arising from the developments of 
naval .--warfare must be submitted separately. 
(Naval Staff for instance requests the fitting- 
up of 2h naval landing craft as river mine- 
exploding vessels. These 3 just as the naval 
landing craft (artillery), are to be substract- 
ed from the total of naval landing craft avail- 
able as landing and transport vessels.) Under 
the above conditions Naval Staff can, after 
the present building program of naval landing 
craft (410) is completed, make do from about 
September or October 19^ by maintaining the 
number of naval landing craft on hand, i. e. 
the construction of replacements must cover 
naval landing craft lost by enemy action and 
those becoming obsolete, A monthly output of 
30 naval landing craft is considered necessary 
for this." . ■ '- 

b. As regards naval artillery lighters it is stated: 

"An initial series of 12 naval artillery- lighters has 
been built up to now. By order of the Fuehrer they 
were put into operation at once wihtout awaiting the 
outcome of trials, owing to the difficult situation 
in the Sea of Asov. Although a few came 
to light, such as are natural with any new type, the 
naval artillery lighters have proved excellent in 
operation. Four Russian gunboats were sunk and the 
ports and the Mius front were successfully shelled 
without the boats themselves sustaining any serious 
damage. The deficiencies that came to light have 
been given consideration and will be corrected in 
the second series under construction. In comparison 
the specially armed Siebel ferries did not come up 
to expectation in a similar operation on Lake Ladoga 
in the spring of 19^2.- Naval Staff cannot, therefore 
do without naval artillery lighters for certain 
specific operations, especially since naval cons- 
truction, engineers: guarantee that, as regards sea- 
worthiness,' their operational possibilities are at 
least equal to those of SiebeT ferries . The question 


25 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDE NTIAL 

brought up (see page. 13 ) at; the -meeting, on 28 Sept., as to 
■whether these tasks can be. -taken over by the Stebel ferry, 
must therefore be answered in, the 'negative." 

c. Quartermaster' Division "then corrected the false views 
held with regard to the engine question, of naval landing 
craft and Siebei ferries. The Deutz engine of the naval 
landing craft g3've performances hitherto not thought 
possible. High gasoline consumption and increased infl- 
ammability of this fuel speak against the introduction 
of the BMW 6ms chine. Neither of these engines is the 
ideal propulsion for this type. They- -were, however, 
used because they were available in the required number. 

d. The idea of building in future only a vessel of stand- 
ard type (surface and en pa city) is attractive from the 
point of view of production. Unfortunately this is not 
feasible operationally, since one cannot do with one ^ 
type of vessel only in naval warfare even under the 

most severe restrictions, Although we are today in 
a much more difficult position than the enerrry as re- 
gards the production situation, it must be pointed 
out that he has about lb different types of "landing 
craft at his disposal. The plan to fit an easily re- 
mobable superstructure on a flat vessel, so as to 
combine the advantages of the flat vessel with those 
. .of the capacious one, is entirely out of question in 
any case. Naval Staff must therefore reject such a 
s lu t ion for the follow ing re r \ s ons : 

1. The already deficient seaworthiness of the flat 
vessels will be affected to mi impossible extent 

a. immediate destruction (of the superstructivc ) ^ 
in heavy seas if lightly constructed. 

b. Creation of a large wind trap on a vessel 
which already drifts easily. 

c. Great difficulty in managing the vessel when 
maneuvering, coming alongside or casting off 
by abolition of any visibility. 

2. Considerable enlargement of the silhouette and thus 

3. a larger target for the enemy, 

4. considerable overloading ahd unwieldnness , if the 
superstructure is heavy. ' This - will eliminn te the 
load capacity. / . ■■' ■'.'■. 

5. Surface will be considerable decreased, because a 
gangway -must remain on either side for maneuvering, 
making feat ropes, etc. - 



25 Oct. 19^3 UO[M l''ii^JVi l _.U-b 

6. great risk of fire if. constructed of wood in 

order to lessen the weight (the enemy is lately 
using phosphorus against ships), 

In conclusion Naval Staff emphasized once more the necess- 
ity of carrying on the construction of small transports 
with all available means on the basis of the requirements 
stated above. 

2. Because of the "t)uke of Aosta" incident the Foreign 
Office on 8 Sept. gave instructions to the Ambassadors that 
the Armed Forces Attaches should address reports, even if of - a 
purely military nature solely via the Foreign Office, . 

On this matter Naval Staff advised Armed Forces High Command, 
Foreign Division, with copies to Commander in Chief, Air '[.., 
Force and High Command, Army (Attache Section) on 12 Oct.' 
1943 as follows : • 

"I, Naval Staff can agree if the reports deal pith 
internal matters or those of a purely political 
nature, i. e. which will have no operational 
consequences It may, however, be extremely 
difficult to judge how far political action in 
wartime has operational consequences-; Should it 
be a matter of political news whicn is passed 
on to the Naval Attache direct by an agent or 
reports which might give rise to strategic 
a nd opera t i ona 1 de 1 iber a t j ons , the Amba ss.a dor 
and Commander in Chief, Navy (through Naval 
Attache Section, High Command, Navy) must 
be advised simultaneously. The Foreign Office 
is partly responsible. .' , 

2. As a line can hardly be drawn between politics .. 
and warfare, it must be insisted here that the 
reports be submitted to Commander in Chief, Navy 
and to Ambassador simultaneously, namely through 
direct channels. The Ambassador may thus comment 

on such reports; there must, however be a guarantee 
that the reports reach Commander in Chief, Navy or 
Naval Staff through the Naval Attache Section, 
High Command, Navy as quickly as possible, i. e. 
through direct channels, since military decisions,', 
which usually permit no delay, depend on this. The 
Foreign Office is responsible, in agreement with 
High Command, Navy. 

3. Information of a military nature should at once 
be submitted direct to Commander in Chief, Navy 
vie the Naval Attache Section, High Command, Navy. 
The Ambassadors may be Informed at the same time, 
orally, as provided in the Fuehrer's directive 

to limit knowledge to the most restricted circle. 
The parties responsible will be Armed Forces High 
Command or the Service, Branches of the Attaches. 


25 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL ' 

The following arguments speak for direct reporting:' 

1. Directive of the Fuehrer, according to which military 
reportsare to be limited to the most restricted circle, which 
is not assured if reports are submitted thr ought the Foreign 
Office. High Command, Navy is ready to submit evidence support- 
ing this allegation. 

2. Reports must be despatedbed direct, since forwarding 
through the Foreign Office entails a normal delay of 1-5 
days in the most faroable circumstances: even delays up to 
12 days have already occurred. Here too High Commnd, Navy is 
able to submit evidence. It is unbearable that High Command 
is unable to make the necessa-ry decisions at once because 
important military reports are delayed. At the same time it 
is requested that the system of forwarding messages be re- 
examined, i. e. that the Naval Attache be given the opport- 
unity, if necessary, of sending coded military telegrams via 
the Foreign Office, which are passed on direct to High Command, 
Navy. Information from Naval Staff., Operations'" Division to the 
Foreign Office is not affected by this. 

On account of the above, Armed Forces High Command will raise 
objection to the Foreign Minister's order, which was issued 
without previously informing Armed Forces High Command. 

3. Report on the incident "Captain von Kamptz" which occur- 
red In connection with the execution of operation. "Achse" is 
contained infiies in W«r Diary, Part C, File Ap A (enclosures 
of a personal nature), 

4. Chief, Naval Communications Division began publication 

on 14 Oct. of "Reports on tactical naval radar service", which 

will probably be published every month,. These reports are to 

serve Naval Commands as an aid in operational control. For 

cops as per l/Skl 28892/43 Gkdos . see War Diary, Part B, * 

Vol. VI. 

5. Naval Intelligence Division reports on the development 
of the American radar set on the basis of the U. S. Naval 
Magazine "Our Navy", August 1943 issue, and on the extension 
of the railway network In Northwest Africa. ' ! 

For copy of these reports as per 11 Ski. 31234/43 geh. and 
32854/43 geh. see War Diary, Part D "Evaluation. 0^ Intelligence 
on Foreign Navies". . . 


25 Oct. 1943 CONFIDE NTIAL 

Situation 25 Oct. ■...-■■.■-> -\ "":■■■' •: :"•' 

I. War in Foreign Voters 

^ • Enemy Sit ua ti on: 

Nothing to report ;. ... -" 

2. Own Situation: 

Another seven, survivors of Ship "28" were found on 
the island of Hachiuoshima, according to a report from the 
Japanese Navy. Their teansfer to Yokohama has been ordered. 

Naval Staff does not intend to release the news of the loss 
of this auxiliary cruiser yet. The Naval Attache in Tokyo will 
be advised accordingly and will be asked to state his opinion. 

Naval Staff advised the Naval Attache in Tokyo by telegram 2359 
that submarine "Luedden" is due at the rendezvous one hour 
past sunrise on 28 Oct. 

The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports that all three AQUILA sub- 
marines were handing over to him by the Japanese N- n val Min- 
ister on 22 Oct. and added that a report on their condition 
and sailing date will follow. 

II. Situation West Area 

I. E nemy Situation : 

Over the Bay of Biscay 31 planes were detected on 
operation. One British vessel was located at 2028 in AM 7880, 
one at 1031 in BE 6540 and one at 1558 in BF 164-0. 

Reuter announced the loss of the cruiser CHARYBDIS and the 
destroyer LIMBOURNE off the French coast on 23 Oct. The des- 
troyer is said to. have been scuttled. 

Our own air reconnaissance reported: 

At 0845 re-location of the convoy of 30 merchantmen in BE 
o464 on southerly course. 

At 0945 a convoy of 60 merchantmen escorted by 1 cruiser and 
6 escort vessels (presumably SL 138) in. DJ 1259 on course 
300 degrees . 


25 Oct. 1943 - CONFIDENTIAL 

At 2040 in CG 8459 20 ships, presumably the landing craft 
which left Gibraltar on 23 Oct., and 2 escort vessels on 
course 350 degrees. 

At 1145 in BE 6361 8 merchantmen and 4 destroyers on course 
240 degrees speed 18 knots. 

Own Situation: 

a o 

Atlantic Coast: 

The loss of submarine -chaser "1403" on 24 Oct. is to 
be attributed to a mine. The Commander and six of her complem- 
ent are missing, Fourteen moored mines of an enemy barrage 
were swept on coastal route "Liebesbank" . At 1400 the air- 
field of Brest-South was raided by 25 enemy bombers heavily 
escorted by fighters. 

Destroyer Z "23" was transferred from Bassens to Verdcn roads. f <£- 

Ch annel Coast : 

In the air raid on Cherbourg on 24 Oct. altogether 
eight of the attacking planes were shot down, two of them by 
forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West and two by 
naval anti-aircraft guns. 

The steamer MUENSTERLAND is disabled and can therefore not 
be moved further east for the time being. 

During a planned torpedo operation by the 2nd, 4th, 6th, 

and 8th PT Boat Flotillas, led by Commander ?T Boats, 

against a northbound convoy northeast and east of Cromer 

our boats encountered six enemy destroyers and numerous . 

motor gunboats, which effectively prevented our attack on 

the convoy. PT boats S "88 M and S "63" of the 4th Flotilla (g 

were lost. Our own forces rescued 20 men from the S "63" 

and 3 men from the S' ; 88". 

Nineteen men of the Flotilla leader S "88" were captured by 
the enemy, according to radio intelligence. Lt. Cmdr. Luetzow 
Commander, is amongst those missing. 

PT boat S "116" ran aground off Egmond- op-Zee, but was later 
on towed into port. For brief report from Comma rider, PT" boats 
see teletype 1Q00. 

The steamer N0RDVAARD left Boulogne at 2015 heavily ^escorted. 
Shortly after, enemy targets were located in BF 3356 uppere 
center, BF 3329, BF 3331 center and BF 3359 center right. 
Three enemy formation leaders received operational radio- 
grams and were ordered not to acknowledge, 



25 Oct. 19^3 ' • - CONFIDENTIAL 

receipt. Dover reported from 2030 to 2200 continuous 
locations of the formation, which from 20*10 to 2110 approached 
MTB "235" from 8,6 to 2.2. miles. Furthermore at 2059 long- 
range shelling commenced and continued, until 2236. Nineteen 
rounds were counted. Patrol boat VP "1506" whichvas close 
to the steamer, . Sustained slight damage. One impact was , 
observed on shore 'near.. Calais. .Two naval gunnetfs ; were killed. 
The convoy was then ordered to proceed to Calais" where It 
put in at 2300. Our batteries returned the fire until 2237 
with 22 rounds of' the heaviest caliber. 

At 2^00 the convoy went on from Calais to Dunkirk. 

Ill, North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters 

North Sea : 

Convoy "466" Elbe-Hook was carried out without incident. 
One ground mines each was swept west and southwest of Helig- 
oldnd and north of Terschelling . Minesweeper M "23" ran aground 
in the Molengat (Helder). 

Salvage operations are under way. 

Norway, Northern Waters : 

I . Enemy Sit uation: 

Over the North Sea 26 planes were detected on 
operation. On 23 Oct, one plane was reported in the Banak 
area and two in the area of the Sylte Fjord. At 07^5 on 
25 Oct. two PT boats shelled the Norwegian cutter KILSTRAUMEN 
and drove her on .shore at Bessaker (north of Trondheim) . . The 
PT boats put up a smoke screen when shelled by harbor defense 
boat MOEYE and withdrew to the north and later to the vest. 
One of the boats was destroyer by oar fighters. 

According to a report from submarine U "956" Advent Bay is 
occupied by the enemy. Two wooden hats, apparently new, and 
radio masts were sighted. The submarine was also fired on 
by anti-aircraft guns from shore. Reconnaissance of Barents - 
burg was carried out' without defense being encountered. 

2 • O wn Situatio n : 

Twenty-six ships were escorted north and 35 south. 


25 Oct. 19^5 ■". ^CONFIDENTIAL 

Eighteen ships were left lying 
of escorts . '■ :;/-' 

in harbor' owing to shortage 

Weather ship K. J ? BUSCH- (operation "Kreuzritter" ) was met 
at 0615 on her way in from the operation;. 

The destroyers BEITZEN and Z "38" proceeded northward from 
Kristiansand South on the evening of 26 Oct. A stay of 24 
hours is planned at Bergen, from whence they are to proceed 
direct to Narvik. 

Naval Command, Norway reported on 2k Oct. with reference to 
the comments made by Naval Staff on 16 Oct. regarding mane- 
laying projects "NW 62" and "63" as follows: 

"I. The Amerland was sunk by torpedo. The mines discovered 
near Nordkyn. seem to have been laid recently and have nothing 
to do with the loss of the AMERLAND. 

2. Depth setting of the anti-submarine barrages requested is 
minus 17 meters. This will not hamper our own minesweeping 
operations . 

3. The sea area of Vardoe seems particularly promising after 
further investigation. Approval requested for provision of 
mines . " 

Operations Division then decided: 

"With a depth setting of minus 17 meters mines will not be 
effective against submarines at periscope depth and If set 
shallow they will hamper our own minesweeping operations. 
In view of the shortage of UMB mines their use is only, 
justified with a depth setting that promises results, 
Barrages "NW 62" and "63" must therefore be dispensed with" . 

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea 

I. Enemy Situation : 

The 18th Army Command considers the situation and 
assessment of the enemy to be unchanged. A Russian attack 
by three divisions and about 200 tanks in the area of Uritzk 
was -started on 19 Oct., but was suddenly called off, accord- 
ing to the latest statements by prisoners of war. The 
enemy now seems to be waiting for our retreat or for frosty 
weather to set in before starting a new attack. 

2.. Own Situation: 

Our planes sighted seven drifting mines west of our 


( *T 




25 Oct. 19^3 * CONFIDENTIAL. 

Skaggerak declared area . On the evening of .25 Oct. 2-5.-30 
planes flew into the Kattegat, obviously on" a 'mine laying , 
mission. Numerous, routes -were closed and all available boats 
of the 9th .andlOth Coast Patrol Flotillas and of the 29 Mines 
weeper Flotilla were ordered out as additional forces for 
sweeping operations.--.; ■ • . .; . -,. 

Convoy traffic in the entire Baltic Sea area was carried out 
without incident. The 'Finnish steamer OSMO was unsuccessfully 
attacked at an enemy plane with one torpedo- and two bombs .-■ 
west of Nargoen at 1215. A similar unsuccessful attack was 
carried out on the tug HAP SAL with a barge in tow near Cape 
Juminda at 0730 on 24 Oct. 

V. Merchant Shipping 

1. With regard to the inquiry of the Reich Commissioner 
of Marttime Shipping asking which ports in Southern France are 
approved as alternatives for the merchantmen transferred back 
from Italy and how many ships at the most may be laid up 
at each such port, Operations Division replied, after consult- 
ation with Group West, that it Is planned to make use primarily 
of the Etang de Berre where a large number of ships can be 
laid up. For the purpose of dispersal against air raids a 
few ships will also be laid up at Marseilles and at Sete. 

2. Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant 
Marine Branch deals in Report No. 9/43 with enemy tonnage 
operating to and .from Portugal and with Italian merchant 
shipping. For copy as per 1/Skl. 32978/43 gen. see war Diary, 
Part C, Vol. XI. 

VI . Subma r ine Wa v fa r e : 

Submarine U "566", the fifth submarine proceeding to 
the Mediterranean, was sunk by an enemy p,lane 30 miles south- 
west of Leixoes, according to a report from our Naval Attache 
in Madrid. Her entire complement -was rescued by a Spanish 
trawler and landed at Vigo. Immediate release can be expect- 
ed since it is a clear case of shipwreck. The .submarines now 
in the North Atlantic have been assembled into Group "Siegfried 

On account of a bearing of 213 degrees from BC 3343 taken on 
a convoy radio wave by submarine U "413", this Group has 
orders to proceed from 2100 

a ll 


25 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

on 25 Oct. on course 220 degrees in order to intercept- the 
convoy quickly and, if possible, still during the night and 
to block any avoiding U "188" .will be at the rendezvous off 
Penang on §8 Oct. and submarine U "532" on 29 -Oct. 

No reports of successes have been received from the Indian 
Ocean or from the Atlantic. . . 

VII. Aerial Warfare. 

British lies and Vicinity : 

The 3rd Air Force had 10 planes out on operation against 
England, 59 over the Atlantic and 7 over the Mediterranean. No 
reports of enemy planes having been shot down were received. 

During the night of 25 Oct. three heavy fighters flew a 
mission against London. At 1416 eight FV 200's' started out 
against a convoy in the Atlantic. Twelve Ju 88 ' s returned from 
unsuccessful free-lance operations over the Atlantic. ■ 

There was no enemy air acticity over Germany on 25 Oct. and 
during that night. During the day three single planes .were 
reported over the area Stavanger-Oslo and Stavanger-Bergen. 
Our fighters were unsuccessful against these planes. 

In Western France enemy planes attacked airfields, a power 
station and a railroad station. For damage sustained at the 
airfield of Brest-South see '"Daily Situation". Anti-aircraft 
guns shot down two of the attacking planes. Several fighter 
formations flew into the coastal areas of Belgium and North- 
ern France without attacking. In the evening 25 planes flew 
into the Kattegat, probably one minelaying. Fifty-four planes, 
including 22 night fighters, went up on defense, but scored 
no success . 

Mediterran e an Theater: 

During the day ten fighter -bombers of the 2nd Air Force 
attacked ground targets west of Termoli. There were no night 
operations. In Italy the enemy carried out attacks on Tar- 
quinia and on the front; in Greece on Kos, Jania, Pordgorica 
(north of Durazzo) and Candia . Altogether six enemy planes 
were shot down. 




25 Oct. 1943, COTFIDENTIAL 

Eastern Front: , ..' ; 

The 5th Air Force .reported 6.7 planes out on .; operation. 
On Ice Fjord (Spitzbergen) unoccupied huts were sighted. It 
can be assumed that the last' remaining troops were evacuated 
by the destroyer reported by one of our submarines, since 
no occupation or defense has been observed since the reconn- 
aissance on 20 Oct. ■ ■•• ;•; 

VI I I . Ware fare in the Mediterrane an and Blac k Sea_ 

i» Enemy Situation Medite rranean' ;; i.,- ; 

According to la tes t reports altogether 38 vessels- 
left the Mediterranean or Gibraltar for the Atlantic on; the / 
afternoon of 23 Oct. namely 32 freighters, 2 tankers, 3 des- 
troyers, and 1 auxiliary cruiser. Of these, 1 3 freighters, 
and 1 tanker came from Girbraltar. • - 

On the evening of 2^. Oct, a British transport 'with troops 
aboard left Gibraltar for the Atlantic escorted by a destroy-'-- 
er. A DELHI class cruiser passed Cape . Spa : rtel at 1520 on 
24 Oct. heading for the Mediterranean, On the same afternoon 
1 auxiliary cruiser, 1 cable-layer from the Atlantic and two 
LCT's from the Mediterranean arrived at. Gibraltar. At 0100 
on 25 Oct. 4 vessels of medium tonnage and 1 large ship pass- 
ed Ceuta, bound for the Atlantic. 

The following were located at . Gibraltar at 1900 on 24 Oct., 
1 mine laying cruiser, 2 cruiser's in dock, 1 auxiliary cruiser, 
13 destroyers, 8 corvettes, 12 'escort vessels, 5 British and 
I Italian transports, 42 freighters, 12 tankers, and 171 
planes. According to agent's report, there are still about 
12,000 men aboard freighters . and transports in the bay and 
harbor of Gibraltar, although 10,000 men have already left 
Gibraltar for the Mediterranean. 

There is still a large number of ships in Oran and Algiers,, 
according to air reconnaissance. 

At Mers el Kebir only warships, but no battleships, were 
located. Olbia and Maddalena showed a slight increase in 
freighters, but no supply traffic was observed, No new 
reports have been received from the areas of Naples, Salerno 
and Termoli. Increased activity by light naval foroes is 
reported in the area Pescara-Ortona . Commanding General; 
Armed Forces-, .South corrected his report of 24 Oct,, to 
the effect that only 80 LCT's left for- the Atlantic up to 
23 Oct. and not 180 LCT's as reported; 



25 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

2 . O wn Situation Mediterranean : 

The hospital ship AQUILEJA left Marseilles for 
Barcelona at 14-30 and the hospital ship DJENNE rt 

Submarine U "453", after completing her mine laying operation, 
returned to Pola from Brindisi to take en a fresh supply of 
mines in order to repeat this operation. Submarine U "431" 
has not yet answered the enquirees of 23 and 25 Oct. regard- 
ing her position. 

German Naval Command, Italy reports that the demands for 
sea transports made by Army Group B and Commanding General, 
Armed Forces, South are steadily increasing due to the 
revival of enemy air activity against our land communications. 
On the vest coast of Italy continuous supplies from Genoa 
and Spezia to Civitavecchia call for 30,000 tons per month 
and in addition one supply-run with 44/000 tons. For arrears 
from Plomblnb and Leghorn 1J>&, 000 tons have so .far beer, noti- 
fied and will probably exceed 300 a 0G0 tons. Ports of destin- 
ation are GJenoa or Marseilles.. Besides this, Elba must also *e 
supplied. Delay In the transfer of the large ships from Italy to 
France is caused by the shortage of crews and escort forces. 

Mounting losses through enemy PT boats, submarine and 
fighter -bombers demand heavier escort and intensified 
submarine chase, especially as the Air Force is more 
or less unable to assist. The 2nd Air Force has turned down 
a request owing to lack of adequate and suitable planes, 
but will try at least to cover the most important oper- 
ations of the Navy through air reconnaissance. Only three 
planes are available at present for convoy escorts. Every 
endeavor Is being made to afford anti-submarine defense by 
increasing ship-borne squadrons and by employment of Italian 
planes with crews. The defense forces available are insuff- 
icient, as many vessels are lying in dock. Motor mines- 
weepers are required at the same time for mines weeping and 
nine laying operations. The increase through captured ships, 
especially in submarine-chasers, shows no effect yet. Convoy 
escort will probably therefore be "extreme l.y weak. Naval landing 
craft will proceed without escort. Further delays will be 
caused because in the southern part ships can only move at 
night. German Naval Command, Italy, therefore requests that 
for the west coast war transports be fitted up as auxiliary 
submarine chasers, that more freight barges be brought up 
from Southern France and that, the projected German and Italian 
construction program for naval landing craft be continued. 

For the Adriatic Sea, the Army has demanded at once the 
shipping of 30,000 tons per month from Trieste to ports 
as far south of Ancona. Since only a limited number of 
small vessels is available it 




25 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

is necessary to tranship the cargo in Ancona from steamers 
to smallships. German Naval Command,- Italy regards the 
number of promised naval landing craft and Siebel ferries 
as inadequate. Because of the increasing threat from enemy 
naval and air forces, the question of defense becomes more • . 
and more acute. The few escort vessels so far requisitioned 
and in sailing, readiness do not suffice. At least 10- 15 fast 
and 'yell armed boats are required for escort tasks. There 
■would be a. serious gap if these escort vessels were trans- 
ferred to Admiral, Adriatic and fulfillment of the demands, 
made . by the Army would become doubtful, especially since 
these vessels are exceptionally suitable for carrying cargo 
at the same time. German. Naval Command, Italy therefore 
requests the following for the Adriatic coast: that naval 
landing craft and Siebel ferries be constructed quickly; 
the final figure be increased and losses replaced; a sufficient 
number of escort vessels be left in the West Adriatic; coastal 
traffic in the West Adriatic be controlled by German Naval 
Command, Italy. Finally, German Naval Command, Italy points 
out once more the urgency of mine defense off both Italian 
coasts, which requires immediate, action. 

3 . Area Naval Group South : 

a . Adriatic Sea : 

At noon on 24 Oct. two U. S. bomber formations 
passed over Split, flying to the north. 

An auxiliary sailing- vessel on passage to Cattaro is ovejc- ;,-;.. 
due. Two steamers left Dubrovnik for Trieste on 24 Oct. One 
German steamer' and 'four other ships were seized off the 
Dalmatian coast, according to an enemy radio report. 

Naval Staff has confiremd the views, of Group South (see - ... , 
War Diary 23 Oct.), but draws the attention of Group South,. 
German Naval Comma-hd, Italy and Admiral, Adriatic to the ; 
fact that an exceptional 'situation exists as regards the 
AUDAGE, inasmuch as Naval Staff already ordered on 12 Oct.. ., 
that this vessel be placed temporarily under German Naval 
Command, Italy as regards operations. .... 

b . Aeg ean Sea : • : 

Enemy S 1 1 ua t ion : •' 

Five Hudsons made a low -level attack with bombs 
and machine-guns on the harbor of Kos and on naval landing 
craft F "123". No casualties or damage were sustained. Our 
air reconnaissance sighted at 1430 50 miles south of Castell 
Rosso three destroyers. 


25 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL 

course north-northwest, which were joined at 1500 by a 
cruiser coming from the east. This group was 21 miles 
southwest of Castell Rosso at 1612. 

A submarine was reported north of Suda . On the afternoon 
of 24 Oct. six planes attacked coas-'t patrol boat GA "54". 
One plane was heavily damaged. The same boat reported, while 
on passage from Naxos to Levitha, an engagement with an 
enemy submarine at 0545 on 25 Oct. five miles east of the 
northern point of Amorgos . Our boat sustaind damage and 
suffered casualties. Amongst other things, the steering 
gear was damaged and she was forced to resort to her hand 

It is probable that another vessel, apart from the British 
escort boat HURWORTH L'"28", struck a mine near Kalymnos • 
since detonations were observed on 22 and 23 Oct. at the same 
position. According to statements of prisoners, the HURWORTH 
L "28" had a complement of 200 men and was armed with three 
12 cm. twin-barreled guns, two 3 cm. anti-aircraft guns and 
two ma chine -guns . 

The boat was on passage from Alexandria. 

Own Situation: 

Our troops landed at 0955 on the north coast of Levitha. 
The island was cleared of the enemy during the day. Thirty- 
three British were taken prisoner. 

Reinforced company "Brandenburg" with Bulgarian assistance 
carried out reconnaissance of the island of Strati (southwest 
of Lemnos ) . No enemy forces were on the island. 

The minelayer DRACHE left Piraeus during the night of 24 
Oct. for Chalkis in" order to carry out a minelaying oper- 
ation in the area of Pontikonisi during the night of 25 
Oct. The minelayer will then proceed to Salonika to take on 
fresh mines . 

c. Black Sea 

Enemy Situation: 

Nothing special to report. 

Own Situation: 

Six boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla in two groups 
are to attack vessels assembeled on Anapa roads during the 
night of 25 Oct. 



25 Oct. 19^5 


The operation is already under way and is assisted by 
night reconnaissance planes. Otherwise nothing special 
to report; :,' 

The Army and the Air Force plan to transfer a considerable 
part of their forces also to Old Rumania, i. e. not only 
to Trans is tria, according to information received from Armed 
Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, Both services 
approached Armed Forces High Com and "with requests to this 
effect and wished '%o ascertain whether the Navy also plans 
similar measures and considers them necessary. Quartermaster. 
Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch;- confirmed, 
the necessity of heavy occupation also of Rumanian territory 
with naval forces and the necessity thus- of bases, supply, 
forces and coastal defense forces. The extent of this will 
depend on how f r r the focal point of na.val warfare necessar- 
ily shifts further west if the front is withdrawn any. more. 

IX. Situation East As ia 

■ ■ 1 

Nothing special to report. 


2o Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

I ters of Politic a l Im port ance ■ . ; . . 

"Exchange f Telegraph" denies the view, so' far generally 
held, that the present Foreign Ministers' discussion "in Mos • 
cow are to prepare the way. f or /a iconf ernnce between Rossevelt, 
Churchill and Stalin. The negotiations, now concluded, will 
already lead to far-reaching' practical results. Actually In 
very many individual cases final solutions may have been found 
and these will then only require the formal approval of the 
three Governments concerned. These resolutions may then be 
worked out In detail at a later date. The essential factor 
i.s that every single resolution be so clearly ?nd accurately 
defined as to exclude the possibility of a different inter- 
pretation later on. The Russians, especially the man in the 
street, are ma inly interested whether the conference will lead 
to the second front. It is obvious that this question cannot 
be- answered owing to strick military secrecy. .The people are, 
however, amazingly optimistic and have themselves already 
answered this question in the affirmative. 

With regard to politics, it" is stated that all three powers 
seem to have decided on a common policy towards the satellite 
states so that once and for all It will be impossible for them 
to play with the idea of finding protection from the U. S. 
and Great Britain against the Soviet Union or vice -versa or at 
any time in the future. The three Foreign Ministers are with 
out doubt endeavoring to fix a uniform policy towards Rumania 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland. 



According to agency reports from Washington, the predicted 
appointment of Marshall on 25 Oct. as Supreme Commander 
the invasion forces in Western Europe did not materially. 
This appointment will probably not take place until Marshal"] 
comes to London next spring. The strategic plans, which did 
envisage a landing in France p-n6 Holland before the spring 
or summer of 1Q44, are entirely upset by the course of evenos 
on the eastern front. The opinion was held In Washington Vst 
winter that another year on the eastern front would result 
in fulfillment of the aim of the U. S. i.e. exhaustion both 
of Germany and of Russia, so that the armies of the Western 
Powers would have an easy target in the course of a larding 
in Western Europe. AMGOT would then take over in Europe in 
order to stop the advance of left wing radicals. The Russian 
summer offensive has completely upset all these plans and the 
Americans and British must now act before the war has been 


2b Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

Confernece on the Sit nation with Chief, Naval Staff 

I. Army Situation; 

The enemy extended his break-through near Melitopol 
on the southern sector of the eastern front. A weak defensive 
front is being built up by our forces. It is still doubtful 
whether this attempt will succeed in view of constant heavy 
enemy pressure. The enemy also extended the break-through south- 
west of Zaporozhe still further. One ropetrovsk fell. The fight- 
ing strength of our own forces can be estimated by the fact 
that only one combat group could be formed from the remnants 
of five divisions. The enemy started his drive on Krivoi Reg. 

The sectors of Army Groups, Center and North were comparat- 
ively quiet. 

Only minor local fighting is reported from the Italian front. 

No orders have been issued so far regarding a possible evac- 
uation of the Crimea. According to information from Armed 
Forces, High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, the Crimea is 
to be held at all costs. 

-*- -*- • Report b y Quartermas tier general : 

a. Torpedo boat T :30" was commissioned at Danzig. 

b, Orders dealing with the new erection of coastal batteries 
on the Channel coast have been received from Armed Forces 

^ High Command, Operations Staff. This measure is obvious- 

ly aimed mainly at protection of special weapons. Copy of 
teletype as per l/Skl 3202/^3 Gkdos . Chefs, see War Diary 
Part C, Vol. X. According to these orders, the Navy is 
to furnish the guns and personnel for at least two med- 
ium batteries (four 15 cm, guns each) and the personnel 
for two 21 cm. batteries of four guns each. Part of the 
personnel Is to be Oravn from the 1,000 volunteer? 0^ the 
Russian Legion and troops from the east who will be made aval 
lable by Commanding General, Armed Forces, West. This will 
not entail a reauction In the number of volunteers re- 
quested by High Command, Navy for other points. Naval 
batteries on other coastal sectors are not to be de- 
commissioned on account of those new formations, 

c A uniform operational command is necessary for aerial 

defense of Gdynia and Danzig. Measures are oeing worker 
out together with the Air Force. 


26 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

In a Highly Restricted Circle 

III. Report of Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division : 

a. Commander y. Submarines, Mediterranean has voiced object- 
ions to new mine laying off Br in4'&s-i> ; since it is'. not certain 
that TMB mines will react at the -water depths, of -over 20 ■' • 
meters existing there and because the effect of the first, 
operation -will, lead to patrol and defense. The -water depth of 
off Bari makes minelaying possible, but Commander, Submarines,' 
Mediterranean, advises against it, because this harbor j.s- '■■'■ 
unimportant and since enemy patrol must be expected there. He 
plans a, torpedo operation b^ submarine U "453" in the area of 
the southeast coast of Italy and Sicily. 

Chief, Naval Staff decides that submarine U "453" should 
first ca.rry out a minelaying operation off Bari and later on 
repeat minelaying off Brindlsi. . 

b. The 0S0RN0 sailed from Batavia today. A decision as to- 
■whether she sould attempt a blockade-break must be reached 
at the end of November. Plans for putting in are at present 
under discussion by Group West -with an officer from Naval 
Staff. Chief, Auxiliary Cruiser Section reports that the cap- 
tains are remarkably confident. ':.:"■:. 


Special Items: ■'■ « ' ■ 

1. On inquiry from Quartermaster Division the Naval Liaison 
Officer to High Command, Army. Army General Staff t reports.: 

"1.; The flow of supplies to the Crimea is very limited. 
Requests for shipment of supplies by sea have already been 
received direct from Quartermaster General. . . . _- 

2. The following figures must be assumed in case the Crimea, 
is to be' evacuated: 

a) Troops: approximately 200,000 #ien« 

Horses: 60,000 

Motor Vehicles: 15,000; in addition, all other equip- 
ment . 

b) Supplies: approximately 500,000 tons. About 120,000 
tons" of livestock (400,000 head of cattle). Altb- 

■' .. ..'..• gether 620,000 tons. 



Should the overland route vis the isthmus of Perekop be 
open, It csn be assumed that the bulk of the troops and 
part of the cattle will be evacuated from the Crimea on foot 
and supplies by railroad. Daily capacity 16 trains (7,200 '■ . 
t ons ) . 

Army General Staff. -request that everything be prepared in 
such a -way that as much as ; passible is shipped by sea, 
should evacuation become necessary at short notice," 

II. Naval Intelligence Division submits the following assess ■ 
ment of the situation regarding enemy landing craft: 

^ I. Another 47 landing craft left the Mediterranean for 

the Atlantic, making so far altogerher 80 LCT ! s or LCI's, 
or 18$ of the number in the Mediterranean. Transfer to 
England can be sssumed, since the first part of this group 
•was sighted by our air reconnaissance at 0900 on 23 Oct. 
300 miles northwest of Cape Ortega 1. 

2. Amongst the vessels withdrawn were 6 LCF's and 13 LOG'S, 
i.e. about two-thirds of the Mediterranean strength of these 
classes. The others were probably LCI's, Since LCI's are not 
built in England but come from the United States, their trans 
for from the Mediterranean might be due to the difficulties 
of a transatlantic crossing in winter. 

3. In connection with the transfer of landing craft from the 
United States to England in North Atlantic convoys, observed 
for the first time on 8 Oct,, the following was detected: 

% arrival of 2 L.'.T's en 12 Oct. and of further LST's, number . 
unknown, on 24 Oct. in Londonderry. 

4. This movement has not yet substantially changed. the 
operational possibilities in the Mediterranean theater and in 
the area of England. 

Situation 26 O ct. 
■^ ' War in Foreign Waters 
I* Enemy Situation: 

Nothing special to report. 


25 Oct. 19^3 iGON-F- TDSNTIAL 

2. Own Situation: r ;./; t ../; J ." 

The planned,; supply ";6^^a^ti. p^ '^ ^ijfae. BRAKE is can- 
celed, since the submarines' operating in the Indian Ocean 
are to call at Penang for supplies. An order to this effect 
has been sent to the BRAKE with Radiogram 2142. She should, 
however, hold herself in readiness for. further operations. 

■*•-£• Situation W est Area 
1. Enemy Situation: 

Over the Bay of Biscay 33. planes were detected on' 

24 merchantmen o.f up to J>,QQO CRT en northerly course. Group 
West assumes them to be landing craft » At 1210.20 vessels, 
yrri-bably also lending craft were sighted in CG- 4277 on a simii 


2. Own Situation: 

Atlantic Coast: 

The loss of submarine chaser "1403" on 25 Oct. was 
apparently not due to mine or torpedo action, since no deton- 
ation was heard or any great vibration felt, according to 
statements made by survivors. 

Sabotage is therefore presumed. The boat had docked at Lorient 
and left the dockyard on 20 Oct. 

Two ELM/J mines were swept off St. Nazaire. 

Channel Coast: 


The convoy of the steamer NORDVAARD left Calais, 
eastward bound, at midnight and arrived at Dunkirk at 0300; ■ It 
put out at 2100, but was forced by weather conditions to return 
to port ha If an hour la ter . ■ -. , - -- : "■ - •■ 

Torpedo boat T"l4" and seven motor minesweepers left Le 
Havre at 1800. They will proceed as far as Dunkirk, , weather 

Commander, 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla had three boats in 
immediate readiness at Le Havre for PT boat chase, if such 
were located. 


2b Oct. 1943. J . ,',"' ..... f _ CONFIDENTIAL 

Fop brief 'action report of patrol bo-t "v.d. GROEBEN", of 
convoy escort NORDVAARD, dated 25 Oct, see teletype 0220" 

III. Nor th S ea , Norway, Northern Waters 

Nor th Sea : 

Seven ELM/J mines vere swept near the West Frisian 
Islands. Minesweeper M "23" -was refloated in the Molengat. 

Nor way, North ern Waters ; 

I . Enemy Situation: 

Over the North Sea 21 planes vere detected on 
operation. One British vessel was located at 1440 in AN 
l\660. A PT boat was sighted off Honningsvaag at 0747 and 
was attacked. 

The areas of two grid squares at the entrance to Porsanger 
Fjord have been closed owing to suspicion of mines. 

At 1050 on 25 Oct. in enemy PT boat encountered a defense 
cutter- in the Buskoesund (north of Sogne F^ord) but with- 
drew to the north when haad grenades were thrown and •submac- 
hine-guns fired. At 1500 two PT boats were sighted near Hovden 
on course northnortheast . At 0702 en 26 Oct. a Hampden fired 
a torpedo which missed on one of our southbound convoys near 
Feistein. Numerous single planes were observed approaching the 
west coast on 25 Oct. 

2. Own Situation: 

The destroyers BEITZEN and Z "38" left Kris tiansand 
South at 2130, northbound. . 

Thirty-four ships were escorted north and 17 south. Altogether 
19 ships were delayed owing t.o shortage of escorts. 

According to a report from Naval Command, Norway an agent 
of the Secret Service was told to find out: 

"What damage did the TIRPITZ sustain in the submarine attack? 
Can this be repaired in Norway?". 

Group North/Fleet proposes that the agent be given the follow- 
ing information: . - , . 

"Several double-bottom compartments of the TIRPITZ were dam 
aged, resulting in the loss of oil. In addition several range- 


26 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL _ 

finders and light guns were damaged through vibrations. Repairs 
willbe carried out during present repair in Norway. The ship 
is apparently going on to Germany for routine dockyard per- 

Naval Staff, which centrally controls the passing- on of in- 
formation to the enemy intelligence, service regarding the 
TIRPITZ, outlines the statements- and their tendency as 
follows : 

"Damage sustained by the TIRPITZ in the submarine attack is 
only slight, since the mines exploded at a considerable -. 
distance from the ship. Minor underwater damage to the 
double -bottom compartments, resulting in the loss of oil. 
Docking was unnecessary. In addition certain damage to 
her electrical installations, obviously through vibration, 
details of extent not known. Repairs possible in Norway. 
At the same time routine repairs of boilers, engines and 
weapons will be carried out. The ship will not return to 
a German port uniil later, for as short a dockyard period 
as possible. The reason is allegedly the heavy air raid 
damage at the dockyards at Hamburg." 

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea 

1. Enemy Situation: 

Firing practices by the heavy anti-aircraft guns 
aboard the MARAT were observed. Two tugs and two large 
patrol vessels were seen sweeping magnetic mines on 
the west roads of Kronstadt. Enemy planes over Luga bridge, 
Lippovo and Kirgolovo were fired on by our anti-aircratt 
batteries. North of Hungerburg bombs were dropped south 
of the 2nd Army Coastal Battery of the 929th Battalion. 

2. Own Situation: 

In the Baltic Sea entrances 41 boats were out on 
minesweeping operations and in the Baltic Sea 17. One ELM/J 
mine was swept off Halsbarre. One mine detonation was re- 
ported southeast of Grenaa. Escort service in the areas of 
Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic and Commander, Mines- - 
seepers, Baltic was carried out as planned and without 
incident. Minesweeper M "451" ran aground south of Varisai 
and sustained heavy damage. 

Five coastal minelayers were out on mine laying operations 
in the area northeast of Schepel. 

Naval Command, Baltic reports with reference to the order 
of Naval Staff (see War- Diary 19 Oct.) regarding dismantling 
of batteries from the area of Admire 1, Baltic States that: 

I. For the time being the following batteries will be left 


I— ^/ W ^ w • ju^i^y 



at Kronsta&t Bay. Battery "Karkuli"" (f Our "I?" cm-.' guns)", 
Battery "Peterhof" -(three 10.'5 cm-.' guns )'/ Battery ";Koen~ 
igsberg" (three 10.5 r cm. guns)," the Battery of the ,. 
239th 239th Naval Anti-aircraft Battalion, (four 8.8 cm,: . • 
anti-aircraft guns) the sixth Battery of the 239"th Naval 
Ant i-a ircra ft Ba tta lion (seven 3 »v? •'■■cm. anti-a ircra ft guns ) ,- 
and 'also 2 cm. guns" for battery defense. .■,:•;• :;/ •..: : 

2. Complete dismanting gear for Battery . "Prinz He inrich". , 
is available. Order for dismantiling this Battery has been 
given; 'time required probably three "weeks. 

V. S ubmarine War f are 

Submarine Group "Schill" consisting of eight boats, 
hss been given orders to operate against a northbound 
convoy in the Atlantic. This Group is to be ijpr patrol 
line from BE 8878 to 8989 at 1000 on 2S Oat. Reconnaiss- 
ance -will be carried out by BV 222 ! s and FW -200 ' s . 

Submarines of Group "Siegfried" detected .an enemy bearing 
in BC 3526 and BC 31. I n "the same area one of our submarines 
■was attacked by a plane. According to .: radio decoding,- 
stragglers of the awaited convoy received orders not to 
proceed via BE 9360 but via 99?4. Then the convoy -was 
proceeding much further south than assumed. The operation 
■was broken off, since pursuit in a' southeasterly direction 
could not lead to interception in view of the ins tense 
enemy air activity which had started . in the meantime; - 
Group "Siegfried" -was ordered to"" take up"a"new disposition 
in-BC, right. third, against an expected slow :eastbound 
convoy.' ■•-■; . .-; 

Submarine U "I83" reports from the sea area of the 
Maldives and Ceylon in the Indian .Ocean that she fired . 
eight torpedoes which missed on 19, 23 and 24 Oct. and 
attributes this to electric torpedo failures. This boat 
is due at Penang on 30 Oct. ' 

VI. Aerial Warfare 

British Isles and Vicinity : 

The 3rd Air Force reports 2 planes on operation over 
England, 3 over the Atlantic and 4 over the Mediterranean. 
For reconnaissance evaluations of the Atlantic see "Enemy 
Situation West Area".: 

In the afternoon major enemy formations. carried out dive- 
bomb attacks on the airfield at Brest South. Half of the 
bombs fell into ; the sea. The seaplane dockyard and engine 
workshop as well as the yard for land planes sustained 
damage but are still in operation. No night operations are 
reported. 374 CONFIDENTIAL 

26 Oct. 19^3 CQWPlDEWTXAL 

Mediterranean Theater: 

jCMMM .' — •-*-/ 

Reconnaissance planes and fighter -bombers of the 2nd 
Air Force supported Army operations on the Italian front by 
attacking motor vehicles and tanks in the sector of Montenero. 

In the Greek area our planes attacked Leros, Samos and in- 
surgents in Northern Croatia and in the area of Joannini. 
The attack on Leros harbor was carried out by 51 bombers 
and 17 dive-bombers. Two small warships north of Leros and 
west of Archi were damaged by direct bomb hits. Two cutters 
were sunk. In the Italian area enemy fighters attacked 
Ancona with machine-guns during the day. In the Greek area 
raids were carried out on the airfields of Salonika -Sedes 
and Mikra . Damage stained was slight. 

In the Aegean area six enemy planes carried supplies to the 
insurgents . 

Eastern Front : '.k 

The 5th Air Force withdraws its assumption of 25 Oct. 
that Ice Fjord is unoccupied. One of our reconnaissance 
planes was fired on from Longyearbyen. 

Otherwise nothing special to report. 

VII. _ Warfare in the Medi terran ean a rd Black Sea 
I. Enemy Situa-cicn Mediterranean: 

Twelve LCT's of an unknown type arrived at Gib- 
raltar from the Mediterranean. One U. S. cruiser of the 
HONOLULU Class, probably the PHILADELPHIA, and one dest- 
royer left for the Mediterranean. At l8l4 one of our submarin- 
es detected and unsuccessfully attacked a westbound convoy 
45 miles west of Algiers. 

No reports have been received from the area of Sardinia - 
Corsica. In the Gulf of Salerno there were: on the morn- 
ing of 25 Oct. a convoy of 6 freighters and 1 destroyer; < 
at noon an outbound convoy of Ik ships. A formation of. 
landing craft was sighted southeast of Capti. No sighting 
reports received from the Gulf of Gaeta', Only mlo-or supply 
traffic was observed off the east and south coasts of Italy. 
Otherwise no reconnaissance -reports received. 

- 2. Own Situation Mediterranean: 

- : During the night -of 25 Oct. two boats of the 3rd PT 
Boct Flotilla broke through a double destroyer patrol off the 
Bay of Naples. A torpedo was fired against a destroyer but it 



26 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

The boats -were forced to turn about 4§ miles off the 
anchorages in the Bay, since stershells end location made 
further approach impossible. Six boats of the 11th Motor 
Mines-weeper Flotilla left Spezia in the afternoon of a 
mine laying operation. Flanking escort was afforded by 
four boats of the 7th PT Boat Flotilla. Bad Weather is 
at present hampering coastal traffic with small vessels. 
Otherwise coastal traffic was normal. 

The hospital ship DJENNE arrived at Barcelona in the 
afternoon and the AQUILEJA in the evening. 

Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy reports that the 
transfer of motor minesweepers and PT boats from the 
Western Mediterranean to the Adriatic See via Genoa - 
Piacenza will start on 6 Nov. It will be possible to transfer 
six large and nine small motor minesweepers and all PT boats 
by the end of November. Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy 
reports, with reference to the situation report submitted 
on25 Oct., that escort, minesveep ng and mine laying oper- 
ations on the west coast can no longer be carried out to 
the extend required efter withdrawal of the PT boats and 
motor minesweepers; furthermore, that any operational act- 
ivity will be Impossible. He requests that large motor mine- 
sweepers and PT boats be left on the west coast of Italy 
until transfer of further vessels from home waters is 

Operations Division is at present investigating the dispostion 
of forces In the Mediterranean. The result of this invest- 
igation is to be expected on 27 Oct. 

3. Area Naval Group South: 

a . Adriati c Sea : 

The enemy air attack with bombs and machine-guns on 
Janina (northwest of Dubrovnik) on the morning of 25 Oct. 
caused no damage. According to a Croatian report, the 
steamer RAD (4,000 CRT) was sunk by enemy air action. Naval 
Shore Commander, Daimatia has moved to his emergency head- 
quarters at Klis owing to the enemy situation. Departure of 
three steamers from Dubrovnik to the north has been post- 
pone! because of the enemy situation. The report of 25 Oct. 
about an auxiliary sailing vessel being overdue has turned 
out to be incorrect. The vessel did not leave Cattaro north- 
bound intil the afternoon of 26 Oct. 

Mopping -up operations on the islands off the Dalmatian coast 
are being continued; next on the list is Korcula . 


26 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

b. Aegean Sea : 

Enemy Situation: 

No damage to speak of was 3uttained in the air 
attack*on Candia during the night of 25 Oct. On 24 Oct. an 
enemy bomber was shot down near Gavdos, 

The following were disarmed and evacuated: 

On Naxos 8 Italian officers and 340 men; 
On Par os 2 Officers and 150 men. 

The following information has been received about the enemy- 
occupied islands in the Dodecanese: 

Castell Rosso: Occupied by the British. Base for light 

surface forces. Seaplane base. 

Symi: Occupied by the British. 

Nisyros : Said to be occupied by the British. 

Leros : Total occupation 5-6,000 men (mostly naval 

personnel). 3-400 British, well armed; rein- 
forcements must be expected. Allegedly strong 
anti-aircraft defense, one modern 9 cm. battery, 
one Italian battery. 

Pa thmos : One Italian battery. 

Nicaria : One Italian infantry company, two companies 

of Black Shirts, said to be pro-German. Is- 
land allegedly occupied by the British. 

Samos : Staff of Division Cuneo (General Soldarelli). 

Occupation 6-8,000 Italians, 2-300 British 
and allegedly 5,000 Greeks. Two airfields 
under cons true -Dion. 

Own Situation: 

The DRACHE returned to Salonika after completion of 
a mine laying operation. Convoy operations were carried out 
without incident. Coast patrol boat GA "54" left Levitha 
for Naxos in the morning, carrying troops. 

Group South transmits for information copy which it has re- 


26 Oct. 19^3 




of a teletype from Army Group E to Army Group F regarding 
surprise occupation of Samoa before the execution of oper- 
ation "Leopard". For copy of teletype as per l/Skl 3l8l/43 
Gkdos Chef3. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV. 

c. Black Sea : 

Enemy Situation: 

Enemy submarines were located 20 miles southwest of 
Sevastopol according to radio monitoring. 

An enemy submarine attacked our towed convoy from Sevastopol 
to Ak Mechet with two torpedoes at noon 25 Oct. A lighter sus- 
tained damage and was towed in. Submarine -chase has been start- 
ed at the point of attack, a Sub marine was sighted and attack- 
ed by one of pur planes eight miles northwest of AK Mechet; 
no success was observed. 

Own Situation: 

The sector between the northern and southern break- 
waters of Kerch was shelled by 15 cm. guri3 between 1130 and 
1155 on 25 Oct. No damage was done to naval installations-. 
At the same time air attacks were carried out on the town 
and harbor of Yalta. The tug BAIKAL sustained damage. 

The goods train ferry EAINBU.RG vhich was damaged some time' 
ago by an aerial torpedo hit sprang a leak while in tow from 
Sevastopol to Odessa and put in to AK Mechet, where she was 

The 1st PT Boat Flotilla carried" out the operation against 
Anapa during the night of 25 0ct o as planned. The southern 
decoy group had an engagement with patrol vessels, the north- 
ern group at the same time attacked the harbor of Anapa with 
six torpedoes. No detonation wa3 heard. The torpedoes pro- 
bably passed under the targets and ran ashore or were caught 
in barrages . 

Two naval landing craft are evacuating the garrison of the 
island of Biryutshi (east of Genichesk). 

Two Italian midget submarines left Sevastopol on a submarine 


26 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDEN TIAL 

VIII. Situatio n East Asia 

Nothing Special to report. 




27 Oct, 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Political Importance 

According,. to "Exchange Telegraph" one of the concrete 
results of the discussions so far in Moscow seems to be ■ 
the decision to establish immediately a permanent joint 
Three Power Committee which will' have sufficient authority 
to deal -with future problems -which arise. The Kremlin 
attaches great Importance to the creation- of ■inter- > •■ 
Allied organizations. The criterion of the success of this 
confernnce is, howover , still the military aspect, It is 
said that the Soviet Press. has not taken up or commented 
on Smuts ' Speech in -which he predicted the opening of the 
Second front in Spring 19 } 4,4. This is probably because the 
Soviet Delegation is still endeavoring to have this date 
changed , 

The conference will last another ten to twelve days. 

The' leading British Press seems remarkably optimistic 
j about the outcome of the conference,, According to Radio 
London, Eden is said to have presented a photo album 
showing the extent of the devastation caused in Germany 
by the Anglo-American air offensive, 

A Russian periodical lists four theses with regard to the 
reparations problem: 

1. Germany, Italy, Finland, Rumania and Hungary must 
pay reparations. 

2. ■.•Reparations to be pa id in kind, not In cash. 

3. Actual repair of war damage must be carried out by 
. direct employment of German ma npower. 

H\ The Soviet Union, Poland, Norway and Greece must 
be given priority in reparations, since their 
economy has suffered more than that of the U. S. 
. and Great Britain. 

The House of Commons passed without a division prolong- 
ation of the mandate of the present Parliament for another 
year. • 

A Government statement before the Japanese Parliament on 
2.6 Oct. states that the main target is at present complete 
agreement between the High Command and political leaders. 
At the same time foreign policy and strengthening of 
Government authority at home must go hand in hand. The back- 
bone of internal strength lies' in a speedy expansion of 
the armament industry. ... t 


27 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

Confernece on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff 

, - ■ ■ " ■ ■■■■■ ■ ■ ■■ 1 —1. - 11 1 ... -■ — — . , , , , 

I. A rmy Situation: 

All German combat divisions have been withdrawn from 
the Crimea, except the 98th Light Infantry Dicision. 
There are ten Rumanian divisions on the peninsula besides 
a very strong German supply base with exceptionally Large 
quantities of material and supplies. 

The enemy enlarged his break-through near Melitopol to a 
depth of 30 kilometers. 

In Italy the enemy more or less completed the assembly of 
his troops in front of our "Barbara" line. He is concentrating 
his activities on heavy bomber, operations , such as have not 
been observed since Messina. 

II. Chief, Naval Intelligence Division states that the British 
Admiralty reports in detail on the operation of our PT 

boats off Cromer on 24/25 Oct. According to this report, four 
German PT boats were destroyed and seven damaged; 19 men 
were taken prisoner. 

In Highly Restricted Circle: 

III. Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division 

a. The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports the following dis- 
position of Japanese submarines in the Indian Ocean: 

1 submarine between Mombass^ and Diego Suzrez 
3 submarines south and southwest of India 
1 submarine on passage to Aden 
1 submarine on return passage from Aden to 
Penang, at present south of India. 

b. According to information received from Armed Forces 
High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, the said Oper- 
ations Staff on 25 Oct. drew attention to the danger 
of an enemy attack on Denmark, which would have very 
serious consequences if it were to penetrate as far 
as Sweden and the Baltic Sea. The Fuehrer agreed with 
this opinion and approved the transfer of a further 
division to Jutland. 

Naval Staff if of opinion that the present assessment of 
the situation with regard to Jutland needs re -examination. 




27 Oct. 19^3 CO NFIDEN TIAL 

Considering the present situation regarding landing 
craft, bad weather can no longer be regarded as an 
obstacle to landing operations and the employment of . 
airborne troops would make operations even more 
independent. Our barrages in the North Sea and the 
Skagerrak will be no serious obstacle. It is significant 
that "the Swedish naval base at Gothenburg has now been 
expanded to a Naval Station and that a notoriously 
pro-British officer has been appointed as its Chief. It 
is noteworthy that this information comes from the 
"Folkets Dagblatt 11 , a newspaper with a strong pro- 
German National Socialist inclination. (The last sen- 
.tence added by Chief of Staff; Naval Staff - Tr . N. ) 

Chief , Naval Staff ordered an investigation as to 
whether , where and to what extent further fensive 
mine barrages can be laid, despite the shortage of 
.mines, The artillery defense of the Jutland coast could 
only be reinforced at the expense of the Channel coast. 

The following factors speak against an invasion of 
Jutland: The possibility of our strong defense forces 
and air formations being brought up quickly and without 
hindrance from home territory; the fact that the enemy's 
long supply route is flanked by the German coast and is 
within reach of our fighters and of small battle units. 

An operation against southern Norway/skagerrak coast 
would be much 'more in line with the defense situation, 
yet in both cases Sweden would be the .target. 

c. According to further information received from Armed 
•Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy the Fuehrer 
attaches the utmost importance to all suitable naval 
forces (PT boats, motor minesweepers, gun carriers, nnd 
if necessary also submarines) being used for defense of 
the Strait of Kerch and the Crimean sea area against 
enemy landings, since Army forces are inadequate. 

At the Fuehrer's request Chief, Naval Staff left here 
at 1400 for the Fuehrer Headquarters accompanied by Chief, 
Operations Branch, Operations Division. 


27 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

Special Items 

I, In cooperation with the Coasts 1 Light Infantry Battalion 
in Special Unit "Brandenburg" see War Diary 14 April 19^3 ) > 
am operation by this Battalion is being prepared against the 
West African and Brazilian coasts (Operation "Reisernte"). 
Naval Staff has made available two motor fishing vessels 
for this operation. For details of this plan and preparations 
see File 1/Skl. I Op. XI, 4 Vol. 1 "Commando operations". 

Discussions were held on 22 Oct. between Commander, Coastal 
Light Infantry Battalion and Operations Division, with the 
following results: 

"1. * Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has ordered 
that the Coastal Light Infantry Battalion is at present 
to be employed in its full strength in the Aegean Sea. 
Operation "Reisernte", for which preparations have just 
been completed, must therefore be postponed for the time 

2. Operation "Reisernte", however, is not to be given up, 

• since considerable time was spent on conversion, fitting- 
up and equipment of the two vessels provided for this 
operation as well as on the training of crews. Commander, 
Coastal Light Infantry Battalion expects to be able to 
have the required number of men available for this oper- 
ation at the latest by next spring. Chances of success 
will not be any less then than they are now. 

3. It is not advisable to leave the vessels at the dock- 
yard for the next six months .. Instead it will be better 
for the boats as well as for the crews to be employed 
elsewhere during this time. The boats and crews should, 
however, not be worn out in such operations. Special 
care must be taken that the vessels' ultimate use is 
not disclosed. They should only participate in oper- 
ations where the enemy has no opportunity to draw con- 
clusions, from their present use, as to their later 
assignment and where he cannot obtain an exact descrip- 
tion or pictures of these vessels." 

Chief, Fleet Branch, Quartermaster Division has been advised 
accordingly. A telephone conversation with Chief of Staf, 
Group North revealed the fact that Armed Forces High Command, 
Intelligence Division, Sabotage Section had offered the boats 
provided for operation "Reisernte" to Group North as patrol 
vessels in the Skagerrak for control of the Swedish skerries 
(Operation "Greif"). Chief of Staff, Group North was there- 



27 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

upon advised that this offer by Armed Forces High Command, 
Intelligence Division, Sabotage Section is opposed to the 
views held by Operations Division. For secutiry reasons 
these boats can under no circumstances be' used for oper- 
ation. "C-reif " . Group North will there-fore assign other 
vessels to this and will employ the boats provided for 
operation "Reisernte" only in such a way that security 
is in no way endangered. 

The Sabotage Section was informed by phone of the above 
instructions given to Group North. The' order issued by 
the Sabotage Section, without first consulting Naval 
Staff, was due to a misunderstanding. 

II. Operations Division has reached the following con- 
clusion and assessment of the situation with regard to 
divisi on of f or ces be tween the We 3 t ern Med it e rr^ neon 
and the" Adriatic Sea s 

"I. In the Wes tern lie d! terra ?iea n raval warfare is at present 
concentrated" on defense - .* - 
The tasks are chiefly: 

a. Defense of our convoy traffic along the coasts of Italy 
and southern France. 

. b. Defense of the coast against landings. 

- Our sea communications along the coast are at presnnt 
starting up, German Naval Command," Italy states that 
transport requirements will be 50,000 tons monthly 
from Genoa and Spezia to Civitavecchia. Besides the 
above, one single supply shipment of 44,000 tons is 

At present there are 136,.000 tons of return cargo at 
P-iombino; this quantity will most likely increase to 
■over 300,000 tons. Sea communications along the coast 
will probably gain in importance, ' since the enemy is 
already trying to wreck and interrupt overland commun- 
ications in central and- northern Italy by air raids on 
railroads and highways. However, sea connnuni cat ions 
will not be d e cisiv e in holding • central Ital^y because 
it will be possible to transport a large part of supplies 
over the comparatively extensive network of- roads even 
if air attacks hamper these operations. '. 

■ P oa st s l defe nse in Italy and Southern France must be 
borne chiefly' by coastal fortifications on the mainland 
and by Army forces; naval .forces are only suitable for 
patrol of coastal waters at night and sre therefore not 
decisive in the defense of the coast. 


27 Oct. 19^5 CONFIDENTI AL 

Offensive task s would lie in attacks against enemy 
supplies: to the Naples area and to Sardinia and 
Corsica, if our own forces, were strong enough. PT 
boats would be the only suitable naval vessels, but 
but weather conditions during the nest six months 
will restrict their operations. 

With his naval bases in the Western Mediterranean the 
enemy has moved quite close to our shores (Naples, 
Sardinia, Corsica), in particular he posses almost 
unchallenged air supremacy and his Air Force is there- 
fore in a position to endanger our sea traffic cons- 
iderably. The consequence is already that sea trans- 
ports in the main areas can only be carried out by 
small vessels, which must look after their own defense 
in most cases (for instance: Naval landing craft). 
Enemy naval acticity in this area has so far not had any 
appreciable effect. It must, however, be expected that 
stronger enemy naval forces will-appear on the coast as 
the bases on Sardinia and Corsica are built up. 

The submarine danger is still considerable. 

In view of this situation it is not to be expected that 
the few German naval forces will play a decisive part in 
the tasks of the Navy, unless it should be possible to 
increase their number considerably by transfers from 
home waters. On the other hand, it is necessary to in- 
crease sea transport on small, fast vessels in every 
way possible. 

2. In the Adriatic Sea the main problem at present is 
the movement of supplies to the Army along the West 
Adriatic coast, as far as Accona and along the Delmation 
coast to the southeast. The extent of this traffic is 
given as 30,000 tons monthly from Trieste to Ancona. Part 
of this cargo must be transhipped at Ancona into small 
vessels and carried further along the coast on these. 
What has been said under 1) with regard to the west coast 
of Italy also refers to this traffic. It will undoubt- 
edly be possible, to route the greater part of this 
traffic overland. 

Supplies from Trieste along the Dalmatian coast to 
Montenegro and Albania, however, play a d ecisive 

; part in view of the traffic conditions in the Balkans, 
At least. 100,000 tons per month must be transported 
over this route by sea. Army Group Southeast states 
that these supplies could never be transferred to 
overland routes because roads and re ilwa-ys . are inade- 
quate, but foremost owing to the partisan activity. 

, thus the fighting strength of end supplies to the 
German Forces in the Southern Balkans depend on sea 




27- Oct. 19*13..'; ,...:-:::; .; : \ • CONFIDENTIAL 

traiff ic which/ however, cannot be started yet at all,, 
since most of the island off the Dalmatian .coast, are 
. being held by partisans. • 

Coas tal defense is extremely -weak in this area. It 
cannot rely entirely on fortifications on the mainland 
but must also be effective on the outlying islands. The 
. necessaty operations for first of all mopplng-up and 
.. occupying these islands and then for setting up defense 
"VouldT require quite a few light naval forces, ■vhich are 
not yet available. 

The enemy has in the Italian' coast as far as Termoli 
area a favorable jumping -off base for attacks on the 
opposite coast, -which he can now easily reach unobserv- 
ed, in one night, especially during the -winter because 
Of the short distance tobe covered (on ;an average 60-80 
miles). The excellent airfields in the Foggia area also 
offer the enemy an opportunity for air operations against 
our convoy traffic. 

3. ' Our own Air Force will' be to assist the Navy 
'..' ; effectively in the near future. . ; • 

The few available naval forces must therefore be con- 
centrated so. that dispersion will not 'make it . impossible 
to carry out the required task in at least one area. 

The most important task is sea traffic along the Bnlkan 
coas.t. 'All available forces must be concentrated on this 
target, eve n if j. t should ac tually be d e sira ble to in- 
crease sea traffic also in the "other areas and to make 
forces available, for offensive operations. 


In conclusion it must be emphasized that there is already 
such shortage everywhere in transports alone (steamers, 
war transports':/ naval, landing craft, Siebel ferries and 
auxiliary., sailing vessels) that it is necessary, to start 
building new vessels in as >; large a number and. as quickly 
as possible, if it is impossible to transfer naval forces 
from home, waters to. the Western Mediterranean via : the 
Rhone river, complete withdrawal of our combat ;forces 
from this sea area must be accepted. . - ■ ■■■' 

The enemy may otherwise be able to destroy or cut off 
pur sea communications in the Eastern Adriatic through 
' : - a relatively small commitment of his naval and air forces, 
-■'in such a- way that our Army in the Balkans will become 
: - 'powerless . " 

These -considerations have led to the despatch of the following. 


27 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

information to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff 
Quartermaster Division, Commanding General, Armed Forces, 
South, Army Group B, Commanding General, Armed Forces, 
Southeast, Army Group E, German Naval Command, Italy, Group 
South, Admirals, Adriatic and Aegean, -with copies to Admiral, 
Fuehrer Headquarters, Commanderin Chief, Air Force, Operations 
Staff, Navel Liaison and High Command, Army, Army General 
Staff, Naval Liaison: 

"I. The following basic considerations have been followed 
by Naval Staff in the dispostiion of naval forces in the 

1. Tasks of Naval Forces: 

a. In the- Aegean Sea? Most urgent is the mopping-up 
of the remaining islands, then continuous supp- 
lies oo the island occupation forces (including 
constantly required shifting of forces) and, if 
necessary, evacuations. 

b. In the Adriatic Sea: Supplies for all services • 
to Dalmatian ports, Montenegro and Albania. 
Mopping-up of the outlying islands is essential 
for this and at the smee time for building up 
coastal defense. 

c. On the West and East coasts of Italy: Transports 

of supplies, especially for the Army and the 
Air Force. Large return shipments, Patrol of 
coastal waters for coastal defense; operations 
against enemy supplies to Naples, Sardinia and 
Corsiaa . 


d. Off the south coast of France: Convoy escort 
and patrol of coastal enters. 

2. Undoubtedly the most important tasks of those mentioned 
above are the ones on the Adriatic east coast ind in the 
Aegean Sea. Re-routing of transports to Dalmatian ports, 
Montenegro and Albania to the overland route is entirely 
out of question in view of the Balkan traffic conditions 
and because of partisan activity. Thus the fighting stren- 
gth of the Gorman forces operating there and their supplies 
depend entirely on the sea traffic. The same applies to' 
the Aegean Sea . 

Tasks in the Western Mediterranean and on the Italian 
. Adriatic coast can and must take second place to these. 
Supplies to the Italian front can be transported over- 
land even if hampered by air attacks on railways and 
roads. For offensive operations, which are verj desir- 
able, only PT boats are suitable, but weather conditions 
during the winter months limit their commitment very 




2 7 Oct. 1943 ' UOlNiFlD iJlxriUilli 

II. Naval Staff has therefore introduced the following 

1. For the time being the two captured Italian destroyers : 
and four Italian torpedo boats will put' into commission 
in the Aegean Sea. . : . 

2. In the Adriatic Sea all available and sutiable warships 
and auxiliary warships will be fitted up and put into 
commission. Center of operations Adriatic east coast. 

3. All German PT boats ( 4 large, 8 small)- and 7 large and 
9 small" German motor minesweepers:, will be transferred 
from the Western Mediterranean to the Adriatic Sea over- 

Further transfer of some of these boats to the Agean Sea 
is reserved. 

One German 'mo't or minesweeper flotilla (11 lprge boats) 
will remain in the Western Mediterranean. Transfers will 
probably start on 6 Nov., one boat will be transferred 
. daily. 

4. In the Western Mediterranean as many Italian and French 
Warships as it will be possible to man will be put into 
commission (in the Italian area for the time being 5 tor- 
pedo boats and at Toiilon. 4 French fleet tenders). In add- 
ition captured vessels will be used to replace losses 
and in exchange for vessels less suitable." 

For- copy of teletype I. Ski I op 30089/43 Gkdos . see War Diary 
Part C, Vol. XIV. 

Ill, The decision reached by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff 

regarding -che withdrawal of naval gunners from the area 
of Admiral., Black Sea for reinforcement of the Adriatic 
Sea area (see War Diary 23 Oct.) which decision was 
forwarded to Army General Staff by the Liaison Officer 
to Naval Staff, reads as follows: 

"The withdrawal of naval gunners by Group South from 
the area of Admiral, Black Seas as reinforcement for 
the Adriatic Sea, where the number of personnel is 
inadequate, is in line with the demands' .'of- Naval Staff. 
However, the present situation in the area of the Crimea 
and the Sea of Asov permits only the withdrawal for the 
Adriatic coast of part of the navnl personnel which has 
become a va liable through changes in the front. Naval 
forces at present operating in the area of C-enichesk 
will not be withdrawn for the time being. ..Naval gunners 
who have up to now been brought up for manning Army coast' 
al batteries are, however, to be withdrawn; it must be 


as per I 

27 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL 

assured that equipment Is taken over by navel reserve 
forces and action readiness re-established as far as 
possible. " 

For copy of order l/skl I a 29393/^3 Ski Qu A II 
29883/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV. 

IV. Naval Intelligence Division, Enemy Situation Brancy 
reports in "Brief Intelligence on the Enemy Situation" No. 
21/43, amongst other matters on Anglo-American -warship 
operations during the action in the Gulf of Salerno. 
Naval Intelligence Division bases its information on a 
special report from Reuter which reads as follows: 

"At the opening of the attack in the Gulf of Salerno on 
Sept. 9 a strong Anglo-American naval force of more than 
500 vessels took part, from a 35,000 ton battleship down 
to small tugs. During the following days the fleet assisted 
the landing operations by fire of singular force and concen- 

Admiral Cunningham was in command of the fleet. Vice Admiral 
H. K. Hewitt of the U. S. Navy commanded the "Western Task 
Force" operating off the Salerno coast. 

The most formidable battle squadron ever to operate in 
the Mediterranean protected the landing operation in the 
Tyrrhenian Sea against attacks by surface forces. This 
force was under command of Sir Algernon Willis and consist- 
V and HOWE, the aircraft carriers ILLUSTRIOUS and FORMIDABLE, 
the cruisers AURORA, PENELOPE, SIRIUS and DIDO and numerous 
destroyers . 

Another Force under the command of Rear Admiral Sir Philip. 
Vian consisted of the small aircraft carriers UNICORN, HUNTER, 
BATTLER, STALKER, and ATTACKER and was escorted by the 

The "Westerm Task Force", responsible for the protection of 
the landing operation, was divided in two groups - the south- 
ern attack group commanded by the U. S. Rear Admiral J. L. 
Hall, Jr,i , and the northern attack group commanded by. the 
British Commodore G. N. Oliver. The southern group consisted 
of the U. S. cruisers PHILADELPHIA, SACANNAH and BOISE and 
18 destroyers; the second group consisted of the British 
cruisers MAURITIUS, UGANDA and ORION, the monitor ROBERTS 
and 20 destroyers. 


'Both groups were escorted" by a large number of minesweepers, 
which did splendid work by sweeping lanes in the heavily mined 


27 Oc t . 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

approach -waters for landing craft, troop and supply transports. 
They' cleared 135' mines during. the first four days of operation. 

Following their orders to attack without regard to losses or 
difficulties, the destroyers proceeded straight to the coast 
and attacked the coastal batteries at. close range* Numerous 
batteries were put out of action right at the beginning of 
the operation. In the following days almost* every one of the 
warships fired a large number of shells on the German coastal 
positions, The UGANDA fired 8l6 rounds of six-inch shells 
within 10 days, while the AURORA, PENELOPE, SIRIU3 and DIDO 
fired 5085 rounds in 14 days. 

The- battleships WAPSPITE a nd : VALIANT, which were freed through 
the capitulation of the Italian Fleet, arrived on 15 Sept. 
Of 30 15-inch shells which they fired on this day, 19 hit 
their targets. On the f ollowing da^ 16 direct hits were scored 
and 8 vere within a radius of '±00 meters, of the target. 

The American warships made similar efforts. The PHILADELPHIA 
fired 29^6 6-inch and il6l 5-incJi shells during the operation. 

The figures give only a slight Impression of the Intensity 
of bombardment and the deadly accuracy but ths;?e Is no ques- 
tion that this, bombardment was of immense importance "to the 
success of the operation. 

The Allied Fleet sustained losses, but t;he ris,k" taken is 
regarded as having been sufficiently justified, This operation 
was a ma gnif i c ent ' ' e.xa m£ le of the c cmr- J. e te c o - opera t i on of 
the British and Amrrlean Fleet in a joint action ..against the 
same target. " 

Naval Intelligence Division comments as' follows: • 

The above statements and other information obtained' from a 
reliable source reveal, the. following tactical formation of 
the naval forces -engaged in the landing operation at Salerno: 

Two groups of heavy naval forces operated under Admiral A. B. 

1. One group of battleships and aircraft carriers under Adm- 
iral Sir A. Willis, 

2. 'one glrcraft carrier group under Admiral Sir Ph. Vian 
both with anti-aircraft cruisers and "numerous ' destroyers as 
outer escort for the landing operation. 

The landing itself was carried out by the third group, the 


27 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

Task Force- 1 , under the U. S. Admiral H. K. Hewitt. The 
U. S. Aircraft tender BISCAYNE served as flagship of the 
"Western Task Force". Admiral Hewitt had two groups at 
his disposal: 

1. The northern group under the command of Commodore 
G. N. Oliver. 

2. The southern group under command of the U. S. 
Admiral J. L. Hall. 

The absence of the NELSON indivates that she was lying 
(damaged?) at some port (Malta?) at the time of the 
Salerno operation, since her departure from the Mediterranean 
has not yet been ascertained. 

The U. S. naval forces are combined in the 8th Fleet, with 
Fleet station in Algiers, as has now been ascertained. 

As regards the losses mentioned, so far only the loss of 
the U. S. destroyers BRISTOL and BUCK and of the British 
destroyer PANTHER have been reported by the enemy. 

The BRISTOL and the BUCK were probably lost through striking 
mines. The British have admitted the loss of the destroyers 
PANTHER and INTREPID and of the minelayer ABDIEL. The Poles 
have admitted the loss of the destroyer ORKAN. 

Situation 27 Oct. 

I. War in For e ign Waters 

I. Enemy Situation: 

A heavily escorted convoy carrying war materiel and 
food for Russia is scheduled to leave New York on 7 Nov., 
according to an intelligence report received via Portugal 
Escort forces are said to include two auxiliary aircraft 
carriers . 

On 22 Oct. eleven troop transports left Pensacola for England. 
The troops will be moved to southeast England by rail from 
ports of disembarkation on the west coast.. 

2. Own Situation: 


o n 

Naval Staff advised the Naval Attache in Tokyo by 
Radiogram 0100 as follows: 

II -T- 

I. Commanding Admiral, Submarines plans to have all MONSUN 




27 Oct. 1943 • CONFIDENTIAL _ 

submarines cell at Penang. No supply by the BRAKE. This 
ship is,' .however, to be kept in readiness for other tasfes . 
Nov "Schedule" -will follow. 

2. Submarines "Lueddem", "Schaeger" and •'iTunker" will 
arrive together at the rendezvous on 29 Oct. one hour after 
sunrise, according to the lates-t reports from these sub- - 
narines . 

3. You may .expect submarine U."533" (Henning) and submarine 

U "168" (Pich) on 5 NovV! •' ' ' • ■•■'■-<.. : 

II. Situation We s t Area 
■ £"'• Enemy Situation: 

Over the Bay of Biscay 51 planes were detected on 
operation. One British vessel saa located at 1153 in AL 
6389 end one at 2215 in BE 27^0. 

Our sir reconnaissance sighted at 1255 : in CP 9178 a north- 
bound convoy of 56 merchantmen escorted by 1 cruiser, 2 
destroyers and 4 escort vessels^ Speed 9 knots. There were 
2 destroyers on northwesterly course at 1135 In CF 9673 • 

2. Own Situation : ■; 

A tlantic Co a st: ■: • 

One submarine was escorted out from St. Nazaire. 

- Ch annel Goas-.t; .. . -■.•.-■.. 

+ - • . 

During the night of 26 Oct. from 23 10 to 0150 un- 
known enmey targets ■ were continuously located by radar in 
the area Fecamp to Oris Nez. Between 0235 and 02^5 an Army 
Battery fired three rounds on targets west of Fecamp, which 
withdrew northwest at high speed,. ''From 1358 to 1710; targets 
on alternating courses were again located in the sea area 
between Gris Nex-.and Calais in:. heavy fog. 

At 2237 an enemy vessel carrying radar was located north 
of Cherbourg proceeding on northerly course at medium 

Torpedo boat T"l4" arrived at Calais at 0250. The convoy of 
the ■ NORDVAAPJD put in to Dunkirk again at 2132 on 26 Oct. 
Torpedo boat 


27 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

T "14" and the convoy of the NORDVAARD are to go on 
eastward during the night of 27 Oct. 

Six nines with snag lines were swept between Nieiiport and 
Ostend. For brief report of Group West on the torpedo 
operation by the 2nd, 4th, 6th and 8th PT Boat Flotillas 
during the night of 2 4 Oct. see teletype 0336. Group 
West floses its report with the following estimate: 

"After midnight steady decrease of visibility towards 

the east, which hampered the operation considerable. 

The operation was entirely based on radio intercept reports; 

air reconnaissance could not be carried out owing to the 

enemy situation. Final conclusion arriver at is that the 

convoy was actually about 12 miles further north than 

assumed and moved in closer to shore before the attack 

by the 8th PT Boat Flotilla, or that this Flotilla was 

successfully driven off by destroyers." u 

For estimate of landing possibilities during the night of 
27 Oct, see teletype 1718. 

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters 

11 ' m tm ■ 1 ... ■ m ™-.m ■ ■■■■■■■■i n — «■ 1 ■■'■ — 1 ■■,! — - ■■ >. m 1 . 1 ■ 1 1^. — .. 1,1 — .^....— ■ 1 

North Sea : 

1. Enemy Situation: 

Our sir reconnaissance sighted at 0841 two landing 
craft in AN 4999/3777 and at 1305 one minelayer proceeding 
at high speed in AN 3780/90. Group North/Fleet believes that 
these vessels were probably sweeping a channel for a break- 
through by blockade runners, 

2. Own Situation: 

No shipping movements on account of heavy fog. 

Norway, Northern Waters : 

1. Enemy Situation: 

Over the North Sea 15 planes were detected on 
operation. Our Air reconnaissance sighted at 1140 in AB 
2549 (southwest of Spitsbergen) 1 cruiser and 1 merchant- 
man (5*000 GRT) on course 300 degrees, proceeding at 15 
knots. Three of our own submarines have been ordered to 
take up position against this unit off Ice Fjord. 


27 Oct.. 19^3. . CONFIDENTIAL 

2. Own Situation: 

In the area of Naval Command, Norway 32 ships 
were. escorted north and 15 south, Nineteen ships were 
delayed owing to shortage of escort. 

Submarine U "39V left Hammerfest on 25 Oct, for Hope 
Island with a weather detachement of the Air Force aboard. 

At 0409 the destroyer EEITZEN ran aground in the Karmsund 
two miles north of E_opervik. 

No salvage operations are possible yet owing to heavy 
south winds. Preparations have been made to bring up. .. .. 
tugs, lighters and a floating crane. 

Fighter procection has been promised, weather permitting. 
Destroyer Z "33''' is standing by the BEITZEN. For further 
particulars see teletypes 1750 and 1815, The damage was 
caused by faulty navigation. Group North/Fleet has submitt- 
ed an extract from the operational order of Admiral, North- 
ern Waters for minelaying operation "Katharine" c -This oper- 
ation is to be carried out by the 4th- -Destroyer Flotilla 
with four vessels between 27 Oct. and 3 ■Nov,- The barrage 
will be laid off Eanin Nos . For teletype regarding this, as 
per 1/Skl 3l82/ i J3 Gkdos . Chefs, see War Diary, Part C, Vol. 
Ila. : 

IV. Skagerrak, B altic Sea Entrances, Balt i c Sea 

I. Enemy Situation: 

Shelling of targets in Leningrad by'Army guns led 
to lively counter -fire which caused, however, only minor 
damage. At 0750a minesweeper group was sighted south of 
Lavansaari; this turned about presumably on account of the 

There was lively air activity over Tyters . At the front, 
operations by assault troops repulsed. 

From 1018 to 1158 20 bombers and 7 fighters attacked our 
barrage patrol between Tyters and Hogland in three waves. 
Casualties were sustained but no damage. 

2. Own Situation: 

In the Baltic Sea entrances 28 vessels were engaged on 


27 Oct. 1945 CONFIDENTIAL 

■ "^ ■■■■Ml II 

mines weeping operations and in the Baltic Sea J>6 vessels. 
One ELM/ J mine was swept southwest of Laesoe. Escort 
duty was carried out as planned and without incident. Mining 
of the area northwest of Schepel with TMB mines was carried 
out by five coastal minelayers. 

Battery "Prinz Heinrich" shelled the naval dockyard at 
Leningrad. Targets: four submarines and an aircraft 
carrier under construction. Our fire was shifted to the 
naval dockyard at Kronstadt when a smoke screen was put 
up at Leningrad. 

Dismantling of Battery "Prinz Heinrich" was started at 1200. 

V. Merchant Shipping {£ 

Information has been received from the Deputy f Q i« 
German Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean that German 
crews will be available for six ships weekly which can be 
moved back from Italian ports to southern France under 
escort. If these crews can be supplemented by Italians 
more ships can be transferred. German Naval Command, Italy 
has been instructed to investigate whether escort can be 
dispensed with, in order to assure a more 3peedy transfer, 
and to submit its plans after consultation with Group West. 

VI . Submarine Warfare 

Group "Siegfried" has been ordered to have 20 submarines 
In patrol line from BC 3^38 - 3849, 6222 - 6883, 9522 - 1882 
at 1000 on 29 Oct. 

Otherwise nothing special to report. 

VII. Aerial Warfare 

British Isles and Vicinity: 

The 3rd Air Force had 2h planes out on operation over 
the west area and two over the Mediterranean. There was also 
very little enemy air activity. Nothing special to report. 



27 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

Mediterranean Theater: 

Our own Air Force carried out reconnaissance operations ; - 
over the Italian area and the Aegean Sea , One enemy reconn- 
aissance plane "was shot down- over Kos . ■■ 

Eastern Front: 

The 5th Air Force carried out reconnaissance. For eval- 
uations see Situation North Sea and Northern Waters. In 
both cases contact could only be kept for a short time owing 
to strong anti-aircraft defense. A bomber mission was unsuccess 
ful since the target was not found again. 

VI II , Warfare in the Med i terranean and Black Sea 


I. Enemy Situation Mediterranean; 

A light French cruiser passed through the Straits 
of Gibraltar, westbound, at 0?45. Cape Spartel- sighted at 
1120 a convoy- of apparently 10 ships proceeding towards the 
Mediterranean. The following we're lying in Gibraltar at 
2O00' o'n-26 Oct.-: ■■''■ - ' '"' ! • 

1 cruiser in dock, 1 mine laying cruiser, 1 auxiliary cruiser, 
14 destroyers, 11 oorvettes, l hospital ship, 2, transports, 
including an Italian one, 41 freighters' and 8 tankers. 

At 1230 there were east of Maddalena 3. torpedo boats and 
4 patrol boats obviously oh minesw'eeping of the eastern 
barrage in the Strait of Bonifacio. 

Evaluation of photographic reconnaissance of 26 Oct. over 
Termoli shows 2 largo, 8 medium-sized and 20-30 small 
landing craft a3 well as 8 transports leaving port. An 
outflanking landing is considered possible. 

At 1245 there were between Ischia and Naples 3 destroyers 
on northerly course. 

At 1550 Gaeta was shelld from the sea. At 1357 20 miles south 
of the Straits of Messina 28-30 ships were sighted on course 
30 degrees. At noon our air reconnaissance sighted 75 miles 
north-northwest of Alexandria 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers or ' 
torpedo boats on course 160 degrees. 



According to an intelligence report via Portugal, British 
merchantmarine captains are of opinion that an attack on 
the Channel coast is not imminent but rather believe that 
operations in the Mediterranean "will be intensified. Strong 
formations of troops are said to be ready in Syria and, for 
these, transports and escort vessels are being assembeed at 
various ports in Libya, Egypt and Cyprus. 

It is furthermore reported that large quantities of war 
materiel are being assembled on Corsica, presumably for 
an operation against Southern France. 

2. Own Situation Mediterranean: 

German Naval Command, Italy is of opinion that 
experiences during the PT Boat thrust into the Gulf of 
Naples on 26 Oct. indicate excellent prospects of success, 
so that the withdrawal of PT Boats because of dwindling (f_ 

prospects in the open sea owing to the lack of reconnaissance 
does not seem justified. 

Six motor minesweepers and one naval landing craft carried 
out mine laying operations "Zange" and "Hornisse" according 
to plan, PT boats as escorts for operation "Zange" advanced 
so far as the Strait of Bonfacio dut did not not contact 
the enemy. 

Submarine U "565" sank an enemy destroyer with a "Zaunkoenig" 
torpedo in CJ 88^5. 

The hospital ships AQUILEJA and DJENNE left Barcelona in 
the eveningfor Marseilles. 

One submarine was escorted out of Toulon. . 

The Red Cross steamer PADURA struck a mine, most probably in 
our barrage, and sank at 0200 ten miles south of La Couronne 

while en route to Marseilles'. The steamer : did not follow course 
instructions . 

The convoy route between La Canarque and Marseilees has been 
closed as a precaution owing to suspicion of mines. 

German Naval Command, Italy asks for confirmation that it 
will be advised in time about the- operation by the 10th 
Italian PT boat Glotilia in connection with intelligence 
(see teletype 1830). This matter is being dealt with by 
Quartermaster Division. 



27 Oct. 1943 .CONFIDENTIAL 

3. : Area Naval Group South; ' '..■• 

a . Adria tic Sea : 

Contrary to the order given, the steamers MAMELLI, 
BRUNNER and MARKO left Dubrovnik for the north on 25 Oct. 
They were attacked by enemy planes and shelled from the 
island of Brae. The &AMELLI and the MARKO arrived .at Split 
on the morning of 26 Oct. with 12\C. and 25 -wounded.. The 
BRUMER continued her passage and is said to have entered a 
port of refuge 

Cn 24 Oct. the Fascist boat ENARE under the command of an 
Italian Major left Zara northbound, despite a warning issued 
by the Port Commander, and was lost. 

Mine-sweeping operations in the Fares ina Channel were dis- 
continued after a mine detonation. Two mines were swe:pt. 

Port Commands were established at Monfalcone, Pirano, 
Parenco, £lbona, Arsa and Rovigno. 

Naval 'Shore Commander, North Adriatic reports the setting 
up of five batteries of the 621st Naval Artillery Battalion 
at Polo, .Flume and Trieste. The batteries are only ready 
for action to a limited extent since there is no- fire con- 
trol and radar .gear. The five batteries at the ■three places 
mentioned are not manned. For particulars -see teletype 0724. 

b. Aegean Sea : 

En e my S i t ua ' t i on : 

A submarine 'was sighted at 1^40 on 26 Oct. 25 miles 
east of Sklathos. •' • ■ 

On the evening of 26 Oct. there were two vessels, presumably 
destroyers, north of Levitha on westerly course. 

At 0920 on 27 Oct. coast patrol boat GA "54" reported a 
submerging submarine northwest of Naxos . At IO56.GA "01" 
was unsuccessfully attacked by a submarine. Submarine. 
chase is being carried out. Our air- reconnaissance ■ 
sighted at 1155 1 cruiser, J> destroyers and 2 vessels, 
presumably torpedo boats, on : course 160 degrees; at 1235 
1 small cruiser and 1 destroyer- -were sighted on northerly 
course. .•..••'. - .. 


27 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

Own Situation: 

Evacuation of Gavods has been completed. The Naval 
Artilery Battalion on Stampalia reports one 7-6 cm. 
battery in action readiness. The tanker CELENO left Chalkis 
with 501 Italians aboard for Salonika. Other convoy traffic 
proceeded according to plan.- 

c. Black Sea : 

Enemy Situation: 

An intelligence report from an untried source 
dated 16 Oct. states that the Russians are making prepar- 
ations for a landing in the Crimea. These operations are to 
start after occupation of all routes leading through the 
•Nogai Steppe. Training of special troops' has been going on 
since February 19^3 at Sochi (main base?), Tuapse (fuel 
and supply base) a3 well as Gagry, Suchum, Pizunda , Laza- 
revsk, Kalinovya (ports of embarkation); the entire Black 
Sea Fleet is to participate. About 1,200 special landing 
craft of 5-10 tons, supplied by the United States, are ly- 
ing in readiness at Batum, Suchum, Sochi, Tuapse and 
Pizunda . In addition 300 landing craft for tanks and 
materiel. Four tankers have been converted into patrol 
vessels. About three . landing corps of altogether about 
10,000 men are on the vest coast of the Caucasus. Start 
of the operation is planned for the beginning of Oct. 19^5 • 

Naval Intelligence Division has summarized the information 
obtained on the tactical organization of the Russian Black 
Sea Fleet. For copy as per l/Skl 32631/43 geh. see War 
Diary, Part C, Vol. XlVa . 

Own Situation: . 

The tug BAIKAL capzized on Yalta roads owing to 
damage sustained in the a ir attack on 25 Oct. In the enemy 
air raids on Feodosiya at noon on 2.6 Oct. 2 of the 17 
attacking planes were shot down. On their return flight these 
planes attacked our convoy Cape Chauda - Feodosiya without 
much success. 

Submarine chase by Ship "19" and two boats of the 23rd 
Submarine Chaser Flotilla near Ak Mechet was without 
result. Two Italian midget submarines also returned to 
Sevastopol from an unsuccessful submarine chase off the 
south coast of the Crimea. 

Submarine U "18" left Constanta for operations on the 
afternoon of 27 Oct. Five naval landing, craft left Genichesk 
on the afternoon of 26 Oct. in order to evacuate the last 
troops from Biryutshi. 



27 Oct. 1943 .. CONFIDENTIAL 

Seven boots of the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla carried 
out a mine check in preparation for barrage "S 47". Four 
motor minesweepers and three naval landing "craft left 
Sevastopol fof Feodosiya m connection -with barrage oper- 
ation "S 73". 

No enemy vessels were sighted by our patrol lines off 
Genichesk and the Strait of Kerch during the night of 
26 Oct. 

The ALBERICH with five river motor minesweepers of the 
Danube Flotilla was sent back' to Belgrade by the Army on 
the evening of 26 Oct. after completion of the defense 
operations on the Sava. 

On 26 Oct. two towed convoys proceeding up the j^nube were 
fired on from short off Tachtalia. 

IC. S ituation East Asia 

According to an intelligence report, Colonel Mishina 
has declared from the Japanese Armed Forces Headquarters 
in China that the reinforcement of the Japanese Air Force 
in China which is necessary for combatting the U. S. Air 
Force is impossible, as demands are too great on other 


28 Oct. 19^3 . . ■ C ONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Political Importance 

Nothing special to report. 

Chief, Naval Staff returned from the Fuehrer Headquarters 

Conference 6n the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff 

■■ m ■ —■-■«., ■».,,■■■■.■ ■■■!■ ■ J ■ li - - i ■ — ■■—-■■ ■■. — ... ,. M .ii.ii — ill i i . • ■■■■■ i i—m . i. i. ■ ■ -ip ■■ !■ — .■ - i - 

I. Report on the conference with the Fuehrer on the 
situation in the Crimea at 16^0 on 27 Oct.: 

"The Fuehrer ordered this special conference to discuss the 
situation in the Crimea on account of a letter from Marshall 
Ant ones cu, the contents of which General Hansen transmitted 
in advance by teletype. Marshal Ant ones cu voiced his apprehen- 
sion about the threat to the Crimea and recommended immed- 
iate evacuation since he places small confidence in his 
Rumanian troops. :: . ' . 

Chief, Army General Staff reported briefly on the situat- 
ion in the southern sector of the easte'rn front: 

There are prospects of sealong off the enemy's penetration 
near Melitopol. To do so, additional forces are being brought 
up from the Crimea . 

The situation at Krivoi Rog was 011I5 lightly touched on with 
the remark that there were no vital changes since the last 
report made at noon today. It was rnentionnned that eight 
divisions are being brought up; this will take some time. 

The fact that the Army Group A consider an immediate evuc- 
uation of the Crimea overland advisable was not clearly 
expressed. General Zeitzler reported that there is enought 
ammunition in the Crimea to last about two to four weeks ' 
depending on the scale of the fighting to be expected. The 
forces can live off the land to a large extent. 

In response to a question by the Fuehrer, Chief, Naval Staff 
reported by means of a chart on the strength of our naval 
forces and shipping available in the Black Sea. It was point- 
ed out that only a part of the naval forces mentioned is 
always In readiness. 

The loading capacity of the naval landing craft for sea trips 
was given as 200 men with small arms and baggage, I.e. that 
50 naval 




28 Oct. 19*0 CONFIDENTIAL 

landing craft, the number which at present can be assumed 
as an average in sailing readiness, -will be able to trans- 
port 10,000 men. A crossing to ports in Rumania requires 
l£ days, a round-trip therefore at least four days. In 
addition to the naval landing' craft, steamers are available 
with a capacity again of approximately 10,000 men. 

Russian destroyers have penetrated into the Western Black 
Sea and submarines are operating there regularly. The enemy 
Air Force is the main peril to our sea transports. This 
threat -will increase as soon as Russian planes can take off 
from the area north of the Crimea. Anti-aircraft armament on 
naval lending craft is to be reinforced, above all with 
quadruple guns which will become available after submarines 
are equipped with the 3.7 cm. guns. In reply to the remark by 
the Reichsmarschall that additional shipping, for instance 
on theDanube, could be made available further investiget- . 
ions were promised. 

The Fuehrer's considerations: 

1. Evacuation of the Crimea will have unpredictable polit- 
ical and military significance. The Russians will move 300- 
400 kilometers nearer to the Rumanian oilfields. Shortening 
of the front will not entail saving fo troops, since expan- 
sion of the defense of the Rumanian and Bulgarian coasts 
will become necessary. The Crimea can anyway be held if the 
pocket at Krivoi Rog can be eliminated; if not, evacuation 
overland is uncertain. All considerations must therefore be 
directed to an evacuation by see. An order for evacuation 
will cause the Rumanian troops to lose their power of resist- 

The Fueher ' s order : 

- r - ■ iVS . .i , iii. 

2. All naval forces are to be made ready for defense of 
the Crimea and shipping for • transports (from or to the 
Crimea according to the situation) and all preparations 
are to be made. Do not. arouse unrest amongst the troops 
through advance orders. 

Receipt of the letter from Marshal Antonescu, which is 
expected on 28 Oct., is to be awaited. Another reason why 
any order for evacuation which may become necessary need 
not be issued today is because the railroads in the Crimea 
are busy for the next 2-3 days in moving our troops. 

In- the discussion which followed, the Fuehrer, Commander 
in Chief, Navy and the Reichsmarschall expressed their views 
on the importance of the Crimea and the possibility of 
holding it and bringing up supplies. Chief, Army General 
Staff concurred. The Reichsmarchall asked how the situation 


28 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

with the Central Army Group had developed. When General 
Zeitzler replied that the tension there had decreased, 
the Reichsmarschall promised the transfer of air forces 
from this sector to the area of Army Group South for 
attacks on shipping targets. 

Chief, Operations Branch telephoned from Fuehrer Head- 
quarters and advised Chief of Staff, Naval Staff about 
the above decision. Instructions were then passed on by 
telephone to Group South by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff. 

During the evening situation co nference at 2200 the question 
of the Crimea was discussed further along the same lines. 

Following a report by Chief, Operations Staff, Armed Forces 
High Command on a projected directive regarding strengthen- 
ing of defense on the northwest coast of France, the Fuehrer 
asked when the heavy battery of Cherbourg is expected to be 
completed. Commander in Chief, Navy stated in reply that the 
date set so far was 1 Feb., but that completion will be 
speeded up. Chief, Operations Staff, Armed Forces High 
Command emphasised that all measures here must be completed 
by the end of January." 

II. The following report was received last night from 
Group South: 


I. A week ago Army Group A ordered a "study" to be drawn 
up on the evacuation of the Crimea in two hypothetical 

a. Economic and materiel evacuation; 

b. Evacuation of personnel and Its tactical exectuion. 

The 17th Army Command handed the completed study on *— 
24 Oct. to Admiral, Black Sea. 

In the first case evacuation of materiel is provided 
within four weeks without any changes in the fronts. 
In the second case, which may be ordered or become 
necessary through enemy pressure, the following is 
planned: 36 hours for the evacuation of the eastern 
front of the Kerch peninsula . Three days for with- 
drawal to the Parpatsch line, two days for the evacu- 
ation of the southern and southeastern part of the 
Crimea, including Sevastopol, and three days for with- 
drawal over the Perekop Isthmus. In all ten days. 

In the latter case only troops with equipment and such 
materiel as they themselves can carry will be withdrawn. 
Evacuation by sea is limited since Sevastopol will soon 
no longer ae available and the Eupatoria roads and the 
bay of Ak Mechet, both rather unsuitable for only three 
days more. 




28 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

The Army is therefore not reckoning on evacuation by 
sea; this will he available only to the Navy. 

3, The Navy recommended evacuation by sea instead of via 
Perekop. This -would necessitate a step-by-step with- 
drawal of the Army to the bridgehead at Sevastopol 
Evacuation of 210,000 men with all shipping available 
in the Black Sea would require five to six weeks. The 
Army believes it impossible to hold Sevastopol that long 
with the available two German and seven Rumanian div- 
isions, the latter rather unreliable, and therefore 
adheres to withdrawal via Perekop. 

4. The Navy will make preparations for evacuation along 
the following lines: 

a. Transfer of flotillas to ports on the west coast. 

b. From shore units, the personnel of port commanders 
and the crews of batteries, after demolishing these will 
be combined in battle units, They will be made partially 
mobile with naval vehicles available in the Crimes and 
will be attached to Army Units. The romaineder will be 
evacuated by sea. Since political and currency questions 
have not yet been settled, shore units will be withdrawn 
to inland places in Rumania and Bulgaria or perhaps to 
home territory; they will then be sent for new oper- 
ations to the Adtiatic and Aegean Seas or to the Ruman- 
ian and Bulgarian coasts after the political question has 
been settled. 

c. Quartermaster Division, Admiral, Black Sea will be trans- 
ferred in this case to Constanta in order to control 
withdrawal movements. The command post of Admiral, 
Black Sea will also be moved to Constanta, as Nikola yev 
is unfavorably situated and the remaining naval oper- 
ations on the west coast can best be controlled from 
there with the front towards the east. 

d. The vessels operating in the Sea of Asov can probably 
not be withdrawn. These are to carry out patrol duty" 
during the evacuation of the Crimea. The crews are 
then bo blow up their vessels and attache themselves 
to the .Army. 

e. The Reinforced Frontier Guard Control Service (Coastal), 
the Black Sea Legion and Foreign Volunteers will be 
transferred to the Adriatic Sea. 


28 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

5. The present situation is marked by: 

a. The assembly of landing craft opposite Kerch and 
moving up by the enemy of heavy guns under cover of 
smoke . 

b. The break-through of Melitopol on 25 Oct. The enemy 
is now 60 kilometers from Genichesk. The Biryutshi 
Peninsula was evacuated on the night of 26 Oct. 

c. The enemy spearhead from the break-through at 
Deepropetrovsk is 120 kilometers from Nikola yev. 

6. Owing to the events at the front Army Group A ordered 
at noon on 26 Oct. that evacuation according to the 
second plan be started on 27 or 28 Oct. Admiral, Black 

Sea therefore ordered the concentration of all shipping C 
at Sevastopol. A telephone conversation with the Naval 
Loaison Officer to High Command, Army showed that comp- 
lete evacuation of the Crimea is not yet contemplated 
according to the situation as estimated there. A report 
from Admiral, Black Sea received in the evening stated 
that Army Group A had canceled the order for Plan No. 2 
and had ordered preparations for commencement of Plan 
No. 1. Admiral, Black Sea therefore canceled the orders 
for the assembly of shipping. 

7. Shipping will be provided for the evacuations from the 
Crimea which will now become necessary. In addition to 
this, steamers will be transferred from, the Aegean Sea 
to the Black Sea, Evacuation of naval materiel will 

• start at once. 

8.. Clarification is again urgently requested of the ^ 

political question regarding withdrawal into Rumanian 
"and Bulgarian territory." 

III., In view of the situation arising from the discussion 
held at the Fuehrer Headquarters, Chief, Naval Staff 
has ordered that the following clear and definite 
instructions be despatched to Group South and Admiral, 
.Black Sea with a copy to Armed Forces High Command . ■ 
Operations Staff, Navy:- 

"I. The Crimea is of special political and military Importance: 
as a cornerstone of the eastern front and as an advance 
position off the Balkan coast. Rumania and also the 
..alkan area is defended on the Crimea.. Evacuation of the 
penisuia will not shorten the front, since Russian pressure 
will force us to build up defense of the entire Rumanian 

C oa s t . 


28 Oct.. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

A Russian advance by a further 300 to 400 kilometers to 
the Rumanian oilfields, which are essential for -warfare 
in Europe, will be very disadvantageous. - 

2. The Crimea will not have to be given up. if the eastern 
front can be held in the sector Krovoi Rog - Melitopol. 
If the Russian break-through cannot be stopped, the poss 
ibility of evacuation and the supply by land is doubtful 
It seems possible to re-establish the southern sector 
of the eastern front by bringing up Army and Air Force 
reinforcements . 

3. According to 20, all considerations with regard to trans 
.ports from, and to the Crimea must be based exclusively ■ 

on the sea route. Further advice on transport require- 
ments for maintenance of supplies by sea will follow. In 
this connection it is particularly emphasized that there 
is no intention of evacuation at present and that no 
order has as yet been received. Nothing but the usual;;- 
economic goods are to be evacuated from the Crimea - • 
also in order to avoid the idea of evacuation taking 
hold of the troops prematrrely and causing alarm. On 

. the contrary, commands, naval snd shore units must be 
';-•' fully aware of the fact that the Crimea is a vital 
position for defense of the Balkans and demands of 
everybody all-out action and devotion in the battle for 
this strategically important target. Gaining time can 

• • also be decisive." 

For relevant orders l/Skl 3200 and 3205/ i O Gkdos . Chefs, 
See War Diary, Part C, Vol. XlVa . 

IV. High Command, Army, Army General Staff, Na val . Lia is on • 
and Commander in Chief, Air' Force^ Operations Staff, Naval 
Liaison, have been informed of the above order and the former 
requested, to submit as soon as possible information on the 
requirements of the Army General Staff for supplies to the 
Crimea by sea. 

Furthermore-Chief, Naval Staff ordered that such personnel of 
the. naval artillery battalions as have not yet been withdrawn 
to the Adriatic Sea are to remain in. the Crimea as long as 
evacuation has not been decided on definitely. Though build- 
ing-up of coastal defense in the Adriatic Sea is urgent, the 
Crimean fortress should in no way be weakened just at this 
moment. Operations Division will communicate at once by phone 
with Admiral, .:*aiack Sea in order to establish the position 
with regard to withdrawal and transmit new orders. 

V. Since Field Marshal Kesselring will remain in command 
in Italy and Field Marshal Rommel will relinquish command 


28 Oct, 1943 CONFIDENTIA L 

of Army Group B., it will be necessary for German Naval 
Command, Italy to move its headquarters back again to the 
vicinity of Commanding General, Armed Forces South. 

VI, . Report by Chief, Naval Intelligence Division: 

a. The German Legation at Bern reported to the Foreign 
Office on 23 Oct. : 

"A report from the Swiss Legation in London confirms that 
no Allied landing on the Balkans was carried out because 
tee Soviet Union handed Great Britiin and the United States a 
note stating that an Allied invasion of the Balkans would bo 
regarded by the Soviet .Union as an unfriendly ect. The United 
States Government, is said to have regarded this note as an 
unpardonable interference' with Allied strategy and shown its 
annoyance.. The U. S. Government is said, however, to have 
agreed at the request of Great Britian to await the outcome 
of the Three Power Conference in Moscow' before deciding on 
an invasion. 

The above report is of special interest inasmuch as it comes 
from Eden's private secretary." 

b. ^According to information available to Naval Intell- 
igence-Division, the enemy hss kO ships in sailing readiness, 
with, a total tonnage of approximately 88,000 GRT, in the 
Black Sea; these could transport in landing operations about 
40,000 men with light equipment or 9,000 men with heavy equip- 

Special Items: ■„ 

I. Air Force Command, Center in agreement with Quartermaster 
Division, Naval Staff, has recommended to Commander in Chief, 
Air Force, Operations Staff, that command of all air defense 
forces in the area of Gdynia - Danzig be made the responsibili 
ty of the Navy. This would mean that all air defense forces 
stationed in Danzig would in every respect be placed under 
naval command as regards operations. Naval Staff has requested 
for this purpose the earliest possible use of anti-aircraft 
searchlights, in order to build up a complete searchlight 
system in. the area of . Gdynia - Danzig for night fighter oper- 
ations . '. ■ 

Air observation Center, Danzig and Gdynia will be combined 
under operational command of the Naval Air Obsrrvation Center, 
Gdynia. It will be impossible' to establish floating obser- 
vation posts, as personnel and materiel are not available. 





28 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

II. Chief, Security Police, Paris reports to Operations 
Division that the Italian steamers INDUSTRIAL, MARINA and 
SULBIA, now at Vigo, plan to desert to the enemy. He 
recommends that efforts be made to induce the captains, who 
are said to be open to bribery, to proceed to French ports. 

Operations Division immediately informed the Naval Attache 
in Madrid with the order to make use of all facilities to 
bring these ships into the German sphere of influence or 
to prevent their desertion to the enemy. 

For order l/skl 30170/43 Gkdos . see War Diary, Part C, 
Vol. XI. 

III. On 26 Oct. a discussion took place between Chief of 
Staff, Naval Staff and Vice Admiral £be , dealing mostly 
with the situation in the Mediterranean. The Japanese 
Admiralty is at present especially interested in information 
on the movements of enemy battleships and requests Naval 
Staff to use its available facilities for this purpose. 

Notes on this discussion as per l/skl I K 3193/43 Gkdos. 
Chefs, in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XV. 

IV. The following radiogram w^s received on 27 Oct. from 
the Naval Attache in Madrid: 

"The Spanish Foreign Minister has advised our Ambassador 
of secret information indicating an imminent Anglo-American 
landing In Southern France and at the same time on the 
Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts. Similar rumors are circu- 
lating here. If the British should actually plan this, the 
speech by Smuts and rumors emanating from various enemy 
sources, according to which the Allies will be unable to 
start an invasion before next spring, could be intended 
merely as a deception." 


Situation 28 Oct . 

I . War In Foregin Waters 

1. Enemy Situation: 
Nothing special to report. 

2. O wn Situation: 

The Naval Attache in Tokyo has received orders for 


2 3 Oct. 1943 CONF IDENTIAL 

submarine "Dommes" to report the nature and weight of the 
keel ballast. 

The following instructions have been despatched to the Naval 
Attache in Tokyo in connection with the loss of Ship "28":. 

"I. Proceedure by "senior officer only" regarding Ship 
"28" is canceled. For the time being despatch all communicat- 
ions exclusively to Operations Division. 

2. No permission to be granted survivors to send telegrams 
or to telephone him. 

3. What in your opinion are the chances of keeping this 
incident secret? Is it considered certain that the submarine 
took prisoners aboard? Are circles other- than the Navy 
concerned in caring for the survivors? 

4. What rescue operations did the Japanese Navy carry out? 
What are the chances of success for a further search, consid- 
ering weather conditions, sea, etc.? 

5. a). From what time was ship "28" supposed to start anti- 

submarine measures? . 

b) What Japanese measures were provided and from when? 
Bringing- in a large Japanese submarine through the 
Bay of Biscay is regarded as a major operation here, 
entailing use of all available escrrt forces. The - 
lack of Japanese escort incomprehensible here. 

6. Please cable as soon as possible n^mes of survivors 
and brief report on her cruise and successes." 

II. Situation West Area: 

I. Enemy Situation: 

Over the Bay of Biscay 27 British planes were 
observed on operation. The convoy reported on 27 Oct. was 
again located at 1053 in CF 5368, consisting of 60 merchant- 
men, 5 escort vessels and 1 cruiser. The following were a Is 
sighted: at O83O in BE 9293 2 landing craft with 2 escort 
vessels on northerly course; at 1551 in BF 2524 2 cruisers 
on northerly course; at 1556 in BF 2299 1 cruiser on north- 
westerly course. 

Heavy detonations were repeatedly heard In the afternoon on 
the English Channel coast. 


28 Oct. 1943 CONFIDE NTIAL 

Between 1119 and 1219 targets were located off Calais and 
Boulogne in heavy fog wnd were shelled by our batteries 
without the effect being observed. Between 2125 and 2236 
targets were located east of Alderney. 

2. Own Situation: 

A tlantic Coast: 

Two submarines were escorted in and one out. 
For estimate of landing possibilities see teletype 1700.. 

Channel Coast : 

Patrol positions were not taken up because of fog* 

.m Between 0353 and 0355 two harbor defense boats off Zeebrugge 

had a brief engagement with an enemy PT boat which withdrew 
after hits had been observed (see teletype 1300). 

The convoy of the steamer NORDVAARD and torpedo boat T "14" 
was forced by fog to return to port immediately after depart- 
ure on the evening of 27 Oct. 

Torpedo boat T"l4" and six boats of the 4th Motor Minesweeper 
Flotilla continued their passage east on the evening of 28 
Oct. as far as Dunkirk. 

PT boats S "100" and S "141" left Cherbourg at 1845 for 


III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters 

N orth Sea : 

Off Terschelling and Texel altogether four ground 
mines were swept. 

Fog prevented the convoy of the steamer NORDVARRD proceeding 
from Dunkirk to Flushing as planned. All minesweeping oper- 
ations a d other convoys as well as patrol operations during 
the night also had to be canceled because of the fog. Channels 
were swept during the day as planned and convoys in the 
Heligoland Bight carried out. The suspicion of sabotage on 
the harbor defense boat which sank at Dordrecht has not been 
confirmed. The boat was swamped and sank due to a faulty 


28 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL 

With reference' to the situation report of Naval Command, 
Baltic dated 23' Oct.' regarding attacks on nine Danish 
fishing vessels on the Dogger Bank, "-Naval Command, North 
points "out that the order issued on 25 May 1943 by Comm- 
ander in Chief ; Air Force,. Operations Staff, at the insti- : 
gation of Naval Staff, is still in force. In this "the 
attacks originally ordered on Danish fishing vessels encoun- 
tered in the closed areas in the North Sea are to be discon- 
tinued for the time being." (see teletype 1230). 

Naval Command, North requests Group North/Fleet, with copy 
to Naval Command, Baltic, to draw the attention of units 
under its command again to this order. 

In connection with the assumption by Group North/Fleet that 
the enemy vessels reported on 27 Oct. in the central North 
Sea might have been engaged in mines weeping on our "West 
Wall", Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North reports that 
laying of enemy barrages as an eastern flanking protection > 
for a swept channel is also not out of question. 

Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North requests in this 

a. effective air patrol of the "West Wall" 

, b. • closing of the : "West Wall" area to fishing 

c. granting permission to the Air Force to attack 
. . ■••. all vessels encountered in the declared area 

d. strengthening of the "West Wall" in the area of 
Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North through laying 

a new barrage "158" north or northwest as an addition 
to barrages "14 A" or "15 A". 

Finally, Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North draws attention 
to the report of Admiral, Denmark of 23 Oct. concerning the 
departure of nine fishing smacks from Tyboroen towards AN 
6238, _in order to search for a missing smack,. since this 
might have some connection with the reported enemy mine- 
sweeping acticity. (see teletype 1240). 

Group North/Fleet comments on the above as follows: 

"I. The assumption of - Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North 
that the enemy acticity of the "West Wall" observed on 
27 Oct. (probably minesweeping) was connected with the 
laying of enemy barrages as flanking protection for the 
channels swept by the enemy, is not out of the question. 
However, the procedure bj the enemy, who stayed for at 
least five hours by daylight in the mined area, rather 



28 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

indicates minesweepigg. This, however does not exclude 
the possibility that enemy mine laying operations are 
being cariied out at night still further east as far 
as our sea lanes. Anyway this must also be reckoned 
■with now, after the discovery of the enemy's gap in 
the barrage. The Group has therefore asked Naval Staff 
for permission to lay new barrages in order to restore 
the "West Wall" in this important area. Uncertainty 
about the situation regarding enemy mine laying will make 
it necessary for us to search our own minelaying courses 
first of all. 

2. Air patrol of the "West Wall" has not only been .requested 
by Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North but also contin- 
uously by all other Commands interested. The lack of 
planes and the fuel situation, however, do not permit 
such patrol. Fonstant observation of the English ports 

on the east coast in order to recognize plans for land- 
ing in good itime is also impossible. Group North/Fleet 
therefore does not believe that enemy plans for landingw 
will be recognized in time. The defensive power of the 
"West Wall" is also from now on an uncertain factor, 
unless the position of the enemy's barrage gap can be 
ascertained, either accidentally through mines which 
have drifted or through enemy minesweeping activity 
which may be observed. Since defensive barrages, such 
as the "West Wall" are only of value as long as they 
can be patrolled and controlled, it is obvious that we 
should give up the plan of reinforcing or restoring 
the "West Wall" at all points where continuous patrol 
is impossible. At first, however, Group North/Fleet 
is of opinion that the barrages should be replaced 
at least where enemy activity has been recognized, 
especially off the Skagerrak, where enemy minesweeping 
activitymay be closely connected iith the sailing of 
blockade-runners . 

3. Group North/Fleet does not believe that systematic 
Danis minesweeping of German barrages is being carried 
out, especially as the sweeping of these, which has now 
been been detected, requires special gear and experience. 
Considering the situation in the North Sea there is no 
reason for the British to make use of Danish fishing 
boats, which are without experience and inadequate for' 
such important tasks as the clearing of gaps. Everything 
considered, Group North is of opinion that it is 

just if labl - to take food economy into consideration. 

Norway, Northern Waters 
I. Enemy Situation: 


28 Oct. -1945; CONFIDENTIAL 

-Over- the North Sea 20 planes were detected on operation. 
On- 27 Oct. three single planes flew into the areas of 
Stavanger and Bergen without carrying out attacks* 

Out air reconnaissance, flown on an increased scale for 
.operation "Katherina" which started today,- sighted at 1050 
and at 1130 in AC 6786 a unit of 2 cruisers, 9 destroyers 
and 11 minesweepers on easterly course, speed probably 
10 knots. Further reports show that the composition of this 
unit is not quite certain since later on only 9 destroyers 
and 5 motor gunboats, but no cruisers, were reported. Anoth- 
er report mentions 9 destroyers and 6 patrol vessels. The 
unit put up a snoke screen when our plenes approached and 
tried to ward' off our contacting planes by heavy anti-air 
craft fire and the use of flying boats. 

2. Own Situation: 

Group North/Fleet gave the following estimate of 
the situation at 1700: 

"The information so far received about the enemy forces 
reported- today in AC 6786 at 1050 and at 1130 does not 
yet clearly reveal the aim and the destination of the 
enemy movements . If the unit actually only consisted' of 
2 cruisers and 9 destroyers (British) on easterly course, 
it is - assumed that it is to bring in a convoy from Russia 
to England. If it also- included patrol vessels or mine- 
sweepers, the transfer of a minesweeper unit to Russian 
waters is possible. The cruising disposition and' the fact 
that no vessels were reported in the vicinity of this unit 
justify the assumption that this was not a convoy oper- 
ation. A report about a cruiser and a merchantman in AB 
2548 at 1130 on 27 Oct. might perhaps have some connection 
with todays sighting report. It is possible that this was 
a supply group for the force located today and was proceed- 
ing to a waiting position further away when sighted. It is 
possible that there will be a similar supply operation on 
return passage. Considering the present situation, patrol 
of Ice Fjord is of secondary importance. Our submarines 
are returning to the Bear Island position. Operation 
"Katharina" has been called off. The Group attaches special 
importance t.o reconnaissance for the force located today and, 
if possible, also for the small enemy group sighted on 27 
Oct. in the vicinity of Spitsbergen and west thereof." 

In accordance with instructions received from Group North, 
Admiral, Northern Waters at 1520 gave orders to the 4th 
Destroyer Flotilla to discontinue operation "Katharina" 
and to proceed to Kaa Fjord via AC 7222. The 4th Destroyer 
Flotilla was at 1100 approcima tely in AL 4940 about 240 
miles west of the reported enemy. Our submarines 




28 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

"were moved from the entrance of Ice Fjord to the operation 
area Bear Island - southern point of Spitsbergen. For sit- 
uation estimate of Admiral, Northern Waters on the calling - 
off of operation "Katharine" see teletype 2359. 

The lack of adequate air reconnaissance, brought to light 
once more by the above incident, is important for an estim- 
ation of the situation in Northern Waters. If an enemy force 
is only detected when it has come almost within tactical range 
of our own naval forces, our operations would no longer be 
justified at all according to the general principles of 
naval warfare. Actually we know nothing of what is taking 
place or has taken place in the area between Scotland, 
Spitsbergen and the Arctic coast, as our air reconnaissance 
can give us only occasional information obtained by chance. 

All attempts to tow the destroyer BEITZEN off have so far 
failed. It will be necessary to lighten her as much as 
possible and to assure her buoyance before towing-off oper- 
ations can be continued. Group North/Fleet advises Naval 
Staff for information of the instructions issued for the 
transfer of the destroyer STEINBRINCK, with Commander, 
Destroyers aboard, and of destroyer Z "34" from Kiel to 
the northern ares. This unit will sail from Kiel at 0500 
on 1 Nov. 

It is still undecided whether destroyer Z "38" is to join 
this group from Bergen. For particulars see teletype 1701, 

In the area of Naval Command, Norway 44 ships were escort- 
ed north and 15 south. Shortage of escorts delayed 21 ships. 

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea 

1. Enemy Situation : 

A service club for the German Armed Forces in Cop- 
enhagen was destroyed at 2000 on 27 Oct. through sabotage, 
Three Germans were killed and 18 including 2 sailors wounded. 

In the areas of Admiral, Baltic States and Commander, 
Minesweepers, Baltic the situation remains unchanged. 

2. Own Situation : 

Two ground mines were swept west of Cape Kullen. 
Submarine chase was carried out northwest of Revalstein 
without success. Otherwise nothing special to report. 


28 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTI AL 

V. Merchant Shipping 

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Quartermaster 
Divisi tij has approved the plan to return the French merchant- 
men to the French Government, especially since they are un- 
suitable. The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping has 
been asked to arrange the necessary formalities -with the 
French Government and to see that these vessels are safeguarded 
in such a way, even after they have been handed over to the 
French Government, that they can be placed at our disposal 
whenever required. 

The Navy has been asked to prevent the possibility ■ of the 
ships deserting to the enemy while being transferred and 
while laid up. German Naval Command, Italy reports on in- 
quiry from the Naval Staff that: 

"I. Investigations are being made to ascertain how many 

merchantmen can be transferred to Southern France and 
from which ports. Details -will follow. ••■ 

2. Transfer will be greatly hampered through the f£:rst 

withdrawal of technical personnel for the Aegean Sea by 
the Deputy for German Sea. Transportation in the Mediterr- 
anean. Approval was not given from here, since it is 
almost impossbile to carry out our own tasks. It is 
therefore requested that the Deputy be induced not 
to withdraw technical personnel until the valuable 
merchantmen have been transferred." 

VI, Submarine Warfare 

The convoy expected by Group "Schill" was sighted by 
our air reconnaissance in CF 5368 on northerly course. 

Anti-aircraft submarine U "256". escorting submarine -tanker 
U "220" reported an attack by severll carrier-borne planes 
from BD 4520. 

The antiraft carrier station in BD has effectively hampered 
our supply operations lately. Submarine -tanker UT "488" was 
attacked four times within two weeks with bombs and once with 
depth charges. No reports have been received from two of the 
submarines of the supply group. 

No reports on successes have been received. 



28 Oct. 19^3 C ONFIDENTIAL 

VII. Aerial Warfare 

B ritish Isles and Vicinity: 

The 3rd Air Force had 17 planes out on operation over 
the west area and 8 over the Mediterranean. 

A Liberator plane escorting a convoy 450 miles vest of Lisbon 
■was attacked four times by a FW 200 and driven off into the 
clouds . 

The enemy raided Cherbourg during the day. Damage vas done 
to buildings in the arsenal. Four of the attacking plenes 
•were shot down. 

Northing special to report during the night. 

Lively courier traffic by air between England and Sweden 
continues . 

Mediterranean Theater: 

The 2nd Air Force carried out reconnaissance over the 
Italian coastal area. The enemy attacked three airfields in 
the Viterbo area. Two of the attacking planes were shot down. 
Our casualties snd damages were slight. 

Air Force Command, Southeast carried out reconnaissance over 
the southern part of the Aegean Sea and in the direction of 
the eastern Mediterranean. In the afternoon a unit of three 
merchantmen with one escort vessel was sighted east of 
Castell Rosso. One steamer (4,000 GRT) out of this unit was 

In aerial combat between Scarpanto and Rhodes between 
4 Me 109' s and 3 Maryland plnnes all of the latter were 
shot down. 

Four Ju 88's heavily damaged a merchantman near Pathmos. 

Eighteer enemy places machine-gunned Stampalia. In the 
evening bombs were again dropped on the airfield of Maritza 
on Rhodes, One Ju 8? was damaged. 

Eastern Front: 

No special reports were received from the Black Sea 
area and from the Gulf of Finland. 

Missions flown by the 5th Air Force oyer the Northern Waters 
are reported under "Enemy Situation, Northern Waters". 


28 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL 

VIII. Warefare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea 

1. "Enemy Situation Mediterranean; 

The convoy of 7 freighters and 3 escorts, reported 
off Cape Spartel at noon on 27 Oct., entered Gibraltar. At 
2000 on 27 Oct. 6 ships left Gibraltar for the Atlantic, 
including presumably 1 destroyer. At 2100 on 27 Oct. a 
convoy, presumably. consisting of 20 ships, passed through 
the Straits of Gibraltar, eastbound. 

At noon on 28 Oct. .6 loaded troop taansports, including 1 
Italian transport, escorted by 1 auxiliary cruiser and 3 
destroyers, left Gibraltrr for the Mediterranean. 

At 0400 a supply convoy of 30 to 40 ships -with escort vessels 
was sighted 40 miles south of Naples, making for this port. 
The following were sighted: 

In Bastia at noon, 2 freighters, 1 tanker, 3 crash boats 
and 1 motor gunboats; 

Olbia 4 freighters: 

Naples 3 destroyers, 4 escort boats, 4 "patrol boats or 

minesweepers, 1 submarine, 4 tankers, 49 freighters, 
1 LST, 2 LCT's "250" and 5 LCT's. 

2. Own Situation Mediterranean: 

Convoy traffic on the west coast of Italy was 
carried out according to plan. Three PT boats were trans- 
ferred from Via Reggie to Civitavecchia for new operations. 
At Spezia a 15.2 cm. battery has been repaired and four other 
guns are ready for action. 

Contrary to previous assumptions, the minelayer JUMINDA was 
not sunk by an enemy submarine but by PT boats on 24 Oct. ' 
near San Stefano. It is to be deplored that her distinguished 
commander, Lt . Cdr. Brill, lost his life in this action. 

The hospital ships DJENNE and AQUILEJA arrived at Marseilles 
from Barcelona . 

3 . Area Naval Group South : 
a . Adriatic Sea : 

According to an Army report eleven unidentified 
vessels passed six miles off Valona at 1600 on northerly 

The steamer BRIMMER entered Sibenik on 26 Oct. The steamers 
MAMELLI and MARKO, which left Split for Trieste at 0300 on 


28 Oct.- 1943- ■ C ONFIDENTI AL 

27 Oct. were fired on in the Drvenic Channel, The MARKO 
returned to Split because of heavy damage. The whereabouts 
of the MAMELLI are still unknown. Traffic for large ships 
between Valona and Dubrovnik is temporarily closed unitl 
its safety can be assured. It has now been reported that 
the steamer MARCELLA (3,08l CRT) was' sunk by bombs on 
31 Oct. (obviously 13 Oct. - Tr. N.), and that the steamer 
MERANO (3,704 GRT) and the tanker POCARICA (7,884 GRT) were 
seized by enemy naval forces during the night of 15 Oct. 

In the area of Cattaro four 15 cm., two 8.35 cm. and three 
7.6 cm. guns manned by Arm, Personnel are reported in 
action readiness. 

According to information from Group South, intelligence 
reports dated 21 and 23 Oct., have been received indicat- 
ing that a landing in the sector of Split from the island of 

^ Brae is planned for the last days of October. On 16 Oct. 

™ five British were observed in Trogir. Group South has order- 
ed Admiral, Adriatic to take any detense measures which are 
possible with the existing limited facilities and has request' 
ed Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean to investigate the 
possibility of operations by submarine "453" for reconnaiss- 
ance and attacks on the enemy (see teletype 1435). 

Furthermore Group South has submitted to the following 
situation estimate as requested from Admirsl,. Adriatic: 

"I. Following the loss of several ships during the last 
few days, it is not advi able at present to continue 
traffic with large ships in the Albanian area up to and 
including Dubrovnik. In the future also no large vessels 
should proceed as long as enemy air and naval forces 
have our coastal waters under continuous observation, 
^ unless constant escort can be given and reconnaissance 

flown. The enemy has complete freedom of action in this 
area. An organized reporting service has obviously also 
been built up already, so that the departure of ships 
even at night is no longer any secret. The only possible 
way of keeping traffic moving is to use a sufficient 
number of small ships. This sould be possible in the 
southern Adriatic as soon as unreliable Italians and 
Albanians have been replaced by, or at least intersper- 
sed with, German personnel who are not available yet. 
Attempts have been made for weeks to speed this up, but 
it depends on the transport situation. 

2.. The area of the Dalmatian islands offers protection from 
enemy naval forces. However, the insurgent situation 
here also has led to serious losses. Traffic is only 
possible at present with small vessels, since nearly all 
ships are shelled despite 


28 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

the mopping-up operztions 30 far reported to be in 
progress. The possibility of large ships operating 
on the Dalmatian coast is dependent on the Islands being 
mopped-up and enemy batteries silenced. It is doubtful 
■whether transports can proceed -without hindrance even 
if the islands have been cleared, unless the latter are 
occupied by the Army and under constant control. Exper- 
iences shew that the insurgents withdraw, but return 
to the -islands if these are left unoccupied. Therefore 
here too the use of large ships offers little success 
at least for the present, not to mention the threat 
from the air. The same refers to see transport and 
bauxite shipments, especially since Ploce,. the main , 
• port for bauxite shipments, has meanwhile again fallen 
into the hands of the insurgents. 

3. No clear picture can be- gained here from the Deputy of 
Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping about personnel 
and materiel and the operational readiness of small. 

' vessels for transport and supply purposes, despite 
repeated endeavors to obtain this information. 

4. Permission for carrying out urgent sea transports 
from' Trieste to the west coast has been. granted at the 
request of- German Naval Command, Italy along the 
coastal route, taking the mine situation into account. 

5. . Demands by Admiral, Adriatic arising from deyelopmentss 

so far and. from the present situation will follow." 

Group 3oUth reports further: 

"a. The Army states that re-occupation by ' insurgents of 
mopped-up islands must be expected, since our own 
forces are not adequate'. f or permanent occupation. 

b. Air. Force Command, Southeast advises that the planned 
convoy escorts cannot be carried out, since the heavy 
fighter squadron for this -purpose has not arrived. 
Furthermore that, in view of the appearance of enemy 
fighter forces over the Adriatic Sea and coastal waters 
out dive-bomber and harassing bomber formations may not 
operate south, of 44 degrees without fighter escort. 
Such fighter .escort is, however, not availbble. For the 
same reason no reconnaissance can be flown at present 
by Air Commander, Croatia. ":'•'' 

c. This eliminates at present the only escort protection 
available against enemy operations and Insurgent activ- 
ity on the islands, which means that sea transport will 
come to a 



28 Oct. 19^3 . 


standstill. The effects for all branches of the 
Armed Forces are obvious . 

d. It is requested that Air Force Command, Southeast 
be supplied with adequate fighter, bomber and 
reconnaissance forces and that an effective anti- 
aircraft defense be built up on the Adriatic 
coast. " 

Army Group B has requested information From Naval Shore 
Commander, North Adriatic in connection -with the planned 
mopping-up operations on the islands of Krk, Cherso and 
Lussino on the following points: 

a. Available transports for the transfer of two 
• to three infantry battalions, one light artill- 
ery battalion, one assault-gun battery c 

b. The possibility of escort. 

c. Suitable ports of embarkation. 

d. Most suitable landing places. 

e. Enemy batteries known to be on Krk. 
(See teletype 1935). 

Air Force General Staff requests Naval Staff urgently to 
instruct German Naval Command, Italy to assign at once to the 
2nd Air Force four captured Italian vessels suitable as 
sea -res cue boats. 

(See teletype 1030). 

♦ The matter will be dealt with further by Quartermaster . 

b. Aegean Sea : 

Enemy Situation: 

Our air reconnaissance sighted at 1024 125 miles 
northwest of Alexandria 4 ships, presumably destroyers, 
on course 160 degrees and 1325 40 miles souths outness t 
of Castell Rosso a convoy consisting of 3 merchantmen 
on course 300 degrees. A report has already been made about 
the successful attack carried out on this group. Between 
1350 and 1418 an unidentified shipping target was located 
12 miles west of Crete on southerly course. 

At 2030: on 6 Oct. a submarine sank' an auxiliary sailing 1 
vessel 23 miles northeast of Andros . 

On the morning of 27 Oct. one enemy plane wa3 shot down by 
anti-aircraft guns over Kos . 

..../.:. -420- CONFIDENTIAL 

28 Oct. 19^ , . • CONFIDENTIAL 

Own Situation: 

Submarine chase on 28 Oct. northwest of Naxos was 
discontinued, as no more locations were made. A small oil 
trace was still visible. The steamer INGEBORG and one armed 
fishing vessel were transferred from Syra to Naxos . A customs 
launch from Piraeus is to join this convoy and it will then 
sail in the evening for Kalymnos, via Candie and south of 
Stampalia, in order to disembark troops. 

At midnight the steamer GERDA TOFT, with 18 combined oper- 
ations assault craft on deck, is to sail from Piraeus to 
Lavrion together with submarine chaser "2102". Naval Artil- 
lery lighter MAL "12" will also he sent to Labrion from 
Chalkis, in order to take troops and equipment for special 
operation Samos (operation "Zwischenspiel" ) . Departure 
i*s scheduled for 1600 on 29 Oct. from Panormos Bay (Mykonos ) . 

Operation "Zwischenspiel" is to start on J>Q or J>1 Oct. 

The DRACHE carried out a minelaying operation in the Gulf 
of Salonika during the night of 27 Oct. 

Naval landing craft F "370" with 200 survivors from Milos 
arrived at Piraeus. Motor tanker MT "3", so far held at Istan- 
bul, iilll sail on 29 Oct. for Mudros. 

c. Black Sea: 

Enemy Situation': 

According to radio intelligence, there was a 
submarine at 1251 off Cape Tarchentskuski and a destroyer off 
the cnetral Caucasian coast at 1500. In the evening air raids 
were carried out on Sevastopol and Eupatoria. 

: Own Situation: " 

A motor minesweeper group with three naval 
landing craft on passage from Sevastopol to Feodosiya • was 
forced by bad weather to put in to Balakaava. Naval landing 
era t F "135" ran gground off Feodosiya, while returning 
from patrol line. Mines weeping and convoy operations off the 
Crimean coast had to be interrupted owing to weather con- 
ditions. Patrol lines were not taken up during the night 
of 28 Oct. 

The moles of Kerch have been demolished. The town is under 
enemy gunfire. . 

Group South transmitted In the evening the following report 
from Admiral, Black Sea: 




28 Oct, 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

"I. Genichesk -will be evacuated on 29 Oct. 

2. The naval landing craft at Genichesk -will leave on 
29 Oct. for Kerch and should pass the northern part 
of the Strait of Kerch during the night of 29' 'Oct. 

3. The five naval artillery lighters cannot be trans- 
ferred under present weather conditions owing to 
unseaworthiness increased by damage to their hulls 
and contition of engines. These boats were already 
partially swamped in seaway 2-3 during their last 
operation. Their 8.8 cm, and 2 cm. guns will be 
put aboard naval landing craft. The hulls < will be 
blown up." 

Naval Staff passed this report on to Armed Forces High 
Command, Operations Staff, N vy, Commander in Chief , Air 
Force, Operations Staff, Naval Laiison and Army General 
Staff, Naval Liaison. 

The measurres seem to be premature, in view of the assess- 
ment of the situation at the Fuehrer Headquatters . Chief, 
Naval Staff will be asked to decide whether intervention is 
considered advisable. 

According to 'a report from Group South, defense of the 
Crimean coast .will be provided by: 

£• In the Sea of Asov the 5 naval artillery lighters 

stationed at Genichesk. Four naval landing craft ■•and 
harbor defense boats will be in patrol line nightly be- 
tween Ostroy - Birvutshi and Tchokrak. Furthermore, 
reconnaissance line off Arabatskaya is planned, depend- 
ing on the' enemy situation. -. 

2. In the Strait of Kerch nightly patrol line with the 

4 naval landing craft and- harbor defense boats remaining 
there . 

3. In the Black Sea: - ■; - 

a. 4 to 6 naval landing craft of the 3rd Landing 
Flotilla transferred to Feodosiya will nightly 
take up patrol line from Cape Chauda to Kysaul. 
It is planned to increase the number of boats.' 
Furthermore, patrol line off the south const 
of the Crimea west of Feodosiya . 

b. The 1st PT Boat Flotilla and the Crimean group 
of the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla will take 
up reconnaissance line a gins t en enemy landing 
operation only when certain information indicates 
imminent attacks, in order to carry out offensive 
operations against eneny naval forces if possible in 
conjunction with night reconnaissance planes. 


28 Oct. 1945 CONFIDENTIAL 

c. Attacks on enemy forces which are not detected 
until landing:-' 

- aa: By naval landing craft in patrol line and 
lying at Feodosiya. 

bb: By boats of the 1st PT Beat Flotilla -which will 
be kept in immediate readiness during darkness 
in Ivanbaba, unless out on operation against 
the 'enemy' landing fleet. 

G. The following are- at present available for the coast 
end southern Crimea: 8 naval landing craft at 
Feodosiya, 5 PT boats at Ivanbaba and, probably 
from 29 Oct., 3 motor minesweepers. 

©.. Furthernore barrage sections "S 71" and "S 72" 
have been laid in Feodosiya Bay as protection, 
against landings. These will be supplemented 
probably on 28 Oct. by barrage-section S "73" 
Subsequently mining is planned of Koktebel . 
Bayand Baracken Bay (west and east of Ivanbaba) 
which are suitable for landings. (See teletype 

Furthermore Group South advises Naval. Staff, for information. 
of the following instructions to Admiral, Aegean: 

"I. The steamers SANTA FE, JOH. MAERSK and SONJA pre to 

be transferred ts quickly as possible to the Black Sea 
for a special operation. . Ports of destination will. 
..follow. Date of sailing readiness to be reported. 

2. The three Bulgarian steamers intended for the Aegean 
Sea will be sent as early as possible so. tha:.t the 
withdrawal, from there of ■ the three steamers of- 
9,246 GRT will shortly be made up by the Bulgarian 
vessels and five auxiliary sailing vessels, totaling 
about 9,500 GRT." (see teletype 1425).. 

IX. Situation East -Asia : 

Nothing special to report. 



29 Oct. 19^5 CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Political Importance 
Nothing special .to. report. 



Conference on the Situation .with Chief, Naval Staff 

1 . Army Situation: 

The Fuehrer has issued the folio-wing directive to'. 
Army Groups A and South: 

"I. I have, brought up divisons- to the eastern front from 
the south and vest, in order so smash the enemy forces 
which crossed the Dnieper below Kremenchug by means of 
a combined counter attack, which will be possible on 
about 10 Nov. This attack will bring about a decisive . 
turn in the situation for the entire southern sector 
of the front. 

2. The -aim. of further fighting until 10 Nov. must therefore 
be to achieve at. all costs the necessary" conditions 

for the successful completion of this intended counter- 
attack, Any crises must be borne until then. 

3. The necessary conditions for the attack 'are: 

a. The' 1st Tank Army must hold its position- in the' .; 
projecting bend of the Dnieper river until the ; 
start of the attack and any withdraw only locally 
and f absolutely necessary. Only thus will it be 
possible to prevent the enemy extending his break- 
through on the western bank of the Dnieper too,, 
much and only this will the forces provided for the 
counter-attack suffice for a successful completion 

'of their task. 

b. Army Group A must protect the southern flank of the 
1st Tank Army in such a way that any threat to the 
.rear of this Army to the north accoss the Dnieper 
.••is avoided at all costs. The 6th Army must therefore 
;• ',„\ hold'as long as possible the positions which it plans 
•• ;tb. occupy during the night of 28 Oct. Should this, 
however, no longer be possible a retreat, step by 
/ ^step, to the line Gromovka-east of Beris lav-Dnieper- 
Nikopol .bridgehead Is permissable 


29 00t.l9 i l3 CONFIDENTIAL 

but the northern wing must definitely hold its 
position at the northern outskirts of Belenkoye* 
Communications to the Crimea via the Perekop Isth- 
mus must be kept open. The' Genichesk and Chongar 
passes are to be closed. If today's attack of 
the 40th Tank Corps effects a complete break- 
through, a temporary relief attack by this tank 
corps from the area of Nikopol is planned. 

r. As regards evacuation of the Crimea my former decision 
rema ins unchanged . " 

For copy of this directive as per l/Skl 3221/43 Gkdos . Chefs, 
see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XlVa . 

On 28 Oct. fighting became lively in the central sector of 
the eastern front. The situation is generally under control. 
In the area of Nevel the enemy seems to be attempting a 
further advance to the west. 

Reports from the Italian front speak of a specially favorable 
situation as regards our tanks and assault guns. ■ 

II. Air Commander, Atlantic Coast has asked that Commander 
in Chief, Navy request further construction of BV 222 and 
FW 200 typos of planes -Chief , Naval Staff does not intent 
to intervene in the Air Force construction program. He is, 
however, willing to intercede for further delivery to Air 
Commander, Atlantic Coast of any planes of these types which 
are still available or will become available in the interests 
of naval warfare. 

Ill* Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division 

a. The enemy situation in Northern Waters proves that 
our air reconnaissance is inadequate. We are unaware 
of actual enemy movements . (Compare War Diary 28 

Chief, Naval Staff ordered that a report to this 
effect be submitted to Armed Forces High Command, 
Operations Staff. He furthermore ordered consider- 
ation as to how the SCHARNHORST and destroyer are 
to operate should the enemy convoy traffic be re- 
sumed. In addition investigations should be made as 
to whether an increased number of submarines could 
be supplied to Commander, Subnerines, Norway. Chief, 
Naval Staff stated in this connection that the 
practical effects of scientific research on 




29 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

location have so far been unsatisfactory. 

Despite the "Naxos" and "Wanze" sets .the submarines 
are nova days intercepted by enemy planes at night 
completely by surprise. 

b. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has issued 
the following directive with regard to Denmark : 

"I. The -withdrawal of a considerable number of very sea- 
worthy landing craft from the Mediterranean to 
England, in conjunction with the political pressure' 
exercised by Moscow on the British and Americans, 
make the possibility of a landing operation again- 
st Western Europe even in winter time, appear much 
more likely than before. The western theater is in 
a constant state of defense readiness, because of 
continuous activity there, whereas our troops in 
. Denmark feel themselves to be more occupation forces 
than combat troops. 

2. Denmark, however, now becomes the foremost of the 
'. countries threatened by an enemy landing. The ■ .: 

occupation of Jutland by the enemy would'h^ve 
strategic and political consequences of the first 
magnitude. Norway would then be entirely cut off 
from supplies, communication with Sweden established 
and the- enemy Air Force' would have .supremacy in the 
Baltic and North Seas. - . 

By order of the Fuehrer, Armed Forces High Command 
will therefore issue detailed instructions in case 
of an enemy landing operation In Denmark. 

3. First of all it is, however, necessary that the 
shifting forces as ordered or planned by Commander, 
German Armed Forces, Denmark, be carried out as 
quickly as possible' (assembly of the 20th Air Force 
Infantry Division, transfer to the coast of the 
160th Division). All other measures which 'are still 
possible in order to strengthen' our defense should 
be taken at once.. : 

Furthermore, all operations staffs' should move to 
the headquarters from which they will control 
operations in case of an enemy landing. 


29 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL 

The Fuehrer expects that Denmark -will Immediately 
be put into highest action readiness, rigorously 
eliminating all peace-time conditions and comforts. 
The measures taken are to he given in the daily 
reports . " 

c. Naval Staff considers the measures taken in 

Genichesk by Admiral, Black Sen to be premature 
(See War Diary 28 Oct.) Chief, Naval Staff is of 
the same opinion. He personally telephoned to 
Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters and Chief, Army 
General Staff, advising them of his opinion and 
asked the latter to postpone the evacuation of 
Genichesk if possible, until -weather conditions 
permit withdrawal of the five unsea worthy naval 
artillery lighters. Chief, Army General Staff 
approved. A telephone inquiry, ordered at the 
same time, to Admiral, Black Sea later unfortunate- 
ly disclosed that the boats have already been 
blown up. Genichesk has not been evacuated yet. 

IV. Report by Deputy Chief, Naval Communications Division 
about the difficulties of obtaining for the Navy a large 
number of "Hohentwiel" sets from Air Force production, Since 
all fighters will now be equipped with these sets, the Navy 
will have to be satisfied at present with a smaller allotment 
than requested. 

v * Report by Chief, Naval Ordnance Division: The difficulties 
of co-ordinating requirements of engineer personnel for 
"Zaunkoenig" torpedo production and for research on location 
are further Intensified through a relaxation in the reserved 
occupation regulations for this personnel also, which seems 
unavoidable in view of the tense manpower situation of the 

VI. Report by Quartermaster General: 

a. The Fuehrer has ordered: 

The economic situation of our ally Rummania forbids 
in general any further encroachment on Rumanian 
territory by German troops, or supply and repair 
installations. Exceptions are still subject to 
my approval in each individual case. Where large 
transfers become necessary in the southern sector in 
the course of dispersal measures or withdrawals, 
these are to be directed to Transnistria , the 
Western Ukraine or Galicia. 



29 Oct. 1945 CONFIDENTIAL 

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff reports in this 
connection that it will probably be impossible 
to carry this our as far as the Navy is con- 
cerned. It will be unavoidable to make increased 
use of Constanta in view of the developments in 
the Black Sea situation. A report will be made 
to Armed Forces High Command to this effect. 

Chief, Naval Staff concurred. 

b. At least 50 days will be required for the teansfer 
of each PT boat to the Black Sea by land and the 
Danube. The bottle-neck is in the dockyard at Linz. 
Possibilities of increasing the dockyard capacity., 
at Linz are under investigation. If necessary, 
transfer of repair work on Black Sea vessels from 
Linz to Rumanian and Bulgarian dockyard's may be 
considered. The Danube estuary usually becomes 
icebound on 3 Jan., but this year will probably 
freeze up already at the end of December. 

c * Q ua r terma s ter Genera 1 reported on the situation 
regarding mine -exploding vessels. 

VII. Report by Chief, Naval Intelligence Division: 

A.. The Moscow conference seems to be progressing . 
smoothly according to Information received. It is 
stated that the Russians asked for a corridor 
to the Aegean Sea, amongst other demands. 

b. The statement made by the Swedish Prime' Minister 
at closed session of the Swedish Parliament dealt 

aa . Negotiations by the Trade Unions in Stockholm 
for a Rus so -Finnish arms t Ice. 

bb. Cessation of convoy traffic. 

cc. Cutting down of ore shipments to Germany. 

dd. Maintenance of Sweden's neutral policy, 

From a secret report of a Swedish diplomat from 
Moscow it is learned that: 

aa . Russian cone liation towards Germany is out 
of question. 


29 Oct. 1943 


bb. The Russian food situation is tolerable. 

cc. The Russian war economy is organized and run 
along model lines. 

Special Items 

I. The tense personnel situation and the inadequate assign- 
ments of personnel to the Navy by Armed Forces High Command 
have made it necessary more than before to recruit for the 
Navy volunteers from the Germanic countries, the Germanic 
races in the West and Croatia in order to cover requirements. 
This recruiting has so far been left to the Reichsfuehrer SS. 

A Fuehrer decree now gives the Navy in future the same priority 
rights as the Waff en SS in recruiting volunteers in these 
countries „ 

High Command, Navy has therefore cone to an agreement with 
the Recihsfuehrer SS with regard to the recruiting of such 
volunteers, this agreement also containing the basic reg- 
ulations on their treatment while serving in the German 

II. The Burea of Naval Armament, War Economy Branch states 
in its special war economy report (No. 219/43 of 26 Oct.) 
regarding the evacuation in the east, amongst other things: 

"Evacuation prepared in the southern sector of the eastern 

front could in the main not be carried out as planned, 

owing to the unexpectedly rapid development in the situation. 

Times allowed for the preparation and evacuation were constant- 
ly changed and curtailed, so that the forces used for evac- 
uation and salvage were Inadequate or the assembled goods 
could not be evacuated owing to lack of loading space. 

In particular large quantities of food had to be destroyer 
or left behind, for Instance: 

grain - about 1.3 million tons 

oil seeds about 0.3 - 0.4 million tons. 

From livestock amounting to two million head of cattle in 
the area of War Economy Inspectorate, South only 0.3 million 
could be moved back in herds. 



29 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

On the other hand, removel of agricultural machinery and 
implements of the MTS (Machine Tractor Stetion) -was success- 
ful. More than ^00 trains or about 10,000 car loads were 
removed, -which will be a help in considerable intensifying 
agriculture in the Western. Ukraine. In the industrial sector 
about 5,000 car loads of economic goods have been evacuated, 
mostly dismantled machinery and equipment from factories pro- 
vided for the "Ivan" program. Valuable motors and transform- 
ers that vere ready for shipment had to be demolished owing 
to lack of loading space. 

Demolition of industrial plants hss been almost complete and :. 
In most cases so extensive that any reconstruction will be 
more difficult than the ■building up of new industry. The 
enemy will therefore be unable to start up industry in the 
evacuated areas for quite some time , For instance the coal : 
mines in operation in the Donetz area, which produced already 
480,000 tons in August, have been rendered useless by dis- 
mantling Important machinery and through demolition. Moreover 
it is to be expected that the mines will soon be flooded 
owing to the lack of electric power. The plants producing and 
treating iron were also demolished effectively, apart from 
those in Taganrog. Evacuation of manpower could not be carried 
out to the extent planned; at the most 400,000 persons crossed 
the Dnieper, including one third fit for work. 

Furthermore, partisan activity increased considerably while 
evacuation was under way. ... 

Evacuation of economic goods In the area of War Economy 
Inspectorate, Center was also hampered by a strong partisan 
movement which is already described as "the beginning of a 
national rising." 

III. Armed Forces High Command, Special Staff for Mercantile 
and Economic Warfare has submitted copy of a memorandum 
which vice Admiral Abe has handed the Recihsmarscha 11 re- 
garding the Japanese request that we ceconsider the import- 
ance of an air communication between Europe and Asia in the 
interests of joint warfare and that every' attempt be made 
to establish such a service. In this memorandum Vice Admiral 
Abe pointed out, amongst other things, that Japan is con- 
tributing "a part" of her operational submarines for traffic 
and transport between Asia and Europe. 

Naval Staff is of the opinion that very much more cnuld be 
done in this respect. 


29 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL 

Situation 29 Oct . 
I . War in Foregin Waters ' 
I.. Enemy Situation: 

According to intelligence report of 16 Oct. from 
Lisbon, the United States and Great Britain are said to have 
requested that the Cape Verde Islands be occupied by Brazilian 
troops. The Portuguese Government has agreed. The United States 
plan to construct naval and air bases on the Cape Verde 
Islands for the protection of shipping between Brazil and 
the Congo river. 

2. Own Situation: 

Np thing special to report. 

II. Situation West Area 

1. Enemy Situation: 

Over the Bay of Biscay during the day and the- • 
night of 29 Oct. reconnaissance of remarkably uniform 
intensity by 62 planes was observed. The large northbound 
convoy which is estimated to be fbout 4 00 miles west of 
Cape Finnisterre was not located again by our air recon- 
naissance today. 

Unidentified targets were located in the Channel between 
0905 and 0945 south of Dover, from 0960 (?) to 1006 west 
of Dunkirk and from 1905 until past midnight between Dunkirk 
and Boulogne. 

On 28 Oct. radar stations on the coast of Brittany located 
between 2000 and 2200 many unidentified targets in the 
area where the 4th Torpedo- Boat Flotilla had an engagement 
with the enemy on. 25 Oct. and north thereof up to the lat- 
itude of Alderney. At the same time gunfire at sea was seen 
and heard. It is quite possible that enemy forces were shell- 
ing each other, since none of our naval forces were there. 
The weather observatory considers weather phenomena to be 

2. Own Situation: 


Atlantic Coast: 

Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West pirns to introduee 



29 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIA L 

some new outer routes in the Bay of Bis cry, as it must 
be assumed that present routes have become known through 
the CAGNI. ■ 

Two ground mines were swept off Brest and one off St. Nazaire. 
Between 1127 and II58 eleven Typhoons made a dive attack on 
the airfield ot Brest-North, where slight damage was sustained. 

Channel Coast: 

PT boat S "100" temporarily ran aground at Cape d'Antifer 
while en route from Cherbourg to Boulogne. PT boat S "141" 
arrived at Le Havre at 1015 and PT boat S "100" at 1555- 
At 11^5 fishery patrol boat FBO "23" struck a mine and sank 
two miles north of Gravelines The crew of five is missing. 
Twenty-six mines were swept in the area of Dunkirk and two 
in the area of Lezardrieux, 

Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West hopes to have the mine 
situation off Dunkirk in hand shortly. 

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters 

North Sea : 

Sweeping of routes and minesweeping operations were 
carried out by strong forces during the day but had to be 
partially discontinued during the night of 29 Oct. owing 
to fog. Four mines were swept. 

Naval Command, North endorses the views of Commanding 
Admiral, Defenses, ~North states on 28 Oct. regarding re- 
connaissance of the Heligoland Bight. Naval Command, North 
is furthermore of the opinion that continuous air patrol of 
the "West Wall" barrages should be possible without any 
extra forces if the area is flown over regularly once by 
daytime and once by night. Possibilities of carrying out 
night reconnaissance, which is especially important during 
the long winter nights, are at present under investigation. 
Naval Command, North urges similar investigations for the 
area of the 5th Air Force. (See teletype 1533). 


29 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL 

Norway, Northern Waters : 

1. Enemy Situation: 

Over the North Sea 19 planes were detected on operation 
in the morning and- 7 later on. The center of reconnaissance 
activity was the sea area between Northern Scotland and the 
Faroes. Our air reconnaissance sighted: at-1150 in;. AW- 2553 
(25 miles east of Svatoi Nos ) 4 destroyers proceeding in 
line ahead on course 120 degrees; at 1240 2 destroyers in 
AW: -2237 on course 220 degrees; at 1515 in AC 8981 (20 miles 
ea : st of Teriberski) a unit of warships; consisting" of 1 
large, 5 medium-sized and 6 small vessels /.on" course 330 
degrees. The types of these ships were not ascertained as 
darkness was setting In. Whether this Is the same unit as 
the. one on 28 Oct. cannot be said until further evaluation 
has been made of photographic reconnaissance. On 28 Oct. 
one enemy plane was reported over the Petsamo area and dur- 
ing the night another one between Sogne and Hardanger Fjords. 

2. Own Situation: 

In the area of Naval Command, Norway 36 ships were 
escorted north and 23 south. Altogether -25 ships were delayed 
owing to shortage of escorts. 

Group "Katharine" entered the skerries at 0349 on its home- 
ward passage. 'Admiral, Northern Waters plans to repeat this 
opera .tionas soon as: 

a. Evaluation of our air reconnaissance gives us 
an insight into the enemy situation, 

b. the uncertain weather again becomes favorable. 

On 12 Oct. the Naval "Command, Norway expressed to the 
Quartermaster Division its belief that the best solution for 
strengthening Alta would be to provide some PT boats (even 
of older type) while the TIRPITZ is out of action readiness. 
The Task Force supports this -recommendation and proposes that 
a PT Boat Training Flotilla be transferred to Alta. It is 
pointed out that Alta Fjord offers an ice-free exercise 
area, long nights and protected: firing ranges. 

Quartermaster Division fulls explained to Operations 
Division the reasons for rejecting this plan. The task and 
size of the PT Boat Flotilla require a number of buildings 
on shore, besides numerous units afloat. Smooth working 
of the training program does not allow the personnel aboard 
to be separated from those in training ashore. Naval Staff 
has therefore sent the following decision to Naval Command, 
Norway, Commanding Admiral, Task Force and also to Group 
North/Fleet for information: 


29 Oct.. .1^3 CONFIDENTIAL '■ 

"Transfer of PT boats- to Alta Fjord while the TIRPITZ'ls out 
of action readiness is . impossible. Boats from, operational- 
flotillas cannot be made a vo liable for this purpose. Trans- 
fer of PT Boat Training Flotilla is impossible. Withdrawal 
to Alta Fjord of PT boats from the area- of -.Admiral, .West 
Norwegian Coast Is left to your discretion. " 

IV. Skage rrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea 

1. Enemy Situatio n: 

The Foreign Office submits the following reports 
received from the Consul General at Gothenburg on 28 Oct. : • 

"I. A British PT boat arrived this morning at Lysekil. 
Great' danger of Norwegian ships putting out. 

2. According to a reliable report, a British PT boat 

arrived at Lysekil at 0900 on 28 Oct. She commenced at 
once with the unloading of about 50 drums of about 50 
kg. each, contents unknown. From 1500 loading started 
of a large quantity of small, heavy and seemingly 
valuable iron parts. At 2000 the boat was still at 
Lysekil, loading having ceased. During- this months six 
small cranes that are now being used for the first time 
were erected in the harbor of Lysekil for no obvious 
reason. At present there are about 100 police and 
stevedores at Lysekil. Great danger of Norwegian ships 
also putting out." 

Both reports were immediately passed on by teletype to Group 
North/Fleet, Naval .Command, Norway and Commanding Admiral, 
Defenses, Baltic. , 

2. O wn Situation; . 

Patrol in the Skagerrak for blockade -runners is 
being carried out during the night by six boats in patrol 
line from Skagen to Valderoebod via Halloey and three 
minesweepers in AO 4415; during the day by patrol line 
of six boats from AO 4428 to 4152 and three minesweepers 
In patrol' line from AO 3625 to 3661. 

Minesweeping operations in the Baltic Sea entrances were 
carried out by 13 boats and in the Baltic Sea by 31 boats. 

Nothing special to report from the areas of Commander, 
Minesweepers, Baltic and Admiral, Batlic States. 


29 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

According to a report from the Mining end Barrage Command, 
Frederikshavn of 7 Oct. about 45 German EMC mines with 
antenna firing and 0,5 m. mooring rope have been found cut in 
the Skagerrak. Operations Division asked for the numbers, 
which showed that most of the mines belong to barrages 
"16 c" and "16 d" off the Skagerrsk end some to barrages 
"6 a" and "25". As these mines were not detonated by the 
enemy, it can be assumed that they were cut during a mine 
reconnaissance operation at night. Systematic minesweeping 
operations are not indicated. There may be some connection 
with a boockade -break from Sweden. Extensive mine reconn- 
aissance in preparation for a landing is, however, also 
conceivable, this being indicated by two mines from barrage 
"6 a" (off List.) and one mine from barrage "23" (off Bergen). 

V. Merchant Shipping 

Naval Staff has despatched the following directive 
to German Naval Command, Italy and Group West:' 

"Armed Firces High Command has approved the request of 
the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping to return 
to the French Government the large French Merchantmen . 
which are unsiited for our purposes. The Reich Commissioner 
will arrange formalities with the French Government and will 
see to it that these ships are always at our disposal in 
case we need them. German Naval Command, Italy and Group West 
should take measures to prevent the ships deserting to the 
enemy while being transferred end while laid up". 

VI, Submarine Warfare 

The operation by Group "Schill" against the northbound 
convoy in BE has so far been without result. One of the 
submarines only was able to obtain hydrophone bearings 
on three to four steamers end one destroyer. Long-range 
reconneissance of Air Commander, Atlantic Coast will try 
to find out on 30 Oct. at dawn whether the enemy has 
made any deviations. Group "Seigfried" reported nothing 
but a few planes sighted. 

Submarine U "218" has carried out the mine laying operation 
off Trinidad. 



29 Oct. 1945 CONFI DENTIAL 
VII. Aerial Warfare 

British Isles and Vicinity: 

• •mm~ 1 1 ■■ — ■ ■ — ■■■ I L P 1 — II II I II I Ml' ' ■ ■ ■■ '* " " 

The 3rd Air Force had 19 planes out on operation over 
the vest area and 21 over the Mediterranean. 

Air Commander, Atlantic Coast reported at 1110 a large oil 
patch at position 420 miles -west of Cape Ortega 1, Otherwise 
nothing special to report. 

Mediterranean Theater : 

The 2nd Air Force had 18 fighter-bombers, 35 fighters 
and 11 reconnaissance planes out on operation and Air Force 
Command, Southeast 7.1 bombers,- 10 fighters, 17 reconnaissance 
planes and 18 transport planes, 

In the Italian area only reconnaissance missions were carried 
out. A Unit consisting of 1 light curiser and 3 destroyers 
were attacked' by eleven of our bombers at 1315 South-southeast 
of Castell Rosso. No exact observation of the result i-s 
reported. At noon the enemy attacked Genoa with 60 - 80 
Fortresses and Stirlings and, among other things, caused 
heavy damage at the tank factory on Ansaldo harbor. One 
Fortress was shot down by anti-aircraft guns-. One out of 
twelve Spitfires which raided the airfield of Guidonia was 
shot down by our fighters. No damage'was sustained during 
the raid on the airfield of Grosseto* . Over the Army front 
two planes were shot' down by Army anti-aircraft guns. About 

30 fighters made a -sortie as far as Rome. In the Aegean Sea: 
nine, planes attacked the island ofAmorgos. One of our 
patrol vessels was sunk. Naval anti-aircraft guns and- fighters 
each shot down one enemy plane. Twelve • planes attactked the 
airfield of Candia . During the night' of 30 Oct. four reconn- 
aissance planes were located over the Aegean Sea . 

"' Eastern Front: ; 

Photographic reconnaissance of the Black Sea establ- 
ished in Tuapse', Ge lend zhik and Anapa 64 landing craft and 
altogether 20 motor minesweepers and 19 PT boats. Minor enemy 
forces'" attacked Sevastopol and Yalta during the night of 30 
Oct.. ;; • • ... 

The 5th Air Force; re onna is sane e activity. For evaluations 
see Enemy Situation Northern Waters. 


29 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENT IAL 

VI I I . Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea 

1 . Enemy Situation Medit er ranean; 

A convoy of 52 merchantmen -with 1 destroyer and 2. 
corvettes passed- through the Straits of Gibraltar westbound 
at 1500 on 28 Oct.; 8 freighters and 1 escort vessel of this 
convoy entered Gibraltar. The convoy was joined;.by 2 freighters 
2 tankers and 4 escort vessels from this port, At 1800 on 28 
Oct. 3 freighters in ballast and 1 French gunboat- left Gib- 
raltar for the Mediterranean. During the night of 28 Oct. 1 
DIDO class cruiser and 4 auxiliary curisers put in to 
Gib tal tar -and I mine laying cruiser .' ', out. 

Tho westbound convoy sighted by Cape Tres -Forces' at 1530 
on 28 Oct. passed Ceuta on 0100 on 29 Oct. It consisted 
of 22 ships, including several very large transports. 

According to an intelligence report, altogether 40,000 men 
have passed through Gibraltar for Italy since 21 Oct. 
Alboran reported at 1800 on 28 Oct., at a distance of 35 
miles north of the coast 1 battleship, 2 cruisers and other 
vessels heading for the Atlantic. 

No new observations are reported from the Italian sea area. 

2 . O wn Situation Mediterranean: 

The mine laying operation just starting off the 
Italian east coast had to be postponed owing to weather 
conditison. Five patrol vessels have been commissioned. at 
Marseilles. Three of these boats developed engine trouble 
while on transfer to Toulon. Three boats of the 7th PT Boat 
Flotilla were sent out from Nettunia on a torpedo operation 
in the Bay of Naples. 

For report of German Naval Command, Italy on the loss of 
the minelayer JUMINDA on 22 Oct. west of San Stefano see 
teletype 0125. The body of Lt. Cdr. Brill was recovered 
on 24 Oct. and buried at Snn Stefano on 28 Oct. 

Group West reports that the assumption regarding the loss 
of the PADUA In our own barrage south of Port de Bouc is up- 
held, although the Captain of the steamer and members of the 
creq are trying to shift the position of sinking to route 
"Lowe". The Captain of this stealer had strict orders not 
to proceed at night". The qccident was solely caused by negli- 
gence. The route has again been opened to traffic (see teletype 

The hospital ship AQUILEJA Arrived at Marseilles at 0200. 

Submarine U "431" must be regarded as lost. This submarine 
started on return passage to Toulon on 19 Oct. after her 
great succes in CH 7496. She was spotted by an enemy plane 
on 21 Oct. and has not reported although- called on twice 

to do so - 437 CONFIDENTIAL 



29 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL _ 

Own submarine situation in the Mediterranean: 

Total number 12 of which 

at Toulon 4 

at Pola : 3 out of war 

in the Western Mediterranean: 1 

on return passage: 2nd . 

on passage to the Aegean Sea: 3rd 

returned to Toulon, owing to damage: 4th 

at Pola, ready for mine laying operation f 

off Brindisi:5th 

The next submarine at Toulon will not be ready to sail 
before 13 Nov. • 

The submarines at Pola have no "Zaunkoenig" torpedoes and 
are therefoer unsuitable for operation in the Aegean Sea. 

Owing to this situation only one submarine is available for 
the Aegean Sea, since at least one must be left in the 
Western Mediterranean where prospects of suscess are good. A 
break-through the Sicilian Channel by further boats has 

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy has been 
advised accordingly. 

German Naval. Command, Italy reports that following the' 
new disposition of anti-aircraft guns by Army Group B, 
only 18 heavy anti-aricraft batteries are left on tte 
Ligurian coast from the border down to Piombino. This is 
inadequate for protection of the ports.. This weakness is 
also having its effect on the defense against sea targets. 
This is all the more serious inasmuch as one division of 
reserves has been withdrawn from the area of Army Group B. 

3- Area Naval Group South: 

a . Adriatic Sea: 

The steamer MAMELLI arrived at Pola on 28 Oct. with 
16 dead and 40 wounded aboard. On 29 Oct. the steamers 
GIGLIOLA, BRUNNER and FITENGOOT left Sibenik for Zarn . Naval 
Shore Commander, South Adriatic has transferred to Tirana. 

b. Aegean Sea : 

En emy Situation: 

During the nl S ht of 28 Oct. the airfield of Mar- 
itza on Rhodes was raided. At 0940 on 29 Oct. our air reconn- 
aissance sighted 90 miles south of Caste 11 Rosso 1 cruiser 
and 3 destroyers on northerly course and at 1245 4 destroy- 
ers 38 miles southwest of Castell Rosso. 


29 Oct. 1943. C ONFIDENTIAL 

at O83O eight torpedo bombers attacked a submarine chaser 
group out on operation south of Amorgos with bombs, torpedoes 
and ma.chine-guns. At the same time torpedoes fired by the 
submarine had to be avoided. Two of the attacking planes 
were shot down. The submrrine was detected again by our air 
reconnaissance at 1105 ten miles south of Amorgos. All 
Available submarine -chasers have been ordered out. 

An intelligence report from the beginning of Oct. states that 
small sailing vessels flying the Turkish flag, but with Brit- 
ish crews, are being used for combatting submarines between 
Rhodes and Castel RRosso. 

Own Situation ; 

The steamer INGEBORG was torpedoed at OO56 west of 
Stampalia and sunk. The customs cutter NIOI was torpedoed 
at 0812 during rescue operations. Armed Fishing vessel KFK 
"3" arrived at Stampalia with III survivors from the INGEBORG 
abroad. Further survivors are still adrift on floats at the 
scene of the disaster. 

Nice infantry landing craft, on passage from Salonika to 
Piraeus, were forced by bad weather to seek shelter off 

c . Black Sea : 

Enemy Situation: 

Our air reconnaissance sighted at 0640 90 miles 
wests oiithwest of Sucftum 1 destroyer, 2 guardboats and 1 
motor on course 300 degrees. Destroyer "C" was probably 
in the area of Sochi in the evening, according to radio 

■ Own Situation: 

NO PT boat operations were carried out during 
the night of 28 Oct. owing to weather conditions. Patrol 
lines were not taken up for the same reason. 

The five naval artillery lighters lying at Genishesk have 
been blown. up. The motor minesweeper group with three naval 
landing craft has been transferred from Balaklava to Feod- 
osiya for a minelaying operation. 

Convoy Sevastopol - Constanta has been postponed for 24 
hours because of weather conditions. Naval landing craft 
MFP ,; 126" ran aground near Cape Khersonnes while evacu- 
ating the field railway. Attempts to tow her off have so 
far been unsuccessful. 

Group South transmits a report from Admiral, Black Sea that 
the 17th Army Command has withdrawn the order for a short- 
term evacuation of personnel from the Crimea (code; word 
"Michael 2"). The order for the evacuation of materiel ( 


50 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIA L 

(Code word"Michfiel" ) remains In force. 

IX . Situation in East Asia : 

Nothing special to report. 

Items of Political Importance 

According to Allied agency reports it seems as if the 
Moscow talks have already led to an agreement. Ratification by 
the Governments concerned -will not take long. In a statement to 
the press Rossevelt said that the aims of the conference "were 
lasting peace and the end of world aggression. It is generally 
regarded as significant that Russia has become a partner in a 
the large-scale political plans for a new order in Europe at 
least in principle. If this is actually the case, a great weight 
has been taken off the mind of the Western Powers and a polit- 
ical success has been gained, estimation of which depends on 
the extent of the concessions, probably in military. matters, 
made to the Russians by the Americans and British. Our hopes 
that political tension between our enemies might improve 
our situation in a not too distant future may be frustrated 
if present indications about the results of the conference 
should prove correct. . 

Noteworthy is the observation that British propaganda is be- 
ginning to pay increased attention to the development of 
the situation inside Germany. The description of conditions 
in Germany given by exchanged prisoners of war plays an im- 
portant part in this. 

According to a report from a neutral (Swedish) source in 
Finland, the Finnish Congress of Trade Unions is said to 
have demanded in a declaration addressed to the Finnish 
people that the Government do its utmost to gee out of the 
war as soon as possible. .It is high time, it stated, that 
thing be done in this direction. However, the country must be 
put in a position to maintain good relations with all her 
neightors . 

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff 
I.. , . Army Situation : 

The enemy has put up an extensive smoke screen in the 
Strait of Kerch. It must be assumed that preparations for land- 
ing are completed. 

Our forces in the Nogai Steppe are at present retreating to 
a line ten kilometers west of Genichesk - Berislay. An offen- 
sive operation by us is underway northwest of Zaporozhe in 
order to shorten the front. 


30 Oct. 19^5 


in the sector of the 9th Army fighting continued with vary- 
ing success. Attacks carried out with a further intensificat- 
ion of gunfire and repeated fourteen times during the day 
were repulsed in the area west of Smolensk. 

A new enemy attack is expected in the area of Nevel. 

In Italy the "Barbara" line is in general occupied by our 
forces . 

The situation on the Dalmatian coast is still extreme ly 
unsatisfactory. : 

II. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff deems it necessary that 
Group South and Admiral 1 , Black Sea be given specific 
instructions by Naval Staff regarding the Crimea. 

Chief, Naval Staff concurred. The teletype regarding this 
makes reference to the instructions given by Naval Staff 
on 28 Oct. and then continues as follows: 

"Order for defense of the Crimea is confirmed. 
Further air forces are being brought up to the 
southern sector of the eastern front. The order to 
Army Group A provides that critical situations must 
be borne until the arrival of reinforcements, now on 
their way, takes effect. Commanders must see to it 
that uneasiness felt by the troops, which must be 
assumed owing to the premature order for evacuation, 
is removed and that the old fighting spirit is rest- 
ored wherever it has been affected. Orders issued by 
the Commanding General, Armed Forces for the evacuat- 
ion of economic goods from the Crimea are not concern- 
ed by this . " 

III. The German Ambassador at Ankara has, on instructions, 
attempted to obtain Turkish permission for eight to ten 
naval landing craft, flying the merchant flag and carrying 
civilian crews, to proceed from the Black Sea to the Aegean 
Sea for the purpose of carrying supplies to the islands. 

This request was finally rej.ected on 27 Oct. The Turkish 
Foreign Minister took the opportunity to point out that 
the previous pasoage caused strong protests from London and 
Moscow and that these countries on their part had requested 
permission for similar vessels to pass through. He therefore 
took the German radio announcement that naval landing craft 
are to be regarded as warships as the basis for a state- 
ment to these two Powers that in future the passage of such 


30 Oct.. 19^3. CONFIDENTIAL 

will no longer be allowed. This decision is not so un- * 
favorable for us, he stated, inasmuch as he has agina 
rejected the passage of enemy ships of types -which are- 
much more troublesome than naval landing craft. In view 
of Turkey's, extremely difficult situation as regards the 
Straits she can take no risks or make any exceptions 
to either side. (See also War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII ). 

IV, Chief, Naval Ordnance Div is ion reported about the 
effects of the elimanation of the Fuehrer's full protection 
against conscription from the electrical Industry. Commander 
in Chief, 'Navy cannot compy with the request- made by these 
circles for personal intervention with the Fuehrer, sine 
Minister Speer has already andertaken an unsuccessful attempt 
in this direction. Should new aspects of the situation 
arise, he would be willing to approach the Fuehrer once 
more, together with Minister Speer, in view of the problem 
of developing electric submarines. Commander in Chief, Navy 
furthermore orderrd an investigation and report on the effects 
of the. 8$ withdrawal from naval factories. 

V. Quartermaster General reports that the Navy has been 
requested by Chief, Air Force Geeeral Staff, to assist air. ■ 
Commander, Atlantic Coast with manpower in the construction 
of airfields in Western France. Quartermaster Division draws 
attention to the small controbution that the Navy could at 
best make to the ^gignatic airfield construction project 

of the Air Force. Moreover considerable . hesitation is 
felt on principle to the fulfillment of this wish, as it 
would create a precedent 'the consequences of • which cpnnot 
be foreseen. The utmost that Quartermaster Division could 
recommend is that the request for further allocation of 
manpower by Air Force General Staff ve endorsed with the 
Ministry, drawing attention to the Navy's interests in 
air operations off the Atlantic Coast. 

Chief, Naval Staff concurred with the opinion of Quarter- 
master Division. ,.:'- 

In a Highly Restricted Circle 

VI. In view of the sinking of the steamer INGEBORG the 
Fuehrer has .urged that more submarines be despateced to the 
Aegean Sea. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy 
has meanwhile been informed of the submarine situation in 
the Mediterranean (see War Diary 29 Oct.) 

Chief, Naval Staff ordered that arrangements be made for the 
despatch of a further submarine. 


30 Oct. 1943 CONFI DENTIAL 

Special Item s , ..' 

I. The Fuehrer was Indignant about the report that the 
five naval .artillery lighters at Genichesk were blown up, 
according 'to' information received from Armed Forces High 
Command, Operations Staff, Navy. 

The Army has been ordered to make investigations regard- 
omg the premature order, now canceled, for evacuation of 
the Crimea and regarding the evacuation of Genichesk. The 
Commander responsible has been called to the Fuehrer Head- 
quarters. in order to vindicate himself. 

Admiral, Black Sea was requested at 2045 by telephone to 
submit a full report on the events and circumstances lead- 
ing to the blowing-up of the boats. 

II. In departmental discussions at the Naval (Ship) Constr 
uction Division on 18 Oct. 194;? the question was raised by 
Naval (Ship) Construction Division, regarding submarine type 
XX B, whether Naval Staff cuuld accept a reduction of the 
submarine's radius of action from 20,000 to 12,000 miles 

In favor of a gain in cruising speed bj .two .knots (from 10 
to 12 knots). Operations Division then advised Naval (Ship) 
Construction Division that a cruising speed above ten knots 
would be very welcome but that reduction of the action radius 
is impossible. A radius of 12,000 miles is actually equal to 
the shortest route between Bordeaux and Singapore, but in- 
cludes no reserve and permits neither a deviation from the 
shortest route, which must be possible to a great extent, 
nor a. long patrol off one of the two ports of destination, 
which must also be reckoned with. The possibility that the 
Atlantic ports as well as Singapore might be closed to 
the submarine and that she may have to. proceed to a Nor- 
wegian port through the North Atlanic or to some other 
Japanese base through the Sunda Strait must not be lost 
sight of when considering the action radius. A radius of 
20,000 miles is therefore indispensable. 

III. Brief Report on the Enemj Situation No. 22/43 of 
Naval Intelligence Division deals, amongst other' things , 
with the rights, referred. to as Facilities", accorded by 
Portugal to our enemy: 

1. Great Britain receives the right to use the airfield on 
the island of Terceira which has been occupied by British 

2. For use of the port of Horta of Fayal the restrictions 
of the Hague Covenant of 190? have been waived for 
Great. Britain and her Allies, i. e. enemy warships and 
merchantmen may use the port of Horta as in peacetime. 


30 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

Supplies for enemy forces on the Azores will be 
carried exclusively by enemy ships. 

Portugal retains full sovereign rights over the Azores 
except for tee airfield of Terceira . 

The report furthermore deals -with Italian submarine losses, 
said to amount to 84 boats, and with the laying down of 
two of the three projected 45,000 ton U. S. aircraft carriers 
■which are to be completed in little more than a year. 

Copy as per l/Skl 33184/43 gen. in War Diary, Part D "Data 
on the Enemy Situation" t 

Naval Intelligence Division also submits a statement, com- 
piled from captured orders, of individual evaluations on the 
operations by naval forces and the landing fleet during the 
landing at Algiers on 8 Nov. 1942. As the documents captured 
are incomplete a survey of the -whole plan is impossible. 

Copy as per l/Skl 33136/43 gen. in W^r Diary, Part D,. "Eval- 
uation of Intelligence on Foreign Navies" . 

IV. A summary of ■ enemy intelligence gained by radio dec- 
iphering and radio intelligence from 18 to 24 Oct, is 
contained in Radio Monitoring Report No. 43/43. 

See especially pages 4 and 5 regarding the convoy battle 

of ONS 20, -with diagram, and page 8 regarding the caution 

shown by the enemy Air Force over the inner Bay of Biscay 

owing to the danger from our own fighters. 

Situation 30 Oct, 

I. War in Fore-gin Waters 

1. Enemy Situation: 
Nothing special to report. 

2. Own Situation: 

The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports that there are 
no objections to the announcement within the Navy of the 
loss of Ship 


30 Oct. 1943 C QfliFIDENT i AL 

"28". It was impossible to avoid the loss becoming known to 
the Japanese public and the German community through the 
landing of survivors at different points.*, their accommod- 
ation in hotels end transfer to the "Hakoke" Nav^l Camp. 
It must therefore be assumed that the enemy will soon receive 
information through neutrals and Russians. The survivors are 
moreover certain that they saw the submarine take prisoners 

Furthermore, the Naval Attache in Tokyo gave the names of 
survivors of Ship "28" - 5 officer, 2 senior noncommissioned 
officer, 45 noncommissioned officer and 59 seaman, altogeth- 
er 111 men. One officer, 4 noncommissioned off